SECOND DIVISION
JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 172953
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BRION, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
April
30, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse
the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And
this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused
but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
In this
Petition for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner) assails the Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its Resolution[3]
dated 30 May 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the
Decision[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City,
Branch 52[5]
which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug.
The antecedent facts follow.
On the strength of a warrant[6]
of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon
City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of
petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon
City on 4 February 2003. The team was
headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members.
The search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad
Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself,
his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets
of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets
containing residual morsels of the said substance.
Accordingly,
petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,[7]
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal information whose inculpatory portion reads:
That
on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the
morning in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon
City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets
of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] “shabu” with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four
empty sachets containing “shabu” residue, without having been previously authorized by
law to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Petitioner
entered a negative plea.[9] At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.
Taking the
witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding
team, testified on the circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he
and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the latter
was shown the search warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered
Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in
executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the police team
positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he
was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the
search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic
sachets with suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and
kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell
off from one of the pillows searched by Esternon—a discovery that was made in
the presence of petitioner.[10] On cross examination, Bolanos
admitted that during the search, he was explaining its progress to petitioner’s
mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search
being conducted by Esternon.[11]
Esternon testified
that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found “behind” the
door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two
filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked.[12] On cross, he admitted that it was he alone
who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing
behind him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed
to him the things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two
sachets of shabu were kept;[13]
that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police
Station for a “true inventory,” then to the trial court[14]
and thereafter to the laboratory.[15]
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered
the examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to
identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets,
four were positive of containing residue
of the same substance.[16]
She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by
Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except
that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the
items from Esternon at the laboratory.[17]
The
evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure
conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began
the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner
himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police
officers declared to Bolanos that petitioner’s wife,
Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer
arrived to conduct the search of Sheila’s body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was
asked to step out of the room. So, it was in his presence
that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked
by a police officer to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the
errand, he was told that nothing was found on Sheila’s body.[18] Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other
bedroom together with her children.[19]
Petitioner
asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to the
bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door
and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told,
Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In
that instant, Esternon showed him “sachet of shabu”
which according to him came from a pillow on the bed.[20] Petitioner’s account in its entirety was
corroborated in its material respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup
and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that
petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search because
at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while
Sheila was being searched by the lady officer.[21] Licup for his part
testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic
sachets. He recounted that after the
five empty sachets were found, he went out of the bedroom and into the living
room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom,
exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.[22]
On 20 June
2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.[23] The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner
was prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s animus possidendi
sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person
possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned
by him. It also noted petitioner’s
failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges
against him.[24]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.[25] In his Appeal Brief[26]
filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court
to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his house was
conducted. For its part, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the contrary, the prosecution
evidence sufficed for petitioner’s conviction and that the defense never
advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding team was improperly
motivated to hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption that they
had regularly performed their duties should prevail.[27]
On 27
January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the
judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an
indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as
maximum.[28] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied by the appellate court.[29] Hence, the instant petition which raises
substantially the same issues.
In its
Comment,[30]
the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly performed its
duties in the conduct of the search.[31] It points to petitioner’s incredulous claim
that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the two
filled sachets was made in his and Licup’s
presence. It likewise notes that
petitioner’s bare denial cannot defeat the positive assertions of the
prosecution and that the same does not suffice to overcome the prima facie existence of animus possidendi.
This argument,
however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.
Prefatorily,
although the trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight
and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case
under appeal.[32]
In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if properly
appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutions
for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act
of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty,
together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.[33]
Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug
be established beyond doubt.[34] Be that as it may, the mere fact of
unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the
moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the
fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The
chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[35]
As a method
of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.[36] It would include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to
it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same.[37]
While
testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable
and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not
readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.[38] The same standard likewise obtains in case
the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination[39]
and even substitution and exchange.[40] In other words, the
exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration
or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise
not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule.
Indeed, the
likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest
when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible
in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily
lives.[41] Graham
vs. State[42]
positively acknowledged this danger. In
that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police
officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the
condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their
possession—was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out
that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have
been sugar or baking powder. It ruled
that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the
possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s
findings is inadmissible.[43]
A unique
characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable
as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain
of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which
similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable
that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
A mere
fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the
identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly
seized from petitioner. Of the
people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and
Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the
evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly
handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as
Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for
chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to
establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask
the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly
seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in
court as evidence?
The
prosecution’s evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer.
Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and
marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether
the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of
seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could have,
but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she
received the items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they
were in her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for
analysis.
The
prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the
identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony
of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient
explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to
the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility
of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment.
This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the
five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also,
contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the
search and seizure was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to be
so, the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police
officers from the commencement of the search of petitioner’s house
until the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of
his wife, that prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was
sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding
team at the door of petitioner’s house in order to forestall the likelihood of
petitioner fleeing the scene. By no
stretch of logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out
of his house on an errand when in the first place the police officers were in
fact apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the
two filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after
petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able to
witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that
he was away.
It is also
strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to
him the items to be searched including the pillow from which the two filled
sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is
contrary to ordinary human behavior that petitioner would hand over the said
pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal drugs are concealed
therein. In the same breath, the manner
by which the search of Sheila’s body was brought up by a member of the raiding
team also raises serious doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police officers
that he saw Sheila tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the
attention of the members of petitioner’s household away from the search being
conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise takes
note of Esternon’s suspicious presence in the bedroom
while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of these
circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the
prosecution’s claim of regularity in the exercise of duty.
Moreover,
Section 21[44]
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the
post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too
plain to require a different construction, it mandates that the officer
acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the
photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the
warrant has been served. Esternon
deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the close of the
search of petitioner’s house, he brought the seized items immediately to the
police station for the alleged purpose of making a “true inventory” thereof,
but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in
petitioner’s house when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and
mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt therefor. Lest it be
forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity to cause the issuance of
the warrant which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its
implementation. While the final proviso
in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the
same cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable
justification for Esternon’s course of action.
Likewise, Esternon’s failure to deliver the seized items to the court
demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the
items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and
verified inventory of the same,[45]
as required by Rule 126, Section 12[46]
of the Rules of Court. People v. Go[47] characterized this requirement as
mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items
by interested parties.[48] Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo[49]
declared that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is
necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it,
they would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to
deliver the same to another agency.[50] Mere tolerance by the trial court of a
contrary practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it
thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment.[51]
Given the
foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal
procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure
custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
manifestly misplaced. The presumption of
regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof
and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.[52] Suffice it to say that this presumption
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[53] In the present case the lack of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were
placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a
finding of guilt.
In our
constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must
rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The
rule is invariable whatever may
be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his
innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.[54] In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability
hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter
of right.
WHEREFORE,
the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 affirming
with modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30 May
2006 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED
on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately released from
custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.
The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision
and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
receipt.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[2]In CA-G.R. No. 28915. Penned by
Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao
and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin
and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo. CA rollo, pp. 81-90.
[4]In Criminal Case No. 2003-5844. Records, pp. 114-119.
[5]Presided by Judge Honesto A. Villamor.
[6]Records, pp. 11-12.
[7]Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.—The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of
purity thereof;
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloriede;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu”;
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but
not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA)
or “ecstasy,” paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide
(LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00),
if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu”
is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams
or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or “shabu,”
or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or “ecstasy,” PMA,
TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed
is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more
but less than five hundred (500) grams or marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12 years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00)
to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin,
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu,” or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or “ecstasy,” PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed
is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams
of marijuana.
[9]Id. at 41, 43.
[11]Id. at 15-16.
[13]Id. at 16-17.
[14]TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 13-15.
[15]Id. at 9.
[16]TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 14. The results of the chemical analysis are
embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-037-03. See
records, p. 18.
[17]Id. at 3.
[19]Id. at 13.
[20]Id. at 11-12.
[22]TSN, 4 February 2004, pp. 4-5, 9.
[23]Records, p.
119. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court finds accused Junie Malillin
y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 and he is hereby sentence[d] to suffer the penalty of Twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to Twenty (20) years and fine of P300,000.00.
The shabu recovered is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government and the same shall be turned over to the
Board for proper disposal without delay.
SO ORDERED.
[24]Id. at 117-118.
[26]CA rollo, pp. 35-47.
[28]Id. at 89. The Court of
Appeals disposed of the appeal as follows:
UPON
THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit,
and the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the
sense that the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term ranging from twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
as maximum. In all other respects, the
judgment appealed from is hereby MAINTAINED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[31]Id. at 107.
[32]People v. Pedronan, G.R.
No. 148668, 17 June 2003, 404 SCRA 183, 188; People v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 146277, 20
June 2002, 383 SCRA 390, 398; People v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, 20 July 2001, 361 SCRA 622, 627.
[33]People v. Simbahon, G.R.
No. 132371, 9 April 2003, 401 SCRA 94, 100; People
v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, 20 July 2001, 361 SCRA
622, 634; People v. Dismuke;
People v. Mapa;
[34]People v. Simbahon, G.R.
No. 132371, 9 April 2003, 401 SCRA 94, 100; People
v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 70.
[35]An Analytical
Approcah to Evidence, Ronad J.
Allen, Richard B. Kuhns, by Little Brown & Co.,
USA, 1989, p. 174.
[36]United States
v. Howard-Arias, 679
F.2d 363, 366; United States v. Ricco, 52 F.3d 58.
[37]Evidence Law, Roger C. Park,
David P. Leonard, Steven H. Goldberg, 1998, 610 Opperman Drive, St. Paul
Minnesota, p. 507.
[38]Evidence Law, Roger C. Park, David P. Leonard,
Steven H. Goldberg, 1998, 610 Opperman Drive, St. Paul Minnesota, p.
507; 29A Am. Jur.
2d Evidence § 946.
[39]29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 946.
[40]See Graham v.
State, 255 N.E.2d 652, 655.
[41]Graham v.
State, 255 N.E2d
652, 655.
[42]Graham v.
State, 255 N.E2d
652.
[44]Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment.— x x x
(a)
The apprehending
officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over the said
items; x x x (emphasis
ours).
[46] SEC. 12. Delivery
of property and inventory thereof to court.— The
officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
[47]G.R. No. 144639, 12 September 2003, 411 SCRA 81.
[48]Id. at 101.
[49]G.R. No. 153254, 20 September 2004,
439 SCRA 601, citing People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 (1993).
[52]People v. Ambrosio, G.R.
No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
[53]People v. Ambrosio, G.R.
No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).