EN BANC
ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE, G.R. No. 166809
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
LYN
B. MACALINGAY, JOCELYN
BASTIAN,
LYMAN B. SALVADOR, CARPIO MORALES,
BIENVENIDO
L. REANO, BRIGIDA AZCUNA,
CECILIA
R. ABRATIQUE, JEAN TINGA,
CORTEZ-MARZAN,
FRANCISCO CHICO-NAZARIO,
M.
BILOG, ROSA P. ESPIRITU, VELASCO,
JR.,
ROLANDO
EBREO, YANIE A. NACHURA,
PITLONGAY,
and VIRGILIO REYES,
MAGPOC, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
Respondents. BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner is the Regional Director
of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Region I, whose office is located in
The Affidavit-Complaint reads:
x x
x
4. That on
5.
That on August 5, 1998, I, Brigida Abratique requested
for the use of the government vehicle but the same was denied by Atty. Erece
for the reason that we would be using the same to Teachers Camp as evidenced by
a copy of the denied trip ticket with the marginal notes of Atty. Erece hereto
attached as Annex ‘C’;
6.
That on
7.
That on April 20, 1998, a proposed trip was likewise
postponed by Atty. Erece on the ground that he will be using the vehicle as
evidenced by a copy of the proposed Itinerary of Travel with marginal note of
Atty. Erece xxx;
8.
That on April, 1997, I, Atty. Jocelyn Bastian requested
for the use of the vehicle as I need[ed] to go to the Benguet Provincial Jail
but I was instructed to commute because he will use the vehicle. To my dismay, I found him still in the office
when I returned from the Provincial Jail;
9.
That such denials of the use of the vehicle are not
isolated cases but were just a few of the numerous instances of conflicts of
schedules regarding the use of the government vehicle and where we found
ourselves always at the losing end because we are the subordinate
employees;
x x x
13. That Atty. Erece regularly receives and
liquidates his Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA) which at
present is in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), the payroll
of such and its liquidation could be
made available upon request by an authority to the Resident Auditor but his
liquidations for the month of April 1998 and September 1998 [are] hereto
attached xxx;
14. That despite regular receipt of his RATA, Atty. Erece still prioritizes himself in the use of the office vehicle to the detriment of the public service;
15. That to compound things, he certifies in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that ‘HE DID NOT USE ANY GOVERNMENT VEHICLE FOR THE SAID MONTH’ xxx which is a big lie because as already stated, he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued to CHR, Region I;
16. That I, Rolando C. Ebreo, the disbursing
officer of the Regional Field Office hereby attest to the fact that no
deductions in the RATA of Atty. Romeo L. Erece was ever done in connection with
his regular use of the government vehicle x x x.”[2]
The CSC-Cordillera Administrative
Region issued an Order dated
In compliance, petitioner countered, thus:
x x
x
4. In relation to paragraphs 2-D, 2-E and
2-G above cited, it is among the duties as per management supervisory function
of the Regional HR Director to approve use or non-use of the official vehicle
of the Region as it was memorandum receipted to him and the non-approval of the
use of the same if it is not arbitrary and for justifiable reasons; said
function of approval and disapproval rests on the Regional Human Rights
Director and that function is not merely ministerial;
5. That I have issued a guideline that the
official vehicle will not be used for the Mountain Provinces and Halsema
Highway/Mountain Trail because of the poor road condition and to prevent
breakdown and early deterioration of same xxx;
6. That Atty. Lynn B. Macalingay, one of
the complainants had gone to Mt. Province to attend the Provincial Peace and
Order Council meetings, conduct jail visitations and follow-up cases on many
occasions using the regular bus trips in the spirit of the policy as mentioned
in paragraph 4 xxx;
7. That all employees had used the vehicle
on official business without exception, all complainants included xxx;
8. On
9. On
‘a) The vehicle was available since
b) On August 6, 1998, a DECS-CHR Seminar
on Use Human Rights Exemplar was held at the Teacher’s Camp Baguio City and the
vehicle was used to transport HR materials, overhead projector and for the
overall use of the seminar upon the request of the Public Information and
Education Office, Central Office, Commission on Human Rights through Susan
Nuguid of CHR, Manila;
x x x
d)
That Mrs. Abratique and Co. were asked to explain the
unreasonable delay to attend to the case of Cherry Esteban which was subject of
the disapproved travel;’
10.
On April 20, 1998, the itinerary of
travel of Lyman Salvador was RESCHEDULED
from April 22 & 23, 1998 to April 23 & 24, 1998 as the vehicle
was used by Atty. Erece on an important travel to Manila upon order of no less
than the Honorable Chairperson, Aurora Navarette-Reciña of Commission on Human
Rights xxx;
x x x
12. As to the use of the vehicle by the Regional HR Director, same shall be subject to the allowance/disallowance of the COA Resident Auditor, likewise the Regional HR Director in all his travels outside Baguio City, he does not claim bus and taxi fares per certification of Danilo Balino, the Administrative Officer Designate and Mr. Rolando Ebreo, the Cash Disbursing Officer, Annex ‘Z’;
13. In many cases, Atty. Romeo L. Erece has to maintain the vehicle including car washing thereof, garage parking at his residence to maintain and upkeep the vehicle and same is still in premium condition to the satisfaction of the office at no extra cost to the Commission;
x x x
15.
In support
thereof, we move to dismiss this case as
pure question on supervisory and management prerogative, which is reserved for
the Office Head and a harassment move by disgruntled employees who are
counter-charged hereof;
16.
Annexes ‘E’ and ‘F’ of the complaint [are] misplaced
and misleading because a clear and cognate reading of same does not reflect
that I checked/marked the use of government vehicle in the certification and as
such no dishonesty is involved; the documents speak for themselves. x x x Annex ‘E’ is for the month of April, 1998
where the check marks are clear. On
Annex ‘F’ of the complaint, no reference is made as to the fact that I did not
use the government vehicle, if so, no allegation as to when I did use same for
my personal use.”[3]
After a fact-finding investigation,
the CSC Proper in CSC Resolution No. 99-1360 dated July 1, 1999 charged
petitioner with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle
in spite of his receipt of the monthly transportation allowance and for
certifying that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact, he did, in
order to receive the transportation allowance.
Pertinent portions of the formal
charge read:
1. That
despite the regular receipt of Erece of his monthly Representation and
Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the amount of P4,000.00, he still
prioritizes himself in the use of the office vehicle (Tamaraw FX) in spite of
the directive from the Central Office that he cannot use the service vehicle
for official purposes and at the same time receive his transportation
allowance;
2. That
Erece did not comply with the directive of the Central Office addressed to all
Regional Human Rights Directors, as follows: ‘to regularize your receipt of the
transportation allowance component of the RATA to which you are entitled
monthly, you are hereby directed to immediately transfer to any of your staff,
preferably one of your lawyers, the memorandum receipt of the vehicle(s) now
still in your name;’
3. That
he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that he did not use any
government vehicle for the corresponding month, which is not true because he is
the regular user of the government vehicle issued to CHR-Region I.
The
foregoing facts and circumstances indicate that government service has been
prejudiced by the acts of Erece.
WHEREFORE,
Romeo L. Erece is hereby formally charged with Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct. Accordingly, he is given five
(5) days from receipt hereof to submit his Answer under oath and affidavits of
his witnesses, if any, to the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). On his
Answer, he should indicate whether he elects a formal investigation or waives
his right thereto. Any Motion to
Dismiss, request for clarification or Bills of Particulars shall not be
entertained by the Commission. Any of
these pleadings interposed by the respondent shall be considered as an Answer
and shall be evaluated as such.
Likewise, he is advised of his right to the assistance of counsel of his
choice.[4]
After a formal investigation of the
case, the CSC issued Resolution No. 020124, dated January 24. 2002, finding petitioner
guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and penalizing him with dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a petition for
review of the CSC Resolution with the CA.
In the Decision promulgated on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.[5]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises these issues:
1.
Whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was not denied due
process despite the admitted facts that respondents failed to identify and
testify on their Affidavit-Complaint and that petitioner was denied of his
right to cross-examine respondents on their Affidavit-Complaint.
2.
Whether
or not the Court of Appeals was correct in adopting in toto the conclusions of the CSC although they were based on mere
assumptions.
Petitioner contends that he was
denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. He stated
that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case,
he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his
Counter-Affidavit. After he rested his
case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their
position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the
CSC over his (petitioner’s) objection. Respondents
then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Petitioner submits that although he
was allowed to present evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver
of his right to cross-examine the complainants.
Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity
with the procedure, still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his
right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly
waived said right.
The Court agrees with the CA that
petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine the
complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard
and present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.[6]
Velez v. De Vera[7]
held:
Due
process of law in administrative cases is not identical with “judicial process”
for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they
rest upon different principles. The due
process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements
are not technical. Thus, in certain
proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are
not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a
regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential
that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there
is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the
making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process
requires. . . .
The
right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential. .
. . [8]
Next, petitioner contends that the CA
erred in adopting in toto the
conclusions of the CSC.
Petitioner contends that the
conclusion of the CSC proceeded from the premise that the petitioner was using
the subject vehicle as his service vehicle, which he disputes, because he did
not use the vehicle regularly. The
evidence showed that the service vehicle was being used by the employees of the
regional office for official purposes. He argues that although the service
vehicle is still in his name, it should not be concluded that it is assigned to
him as his service vehicle, thus disqualifying him from receiving
transportation allowance.
The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent conclusion of the CSC referred
to by petitioner reads:
At
the outset, it must be stated that the entitlement to transportation allowance
by certain officials and employees pursuant to RA 6688 presupposes that they
are not assigned government vehicles.
This was clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Aida Domingo vs.
COA, G.R. No. 112371,
‘The
provision of law in point is found in Section 28 of Republic Act 6688, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1989, to wit:
Sec.
28. Representation and Transportation Allowances. ... The transportation
allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials who are assigned
a government vehicle or use government motor transportation, except as may be
approved by the President of the
x
x x
In
the case of Bustamante vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 134, decided by
this Court on
The
issue need no longer be belabored for no less than this Court ruled in the
aforesaid case that a government official, to whom a motor vehicle has been
assigned, cannot, at the same time, claim transportation allowance. (Underscoring
supplied)
It
is clear from the records that Director Edmundo S. Ancog, CHR-Central office
(Field Operations office), issued a Memorandum dated February 27, 1998,
addressed to all CHR Regional Directors in respect to Transportation
Allowance. The Memorandum states that
transportation allowance shall not be granted to Regional Directors whenever a
government vehicle or use of government motor transportation is already
assigned to them. It further emphasized
that should they want to “avail regularization of their RATA,” the Regional
Directors must immediately transfer the vehicle to any of their staff/lawyer.
Records
show that Erece was issued a government vehicle since
The foregoing facts logically lead to the conclusion that the act of Erece in certifying that he has not used any government vehicle and consequently collecting Transportation Allowance despite the fact that a government vehicle was assigned to him constitutes the offenses of Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.[9]
The above conclusion,as well as the
Memorandum dated
Contrary to the argument of
petitioner, there is no qualification that the assigned vehicle should be for
the exclusive use of the service vehicle of the regional director alone to
disqualify him from receiving transportation allowance.
Since the records show that petitioner collected
transportation allowance even if a government vehicle had been assigned to him,
the CA did not err in sustaining the decision of the CSC finding petitioner
guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and penalizing him with dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
(On Leave)
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE
O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice