THIRD
DIVISION
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REBECCA E. BADIOLA,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, and LERMA G. ABESAMIS, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 170691 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO MORALES,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us
is a Petition for Certiorari[1]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Rebecca E. Badiola (Badiola) seeks to annul, reverse and set
aside (1) the Resolution[2]
dated
The factual
and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Badiola is
the Human Resource Management Officer V of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and is designated as the Chief of the Personnel Division. She is likewise the Head Secretariat of the
DA Promotion and Selection Board (DA-PSB) and the DA Search Committee.
Private
respondent Lerma G. Abesamis (Abesamis), on the other hand, is a Project Development
Officer of the Public Investment Program Division of the DA Planning Service.
On 30 May
2003, Abesamis filed a Complaint-Affidavit[5]
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging Badiola with violating Section
5(a)[6]
of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), Section 3(e) and (f)[7]
of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), Perjury[8],
and Dishonesty and/or Grave Misconduct.
In the
Complaint-Affidavit, Abesamis related that on
In a letter[10]
dated 5 March 2003, then Chairman Bernardino R. Abes (Abes) of the OP Search
Committee returned DA Secretary Lorenzo’s letter of endorsement of Abesamis’s application,
and required instead the submission of (1) the names of at least three nominees for the position, with supporting
documents; and (2) the rating/ranking of the nominees given by the DA-PSB.
Abesamis
alleged that from the time of receipt by the DA of Chairman Abes’s letter on
On
Finally,
Abesamis pointed to the alleged illegality of Badiola’s appointment as Human
Resource Management Officer V (Chief of Division) on
The
administrative complaint was docketed at the Office of the Ombudsman
Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau as
OMB-C-A-03-0186-F, for Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, while the criminal aspect of the complaint was docketed as
OMB-C-C-03-0355-F, for violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No.
3019.
In an Order[15]
dated
On
On
In a
Rejoinder[19] filed
by Badiola, she explained that the erroneous entries were honest mistakes and
that the same were already rectified.
Several
more pleadings and documents[20]
were thereafter filed by the parties before the Ombudsman.
On
[W]ith respect to the charge of Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A.
3019, the essential element of “discharging official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence” is not present in the instant case. In the same token, as regards the charge of
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (f) of R.A. 3019, the essential element of
giving undue advantage in favor of an interested party is lacking herein.
x x x x
Accordingly, it can not be gainsaid that
the [herein petitioner Badiola] acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence since the purported delay is beyond her
control. Furthermore, a reading of the
complaint failed to reveal that “undue injury” has been caused to the [herein
private respondent Abesamis]. In
addition, the actuation of [Badiola] can not be considered as having given
undue advantage to an interested party since the requirements imposed on the
nominees to the position in question appears to apply to all of the said
nominees.
In view of the lack of any sufficient
ground to engender a well founded belief that the respondent committed a
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the only logical recourse is to dismiss the
present case.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is
respectfully recommended that the above-entitled case be DISMISSED, as it is
hereby DISMISSED.
Subsequently,
on
After a careful review of the records of
the case, we conclude, and so hold, that substantial evidence have been adduced
to establish the liability of respondent [Badiola] for Neglect of Duty.
It is beyond question that the official
functions of [Badiola] consist of, among others, the supervision of the
concerned office staff and the submission of data/information of candidates for
appointment/promotion. However, as the
records of the case will reveal, [Badiola] appears to have been remiss in the
performance of the said functions.
For one, it has been shown that the
respondent [Badiola] failed to perform her task of supervising the personnel
under her direction, particularly, Human Resource Management Officer I ROMELIA
A. UFEMIA, resulting in the placing of the name of Undersecretary CHARITO
ELEGIR of the Presidential Management Staff as one of the endorsers in the
application for promotion of the complainant. x x x
From this, it is clear that the respondent
[Badiola] has been remiss in the performance of her duty, i.e., in supervising
the personnel under her charge. Although
this mistake may be considered as innocuous, it apparently has a more
far-reaching repercussion, in that a false endorsement from the Presidential
Management Staff, contained in official records, will have a negative effect on
the application of the complainant [Abesamis].
In addition, the respondent [Badiola]
further failed to perform her supervisory function, by indicating in the same
matrix of short listed applicants for the position of Assistant Director for
the Agricultural Training Institute (pp. 0079, records), that FRANCISCO RAMOS
III, one of the applicants for the ATI position, was a graduate of a masteral
degree in environment and natural resources management, when in fact, record in
the possession of the respondent [Badiola] will show that RAMOS is not yet a
graduate. This again has far-reaching
effects in that it appears to be favorable to the concerned applicant, to the
prejudice of the other applicants for the position.
Again, in the same matrix of short listed
applicants for the position of Assistant Director for the Agricultural Training
Institute (pp. 0081, records), the fact that the complainant [Abesamis] is a
holder of a Masters in Business Administration was omitted, when in fact,
records in the official custody of the respondent [Badiola] will indicate
such. This further shows that the
respondent [Badiola] has apparently failed in the performance of her functions.
x x x x
As discussed above, the performance by the
respondent [Badiola] of her function leaves much to be desired, and for which
the appropriate penalty should be imposed.
In view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, it
is submitted that the medium penalty for the offense of Simple Neglect of Duty
may be imposed against the respondent [Badiola].
WHEREFORE, PREMISES
CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding [petitioner] REBECCA E.
BADIOLA, Guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty, for which the penalty of Suspension
From Office for Three (3) Months Without Pay is hereby recommended, pursuant to
Section 52 B(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.
The Honorable, the Secretary, (sic)
Department of Agriculture is hereby furnished a copy of this Decision for its
implementation in accordance with law, with the directive to inform this Office
of the action taken hereon.
Badiola
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23]
of the above Decision, which the Ombudsman denied in an Order[24]
dated
Badiola
sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari with a Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,[25]
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84623.
In her
petition, Badiola claimed that the Ombudsman erred in holding that she was
remiss in the supervision of the personnel under her charge and that she was
negligent in the performance of her official duties. According to Badiola, the official matrix
that was signed by DA Secretary Lorenzo and submitted to the OP Search Committee showed
the correct qualifications of the applicants, therefore proving that Badiola
did indeed perform her job. Badiola
likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
inasmuch as the implementation of the Ombudsman Decision dated
Badiola
subsequently filed a Supplemental Petition for Review,[27]
in view of the fact that her original petition was instituted without the
services of a counsel and that certain aspects of her case were
overlooked. In the Supplemental
Petition, Badiola further contended that the Ombudsman erred in proceeding with
the administrative case despite the prior dismissal of the criminal aspect that
was based on the same set of facts, and reiterated her prayer for the issuance
of a TRO.
In a
Resolution[28]
dated
For petitioner’s [Badiola’s] failure to
attach copies of pertinent pleadings filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
and a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed Decision
dated January 19, 2004 rendered by the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0186-F as required by Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Court, this Court hereby resolves to DISMISS [the] instant petition.
Thereafter,
Badiola, who apparently had not yet received a copy of the foregoing Resolution
dismissing her petition, filed an Urgent
Motion (To Resolve Application for a Temporary Restraining Order). According to Badiola, on 26 July 2004, she
received a copy of the letter-response[29]
of Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio to DA Secretary Lorenzo’s
inquiry,[30]
informing the latter that in accordance with Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7, as amended,[31]
an Ombudsman administrative disciplinary case may be executed pending appeal
before the Court of Appeals, in the absence of any restraining or status quo
order or preliminary injunction from the appellate court. In view of the imminent danger of sustaining
a grave and irreparable injury through the implementation of the order of
suspension, Badiola again urged the Court of Appeals to immediately issue a
TRO.
On 3 August
2004, Badiola filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion praying for (1) reconsideration of its Resolution dated 20 July
2004 dismissing her petition; and (2) resolution of her Urgent Motion (To
Resolve Application for a Temporary Restraining Order).[32]
In the said
Motion, Badiola enumerated the following documents that were attached to her
original and supplemental Petitions for Review, namely: (1) Legible duplicate
original of the Decision dated
19 January 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0186-F, finding her guilty of
simple neglect of duty and recommending her suspension for three (3) months
without pay; (2) Certified true copy of the Order dated 11 May 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0186-F,
denying her Motion for Reconsideration of the 19 January 2004 Decision; (3)
Certified true copy of the Resolution
dated 10 November 2003 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-03-0355-F, dismissing the
criminal complaint against her; (4) Certified true copy of the letter dated 3 November 2003 of DA
Secretary Lorenzo to OP Search Committee Chairman Abes, endorsing the appointment
of Francisco Ramos III as Assistant Director of ATI and containing a corrected
matrix of short listed applicants; and (5) Certified true copy of the letter dated 5 July 2004 of DA
Secretary Lorenzo to Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, asking for a clarification as
to the implementation of the 19 January 2004 Decision.
Badiola
insisted that the above-mentioned attachments were all certified true copies or
legible duplicate originals as required by Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.[33] Having complied with all the requirements set
forth by the Rules, Badiola argued that a reconsideration by the Court of
Appeals of its 20 July 2004 Resolution dismissing her petition was in order and
that her case should be decided on its merits.
On
In view of the Resolution dated
On
After
requiring Abesamis to submit a Comment[36]
on the said Urgent Reiterating Motion
for reconsideration and resolution, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution[37]
dated
On
In the instant
case, this Court finds the necessity to look into the defenses petitioner
[Badiola] raised in said pleadings if a complete determination of the issues of
the case is to be achieved. No such
compliance was made.
On account of
failure to comply with the Order of this Court, the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner Badiola is DENIED. (Emphasis supplied.)
Still
undeterred, Badiola filed on
In a
Resolution[41]
dated
Before Us is a
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner [Badiola] on
Aforesaid motion
partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration of Our Resolution
dated
Wherefore, in
view of the foregoing, petitioner’s [Badiola’s] Motion for Reconsideration
filed on
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CASE ON ITS MERITS, AND IN
DISMISSING THE APPEALED CASE PURELY ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN PROCEEDING WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE DESPITE THE PRIOR
EXONERATION OF PETITIONER IN THE CRIMINAL CASE BASED ON THE SAME FACTS, ACTS
AND OMISSIONS.[43]
We find the Petition at bar totally devoid of merit.
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65[44] of the Rules of Court is not the appropriate remedy.
A petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1) any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceeding.[45]
Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.[46] On the other hand, a remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency.[47]
Section
7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated
Section 7. Finality and
execution of decision.-Where
the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final,
executory and unappealable.
In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the denial by the Court of Appeals of a petition filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,[48] the party aggrieved may file a motion for reconsideration with the same court. Should this motion be again denied, the case may be elevated to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[49] Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[50]
Hence,
there is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to Badiola in the ordinary course of law,
other than a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. However, instead of already
filing a petition for review under Rule 45 with this Court, Badiola filed
another Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, questioning its
It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in
this case.[51]
A special civil action under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Rule 65 is an
independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if such
loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own neglect or error in the choice of
remedies.[52]
The instant Petition for Certiorari may therefore already be dismissed, as under Rule 56, Section 5(f) of the Revised Rules of Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, as in this case, merits an outright dismissal.
Badiola’s plea for a relaxation of the rules in the interest of substantial justice cannot likewise be heeded. While this Court, indeed, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court,[53] the petition still needs to comply with the reglementary period for filing an appeal under Rule 45. This mandatory requirement is jurisdictional such that failure to do so renders the assailed decision final and executory, and deprives this Court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.[54] Under Section 2 of Rule 45, the petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.
Badiola,
in the instant case, received the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
Even if this Court were to give due course to Badiola’s petition under Rule 65, it would still be dismissible for lack of merit. Badiola claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed her case on purely technical grounds, namely, that she filed a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. This insipid argument, however, fails to convince this Court. Allegations of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated and proved. In this requirement, Badiola was utterly deficient. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the party affected disagrees with it.[56]
The
Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no error, whether of judgment
or jurisdiction, in denying Badiola’s motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated
Hence, the Court of Appeals was correct in denying Badiola’s second motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court explicitly declares that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Such motion is a prohibited pleading, which shall not be allowed, except for ordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave shall have first been obtained.[57] Badiola, however, did not seek any leave to file her second motion for reconsideration nor offer any explanation or reason whatsoever to exempt the same from the general prohibition on second motions for reconsideration.
The only ground upon which Badiola staunchly based her claims in her two motions for reconsideration was, allegedly, her highly meritorious case. According to Badiola, the Ombudsman erred in proceeding with the administrative case and finding her guilty of simple neglect of duty despite her exoneration from the criminal case. By all accounts, her complete innocence and lack of culpability in the criminal case foreclosed any administrative liability on her part.[58]
The Court finds this argument to be entirely incorrect.
Indeed, the well established rule is that the dismissal of the criminal case involving the same set of facts does not necessarily foreclose the continuation of the administrative action or carry with it relief from administrative liability.[59] The case of Tecson v. Sandiganbayan[60] provides elucidation on this very point, thus:
[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public
officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility
for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may
be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful
doing. Thus, if such violation or
wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be
held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal
sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to
suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and
distinct from the penal and civil liabilities.
Furthermore,
a finding of guilt in an administrative case may be sustained for as long as it
is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts
charged.[61] Substantial evidence is defined as that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.[62] On the other hand, criminal proceedings
require a more stringent quantum of proof, which is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. As defined under the law, proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[63] Hence, when Badiola was absolved from
criminal liability, it simply meant that her guilt on the offenses she was charged
with was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
This fact does not and should not in any way bind the outcome of the
administrative case, which requires only substantial evidence to prove her
administrative culpability.
Finally, as aptly observed by the
Ombudsman in its Memorandum[64]
before this Court, the criminal and administrative cases were not at all based
on the same facts as averred by Badiola.
The criminal charges against her were brought about by her alleged act
of deliberately delaying the processing of Abesamis’s application. On the other hand, her administrative
liability was established on the basis of her negligence in the supervision of
the employees under her charge and the performance of her duties as the Head of
the DA-PSB Secretariat.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the
instant Petition for Review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-51.
[2] Rollo, p. 53.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Danilo B. Pine, concurring;Rollo, pp. 408-409.
[4]
[5]
[6] Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are under obligation to:
a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.
[7] Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
[8] Perjury is punishable under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
[9] Rollo, pp. 83-84.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] The following are the subsequent pleadings filed: (1) a Supplemental Rejoinder filed by Badiola on 7 August 2003, (2) an Urgent Manifestation filed by Abesamis on 1 September 2003, (3) a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Badiola on 17 September 2003, (4) an Urgent Manifestation and Motion filed by Abesamis on 21 October 2003, (5) a Counter-Manifestation by Badiola on 27 October 2003, (6) a Memorandum by Badiola on 7 November 2003.
[21] Rollo, pp. 198-208.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Not
[27] Rollo, pp. 289-298.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Section
7. Finality and execution of decision.-Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis ours.)
[32] Rollo, pp. 323-328.
[33] SEC. 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis ours).
[34] Rollo, p. 372.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] The pertinent pleadings included are as follows: (1) Complaint-Affidavit of Abesamis filed before the Ombudsman on 30 May 2003; (2) Counter-Affidavit of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 8 July 2003; (3) Reply-Affidavit of Abesamis filed before the Ombudsman on 17 July 2003; (4) Rejoinder of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 4 August 2003; (5) Supplemental Rejoinder of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 7 August 2003; (6) Urgent Manifestation of Abesamis filed before the Ombudsman on 1 September 2003; (7) Motion for Summary Judgment of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 17 September 2003; (8) Urgent Manifestation and Motion of Abesamis filed before the Ombudsman on 21 October 2003; (9) Counter-Manifestation of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 27 October 2003; (10) Memorandum of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 7 November 2003; (11) Motion for Reconsideration of Abesamis filed before the Ombudsman on 18 November 2003; (12) Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 25 November 2003; (13) Motion for Reconsideration of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 13 April 2004; (14) Comment/Opposition (to the Motion for Reconsideration) of Abesamis filed before the Ombudsman on 27 April 2004; and (15) Reply (to the Comment/Opposition) of Badiola filed before the Ombudsman on 11 May 2004.
[40] Rollo, p. 414.
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44] Section 1 of Rule 65 provides:
Petition for Certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
[45] Ang Biat Huan Sons Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154837, 22 March 2007, 518 SCRA 697, 702-703.
[46] Villanueva v. Porras-Gallardo,
G.R. No. 147688,
[47] San Miguel Corporation v. Court Of Appeals, 425 Phil. 951, 956 (2002).
[48] Section 1 of Rule 43 provides
in part:
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. x x x.
[49] Section 1 of Rule 45 provides:
Section 1. Filing of
petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek
the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency.
[50] San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47 at 956.
[51] Chua
v.
[52]
[53] Some of the instances when a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65
has been considered by the Court as a petition for review under Rule 45
include: (a)
when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and
void; (d) or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. (Metropolitan
[54] People
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394,
[55] Rollo, p. 410.
[56] Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No.
169918,
[57] Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 122472, 20 October 2005, 473 SCRA 490, 496-498.
[58] Rollo, p. 414.
[59] Apolinario v.
[60] 376 Phil 191, 198-199 (1999),
cited in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Torres, G.R. No. 168309,
[61] Velasquez
v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 150732,
[62] Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 5.
[63]
[64] Rollo, pp. 759-788.