THIRD DIVISION
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METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION,
INC., and JOSE L. CORTEZ, JR.,
Petitioners, - versus - PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, SAMMY MALUNES, ROMULO QUIGAO, RODULFO CAMERINO, BRENDO
MAKILING, MAXIMO VITANGCOL, PETER DIA, ELMER BOBADILLA, NOEL ESGASANE, ISIDRO
CORTEZ, CRISPIN YAPCHIONGCO, MARLON E. SANTOS, WILFREDO DE RAMOS, ARTEMIO
SALIG, AGRIFINO GOROSPE, RUEL MAGBALANA, JOEL MARANO, MELCHOR ALARCON, ROMEO
TAGUID, EMERSON LUMABI, ATILANO JOB, DENNIS T. CRUZ, ARNOLD DIMALANTA,
CARLITO MANZANILLA, GUILLERMO DUMAN, CRISANTO S. MAGNAYE, RONALDO ESTRELLA,
EDMUNDO QUEMADA, MARITO N. HEBREO, EDGARDO C. RAMOS, VICTOR G. BABIERA,
EDMUNDO B. GONZALEZ, ROSELL VILLANUEVA, FLORIFE BLAS, JAIME ABULENCIA,
RODOLFO GAMBOA, VALENTIN BORBON, ALAN ATURBA, TEOFANES TESIOMA, PEDRO
TESIOMA, CESAR BATTUNG, EDWIN ENRIQUEZ, RODOLFO PILAFIL, ARIEL BUSTAMANTE,
CRISENDO CASAS, RONALD LOVEDOREAL, VICENTE RAMIREZ, GERARDO DE GUZMAN, ROBINSON
VINZON, ELPIDIO P. VARGAS, LC DELA CRUZ, ARIEL DIMAWALA, JOEY A. LOBERIANO,
REYNALDO S. DEL ROSARIO, PAUL V. LEGASPI, EDUARDO C. SANTOS, JOHN R. NUNEZ,
JUSTINO B. ASAYTANO, JR., RONALD G. DECOSTO, JOENEL G. BALIGUAT, RUTCHIE R.
RELIMBO, BENJAMIN A. ABIDIN, ALLAN CORTEZ, ALEJANDRO M. DIAZ, ANTONIO
BALANGUE, RICARDO G. DALUNSONG, ERWIN S. BARRERA, ALLAN M. MARANG, PONCIANO
M. ZAMORA, APOLINARIO M. BOLGEN, ARNOLD B. ESTORES, RUBEN BERNAL, ROLANDO B.
CANLAS, RODOLFO C. HERESE, ANTONIO VILLAMOR, JR., ARTHUR B. HERMITANIO,
HERNANI M. LIBANTING, ALBERTO T. DELA CRUZ, JEREMIAH V. MAHINAY, HELEN P.
DIOLANDA, PAMPILO R. BALASBAS, EDUARDO G. MANOSCA, NATALIA PAYONGAYONG, JOHN
M. BISCOCHO, DESIDERIO S. MOSQUEDA, GIOVANNI V. MUESCAN, M. MAUR A.
MENDELEVAR, ORLANDO MALAYBA, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, EDGAR V. VICELLAJE, JOEL G.
EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO C. VERANO, CYRILL MAYOR, JOEY J. SABANAL, JONNY L.
IGNACIO, JESUS C. FAJARDO, LEOPOLDO CAZENAS, ANASTACIO JANAVAN, VIRGILO C.
CRUZ, EDGARDO ESPINOSA, ROMEO MIRAFUENTE, EDWIN R. JUAT, RENATO TAPALLA,
EDWARD F. MARIANO, JESSIE A. DUQUE, MANUEL M. FLOGIO, RODRIGO SARASUA, EDWARD
M. DIAZ, TEOFILO RIZ MOCORRO, JR., CESAR CUENCO, JR., ARIEL MAGNO, NEPTALI
PASADAS, MAURICIO DELA CRUZ, WILHEMINE POLINTAN, DANIEL F. IJIRAN, DELIA O.
CUPCUPIN, BERNARDINO G. MATIAS, DANILO B. MARIANO, JOSELITO G. CONCIO, RAMON
CAQUIAT, RICARDO B. ANO, JR., LAWRENCE SACDALAN, MICHAEL GUINTO, RAYMUNDO
LITAN, JR., EUCLIDA GAURANO, GENEROSO RAPOSA, RICARDO SANTOS, ROLANDO PEREZ,
EXEJESON EVA RUAZOL, EDUARDO ROQUE, RONALDO GELLE, RHODELIO G. CRUZ, RONNIE
M. GONZALES, ELIZALDE JANAPIN, EDWIN BORJA, RENIERO L. GAKO, REYNALDO T.
IGNACIO, JOSE A. CENIDONIA, GLECIRIO M. SAYAT, ROGELIO LUMABAN, LARRY ORATE,
SANTIAGO CLARIN, ANTONIO LEGASPI, MARILYN BRAVO, EDUARDO AGUILA, DANA
KINGKING, TERESITA VELASQUEZ, AURELIO PAGTAKHAN, ALBERTO BRAVO, DONALD REYES,
REINERIO RIPAY, ALFONSO TRINIDAD, JR., CESAR CANETE, SILVESTRE ALVANO, JOSEPH
RODRIGUEZ, HAROLD FLORES, MICAHEL ROMBLON, RAMON AMEGLEO, PASCUAL PARAGAS,
VICTOR SANCHEZ, ESTHELA ATIENZA, ANTONY DE LUNA, AGNES DELA CRUZ, CLARYMAR
ESTOQUE, FELIX ARRIOLA, CARLOS SAMONTE, MEDWIN MESINA, REGGIE FELIXMENIA,
RICARDO EVANGELISTA, EDISON JOSE DORDAS, LORNA SALON, LELIBETH CASINO,
GREGORIO SALVEDIA, AQUILINO EBEN, RESTITUTO FELIPE, NELFRED DELETINA,
FERNANDO MALLARI, RAMIR GORDO, CARLOS BANDILLA, ERNESTOR SERENA, MATEO HAO,
RONILO DE VERA, ALBERTO ASIS, JR., JAIME BARCOMA, WILLIAM VILLANUEVA, ARMANDO
NODADO, ENRIQUE ESPANOL, JR., FRANCISCO FLORES, ELMER CRUZ, DANILO YU,
ENRIQUE FLORES, JAYSON LIWAG, ROMEO PALAGANAS, EDUARDO BERBA, MELCHOR
REGALADO, REDEN NOLASCO, MARIO S. DELA CRUZ, ARNOLD MENDOZA, DANTE MENDOZA,
LARRY TAN, LARRY HERNANDEZ, GODOFREDO BEUNO, MANOLO SANTOS, RICARDO
PATRIARCA, ALBERTO RAMOS, ARNULFO DE LARA, WILFREDO BANDIALA, LOVIN DE LIMA,
GEORGE DELA CUEVA, NELSO LABAYO, EDITHA DELA ROSA, ELIZABETH REYES, EDMUNDO
LIONGSON, JR., DANILO RIVERA, SR., BENJAMIN CANDOLE, CATALINO MELEGRITO, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 175460 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: April 14, 2008 |
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Assailed in the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the Resolution[1]
dated
Petitioner Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (MTO) is a government owned and controlled corporation which entered into
a Management and Operations Agreement (MOA) with the Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) for the operation of the Light Rail Transit (LRT)
Baclaran-Monumento Line. Petitioner Jose
L. Cortez, Jr. was sued in his official capacity as then Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of petitioner MTO.
For
purposes of collective bargaining agreement (CBA), petitioner MTO’s rank and
file employees formed the Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Metro,
Inc.-National Federation of Labor (PIGLAS).
Meanwhile, its managerial and supervisory employees created their own
union bearing the name Supervisory Employees Association of Metro (SEAM).
Petitioners
MTO and PIGLAS entered into a CBA covering the period of
On
The
striking PIGLAS members refused to accede to the Return to Work Order. Following their continued non-compliance, on
28 July 2000, the LRTA formally informed petitioner MTO that it had issued a
Board Resolution which: (1) allowed the expiration after 31 July 2000 of LRTA’s
MOA with petitioner MTO; and (2) directed the LRTA to take over the operations
and maintenance of the LRT Line. By
virtue of said Resolution, petitioner MTO sent termination notices to its
employees, including herein respondents.
Resultantly,
respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter Complaints[4]
against petitioners and the LRTA for the following: (1) illegal dismissal; (2)
unfair labor practice for union busting; (3) moral and exemplary damages; and
(4) attorney’s fees.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainants as illegal and ordering
respondents Metro Transit Organization, Inc. and Light Rail Transit Authority
to jointly and severally pay complainants their separation pay and backwages in
the amounts indicated opposite their respective names as shown in Annexes “A”
to “A-5” of this decision or in the total amount of P208,235,682.72.
Respondents are further ordered to
pay the sum equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the judgment award as and by way
of attorney’s fees or in the amount of P20,823,568.27.
The claim of complainant Ronald Lovedoreal is ordered dismissed without prejudice.
All other claims are ordered dismissed for lack of merit.[5]
Petitioners
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a Resolution dated
Section 6, Rule VI of the Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, as amended by Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002 provides, to wit:
“SECTION 6 BOND. In case the decision of the
Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond. The appeal bond shall either be in
cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages
and attorney’s fees.”
In this case [petitioners] filed a property bond, and applying a liberal interpretation of the above Rule and finding support in the Supreme Court pronouncement in the case of UERM-Memorial Medical Center, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 110419, March 3, 1997, we conditionally accepted the property bond subject to the submission of the requirements specified in the Order. Moreover, [petitioners] were directed to comply with the requirements within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order with a warning that failure to comply will result in the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection thereof.
It appears that to date, which is more than a month from receipt of the Order, [petitioners] failed to comply with the conditions required in the posting of the property bond, this Commission is therefore constrained to dismiss the appeal for non-perfection thereof.[6]
The NLRC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, an order is hereby issued DISMISSING the appeal of
[petitioners] for non-perfection thereof and the Decision dated
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by complainants-appellees and the motion to suspend proceedings filed by [petitioners] are both DENIED for lack of merit.
No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained.[7]
Without
filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted NLRC Resolution,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals assailing the same.
On
The
petitioners have filed this petition for certiorari against the resolution of
the NLRC dated
Petitioners
moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court’s dismissal of its
Petition. The Court of Appeals, however,
in a Resolution dated
Hence,
petitioners come to this Court, challenging the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of its Petition.[9]
It must be
primarily established that petitioners contravened the procedural rule for the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The rule is, for the writ to issue, it
must be shown that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10]
The settled
rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.[11] Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the
court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[12] The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption
that the court or administrative body which issued the assailed order or
resolution may amend the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or
error.[13]
We have
held that the “plain,” “speedy,” and “adequate remedy” referred to in Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court[14]
is a motion for reconsideration of
the questioned Order or Resolution. As
we consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is
indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes
it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had.[15]
In the case
at bar, petitioners directly went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari without
filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. The motion for reconsideration would have
aptly furnished a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. As a rule, the Court of Appeals, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, unless
the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to
it.[16] The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration against the assailed
Resolution of the NLRC rendered its petition for certiorari before the appellate court as fatally defective.
We agree in
the Court of Appeals’ finding that petitioners’ case does not fall under any of
the recognized exceptions to the filing of a motion for reconsideration, to
wit: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law; (2) when public interest is
involved; (3) in case of urgency;[17]
or when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been
squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[18] As the Court of Appeals reasoned, the issue
before the NLRC is both factual and legal at the same time, involving as it
does the requirements of the property bond for the perfection of the appeal, as
well as the finding that petitioners failed to perfect the same. Evidently, the burden is on petitioners
seeking exception to the rule to show sufficient justification for dispensing
with the requirement.[19] Certiorari
cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners'
own omission of the filing of the required motion for reconsideration.[20]
Nonetheless,
even if we are to disregard the petitioners’ procedural faux pas with the Court of Appeals, and proceed to review the
propriety of the 19 May 2006 NLRC Resolution, we still arrive at the conclusion
that the NLRC did not err in denying petitioners’ appeal for its failure to
file a bond in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.[21]
In cases
involving a monetary award, an employer seeking to appeal the decision of the
Labor Arbiter to the NLRC is unconditionally required by Article 223[22]
of the Labor Code to post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the amount of the
monetary award adjudged.[23] It should be stressed that the intention of
lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an
appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.[24] The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that
the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to
be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected.[25] Moreover, it bears stressing that the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional,[26]
and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be
reviewed final and unappealable.[27] It cannot be overemphasized that the NLRC
Rules, akin to the Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the
force and effect of law.[28]
As borne by
the records, petitioners filed a property bond which was conditionally accepted
by the NLRC subject to the following conditions specified in its
The conditional acceptance of petitioner’s property
bond was subject to the submission of the following: 1) Certified copy of Board
Resolution or a Certificate from the Corporate Secretary of Light Rail Transit
Authority stating that the Corporation President is authorized by a Board
Resolution to submit title as guarantee of judgment award; 2) Certified Copy of
the Titles issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City; 3) Certified Copy of
the current tax declarations of Titles; 4) Tax clearance from the City
Treasurer of Pasay City; 5) Appraisal report of an accredited appraisal company
attesting to the fair market value of property within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Order. Failure to comply
therewith will result in the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection
thereof.[29]
In the same
Order, the NLRC warned that failure of the petitioners to comply with the
conditions would result in the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection
thereof. Petitioners were directed to
comply with its given conditions within 10 days from receipt of the Order with
a caveat that their failure will result in the dismissal of the appeal. Subsequently, in its
Essentially,
the failure of petitioners to comply with the conditions for the posting of the
property bond is tantamount to a failure to post the bond as required by
law. What is even more salient is the
fact that the NLRC had stressed that petitioners had, for more than a month
from receipt of its
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions
dated
SO ORDERED.
|
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; rollo, pp. 52-53.
[2]
[3] The Order disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Metro Transit Organization, Inc., pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Accordingly, all striking employees are hereby directed to return to work immediately upon receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior to the strike.
The parties are further directed to cease and desist from committing any act that will exacerbate the situation.
Likewise, to expedite resolution of the dispute, the parties are directed to submit their respective position papers and evidence to this Office within TEN (10) days from receipt hereof.
Finally, to ensure compliance of
this Order, PNP Chief Superintendent Edgardo Aglipay, NCR is hereby deputized
to assist in the peaceful and orderly implementation of this Order. (
[4]
[5] CA rollo, pp. 135-136.
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 52.
[9] Petitioner raises the following:
I. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS NO JURISDICTION AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ALSO ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT CASE DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS THE SECRETARY OF LABOR WHICH HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT CASE.
III. ASSUMING PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT GIVE LRTA AND PETITIONER SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLY WITH ITS ORDER TO SUBMIT THE DOCUMENTATION FOR THE APPEAL BOND.
IV. ASSUMING PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT RESOLVE ON THE MERITS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A) The complaints state no cause of action because the non-renewal of the MOA between petitioner and LRTA caused private respondents’ unemployment status.
B) The claims of private respondents are CBA related which CBA was entered into by and between petitioner and PIGLAS or SEAM.
C) The unemployed status of private respondents was not caused by illegal dismissal.
D) Petitioner was not a labor-only contractor.
[10] Solidum
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161647,
[11] Office
of the Ombudsman v. Laja, G.R. No. 169241,
[12]
[13] Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141796,
[14] SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
[15] Lagera v. National Labor Relations Commission, 385 Phil. 1087, 1091 (2000).
[16] Yau v. Manila Banking Corporation, 433 Phil. 701, 709-710 (2002).
[17] Government
of the
[18]
[19] Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 388 Phil. 906, 912 (2000).
[20]
[21] Section 6, Rule VI of the Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, provides:
Section 6. Bond. – In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages, and attorney’s fees.
The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine.
The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.
[22] The pertinent portion of Article 223 of the Labor Code, states:
ART. 223. Appeal. – x x x
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
[23] Calabash Garments, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 329 Phil. 227, 233 (1996).
[24] Navarro v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 765, 774 (2000).
[25]
[26] Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157194, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 452, 459; Dela Cruz v. Golar Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 141277, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 173, 184; FILIPINAS (Pre-fabricated Bldg.) Systems “Filsystems,” Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 463 Phil. 813, 818-819 (2003).
[27] Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Cortina, 461 Phil. 422, 428 (2003), citing Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101527, 19 January 1993, 217 SCRA 237, 246.
[28] Corporate
Inn Hotel v. Lizo, G.R. No. 148279,
[29] Rollo,
p. 171.