THIRD DIVISION
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TEOFILA
ILAGAN-MENDOZA and ROSARIO ILAGAN URCIA, Petitioners, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CALATAGAN RURAL BANK, INC., GEMINIANO T. NOCHE, as President of Calatagan Rural Bank, and REMEDIOS DE CLARO and EDMUNDO RODRIGUEZ, as Sheriffs, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -- - - x Spouses ALBERTO URCIA and
ROSARIO ILAGAN URCIA, Petitioners, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CALATAGAN RURAL BANK, INC., GEMINIANO T. NOCHE, as President of Calatagan Rural Bank, and REMEDIOS DE CLARO and EDMUNDO RODRIGUEZ, as Sheriffs, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 171374 Present: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., Acting Chairperson, TINGA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: April
8, 2008 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, with petitioners praying for the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated 19 July 2005 of the Court of Appeals dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 56688 and
affirming the Decision[2]
dated
The following are the factual
antecedents:
Petitioners are Teofila Ilagan-Mendoza
(Teofila) and Rosario Ilagan-Urcia (
The
respondent Calatagan Rural Bank, Inc. (CRBI) filed on 9 July 1986 with the
Sheriff’s Office two Applications for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgages, pursuant to Act No. 3135 (as amended by Act No. 4110), for
petitioners’ unpaid loans, to wit:
(a)
a Real Estate Mortgage covered by the following
properties, to wit: TCT No. 11234, TCT No. 8465, TCT No. 14493, and TCT
No.18772; and allegedly executed on
(b)
a Real Estate Mortgage covered by property under TCT
No. 31345, executed by Alberto, with Teofila as co-maker, to secure a P10,000.00
loan obtained by Alberto on 23 July 1985, maturing on 19 April 1986.[4]
On 20 August 1986, siblings Teofila
and Rosario instituted Special Civil Action No. 1701 before the Regional Trial
Court of Balayan, Batangas, while spouses Alberto and Rosario instituted
Special Civil Action No. 1702 before the same court, both for injunction and damages,
with an application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction, against respondents CRBI, CRBI President Geminiano Noche (Noche),
and Sheriffs Remedios de Claro and Edmundo Rodriguez of the Batangas RTC,
assailing CRBI’s Applications for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgages referred to in the preceding paragraph, and seeking to enjoin
respondents from proceeding with the auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Special
Civil Action Nos. 1701 and 1702 were consolidated by the RTC.
In Special Civil Action No. 1701,[5]
Teofila and Rosario identified three crop loans obtained by their father, the
late Estanislao, from CRBI in the amounts of P85,000.00, P75,000.00
and P25,000.00.[6]
These loans, covered by a promissory note executed by and between Estanislao
and CRBI, were secured by several Real Estate Mortgages[7]
over the properties registered with the Registry of Deeds Batangas and covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 11234, 8465, 14493, and 18772,
with Estanislao Ilagan, married to Leocadia Mercado, as mortgagors and CRBI as
mortgagee.
Estanislao was required to sign and submit a Deed of
Assignment of all his sugar produce in favor of CRBI, as payment for the loans.[8]
CRBI received the proceeds from Estanislao’s sugar produce which it applied to
his loans. Teofila and Rosario contend
that the records of the two sugar centrals, Central Azucarera Don Pedro (CADP)
and Balayan Sugar Central, Inc. (BSCI), reveal that sufficient payment had been
made on the loans by Estanislao by 1979, but no document was executed to cancel
the mortgages securing the same. Estanislao
passed away on
On
the other hand, in Special Civil Action No. 1702,[9]
spouses Alberto and Rosario Urcia admitted that Alberto obtained two commodity
loans from CRBI, one for P10,000.00 and another for P8,200.00. Alberto stated that to cover said loans,
promissory notes and trust receipts were allegedly signed by him in blank, with
Teofila as co-maker. The P10,000.00
loan was covered by a promissory note dated P8,200.00 was covered by a
promissory note dated
Purportedly
in retaliation to their demands for accounting and their seeking recourse with
the Central Bank, CRBI filed a criminal complaint for libel and a civil action
for damages against petitioners; an administrative charge against Alberto and
Rosario; and the assailed
applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.[10]
The RTC
issued a TRO effective until
(a)
P111,806.05
for the properties of Estanislao Ilagan; and
(b)
P19,295.82 for the properties of Alberto Urcia.
A Certificate of Sale was issued on
the same day in favor of CRBI.
Respondents filed on
In an Order[13]
issued on
Aggrieved, petitioners in the two
Special Civil Actions assailed the RTC Order dated
From the
appellate court’s dismissal of their petitions, petitioners sought recourse
from this Court by filing Petitions for Certiorari
and Prohibition[16] which were granted. In a Resolution[17]
dated 28 October 1987, this Court directed the RTC to proceed with the hearing
of Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702, to determine whether there was
indeed overpayment of the loan obligations of petitioners to CRBI.
Hence, the
proceedings before the RTC in Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702 resumed.
The RTC
summarized the issues in Special Civil Action No. 1701 as follows:
(1)
whether or not the numerous withdrawals on
(2)
whether or not the mortgaged properties were validly
foreclosed on
(3) whether or not deceased Estanislao Ilagan and his heirs had fully paid its [sic] obligation to respondent.
In Special
Civil Action No. 1702, the sole issue was whether or not Alberto’s loans had
already been paid.
After nine years of trial, the RTC
dismissed Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702 for lack of merit. In a
Decision dated
WHEREFORE, petitioners instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.[18]
Petitioners filed a joint appeal with
the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56688. On
Appellants contend that there was no need for the bank to foreclose the mortgage on the Urcia spouses’ property since it could run after either Teofila as co-maker or Rosario whose quedan was in the bank’s possession and is sufficient to pay the loans. The contention is untenable.
Art.
1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to “proceed against any
one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.” The choice
of the solidary debtor or against whom the solidary creditor will enforce
collection is left to the latter (PNB vs. Independent Planters Association,
Inc., 122 SCRA 113). Similarly, the choice of remedy to effect collection
pertains to the creditor. On the other hand, the bank cannot run after
x x x x
x x x The death of the debtor does not extinguish his civil liability as his estate will answer for it (Art. 1078, Civil Code). Since the quedans belong to Estanislao, the proceeds thereof should be applied to his own obligation. In this sense, Estanislao can be considered a debtor of the bank, even after his death, concerning his unpaid loans.
x x x x
Considering the foregoing, appellants’ computation of Estanislao’s loans from the bank is, at best, sketchy and self-serving and renders the purported overpayment implausible.
Consequently,
We uphold the court a quo’s finding that Estanislao is indebted to the bank in
the amount of P67,000.00. As aptly observed by the trial court:
“The Central Bank Report speaks for itself. It
was adopted by the petitioners as their own evidence and was marked as Exhibits
‘J’, ‘RRR-1’ to ‘RRR-3’. There is presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties. And the Court finds the report of the Central Bank
employees as regards the computation of the loans of the late Estanislao Ilagan
to be correct.”
In fine, the lower court committed no error in its appealed decision.
WHEREFORE,
the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas (Balayan, Branch
10) is AFFIRMED in toto.
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[19]
filed by petitioners in a Resolution[20]
dated
Petitioners thus filed on
ISSUES FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 1701
I. WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON CAN VALIDLY CONTRACTED (sic) A LOAN AFTER HIS DEATH.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE LOAN OBTAINED AFTER THE DEATH OF A PERSON WILL FORM PART OF HIS EXISTING OBLIGATION.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE EXECUTED BY A DECEASED WILL COVER AN OBLIGATION INCURRED AFTER HIS DEATH.
ISSUES FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 1702
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS IS VALID AFTER DETERMINING [sic] BY THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE WAS AN OVERPAYMENT OF OBLIGATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT BANK CAN VALIDLY PROCEED WITH THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING THE DEPOSITS IN ITS POSSESSION UNDER THE NAME OF THE PETITIONERS IN PAYMENT OF THE UNPAID OBLIGATIONS.
Petitioners pray that a decision be
rendered reversing the earlier Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed
CA-G.R. CV No. 56688; declaring the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties in
Special Civil Actions No. 1701 and 1702 as null and void; and ordering the
return of the Transfer Certificates of Titles in the name of the petitioners
free from all liens and encumbrances.
Petitioners
challenge the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages by CRBI
for having been done with malice and bad faith.
Petitioners allege that Estanislao
could not have possibly entered into a loan obligation after his death. He died
on P44,000.00, and said promissory
note should not have been included among Estanislao’s obligations.
Petitioners also maintain that the
loan for P10,000.00, covered by promissory note dated 23 July 1985
executed by Alberto, with Teofila as co-maker, was already paid, thus, making the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage securing the said loan null and void. If only CRBI submitted an accounting as
petitioners requested, there would have been no more need to resort to the
foreclosure proceedings since there was, in fact, an overpayment of P3,056.13
on the loan.[21]
Petitioners assert that the sheriffs
and the trial and appellate courts failed to look into the existence and
validity of the obligations secured by the mortgage properties that could have
materially affected the foreclosure proceedings.
Respondents, on the other hand,
contend that the real matter at issue is whether the separate loans contracted
by Estanislao and Alberto still subsist as to make the foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties valid; or, conversely, whether the loans were already
paid, thus, making the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties null and
void. They posit that these factual matters
were already resolved by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in their
favor. Thus, they argue that the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties was in order and, consequently, the
present Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
Clearly, the real issue to be
resolved is whether Estanislao and Alberto still had outstanding loan
obligations with CRBI that would justify the foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties.
We rule in the affirmative, and find
no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
The jurisdiction of this Court in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of
law.[22]
There is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or
when the query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence
considering mostly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole and probabilities of the situation.[23]
A question of law has been defined as one that does not call for any
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[24]
We have
consistently stressed that in a petition for review on certiorari this Court does not sit as an arbiter of facts. As such, it is not our function to re-examine
every appreciation of facts made by the trial and appellate courts unless the
evidence on record does not support their findings or the judgment is based on
a misappreciation of facts.[25]
As
correctly observed by CRBI, the issues raised by petitioners are purely
factual. It would entail a review and
evaluation of the evidence that were already presented before the trial court.
Factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
as in this case, are generally binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court, for
it is not the function of this Court to reexamine the lower courts’ findings of
fact. Suffice it to say that the factual
findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great weight and respect and will not generally be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of a clear showing that the trial court overlooked
certain facts or circumstances that would warrant a different disposition of
the case.[26]
Admittedly,
the above rule is not absolute, as it admits of certain exceptions, to wit: (a)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h)
where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or
where the facts set forth by the petitioners are not disputed by the
respondents, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. [27]
Petitioners,
however, have not shown that any of these circumstances are attendant herein
for us to deviate from the general rule.
A mortgage
is a mere accessory contract to the loan obligation, thus, the validity of the
mortgage depends on the validity of the loan it is supposed to secure. The debtor cannot escape the consequences of
the mortgage contract once the validity of the loan is upheld.[28]
And when the principal obligation is not
paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on the mortgage, have
the property seized and sold, and apply the proceeds to the balance of the loan
obligation. Foreclosure is proper if the
debtor is in default in the payment of his loan obligation.
In
the Petition at bar, there is substantial evidence to support the facts that petitioners
had existing loan obligations subject of Real Estate Mortgages executed in
favor of CRBI and there was default on the payment thereof.
Special
Civil Action No. 1701
It has been established by evidence on
record that Estanislao obtained a total of 32 loans from the bank. Estanislao used the very same properties he
mortgaged to secure his first loan in 1974 as collaterals for his subsequent
loans. However, no corresponding entries
on the constituted mortgages were made on TCTs No. 11234, 14493, 8465 and
18772, except that of the first loan contracted in 1974. As payments for these loans, Estanislao
assigned to CRBI the proceeds from his sugar produce milled at CADP and BSCI. The said proceeds were applied to the
principal, interests and charges of Estanislao’s loans.
Per the Central Bank Report,
Estanislao still had loans left unpaid:
The rural bank
collected from Estanislao Ilagan P678,848.24 which fully paid 30 of his
32 loan accounts thereby leaving 2 loans totaling P67,000 still unpaid (Annex
II-A).[29]
Among the 32 loans charged against
Estanislao by the CRBI is a loan in the amount of P44,000.00[30]
covered by a promissory note dated
Teofila and Rosario urge that the said
loan should be excluded from the obligations secured by Estanislao’s four mortgaged
properties.
While it is
conceded that the promissory note for P44,000.00 was signed by Teofila
from CRBI on 3 October 1984, or after the death of Estanislao, the circumstances
and reasons for this are adequately explained to show that said amount
represent existing loans of Estanislao contracted
by him prior to his death.
First,
during the RTC trial, the following testimony was elicited from Geminiano Noche:
Estanislao died in August 1983.
According to witness, he allowed Teofila Ilagan to sign the Promissory Note
dated
Secondly, Teofila
and Rosario were definite in their petition in Special Civil Action No. 1701
when they were deemed to have admitted therein that Estanislao was required to
sign promissory notes in blank for the renewal of the unpaid balances of the
original loans, which procedure was followed after Estanislao died on August
1983, but this time thru Teofila.
Based on
the foregoing, it can be established that the Promissory Note dated 3 October
1984 then, although signed after the death of Estanislao on 23 August 1983,
reflect an unpaid balance on the loans obtained by Estanislao from CRBI prior
to his death, and secured by the same properties used as collaterals by him
since he obtained the first loan in 1974.
Hence,
payment for said loan, upon default, can be collected by CRBI by foreclosing on
the mortgaged properties.
Teofila and
Rosario then raised another point by contending that withdrawals were
fraudulently made from Estanislao’s CRBI Savings Account No. 5659 on
a.
Savings Account No. 1382, under the name of Estanislao
Ilagan and/or Teofila Ilagan;
b.
Savings Account No. 5659, under the name Teofila Ilagan
and/or Estanislao Ilagan
c.
Savings Account No. 5659, under the name of Estanislao
Ilagan
d. Savings Account No. 5659, under the name Estanislao Ilagan and/or Teofila Ilagan
Estanislao’s
passbook for Savings Account No. 5659 contained entries of withdrawals made on
Julita
Marasigan, a former cashier of the bank, testified on the bank procedure with
respect to withdrawals made in the bank. We find that the entries in Savings Account
No. 5659, in the name of Estanislao, made on
This was
further corroborated by CRBI President Germiniano Noche, who testified as
follows:
Q: It appears on this page of Exhibit B
that there were several withdrawals made on
A: These withdrawals were in accordance with the standard procedure of the bank when there is an up-dating.
Q: What do you mean by “up-dating”?
A: By “up-dating,” before December 21 comes, the client go (sic) to the bank without the passbook.
Q: What did the client do without the passbook?
A: Requesting the bank in order for her to withdraw.
Q: And was the withdrawal allowed?
A: Because of the good relationship between the client and the bank, we allowed the withdrawal without the passbook.
Q: So these withdrawals made on
A:
This refers to withdrawal before
Q: How come that the withdrawal had entered
only on
A: That had been entered only on
Q: By “client”, to whom are you referring to?
A: Estanislao Ilagan and Teofila Ilagan.
Q: Mr. Noche, according to the petition,
Mr. Estanislao Ilagan died sometime in August, 1983. Now, according to you, she
went to the bank on
ATTY. AGUJO:
Objection, you Honor. In the previous question, your Honor Mr. witness stated that Mr. Estanislao Ilagan and Teofila Ilagan. Then the next question your Honor has a conflict because the line of questioning, it appears that it was only Ms. Ilagan by using the word “she”, your Honor.
COURT:
What is the question?
ATTY. CABAL:
Q:
My question is: How come Mr.
Estanislao Ilagan was able to go to the bank on
COURT: May answer.
A: If there is no Estanislao Ilagan, then there (sic) Teofila Ilagan because this is “and/or”.
Q: What is the meaning of “and/or”?
A: We can enter transaction to the passbook either the daughter or the father.[32]
Witnesses
for CRBI have thus sufficiently explained the circumstances behind the
withdrawals entered on Estanislao’s passbook even after his death.
Teofila and Rosario failed to rebut
the foregoing testimonies. Absent any evidence to the contrary, the Court finds
that the entries made on the passbook of Estanislao were regular and speak of
the correct transactions made by the parties therein.[33]
Special Civil Action No. 1702.
The
evidence on record reveals that Alberto has two unpaid loans with CRBI, particularly:
(a)
loan in the amount of P10,000, covered by
promissory note dated 23 July 1985, which would fall due on 19 April 1986; and
(b)
loan in the amount of P8,200.00, covered by
promissory note dated
The Central
Bank Reports submitted establish an overpayment[34]
by Alberto in
the amount of P3,056.13 to CRBI.
However, page 2 of Central Bank Memorandum[35]
dated
(a)
Alberto Urcia paid to the bank P96,054.23 which
fully paid 10 of his 12 loans thereby leaving 2 loans totaling P18,200
still unpaid (Annex I-A)
(b)
The bank charged Mr. Urcia attorney’s fees of P1,403.17
instead of P1,2221.15 or an overcharge of P182.02 (Annex I-A)
(c)
The rural bank made a net overcharge in interest of P2,874.11.
(Annex I-A)[36]
Jose Galit,
Central Bank Examiner, testified that in computing the overpayment of P3,056.13
by Alberto, his second loan of P8,200.00 was not yet included therein:
Q:
Now, I invite your attention to
page two of the report which was marked as Exhibit A-1 and on the findings of
the Central Bank, your department Alberto Urcia, the respondent stated and I
quote “the bank charged xxx” (Please see Exhibit “A-1” record). If you total
this amount the sum would be P3,056.13. Now Annex “1” of that report which was
marked as Exhibit “A-5” for the following findings of your Department and I
quote “Between the petitioner from November 18, 1980 to December 20, 1985,
complaint was xxx” (NOTE: please see Exhibit “A-4” on record). Second, date
granted
A: No, sir.
Q: What do you mean by that?
A: Because that overcharged (sic) pertains to different loans.
Q: What was the status of loan of Alberto
Urcia as of
A: The two (2) loans were unpaid as of examination.[37]
A more thorough review of the Central Bank
Report would disclose that the supposed overpayment refers to Alberto’s other
loans with CRBI, leaving two loans amounting to P18,000.00 with the same
bank still unpaid.
The
testimony of Jose Galit, taken together with the Central Bank Reports, indicate
that the principal amounts pertaining to Alberto’s two outstanding loans, totaling
P18,200.00, plus interests and other charges thereon, exceed the P3,056.13
overpayment on his other loans with CRBI.
Thus, Alberto is still indebted to CRBI for the principal, interest, and
other charges on the said two loans, less the overpaid amount of P3,056.13
on his other loans.
Alberto
further argues that while his loan matured on P10,000.00, which matured
on P8,200.00,
which became due on
Alberto
insists that the real property covered by TCT No. 32345 stands as security for
the two loans, implying that the obligations are indivisible. We are not persuaded. The documents show that the loans were
obtained and set to mature on two different dates. They are obviously separate and distinct from
each other although secured by the same property. CRBI may collect payment on the loans as each
falls due. CRBI resorted to the
foreclosure of the mortgaged property when Alberto failed to pay his P10,000.00
loan which became due on P8,200.00 loan which, at that time,
had not matured.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with
Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza,
concurring; rollo, pp. 37-45.
[2] Penned by Judge Elino A. Ybanez; rollo, pp. 112-147.
[3] Rollo, p. 60.
[4] The same title serves as collateral for a 23 December 1983
loan due to mature on 18 September 1986; rollo,
p. 62.
[5] Rollo, pp.
65-74.
[6] See Petition in Special Civil Action No. 1701.
[7] Rollo, pp.
66-67.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] The
Minutes of the Auction Sale prepared by the Deputy Sheriff on
[12] Rollo, pp. 102-103.
[13] Issued by Executive Judge Alberto A. Reyes; rollo, pp. 104-106.
[14] CA-G.R. SP Nos. 11227-11230.
[15]
[16] G.R. Nos. 77480-77481.
[17] a) to proceed immediately with the hearing of Special
Civil Action Nos. 1701 and 1072, particularly, to determine whether petitioners
have overpaid their obligations to private respondent bank.
b) to cause without any delay,
the registration of a notice of lis
pendens on the certificate of title of the parcels of land sold at the
auction sale held on
[18] Rollo, p. 147.
[19]
[20]
[21] Respondent
Bank already has in its possession the quedans of Petitioners Urcia in the
amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00).
[22]
Section 1, Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court.
[23] Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 156, 171 (2000) citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 101680, December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA 224, 232.
[24] Philippine National
Bank v. Norman Pike, G.R. No. 157845, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA 328,
339-340.
[25] Fortuna v. People, 401
Phil. 545, 550 (2000).
[26] American Home
Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 565 (1999).
[27] Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R.
No. 142408,
[28] Development Bank of
the
[29] The total amount collected includes interest and other
charges.
[30] Evidenced by promissory note dated
[31] Rollo, p. 134.
[32] TSN,
[33] Presumption of regularity.
[34] Folder of Exhibits, Exh. J.
[35]
[36]
[37] TSN,