Republic of the
Supreme Court
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JOHN HILARIO y
SIBAL, |
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G.R. No. 161070 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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April 14, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is
a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by John Hilario y Sibal (petitioner),
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated August 19, 2003[1] and November 28
2003[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75820.
The
antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner,
together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid),
was charged with two counts[3] of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76,
During
trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid, took over representing petitioner in view of the
death of the latter's counsel.
On
On
Petitioner
claimed that he had a meritorious defense, to wit:
1.
The Decision dated December 5, 2001, on page 16 thereof
states an imprisonment term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of Reclusion Temporal - a matter which
ought to be rectified;
2.
The undersigned is a first time offender;
3.
No ruling was laid down on the stipulated facts
(Decision, p. 3) relative to the (1) absence of counsel during the alleged
inquest, and (2) absence of warrant in
arresting the accused after ten (10) days from the commission of the
crime;
4.
Absence of a corroborating witness to the purported lone
eyewitness, as against the corroborated
testimony of accused-petitioner's alibi;
5.
The Commission on Human Rights investigation on the
torture of the accused-petitioner;
6.
and others.[6]
Petitioner
argued that he was
meted a total of 16 years imprisonment or almost equal to the previous capital
punishment of 20 years which was given an automatic review by the Supreme
Court, thus it is of greater interest of justice that his case be reviewed by
the appellate court; and that no damage will be sustained if the appeal is
given due course since he continues to languish in jail while the Petition for
Relief is pending.
The
Assistant City Prosecutor filed his Comment on the Petition for Relief where he
contended that the petition should no longer be entertained; and that perfection of
appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law was not only
mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal rendered the
judgment final and executory.
The records do not show that the
RTC required petitioner's counsel to whom petitioner attributed the act of not
filing the notice of appeal to file his comment.
On
In an
Order[8] dated
After a careful study
of the instant petition and the arguments raised by the contending parties, the
Court is not persuaded by petitioner/accused's
allegation that he was prevented from filing a notice of appeal due to
excusable negligence of his counsel.
Accused's
allegation that he indeed specifically instructed his counsel to file a notice
of appeal
of the Decision dated [sic] and the latter did not heed his instruction is at best
self-serving and unsubstantiated and thus, unworthy of credence. At any rate, even
if said omission should be considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule
that negligence of counsel is binding on the client. x x
x Besides, nowhere does it appear that accused/petitioner
was prevented from fairly presenting his defense nor does it appear that he was
prejudiced as the merits of this case were adequately passed upon in the
Decision dated December 5, 2001.
It must also be
pointed out that in his petition for relief, he stated that he instructed his
counsel to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal of
the Decision dated December 5, 2001, whereas in his affidavit of merit, he
claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of appeal thereof.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, again by himself, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing his petition for relief. He claims that the
delay in appealing his case without his fault constitutes excusable negligence
to warrant the granting of his petition for relief.
In a
Resolution dated
It appearing
that petitioner in the instant petition for certiorari failed to attach the
following documents cited in his petition, namely:
1.
The December 5, 2001 Decision;
2.
Comment of the City Prosecutor;
3.
Manifestation of petitioner's counsel de oficio signifying his withdrawal as petitioner's counsel.
The instant petition for
certiorari is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and as prayed for by the Solicitor General.[10]
Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
Hence,
herein recourse filed by petitioner, still
unassisted by counsel, raising the following issues:
Whether or not the delay in
appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a
Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned
detention prisoner/ petitioner
to pursue his appeal?
Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a
final and executory judgment?
Petitioner
contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on
him for the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks
the fiduciary relationship between counsel-client and cannot be against the client who was
prejudiced; that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this
situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO, who
broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed CA Resolutions both harped
on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his petition for relief; that reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is
serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an affront to
the policy promulgated by this Court that
dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it
will result to unfairness; and that it would have been for the best interest of justice
for the CA to have directed the petitioner to complete the records instead of
dismissing the petition outright.
In
his Comment, the OSG argues that the
mere invocation of justice does not warrant the review of an appeal from a
final and executory judgment; that perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional and failure
to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be reviewed final and not appealable; and that petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment
of conviction is an exercise in futility, thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition
for relief from judgment. The OSG further
claims that notice to counsel is notice to clients and failure of counsel to
notify his client of an adverse judgment would not constitute excusable
negligence and therefore binding on the client.
We grant
the petition.
The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 46, on the ground
that petitioner failed to attach certain documents which the CA found to be
relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari.
The requirements to attach such relevant pleadings under Section 1,
Rule 65 is read in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court,
thus:
Section 1, Rule 65 provides:
SECTION.
1. Petition for certiorari. –
x x
x x
The petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto x x x.
Section 3, Rule 46,
provides:
SEC.
3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of
non-compliance with requirements. –
x x x x
[The petition] shall
be x x x accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling
subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto x x
x.
x x x x
The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The
initial determination of what pleadings, documents or orders are relevant and
pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner. If, upon its initial review of the petition, the CA is of
the view that additional pleadings, documents or order should have been
submitted and appended to the petition, the following are its options: (a)
dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court;
(b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings,
documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order the
petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required
pleadings, documents or order within a fixed period.[11]
The RTC
Decision dated December 5, 2001, finding
petitioner guilty of two counts
of homicide, the Comment of the City Prosecutor as well as the counsel's
withdrawal of appearance were considered by the CA as relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari, thus it dismissed the petition for
failure to attach the same. However, the CA
failed to consider the fact that the petition before it was filed by
petitioner, a detained prisoner, without the benefit of counsel. A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected
to know the rules of procedure. In fact,
even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure.[12] We have held in a civil case that to demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into
an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property
rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know
how to establish such right.[13] This finds
application specially if the liberty of a person is at
stake. As we
held in Telan v. Court of Appeals:
The right to counsel
in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or
property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the
right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is
immutable. Otherwise, there would be a
grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the
judgment had become final and executory, it may still
be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself
and counsel.
x x
x x
Even the most
experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. The demand as much from ordinary citizens
whose only compelle intrare is their sense of
right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an
individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right
to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel
is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More
so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised
at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client
company.
No arrangement or
interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to
counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases
in the pursuit of the appeal.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
The
filing of the petition for certiorari by petitioner without counsel should have alerted the CA
and should have required
petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel. Although the
petition filed before the CA was a petition for certiorari assailing
the RTC Order dismissing the petition for relief, the ultimate relief being
sought by petitioner was to be given the chance to file an appeal from his
conviction, thus the need for a counsel is more
pronounced. To repeat the ruling in Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd
as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and
that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.[15] It is even more
important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his
petition for relief from judgment with the RTC.
It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal
cases, as held in Telan, the right of an accused
person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a
grave denial of due process.
Cases should be determined on
the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their
causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better.[16]
The CA
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for having been filed late. It appears that the CA Resolution
dismissing the petition for certiorari was received at the address written in the petition on
While as
a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period fixed
by law rendered the resolution final and executory,
we have on some occasions relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla[17] we held:
However, this Court
has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had
already declared to be final.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking through the late
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, had occasion to state:
The
Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice
have always been, as they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the
appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
"should give way to the realities of the situation.
Indeed, the emerging
trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.[18]
Moreover,
in Basco v. Court of Appeals,[19] we also held:
Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to
aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would
hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must
yield to the latter. Recognizing this, Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that:
SECTION
2.
Construction. — These rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.[20]
Petitioner claims that he
actually received the CA Resolution dismissing his petition for certiorari only on
September 4, 2003 even as the same Resolution was earlier received on September
1, 2003 at the address written in
his petition, i.e., c/o Robert S. Bacuraya, No.
9 Iris St., West Fairview, 1118, Quezon City, by a certain Leonora Coronel. Apparently, Bacuraya is
not a lawyer. Ordinarily, petitioner being detained at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, the CA should have also sent a copy of such Resolution to his place of detention. Considering that petitioner only received the
Resolution on
Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must be avoided.[21]
In dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
before it, the CA clearly put a premium on technicalities and brushed aside the
issue raised before it by petitioner, i.e., whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioner's petition for relief thus preventing him from taking an appeal from
his conviction.
Even if the judgment had
become final and executory, it may still be recalled,
and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.[22] However, instead of
remanding the case to the CA for a decision on the merits, we opt to resolve the same so as not to further delay the final disposition of this
case.
The RTC
denied the petition for relief as it found petitioner's claim that his counsel
did not heed his instruction to file an appeal to be
unsubstantiated and self serving; and that if there was indeed
such omission committed by the counsel, such
negligence is binding on the client.
Petitioner insists that the
failure of his counsel to timely file a
notice of appeal of his judgment of conviction despite his explicit instruction
to do so constitutes excusable negligence and so his petition for relief should
have been granted.
We find
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's
petition for relief from judgment.
Petitioner
was represented in the RTC by Atty. Rivera of the PAO. Section 1, Article IV of PAO Memorandum Circular No.18 series of 2002, the
Amended Standard Office Procedures in Extending Legal Assistance (PAO Memorandum Circular),
provides that all appeals must be made upon the request of the client
himself and only meritorious cases shall be appealed; while Section 2, Article II of
PAO Memorandum Circular provides that in criminal cases, the accused enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven, hence
cases of defendants in criminal actions are considered meritorious and therefore, should be appealed, upon the client's
request.
In this
case, petitioner claims he had instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal. Under the PAO
Memorandum Circular, it was the duty of the latter to perfect
the appeal. Thus, in determining whether the petition for relief from
judgment is based on a meritorious ground, it was crucial to ascertain whether petitioner indeed gave explicit instruction to
the PAO lawyer to file an appeal but the latter failed to do so.
To determine the veracity of
petitioner's claim, it was incumbent upon the
RTC to have required the PAO lawyer to comment on
the petition for relief. However, it appears from the records that the RTC
only required the City Prosecutor to file a comment on the petition.
The RTC Order dismissing the
petition for relief did not touch on the
question whether the PAO lawyer was indeed negligent in
not filing the appeal as it merely stated that even if said omission, i.e., not filing the appeal despite his client’s instruction
to do so, should be considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that
negligence of counsel is binding on the client.
While as a general rule, negligence of counsel may not be
condoned and should bind the client,[23] the exception is when the
negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of his day in court.[24] In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals,[25] we held:
x x
x Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned
upon despite the fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The established jurisprudence holds:
x x
x x
The function of the
rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to and
binding upon the client, as any other procedural rule, is to serve as an
instrument to advance the ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each
case the rule desert its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.
x x
x x
The court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
purposes of justice require it.
x x
x x
If the incompetence,
ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a
result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause,
is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to
give the client another chance to present his case. In a criminal proceeding,
where certain evidence was not presented because of counsel's error or
incompetence, the defendant in order to secure a new trial must satisfy the
court that he has a good defense and that the acquittal would in all
probability have followed the introduction of the omitted evidence. What should
guide judicial action is that a party be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life,
liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.[26]
The PAO lawyer, Atty. Rivera, filed his
Withdrawal of Appearance on
Thus, there was no basis for the RTC to conclude that the claim of petitioner that he instructed the PAO
lawyer to file an appeal as self-serving and unsubstantiated. The RTC's dismissal
of the petition for relief was done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
an undue denial of the petitioner's right to appeal.
The RTC faulted petitioner for claiming in his petition for relief that he instructed his counsel
to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; while in his affidavit of
merit, he claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of appeal. We do not find such circumstance sufficient ground to dismiss the petition considering that he filed the petition for relief
unassisted by counsel.
In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner
prescribed by law. The
importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appeals[27] where we ruled
that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are
advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the
constraints of technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law,
however, its suppression would be a violation of due process, a right
guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's
loss of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at
all attributed to petitioner.
However, we cannot, in the present petition for review on certiorari, make a conclusive finding that indeed
there was excusable negligence
on the part of the PAO lawyer which prejudiced petitioner's right to appeal his
conviction. To do so would be pure
speculation or conjecture. Therefore, a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the petition for relief from judgment is
just and proper.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Sergio L. Pestaño and concurred in by Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente; rollo, p. 26.
[2]
[3] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91647-48.
[4] Penned by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa, rollo, pp. 36-52.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Garcia v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160798,
[12] See Telan
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95026,
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 11, at 781.
[17] G.R.
No. 160753,
[18]
[19] 392 Phil. 251 (2000).
[20]
[21] Cusi-Hernandez v. Spouses Diaz, 390 Phil. 1245, 1252 (2000).
[22] Telan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 540-541; People of the Philippines v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950); Flores v. Judge Ruiz, 179 Phil. 351, 355 (1979); Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 229 Phil. 362, 366 (1986).
[23] Lamsan Trading, Inc. v. Leogrado, Jr., 228 Phil. 542, 550 (1986).
[24] Sapad v.
Court of Appeals, 401
Phil. 478, 483
(2000).
[25] 320 Phil. 456 (1995).
[26]
[27] 208 Phil. 691, 696 (1983).