MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 174672
AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA),
Petitioner, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
HEIRS
OF MARCELINA L. SERO,
SUPREMO S. ANCA
MAXIMA S. ANCAJAS-NUÑEZ,
HRS.
OF JULIAN L. ANCAJAS,
AGRIPINO ANCAJAS, MARIA
ORBISO,
MIGUELA ANCAJAS, INESIA
ANCAJAS,
PACENCIA ANCAJAS,
CLAUDIA DOBLE,
HEIRS OF ER
MARCIANO ANCAJAS, LUCIA
ANCAJAS,
HEIRS OF ANASTACIO S. ANCAJAS,
MARIA A. AMAMANGPANG,
JOSE S.
ANCAJAS, AMADO S.
ANCAJAS,
HEIRS
OF PORCESO S. ANCAJAS,
CRISOLOGO ANCAJAS,
HEIRS OF SILVESTRA ANCAJAS,
ANICETO A. INVENTO,
ENRIQUIETA I.
GIER, NORMA PACHO,
EDGARDO A.
INVENTO, PROCOLO A.
INVENTO,
ESTRELLA I. MAGLA
HEIRS
OF GERMOGENA S. ANCAJAS,
NENITA ANCAJAS-OSTIA, PAULA A.
AMADEO, NEMESIO A. AMADEO,
PASTORA A. RUSTIA, CONCEPCION A.
ORBISO, BALBINA A. AMADEO,
ANASTACIA A. AMADEO, RUFINO
AMADEO, VALERIANO AMADEO,
HERMOGENIS AMADEO, PEDRO
AMADEO, OPING AMADEO,
HEIRS
OF CRESENCIA AMADEO,
EDITHO A. SERTEMO,
HEIRS
OF DEMETRIO L. SERO,
AURELIA L. SERO, MONICA
S. YUBAL,
HEIRS
OF
PAQUITA S. VILLACSE,
VILLARIN, JOSE S. OSTIA,
HEIRS
OF BASILISA S. SERO,
HEIRS
OF TOMAS S. CUNA,
FERNANDO CUNA,
HEIRS
OF MARGARITO S. CUNA,
LEONARDO CUNA, CONSOLACION
CUNA, SALOME CUNA,
HEIRS
OF PEREGRINA SERO CUNA,
CARMEN CUNA,
HEIRS OF ALEJANDRO SERO CUNA,
LETICIA CUNA,
HEIRS OF SENANDO SERO CUNA,
SONIA CUNA, ANTONIO S. CUNA,
COLOMBA
All represented by their
attorney-in-fact- Promulgated:
ANECITO
INVENTO,
Respondents. April
16, 2008
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the May 12, 2006 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159, which reversed the June 14, 2001
and August 10, 2001 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 8, in Civil Case No. CEB-24012. Also assailed is the
The
facts of the case are as follows:
On
It will be recalled that the subject
properties were acquired by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) through expropriation
proceedings for the expansion and improvement of the
In its Answer, petitioner denied the
allegations in the complaint and by way of special and affirmative defenses
moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
Likewise, defendants Ricardo Inocian, Haide Sun and spouses Victor
Arcinas and Marilyn Dueñas filed their separate motions to dismiss.
On
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders dated 14 June 2001 and 10 August 2001, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 in Civil Case No. CEB-24012, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. We are also directing the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 8 to REINSTATE the case, and to conduct a TRIAL ON THE MERITS and thereafter render a decision.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, it was denied
in a Resolution dated
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER IN CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-24012.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE
Respondents argue that the properties
which were expropriated in connection with the operation of the
A cause of action is an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its elements are the following: (1) the legal
right of plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.[12] The existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint.[13] Thus, in the resolution of a motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in
the complaint must be considered. The
test in cases like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the
complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to
dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically
admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint.[14]
However, while a trial court focuses
on the factual allegations in a complaint, it cannot disregard statutes and decisions
material and relevant to the proper appreciation of the questions before
it. In resolving a motion to dismiss,
every court must take judicial notice of decisions this Court has rendered as
provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,[15]
to wit:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
In reversing the Orders of the RTC,
the Court of Appeals failed to consider the decision of this Court in Mactan-Cebu International Airport v. Court
of Appeals,[16] rendered on
In said case, the Court held that the terms of the judgment in Civil Case No.
R-1881 were clear and unequivocal. It granted
title over the expropriated land to the Republic of the Philippines in fee
simple without any condition that it would be returned to the owners or that
the owners had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was
expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than
as the Lahug airport.[17] When land has been acquired for public use in
fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use
may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner.[18]
Had the appellate court considered
the import of the ruling in Mactan-Cebu
International Airport v. Court of Appeals, it would have found that respondents
can invoke no right against the petitioner since the subject lands were
acquired by the State in fee simple.
Thus, the first element of a cause of action, i.e., plaintiff’s legal right, is not present in the instant case.
We are not unaware of the ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority,[19] concerning
still another set of owners of lands which were declared expropriated in the
judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881, but were ordered by the Court to be reconveyed
to their previous owners because there was preponderant proof of the existence
of the right of repurchase. However, we
qualified our Decision in that case, thus:
We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and do not overrule
them. Nonetheless the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as
regards the properties of respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, must be commensurate
to the facts that were established therein as distinguished from those extant
in the case at bar. Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and inconclusive
evidence, while in the instant case we have preponderant proof as found by the
trial court of the existence of the right of repurchase in favor of
petitioners.[20] (Emphasis
provided)
Thus, the determination of the rights
and obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated but the public
purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsist, must rest on the
character by which the titles thereof were acquired by the government. If the land is expropriated for a particular
purpose with the condition that it will be returned to its former owner once that
purpose is ended or abandoned, then the property shall be reconveyed to its
former owner when the purpose is terminated or abandoned. If, on the contrary, the decree of
expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, as in this case, then the
land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator. Non-use of the property for the purpose by
which it was acquired does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired in
the expropriation proceedings.[21]
Even assuming that respondents have a
right to the subject properties being the heirs of the alleged real owner
Ysabel Limbaga, they still do not have a cause of action against the petitioner
because such right has been foreclosed by prescription, if not by laches. Respondents failed to take the necessary steps
within a reasonable period to recover the properties from the parties who
caused the alleged fraudulent reconstitution of titles.
Respondents’ action in the court
below is one for reconveyance based on fraud committed by Isabel Limbaga in
reconstituting the titles to her name. It
was filed on
An action for reconveyance is a legal
remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name.[23] However, such action must be filed within 10 years from the issuance of the title
since the issuance operates as a constructive notice.[24] Thus, the cause of action which respondents
may have against the petitioner is definitely barred by prescription.
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the action is already barred by statute of limitations, the court
shall dismiss the claim. Further, contrary
to respondents’ claim that a complaint may not be dismissed based on
prescription without trial, an allegation of prescription can effectively be
used in a motion to dismiss when the complaint on its face shows that indeed
the action has prescribed[25]
at the time it was filed.
Thus, in Gicano v. Gegato:[26]
We have ruled that
trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground
of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to
be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or
an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the
ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where
no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been
declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently
and satisfactorily apparent on the record: either in the averments of the
plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.[27]
(Citations omitted)
In the instant case, although the
complaint did not state the date when the alleged fraud in the reconstitution
of titles was perpetuated, it is however clear from the allegations in the
complaint that the properties sought to be recovered were acquired by the
petitioner in Civil Case No. R-1881 which was granted by the trial court on
Further, while it is by express
provision of law that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is
likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.[28] The negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it had either abandoned it or declined to assert it also casts doubt on
the validity of the claim of ownership. Such
neglect to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or
less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party,
operates as a bar in a court of equity.[29]
Respondents’ inaction for a period of
38 years to vindicate their alleged rights had converted their claim into a
stale demand. The allegation that
petitioner employed threat or intimidation is an afterthought belatedly raised
only in the Court of Appeals. As such it
deserves scant attention.
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The May 12, 2006
Decision and September 12, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 73159 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by Associate
Justices Enrico A. Lanzanas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
[2] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[3]
[4]
See Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco,
Jr., G.R. No. 158563,
[5]
See Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v.
[6] Rollo, p. 78.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 122202, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 27, 40.
[13] Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143896,
[14] Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
336 Phil. 824, 833-834 (1997).
[15]
[16]
399 Phil. 695 (2000).
[17]
[18]
[19]
G.R. No. 156273,
[20]
[21]
[22]
See Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco,
supra note 4 at 547.
[23] Declaro v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil.
616, 623-624 (2000).
[24]
[25] Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
129704,
[26]
G.R. No. L-63574,
[27]
G.R. No. L-63575,
[28] Rumarate v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 168222,
[29] Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 211 Phil.
295, 305 (1983).