THIRD DIVISION
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SOLID HOMES,
INC., Petitioner, - versus - EVELINA
LASERNA and GLORIA CAJIPE, represented by PROCESO F. CRUZ, Respondents. |
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G.R. No.
166051 Present: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., Acting
Chairperson, TINGA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1)
the Decision[1]
dated 21 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82153, which
denied and dismissed the Petition filed before it by the petitioner for lack of
merit; and (2) the Resolution[2]
dated 10 November 2004 of the same court, which denied the petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
The factual antecedents of this case
are as follows:
On P172,260.00, to be paid in the
following manner: (1) the P33,060.00 down payment should be paid upon
the signing of the contract; and (2) the remaining balance of P166,421.88[4]
was payable for a period of three years at a monthly installment of P4,622.83
beginning 1 April 1977. The respondents made
the down payment and several monthly installments. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90%
of the purchase price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of
Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon
the final payment of the balance. But
the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the respondents.
The respondents whereupon filed
against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed
of Sale with Damages, dated P5,928.18,
they were already demanding the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and
the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the said amount. The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit
Answer,[5]
together with its Answer[6]
dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no cause of action
against it because the respondents failed to show that they had complied with
their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the respondents had not yet
paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view of the said non-payment, the
petitioner considered the Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and
rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the same contract.
On
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner
appealed[10]
the aforesaid Decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The case was then docketed as HLURB Case No.
REM-A-1298.
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the [D]ecision of [HLURB] Arbiter Gerardo Dean dated
1.
[Herein respondent][12]
is hereby directed to pay the balance of P11,585.41 within the (sic)
thirty (30) days from finality of this [D]ecision.
2. [Herein petitioner] is hereby directed to execute the necessary deed of sale and deliver the TCT over the subject property immediately upon full payment.
3. [Petitioner] is hereby directed to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees other than those authorized by P.D. 957 and other related laws. [13] (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner remained unsatisfied with
the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, thus, it appealed the same
before the Office of the President, wherein it was docketed as O.P. Case No.
5919.
After evaluating the established facts
and pieces of evidence on record, the Office of the President rendered a
Decision[14]
dated
Resultantly, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration[15]
of the
The petitioner thereafter elevated its
case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review under Rule 43[17]
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82153,
raising the following issues, to wit: (1) the Honorable Office of the President
seriously erred in merely adopting by reference the findings and conclusions of
the HLURB Board of Commissioners in arriving at the questioned [D]ecision; and
(2) the Honorable Office of the President seriously erred in not dismissing the
complaint for lack of cause of action.[18]
On 21 July 2004, the appellate court
rendered a Decision denying due course and dismissing the petitioner’s Petition
for Review for lack of merit, thus affirming the Decision of the Office of the
President dated 10 June 2003, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant [P]etition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.[19] (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but, it was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues
for this Court’s resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WHICH MERELY ADOPTS BY REFERENCE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE [HLURB], IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT THE DECISION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND LAW TO ARRIVE AT A DECISION; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENTS LACKS CAUSE OF ACTION.[20]
In
its Memorandum,[21]
the petitioner alleges that the Decision of the Office of the President, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which merely adopted by reference the
Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, without a recitation of the facts
and law on which it was based, runs afoul of the mandate of Section 14, Article
VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that: “No decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.” The Office of the President, being a
government agency, should have adhered to this principle.
Petitioner further avers that a full
exposition of the facts and the law upon which a decision was based goes to the
very essence of due process as it is intended to inform the parties of the
factual and legal considerations employed to support a decision. The same was not complied with by the Office
of the President when it rendered its one-page Decision dated
Lastly, petitioner argues that the
Complaint filed against it by the respondents stated no cause of action because
the respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject
property. The right of action of the
respondents to file a case with the HLURB would only accrue once they have
fulfilled their obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price for the
subject property. Hence, the
respondents’ Complaint against the petitioner should have been dismissed
outright by the HLURB for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of
action.
The Petition is unmeritorious.
The constitutional mandate that, “no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,”[22]
does not preclude the validity of
“memorandum decisions,” which
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decisions of inferior tribunals.[23] In fact, in Yao v. Court of Appeals,[24]
this Court has sanctioned the use of “memorandum decisions,” a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts
in accordance with the provisions of Section 40,[25]
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,[26]
on the grounds of expediency,
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. This Court likewise declared that “memorandum
decisions” comply with the constitutional mandate.[27]
This Court found in Romero v. Court of Appeals[28]
that the Court of Appeals substantially complied with its constitutional duty
when it adopted in its Decision the findings and disposition of the Court of
Agrarian Relations in this wise:
“We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial court’s factual findings and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt, by way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision.” (Underscoring supplied)
In Francisco
v. Permskul,[29]
this Court similarly held that the following memorandum decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
“MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful perusal,
evaluation and study of the records of this case,
this Court hereby adopts by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro
“WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.” (Underscoring supplied.)
Hence, incorporation by reference is
allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the
lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.[30]
However, also in Permskul,[31]
this Court laid down the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions,
to wit:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
x x x x
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with
the requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the
occasions when they may be rendered. Any
deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.[32]
In the case at bar, we quote verbatim the Decision dated
This resolves the appeal
filed by [herein petitioner] Solid Homes, Inc. from the [D]ecision of the
[HLURB] dated [
After a careful study and thorough evaluation of the records of the case, this Office is convinced by the findings of the HLURB, thus we find no cogent reason to depart from the assailed [D]ecision. Therefore, we hereby adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the aforesaid [D]ecision, copy of which is hereto attached as “Annex A.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[33] (Emphasis supplied).
It must be stated that Section 14, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the
case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial
proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled “Judiciary,” and all of its
provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of
government. Certainly, it would be error
to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative
agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.
The rights of parties in administrative
proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due
process has been satisfied.[34]
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR,
we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as
follows:
1)
The right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2)
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3)
The decision must have something to support itself.
4)
The evidence must be substantial.
5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
6)
The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7)
The board or body should, in all controversial
question, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.[35]
As can be seen above, among these
rights are “the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;” and that the decision be rendered “in such a manner that the parties
to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered.” Note that there
is no requirement in Ang Tibay that
the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based. For as long as the
administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that
sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision,
the due process requirement is satisfied.
At bar, the Office of the President
apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient, and said
so in its own Decision. The brevity of
the assailed Decision was not the product of willing concealment of its factual
and legal bases. Such bases, the
assailed Decision noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the
parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be
able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, it bears observation that
while decisions of the Office of the President need not comply with the
constitutional requirement imposed on courts under Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution, the Rules of Court may still find application, although
suppletory only in character and apply only whenever practicable and
convenient. There is no mandate that
requires the application of the Rules of Court in administrative proceedings.
Even assuming arguendo that the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner
applies in the instant case, the decision of the OP satisfied the standards set
forth in the case of Permskul.
Firstly,
the Decision of the Office of the President readily made available to the parties a copy of the Decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners, which it adopted and affirmed in toto, because it was attached as an annex to its Decision.
Secondly, the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the HLURB Board of Commissioners have been embodied in
the Decision of the Office of the President and made an indispensable part
thereof. With the attachment of a copy
of the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Decision of the
Office of the President, the parties reading the latter can also directly
access the factual and legal findings adopted from the former. As the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in its
Decision dated
Thirdly, it was categorically stated in
the Decision of the Office of the President that it conducted a careful study
and thorough evaluation of the records of the present case and it was fully
convinced as regards the findings of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.
And lastly, the facts of the present case
were not contested by the parties and it can be easily determined by the
hearing officer or tribunal. Even the
respondents admitted that, indeed, the total purchase price for the subject
property has not yet been fully settled and the outstanding balance is yet to
be paid by them. In addition, this case
is a simple action for specific performance with damages, thus, there are
neither doctrinal complications involved in this case that will require an
extended discussion of the laws involved.
Accordingly, based on close scrutiny
of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court rules that the said
Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative
due process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The Office of the President did not
violate petitioner’s right to due process when it rendered its one-page
Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe
to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-informed as
to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as
the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the
President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of
the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner would
not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and make a
presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and
the issues involved in its case.
This Court
also quotes with approval the following declaration of the Court of Appeals in
its Decision on the alleged violation of petitioner’s right to due process:
The contention of the [herein] petitioner that the said [D]ecision runs afoul to the Constitutional provision on due process cannot be given credence. The case already had gone through the Offices of the HLURB Arbiter and the Board of Commissioners where petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and present its evidence, before the case reached the Office of the President which rendered the assailed [D]ecision after a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented. What is important is that the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before the [D]ecision was rendered. To nullify the assailed [D]ecision would in effect be a violation of the Constitution because it would deny the parties of the right to speedy disposition of cases.[37]
Petitioner’s assertion that
respondents’ complaint filed with the HLURB lacked a cause of action deserves
scant consideration.
Section 7 of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure states that:
Section 7. Dismissal of the Complaint or Opposition. – The Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA) to whom a complaint or opposition is assigned may immediately dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction or cause of action. (Emphasis supplied).
It is noticeable that the afore-quoted
provision of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure used the word “may” instead of
“shall,” meaning, that the dismissal of a complaint or opposition filed before
the HLURB Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action is simply permissive and not directive. The HLURB Arbiter has the discretion of
whether to dismiss immediately the complaint or opposition filed before him for
lack of jurisdiction or cause of action, or to still proceed with the hearing
of the case for presentation of evidence.
HLURB Arbiter Dean in his Decision explained thus:
This Office is well aware of instances when complainants/petitioners fail, through excusable negligence, to incorporate every pertinent allegations (sic) necessary to constitute a cause of action. We will not hesitate to go outside of the complaint/petition and consider other available evidences if the same is necessary to a judicious, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of the issues laid before us or when there are reasons to believe that the [com]plaints are meritorious. “Administrative rules should be construed liberally in order to PROMOTE THEIR OBJECT AND ASSIST THE PARTIES IN OBTAINING A JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES” (Mangubat vs. de Castro, 163 SCRA 608).[38] (Emphasis supplied).
Given the fact that the respondents
have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject property so they
have yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and
the TCT, nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB Arbiter’s discretion to
proceed hearing the respondents’ complaint in pursuit of a judicious, speedy
and inexpensive determination of the parties’ claims and defenses.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
already sufficiently addressed the issue of lack of cause of action in its
Decision, viz:
The Offices below, instead of dismissing the complaint because of the clear showing that there was no full payment of the purchase price, decided to try the case and render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented. The complaint of the respondents does not totally lack cause of action because of their right against the cancellation of the contract to sell and the forfeiture of their payments due to non-payment of their monthly amortization.
xxxx
The HLURB Arbiter in his [D]ecision, stated that it is undisputed that the contract price is not yet fully paid. This was affirmed by the HLURB Board of Commissioners and the Office of the President. No less than the respondents admitted such fact when they contended that they are willing to pay their unpaid balance. Without full payment, the respondents have no right to compel the petitioner to execute the Deed of Sale and deliver the title to the property. xxx.
xxxx
Lastly, notwithstanding such failure to pay the monthly amortization, the petitioner cannot consider the contract as cancelled and the payments made as forfeited.
Section 24, PD 957 provides:
“Section 24. Failure to pay installments. - The rights of the buyer in the event of his failure to pay the installments due for reasons other than the failure of the owner or developer to develop the project shall be governed by Republic Act No. 6552. x x x.”
Section 4, RA 6552 or the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act provides:
“Section 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the installment became due. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act.”
It is therefore clear from the above provisions that the petitioner cannot consider the [C]ontract to [S]ell as cancelled. The requirements above should still be complied with.[39] (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, during the hearing conducted by
HLURB Arbiter Dean, it became apparent that respondents’ cause of action
against petitioner is not limited to the non-execution and non-delivery by
petitioner of the Deed of Sale and TCT of the subject property, which is
dependent on their full payment of the purchase price thereof; but also the
wrongful rescission by the petitioner of the Contract to Sell. By virtue thereof, there is ample basis for
HLURB Arbiter Dean not to dismiss respondents’ complaint against petitioner and
continue hearing and resolving the case.
As
a final point. Based on the records of
this case, respondents have tendered payment in the amount of P11,584.41,[40]
representing the balance of the purchase price of the subject property, as
determined in the
Since petitioner did not rescind the
Contract to Sell it executed with the respondents by a notarial act, the said
Contract still stands. Both parties must
comply with their obligations under the said Contract. As ruled by the HLURB Board of Commissioners,
and affirmed by the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals, the
respondents must first pay the balance of the purchase price of the subject
property, after which, the petitioner must execute and deliver the necessary
Deed of Sale and TCT of said property.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring, rollo, pp. 10-17.
[2]
[3]
[4] The remaining balance of P166,421.88
was inclusive of 12% interest rate per annum.
The said 12% interest rate per annum was payable monthly to be included
in the monthly amortization for a period of three years. Thus, the P4,622.83 monthly
installments were already inclusive of the said interest [Section 1, Contract
to Sell, rollo, p. 44].
[5]
[6]
[7] Penned by HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean, id. at 69-76.
[8] Otherwise known as “The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree.” It was signed into law on
[9] Rollo, p. 76.
[10]
[11] Penned by Commissioner Luis T. Tungpalan, with Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer Ernesto C. Mendiola and Assistant Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Ex-Officio Commissioner Joel L. Altea, concurring, id. at 95-98.
[12] It should be “herein respondents” [the complainants below]. In the dispositive part of the Board’s Decision, what was written was “complainant is hereby…” But, a careful reading of the Board’s Decision would show that there was more than one complainant in the Complaint filed before the HLURB.
[13] Rollo, p. 98.
[14] Penned by Undersecretary Enrique D. Perez, id. at 99-103.
[15]
[16]
[17] Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals.
[18] Rollo, p. 114.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
[23] Oil
and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323,
[24] G.R. No. 132428,
[25] SEC. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. – Every decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based, which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed from.
[26] Also known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.”
[27]
[28] No. L-59606,
[29] G.R. No. 81006,
[30] Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23 at 44-45.
[31] Francisco v. Permskul, supra note 29 at 335-337.
[32]
[33] Rollo, p. 99.
[34] Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
[35] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[36]
[37] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41] G.R. No. 149756,
[42]