SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 175952
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO
MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
COMPANY
OF
SEMIRARA
COAL CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
In
this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
dated
Following
are the antecedents culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:
On
x x x
3.
Sometime in 2000, plaintiff informed the SSS in writing of its premiums and
loan amortization delinquencies covering the period from January 2000 to May
2000 amounting to P7.3 Million. AG&P proposed to pay its said
arrears by end of 2000, but requested for the condonation of all penalties;
4.
In turn, the defendant suggested two (2) options to
AG&P, either to pay by installment or through “dacion en pago”;
5.
AG&P chose to settle its obligation with the
SSS under the second option, that is through dacion en pago
of its 5,999 sq. m. property situated in P80.0 Million. SSS proposes to carve-out from the said
property an area sufficient to cover plaintiffs’ delinquencies. AG&P,
however, is not amenable to subdivide its
6.
AG&P then made another proposal to SSS. This
time, offering as payment a portion of its 58,153 square meter-lot, situated in
F.S. Sebastian, Sto. Niño, San Pascual, Batangas. In addition, SSS informed AG&P of its
decision to include other companies within the umbrella of DMCI group with
arrearages with the SSS. In the process
of elimination of the companies belonging to the DMCI group with possible
outstanding obligation with the SSS, it was only SEMIRARA which was left with
outstanding delinquencies with the SSS. Thus, SEMIRARA’s inclusion in the
proposed settlement through dacion en pago;
7.
AG&P was, thereafter, directed by the defendant
to submit certain documents, such as Transfer Certificate of Title, Tax
Declaration covering the subject lot, and the proposed subdivision plan, which
requirements AG&P immediately complied;
8.
On P29,261,902.45. Approval of AG&P’s proposal was
communicated to it by Ms. Aurora E.L. Ortega, Vice-President, NCR-Group of the
SSS in a letter dated
9.
As a result of the approval of the dacion en pago,
posting of contributions and loan amortization to individual member accounts,
both for AG&P and SEMIRARA employees, was effected immediately thereafter.
Thus, the benefits of the member-employees of both companies were restored;
10.
From the time of the approval of AG&P’s proposal
up to the present, AG&P is (sic) religiously remitting the premium
contributions and loan amortization of its member-employees to the defendant;
11.
To effect the property transfer, a Deed of
Assignment has to be executed between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Because
of SSS failure to come up with the required Deed of Assignment to effect said
transfer, AG&P prepared the draft and submitted it to the Office of the
Vice-President – NCR thru SSS Baclaran Branch in July 2001. Unfortunately, the defendant failed to take
any action on said Deed of Assignment causing AG&P to re-submit it to the
same office of the Vice-President – NCR in December 2001. From its original
submission of the Deed of Assignment in July 2001 to its re-submission in December
2001, and SSS returning of the revised draft in February 28, 2003 AG&P was
consistent in its regular follow ups with SSS as to the status of its submitted
Deed of Assignment;
12.
On February 28, 2003, or more than a year after the
approval of AG&P’s proposal, defendant sent the revised copy of the Deed of
Assignment to AG&P. However, the amount of the plaintiffs’ obligation
appearing in the approved Deed of Assignment has ballooned from P29,261,902.45 to P40,846,610.64
allegedly because of the additional interests and penalty charges assessed on
plaintiffs’ outstanding obligation from April 2001, the date of approval of the
proposal, up to January 2003;
13.
AG&P demanded for the waiver and deletion of
the additional interests on the ground that delay in the approval of the deed
and the subsequent delay in conveyance of the property in defendant’s name was
solely attributable to the defendant; hence, to charge plaintiffs with
additional interests and penalties amounting to more than P10,000,000.00,
would be unreasonable….;
14.
AG&P and SEMIRARA maintain their willingness to
settle their alleged obligation of P29,261,902.45 to SSS. Defendant,
however, refused to accept the payment through dacion en
pago, unless plaintiffs also pay the additional
interests and penalties being charged;
x x x
Instead of filing an answer, SSS moved for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. In an order dated
Clearly, the motion is triggered on
the issue of the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter and the nature of
the instant complaint. The length and breadth of the complaint as perused,
boils down to the questions of premium and loan amortization delinquencies of
the plaintiff, the option taken for the payment of the same in favor of the
defendant and the disagreement between the parties as to the amount of the
unpaid contributions and salary loan repayments. In other words, said questions
are directly related to the collection of contributions due the defendant.
Republic Act No. 1161 as amended by R.A. No. 8282, specifically provides that
any dispute arising under the said Act shall be cognizable by the Commission
and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission.
Hence, a procedural process mandated by a special law.
Observingly, the running dispute
between plaintiffs and defendant originated from the disagreement as to the
amount of unpaid contributions and the amount of the penalties imposed
appurtenant thereto. The alleged dacion en pago is crystal clear
manifestation of offering a special form of payment which to the mind of the
court will produce effect only upon acceptance by the offeree and the
observance and compliance of the required formalities by the parties. No matter
in what form it may be, still the court believes that the subject matter is the
payment of contributions and the corresponding penalties which are within the
ambit of Sec. 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282.
WHEREFORE, the Court having no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant complaint, the motion is
granted and this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Private
respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order but the same was denied
in an Order dated
Consequently,
private respondents filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court erred in its pronouncement that it had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint and in granting the motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
trial court’s challenged order, granted private respondents’ appeal and ordered
the trial court to proceed with the civil case with dispatch. From the
averments in their complaint, the appellate court observed that private respondents
are seeking to implement the Deed of Assignment which they had drafted and
submitted to SSS sometime in July 2001, pursuant to SSS’s letter addressed to
AG& P dated 23 April 2001 approving AG&P and SEMIRARA’S delinquencies
through dacion en pago, which as of 31 March 2001, amounted to P29,261,902.45.
The appellate court thus held that the subject of the complaint is no longer
the payment of the premium and loan amortization delinquencies, as well as the
penalties appurtenant thereto, but the enforcement of the dacion en pago pursuant to SSS Resolution No. 270. The action
then is one for specific performance which case law holds is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation falling under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.[5]
SSS
filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated
Now
before the Court, SSS insists on the Social Security Commission’s (the
Commission) jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to Section 5 (a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8282. SSS maintains the Commission’s jurisdiction over
all disputes arising from the provisions of R.A. No. 1161, amended by R.A. No.
8282 to the exclusion of trial courts.[6]
The
main issue in this case pertains to which body has jurisdiction to entertain a
controversy arising from the non-implementation of a dacion en pago agreed upon by the parties as a means of settlement
of private respondents’ liabilities.
At
the outset, it is well to restate the rule that what determines the nature of
the action as well as the tribunal or body which has jurisdiction over the case
are the allegations in the complaint.[7]
The
pertinent provision of law detailing the jurisdiction of the Commission is
Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282, otherwise known as
the Social Security Act of 1997, to wit:
SEC. 5. Settlement
of Disputes.– (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with
respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other
matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, and any case
filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its
members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided
within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the
evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be
governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
The law clearly vests upon the Commission
jurisdiction over “disputes arising under this Act with respect to coverage,
benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any matter related thereto...”
Dispute is defined as “a conflict or
controversy.”[8]
From the allegations of respondents’ complaint, it readily
appears that there is no longer any dispute with respect to respondents’ accountability
to the SSS. Respondents had, in fact, admitted
their delinquency and offered to settle them by way of dacion en pago subsequently approved by the SSS in Resolution No.
270-s. 2001. SSS stated in said resolution that “the dacion en pago proposal of AG&P Co. of Manila and
Semirara Coals Corporation to pay their liabilities in the total amount of P30,652,710.71 as of 31 March
2001 by offering their 5.8 ha. property located in San Pascual, Batangas, be,
as it is hereby, approved..”[9] This statement unequivocally evinces its consent
to the dacion en pago. In Vda.
de Jayme v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court ruled significantly as follows:
Dacion en pago is
the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the
creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. It is
a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing to the creditor
who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking
really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is the creditor is really buying the
thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against the
debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely,
consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. In its
modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an
objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of
the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. In
any case, common consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or novation,
to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.[11]
The controversy, instead, lies in the
non-implementation of the approved and agreed dacion en pago
on the part of the SSS. As such, respondents filed a suit to obtain its enforcement
which is, doubtless, a suit for specific performance and one incapable of
pecuniary estimation beyond the competence of the Commission.[12] Pertinently, the Court
ruled in Singson v. Isabela
Sawmill,[13] as
follows:
In
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance
would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).[14]
In fine, the Court finds the decision of the Court
of Appeals in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
Let
the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*As replacement of Justice Arturo D. Brion
who inhibited himself per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
[2]