GENEVIEVE O. GAAS and ADELINA P.
GOMERA, Petitioners, - versus - RASOL L. MITMUG, Regional Director,
Region XII, Commission on Audit, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 165776
Present: Puno,
C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,* Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: April
30, 2008 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioners Genevieve O. Gaas and Adelina P. Gomera
were the bookkeeper and senior clerk, respectively, of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer,
On May 15, 1990, in accordance with Regional Office
Order No. 90-27-A dated May 7, 1990, the State Auditors and Technical Audit
Specialist of the Provincial Auditor’s Office and the City Auditor’s Office
conducted a cash examination as part of a comprehensive audit on the cash and
accounts of Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Assistant Municipal Treasurer Saturnino L. Burgos of Bacolod, Lanao del Norte. They discovered that there was a shortage of
cash in the possession of petitioners as follows: (1) P19,483.20 in the possession of
petitioner Gaas, representing disallowed vales or chits; and (2) P29,956.28
in the possession of petitioner Gomera, also
representing disallowed vales or chits.
Gaas explained to the auditors that she was tasked to receive
liquidations of collections from the Revenue Collection Clerks and was
instructed by P25,648.80 from the collections in
her possession for the payment of various expenses to be incurred by the
General Fund; and that P19,483.20 was disallowed for reimbursement. Gomera, on the other hand, explained that she
was made to draw a cash advance out of the liquidated collections in the amount
of P25,648.80; and that the shortage consisted of chits of municipal
officers and employees, which were submitted to her for deduction from their
respective monthly salaries; but the said chits were disallowed. Both petitioners settled the missing cash
upon demand.
Based on the comprehensive audit report submitted by
the auditors, the Commission on Audit (COA) sent a Letter[4] dated
On
The Office of the Ombudsman for
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondents Genevieve O. [G]aas,
Adelina P. Gomera and Nelson L. Gonzales are hereby found GUILTY of Gross
Neglect of Duty. Pursuant to the
provision of Sec. 23 (c), Rule XIV, Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
91-1631 dated
The Municipal Mayor shall implement this decision within ten (10) days
from the date that it shall have become final and executory.
The complaint against Mayor Warlino M. Relova is hereby dismissed,
without prejudice to the result of the investigation of the criminal aspect of
these same acts.
SO DECREED.[7]
Petitioners filed respective motions for
reconsideration which were denied.
Thereafter, they filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman for
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[8]
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the
Deputy Ombudsman for
. . . The comprehensive audit report submitted by public respondent
Commission on Audit, Region [XII], Cotabato City,
reported that the shortages of cash by the petitioners was due to the
disallowed cash advances (vales or chits) made by the municipal
employees; that such cash advances were made through the petitioners per
instructions of Saturnino Burgos, the Assistant Municipal Treasurer-OIC, who at
that time appointed the petitioners as special disbursing officers; that
appointing the petitioners as special disbursing officers was strictly
prohibited since such [positions were] incompatible to the petitioners’
positions as municipal bookkeeper and unbonded senior clerk. The petitioners themselves admitted such
findings but raised as a defense the alleged scheme by
It is true that their immediate superior,
Thus, this petition.
Petitioners argue that there was a misapprehension of
facts by the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals since the shortage happened
when the funds were still in the possession of the collectors and not
petitioners. They also lament that
although the complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
as early as November 18, 1991, the order for them to file their
counter-affidavits was made only on June 16, 1995 or more than three years
after and the case was resolved only on October 23, 1997. According to them, the delay violated their
constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case.
On the other hand, respondent counters that questions
of facts, particularly as to who disbursed the funds as argued by petitioners,
is not the proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court. Respondent also argues
that petitioners cannot raise the issue on the alleged violation of their right
to a speedy trial for the first time on appeal.
The issues raised by petitioners for our resolution
are:
I.
WHETHER OR
NOT THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY BOTH THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS; and
II.
[WHETHER OR
NOT] THE OMBUDSMAN VIOLATED ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE, CONSTITUTING DEPRIVATION OF
APPELLANT[S’]/PETITIONERS’ RIGHTS TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS.[10]
On the other hand, respondent posits the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE INSTANT PETITION RAISES REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF FACT OR OF LAW AS TO
JUSTIFY A REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
II.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE PETITIONER MAY RAISE BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT FOR REVIEW AN ISSUE
WHICH WAS NEVER RAISED BELOW.[11]
The primordial issues of the case are: (1) Did the Ombudsman commit an error of fact
in concluding that petitioners are guilty of gross neglect of duty? and (2)
Were petitioners’ rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the
case violated?
As to the first issue, this Court has held that any
appeal or application for remedy against a decision or finding of the Office of
the Ombudsman may only be entertained by the Supreme Court on a pure question
of law. Section 14 of Republic Act No.
6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that “[n]o court shall hear any
appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.” Moreover, Section 27 of the said Act provides
further that “[f]indings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.”[12]
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight
especially when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is only when there is grave abuse of
discretion by the Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be
made.[13]
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Ombudsman and uphold its finding which was upheld by the Court of Appeals
that there is substantial evidence against petitioners for violating government
accounting and auditing rules and making disbursements without proper
documentation.
As to the second issue, we rule that there was no
violation of petitioners’ rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition
of the case.
The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the
right to speedy trial, is violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay are the factors to consider and balance. A mere mathematical reckoning of time involved
would not be sufficient.[14]
In this case, although it is true that the Complaint
was filed on November 18, 1991 and petitioners received an Order[15] directing them to
submit their counter-affidavits only three years after or on June 16, 1995,
they failed to raise the issue of speedy disposition of the case at that
time. Instead, they submitted their
counter-affidavits. It was only in this
petition that they first raised the issue.
Neither have they moved for a speedy resolution of the case. It was only when they lost and pursued their
appeal that they first raised the issue.
It cannot therefore be said that the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
Petitioners cannot now seek the protection of the law to benefit from
the adverse effects of their failure to raise the issue at the first
instance. In effect, they are deemed to
have waived their rights when they filed their counter-affidavits after they
received the Order dated
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
||
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* On leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 126-134. Penned by
Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Morong Water District v. Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 116754, March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 363, 369.
[13] Bedruz v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 161077,
[14] Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146368-69,
[15] Rollo, p. 70.