FIRST DIVISION
STEEL CORPORATION G.R. Nos. 169829-30
OF THE
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
SCP EMPLOYEES
NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR UNIONS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April
16, 2008
X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The petition is seeking
to set aside the Decision[1] rendered
by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 79446 and 82314, wherein the CA denied the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
79446 while partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as
the Resolution[2] dated
September 22, 2005 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is
engaged in manufacturing construction materials, supplying approximately 50% of
the domestic needs for roofing materials.[3] On
On
conduct of the election with “NAFLU” and “NO UNION” as choices. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the
Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated.[9]
On
On
On
On July 31, 2000, the Med-Arbiter
dismissed FUEL-GAS’ election protest but deferred the request of respondent to
be declared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the
pending petitions with the CA.[16] Not satisfied with the deferment of their
certification as winner, respondent appealed to the Labor Secretary.[17] It further filed a Manifestation before the CA
pointing out that in the
Meanwhile,
on
As a consequence of its certification
as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA
proposals. Petitioner, however, held in
abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for
reconsideration.[22]
Finding
no justification in petitioner’s refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a
Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on
On
On
On
Meanwhile,
in Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated
On
On
Meantime,
in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC, in a Decision[40]
dated
The
petitions before the CA were later consolidated. In CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, herein petitioner
argued that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE OFFICERS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE ITS CONCLUSION THAT [PRIVATE] RESPONDENT HAD CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.[43]
In the other case, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, petitioner herein
argued that:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DIRECTING
PETITIONER TO RECOGNIZE PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE DECISION OF THIS
COURT DIRECTING THE HOLDING OF ANOTHER CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS OWN DECISION IN THE SAME CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY SCPEU-NAFLU IS NOT ILLEGAL.
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES WHO DEFIED THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR.[44]
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 is DENIED while the Petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, decreeing herein contending
parties to comply with the directives of this Tribunal in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721.
SO
ORDERED.
In denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79446, the CA found no cogent reason to reverse the assailed decision of
the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01.
The CA concluded that petitioner’s claims are based on pure allegations
and not supported by any substantial evidence.[46]
In partially granting the petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, the CA reasoned that by virtue of its decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 55721 dated
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[48] which
was denied in the Resolution[49]
dated
Hence, this petition raising the
following issues:
I
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals has
departed from the law and established jurisprudence when it affirmed the
reinstatement of officers who participated in an illegal strike.
ii
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals
seriously erred when it failed to declare as illegal the strike held by the
iii
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals
seriously erred when it failed to invalidate the order of the national labor
relations commission directing the reinstatement of the strikers who defied the
return-to-work order of the labor secretary.
iv
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals committed
a serious error when it ruled that the nlrc has reconsidered its conclusion on
the illegality of the march 2001 strike.
v
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals
committed a serious error when it concluded that the national labor relations
commission may reconsider in the second certified case its decision on the
first certified case which has become final and executory.[50]
Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by
respondent is illegal. To buttress its
claim, petitioner argues that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain
with the latter. Its refusal to
recognize respondent as the bargaining representative of its employees is based
on the directive of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 to conduct another
certification election. Petitioner
maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for holding the strike
was to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike
is a union-recognition-strike, it is illegal.[51]
Petitioner
further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross
violation of the Labor Code, particularly Art. 264,[52]
which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is
pending arbitration between the parties.[53] Since the labor dispute in the first
certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, was still pending compulsory
arbitration at the time of the strike on February 4, 2003, and since the said
strike was based substantially on the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the
strike is illegal by express provision of the law.
Moreover, petitioner adds that the issue
of illegality of the February 2003 strike was already resolved by the NLRC in
Cert. Case No. 000200-01 involving a strike in March 2001 over the same labor
dispute, namely, the alleged refusal of petitioner to recognize
respondent. As such, the NLRC’s decision
in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 constitutes res
judicata in the second certified case, NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.[54]
Petitioner also contends that the
union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to have
lost their employment. Unlike ordinary
members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the employer prove that
they committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an
illegal strike warrants their termination from employment. Consequently, since the strike was illegal,
it follows that the termination from employment of the union officers was warranted.[55]
Petitioner maintains that it was
erroneous on the part of the CA not to have reversed the NLRC decision[56] ordering
the reinstatement of the employees which were dismissed in connection with the
Finally, petitioner avers that the CA
also committed serious errors on procedural issues when it concluded that the
NLRC may reconsider in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 its decision in NLRC NCR CC No.
00253-03.[58]
The
petition is meritorious.
Whether or not respondent is the
recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in the negative. Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA,
it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the only issues left for determination
are: the validity of the strike participated in by the officers of the
respondent union; and the validity of their termination from employment by
reason of such participation.
The strike is a legitimate weapon in
the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most
effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms
and conditions of their employment. But
to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the
attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the
employer. The law provides limits for its
exercise.[59]
In
the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is
patently illegal for the following reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike
which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute
had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of
the Secretary’s return-to-work order.
Respondent’s
notices of strike were founded on petitioner’s continued refusal to bargain
with it. It thus staged the strike to
compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it
a union-recognition-strike. As its legal
designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer
to recognize one’s union and not other contending groups, as the employees’
bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite
the striking union’s doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition
and lack of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the
bargaining unit.[60]
The certification election that was
conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as
valid, it has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of
petitioner. Thus, it could not ask
petitioner to bargain with it. As the
issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been
settled by the court with finality,[61] petitioner
cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain respondent’s
imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannot sustain
the validity of the strike staged on such basis.
Even if this Court were to uphold the
validity of respondent’s purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike
would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the
Secretary’s return-to-work order and after the dispute had been certified for
compulsory arbitration. Although
ostensibly there were several notices of strike successively filed by
respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds – petitioner’s
continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
provides:
When, in his opinion, there exists a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order. If one has already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees
shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to
enforce the same. x x x.[62]
The powers granted to the Secretary
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise
of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he
is granted “great breadth of discretion” to find a solution to a labor
dispute. The most obvious of these
powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its
lifting if one has already taken place.[63]
The moment the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to
national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike.
It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another
order directing a return to work. The
mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically
carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is
not expressly stated in the assumption order.[64]
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be
discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey,
they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.[65]
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. –
x x
x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or
submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Returning
to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of
obligation. The worker must return to
his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can
be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the
Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to
labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of their motives, or the validity
of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all
acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of
Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore
return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the
company, to justify their action.[66]
Respondent, in the instant case,
after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously
contrary to the provisions of labor laws.
Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in
two certified cases which were earlier consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had
respondent respected the CA’s decision.
That way, the collective bargaining agent would have been determined and
petitioner could have been compelled to bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead
opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the
bargaining agent. The strike, having
been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary
to the return-to-work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus
illegal.
Strikes exert disquieting effects not
only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general
peace and progress of
society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life
to or destroy the union and members in their struggle with management for a
more equitable due of their labors.
Hence, the decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on
a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums
of a few, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which
should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike staged by a union, the
general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved.[67]
Having settled that the subject
strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be
imposed on the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.
Article 264 of the Labor Code further
provides:
Art.
264. Prohibited activities.— x x x
Any
workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful
lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates
in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates
in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, that
mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired
by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.
It bears stressing that the law makes
a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal
strike may not be terminated from employment.
It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be
declared to have lost employment
status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union
officer may be terminated from employment.
The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who
participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses
the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.[68]
Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a
standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse
to discharge and preventing management from filling up their positions.[69]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and
its Resolution dated September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED in that the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the
union officers who participated in the illegal strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, rollo, pp. 52-70.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision dated
SO ORDERED.
[16] Rollo, pp. 154-157.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, pp. 55-70.
[31] Rollo, pp. 253-265.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, pp. 19-20.
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40] CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, pp. 35-52.
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44] CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, pp. 21-22.
[45] Rollo, pp. 52-70.
[46]
[47]
[48] CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, pp. 355-380.
[49] Rollo, p. 72.
[50]
[51]
[52] ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES. — (a) x x x.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
[53] Rollo, pp. 18-24.
[54]
[55]
[56] CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, pp. 49-61.
[57] Rollo, pp. 26-30.
[58]
[59] Association
of Independent Unions in the
[60]
[61] In CA-G.R. SP No. 55721.
[62] Emphasis supplied.
[63] Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications and Philcom Corporation, G.R. No. 144315, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 214, 232.
[64] Telefunken
Semiconductors Employees
[65] Supra note 63 at 243.
[66] Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Corporation, G.R. No. 154591, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 349, 363.
[67] Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 164302-03, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 437, 455; Grand Boulevard Hotel v. GLOWHRAIN, 454 Phil. 463, 491; Lapanday Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 95494-97, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 95, 104-105.
[68] Santa
Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. supra at 458-459; See also: Stamford Marketing Corp. v.
Julian, G.R. No. 145496,
[69] Supra note 63 at 243.