Republic of the
Supreme Court
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G.R.
No. 162195 |
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INC., |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., |
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Acting Chairperson, |
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versus - |
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TINGA,* |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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REYNALDO
CHUA, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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April 8, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court wherein Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.
(petitioner) assails the August 28, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the December
23, 1998 Decision and February 15, 1999 Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC); and the February 19, 2004 CA Resolution,[2] denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner adopted the following
findings of fact of the CA:
Private respondent Reynaldo Chua
was hired by the petitioner shipping company, Bahia
Shipping Services, Inc., as a restaurant waiter on board a luxury cruise ship
liner M/S Black Watch pursuant to a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) approved employment contract dated
On
On
The private respondent alleged
that he was paid only US$300.00 per month as monthly salary for five (5) months
instead of US$410.00 as stipulated in his employment contract. Thus, he claimed
that he was underpaid in the amount of US$110.00 per month for that same period
of five (5) months. He further asserted that his salaries were also deducted US$20.00
per month by the petitioner for alleged union dues. Private respondent argued
that it was his first offense committed on board the vessel. He adverted
further that the petitioner has no proof of being a member of the AMOSUP or the
ITF to justify its claim to deduct the said union dues [from] his monthly
salary.
The petitioner disputed the said
allegations of the private respondent by arguing that it received a copy of an
addendum to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) from the petitioner's
principal, Blackfriars Shipping Company, Ltd.
Consequently, the petitioner requested permission from the POEA through a
letter dated
The Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Declaring [petitioner]
2. Directing the aforenamed
[petitioner] BSSI and its foreign principal BSCL to pay, jointly and severally,
[private respondent] Reynaldo Chua the following money claims as earlier
computed:
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Reimbursement/Refund of
Plane Fare |
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US$ 638.99 |
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Illegal Deductions (“Union Dues”) |
---- |
100.00 |
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Differential Pay
(Underpayment of Wages) |
---- |
550.00 |
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========== |
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US$1,288.99 |
convertible to Philippine currency upon actual payment.
3. Directing the aforenamed
[petitioner] BSSI and its foreign principal BSCL to pay, jointly and severally,
the [private respondent] Reynaldo Chua ten (10%) percent attorney's fees based
on the total monetary award.
4. Dismissing the other money claims and/or
charges of [private respondent] Reynaldo Chua for lack of factual and legal
basis.
SO
ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which issued on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED in that the award
on the unexpired portion of the contract is deducted the amount equivalent to a
day's work of complainant. The other findings stand AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
NLRC denied the same in a Resolution dated
Respondent did not question the
foregoing NLRC decision and resolution.
Upon
a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner, the CA rendered the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
decision dated December 23, 1998, and the resolution dated February 15, 1999,
of the public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the monetary award representing the salary of the petitioner for the unexpired
portion of the contract which is limited to three (3) months under Republic Act
No. 8042 is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The
CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
And so, the
present petition raising the following issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals could
grant additional affirmative relief by increasing the award despite the fact
that respondent did not appeal the decision of both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC.
b) Whether or not reporting for work one and
one-half (1˝) hours late and abandoning his work are valid grounds for
dismissal.
c) Whether or not respondent is entitled to
overtime pay which was incorporated in his award for the unexpired portion of
the contract despite the fact that he did not render overtime work, and whether
or not, it is proper for the NLRC to award money claims despite the fact that the
NLRC decision, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, did not state clearly the
facts and the evidence upon which such conclusions are based.[8]
It is noted that petitioner does not
question the monetary awards under Item Nos. 2 and 3 of the dispositive
portion of the LA Decision, which were affirmed in toto
by the NLRC and CA.
The issues will be resolved jointly.
The LA declared the dismissal of
respondent illegal for the reason that the infraction he committed of being
tardy by 1˝ hour should not have been penalized by petitioner with the ultimate
punishment of termination; rather, the commensurate penalty for such single
tardiness would have been suspension for one or two weeks. The LA further noted that petitioner meted out
on respondent the penalty of dismissal hastily and summarily in that it merely
went through the motions of notifying respondent and hearing his side when, all
along, it had already decided to dismiss him.[9]
The NLRC sustained the foregoing
findings of the LA, noting that the
claim of petitioner that respondent's tardiness was not infrequent but habitual
is not supported by evidence.[10] However, the NLRC held that, although the
penalty of dismissal on respondent was properly lifted, a penalty of deduction
of one day's salary, the same to be subtracted from his monetary award, should
be imposed on the latter for the tardiness he incurred.[11]
The CA held that the NLRC and LA did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in arriving at the factual assessments
which are all supported by substantial evidence.[12]
Petitioner assails the ruling of the
CA for being based on the faulty premise that respondent incurred tardiness
only once when in fact he had done so habitually.[13] Whether respondent had been habitually tardy
prior to
As the Court held in Acebedo Optical v . National
Labor Relations
Commission,[15]
Judicial
Review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which its labor officials’ findings rest. As such, the findings of facts and conclusion
of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even
clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence.[16]
In the present case, petitioner has failed to establish a
compelling reason for the Court to depart from this rule. In fact, as pointed out by the CA,
petitioner's claim that respondent's tardiness was habitual lacks evidentiary support
as “no other documents on record were attached to substantiate that the private
respondent was forewarned for the first and second time for any infraction or
offense, work-related or not, vis-ŕ-vis the performance of his regular
duties and functions.”[17]
Such empty claim of petitioner, therefore, cannot
persuade the Court to simply disregard three layers of thorough and in-depth
assessments on the matter by the CA, NLRC and LA.
It being settled that the dismissal of respondent
was illegal, it follows that the latter is entitled to payment of his salary
for the unexpired portion of his contract, as provided under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042, considering that his employment was pre-terminated on March 9, 1997
or four months prior to the expiration of his employment contract on July 17, 1997.
However, the LA limited the award to
an amount equivalent to respondent's salary for three months. The NLRC affirmed said award but deducted therefrom his salary for one day as penalty for the
tardiness incurred. The CA affirmed the
one-day salary deduction imposed by the NLRC but removed the three months -
salary cap imposed by the LA. In effect,
as this particular monetary award now stands, it is to be computed based on the
salary of respondent covering the period
Petitioner questions the CA for
lifting the three-month salary cap, pointing out that the LA and NLRC decisions
which imposed the cap can no longer be altered as said decisions where not
questioned by respondent.[18]
Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal from a judgment
is deemed to have acquiesced to it and can no longer obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other that what was already granted under said
judgment.[19] However, when strict
adherence to such technical rule will impair a substantive right, such as that
of an illegally dismissed employee to monetary compensation as provided by law,
then equity dictates that the Court set aside the rule to pave the way for a
full and just adjudication of the case.
As the Court held in St. Michael's
Institute v. Santos:[20]
On the matter of
the award of backwages, petitioners advance the view
that by awarding backwages, the appellate court
"unwittingly reversed a time-honored doctrine that a party who has not
appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other
than the ones granted in the appealed decision." We do not agree.
The
fact that the NLRC did not award backwages to the
respondents or that the respondents themselves did not appeal the NLRC decision
does not bar the Court of Appeals from awarding backwages.
While as a general rule, a party who has not appealed is not entitled to
affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court
below, the Court of Appeals is imbued with sufficient authority and
discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it
finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice.
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin reliefs
of (a) either reinstatement or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and (b) backwages. Both are distinct reliefs given to alleviate the economic damage suffered by
an illegally dismissed employee and, thus, the award of one does not bar the
other. Both reliefs are rights granted by substantive
law which cannot be defeated by mere procedural lapses. Substantive rights
like the award of backwages resulting from illegal
dismissal must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the
rules. The order of the Court of Appeals to award backwages
being a mere legal consequence of the finding that respondents were illegally
dismissed by petitioners, there was no error in awarding the same.[21]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court has consistently applied
the foregoing exception to the general rule.
It does so yet again in the present case.
Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042,[22]
entitles an overseas worker who has been illegally dismissed to “his salaries
for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”[23]
The CA correctly applied the interpretation of
the Court in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission[24] that
the second option which imposes a three months – salary cap applies only when
the term of the overseas contract is fixed at one year or longer; otherwise,
the first option applies in that the overseas worker shall be entitled payment
of all his salaries for the entire unexpired period of his contract.
In Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira,[25] wherein
the overseas contract involved was only for six months, the Court held that it
is the first option provided under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 which is
applicable in that the overseas worker who was illegally dismissed is entitled
to payment of all his salaries covering the entire unexpired period of his
contract. The CA committed no error in
adhering to the prevailing interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
Finally, the Court comes
to the last issue on whether in the computation of
the foregoing award, respondent's “guaranteed overtime” pay
amounting to US$197.00 per month should be included as part of his salary. Petitioner contends that there is no factual
or legal basis for the inclusion of said amount because, after respondent's
repatriation, he could not have rendered any overtime work.[26]
This time, petitioner's
contention is well-taken.
The Court had occasion
to rule on a similar issue in Stolt-Nielsen
Marine Services (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[27] where the NLRC was questioned for awarding to
an illegally dismissed overseas worker fixed overtime pay equivalent to the
unexpired portion of the latter's contract. In resolving the question, the Court, citing Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission,[28] held
that although an overseas employment contract may guarantee the right to
overtime pay, entitlement to such benefit must first be established, otherwise
the same cannot be allowed.
Hence, it being
improbable that respondent rendered overtime work during the unexpired term of
his contract, the inclusion of his “guaranteed overtime” pay into his monthly
salary as basis in the computation of his salaries for the entire unexpired
period of his contract has no factual or legal basis and the same should have
been disallowed.
Based on respondent’s
Position Paper filed with the Labor Arbiter,[29] his
basic monthly salary is $213.00.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed August 28, 2003
Decision and February 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that in the computation of the payment to respondent
Reynaldo Chua of his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his contract,
his basic monthly salary of US$213.00
shall be used as the sole basis.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE
CONCUR:
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate
Justice
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice |
RUBEN
T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* In lieu of
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, per Special Order
No. 497 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and
concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., rollo, p. 18.
[2]
[3] Petition, rollo, pp. 6-7.
[4] Rollo,
pp. 40-41.
[5]
[6] CA rollo, p. 54.
[7] Rollo, p. 27.
[8] Petition, id.
at 7-8.
[9] LA Decision, rollo, pp. 36-37.
[10] NLRC Decision, id.
at 49.
[11]
[12] CA Decision, id.
at 22.
[13] Petition, id. at 10.
[14] Ogalisco v. Holy Trinity College of General Santos City, Inc., G.R. No. 172913, August 9, 2007, 529 SCRA 672, 677.
[15] G.R.
No. 150171,
[16]
[17] Rollo, p. 21.
[18] Petition,
rollo, pp. 8-9.
[19] Salazar
v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc., G.R. No. 154628, December 6, 2006, 510
SCRA 288, 296, citing Filflex Industrial
& Manufacturing Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 349 Phil.
913, 925 (1998); Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Daniel, G.R. No.
156893, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 494, 506.
[20] 422 Phil. 723 (2001).
[21]
[22] Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995,
effective
[23] Pentagon
International Shipping, Inc. v. Adelantar, G.R.
No. 157373, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 342, 346.
[24] 371 Phil. 827 (1999).
[25] 440 Phil.
906 (2002).
[26] Petition,
rollo, p. 13.
[27] 328
Phil. 161 (1996); see also PCL Shipping v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 153031, December 14, 2006, 511 SCRA 44.
[28] G.R.
Nos. 85122-24,
[29] LA
Decision dated