Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
CONCEPCION CHUA GAW,
Petitioner, - versus - SUY BEN
CHUA and FELISA CHUA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 160855 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: April 16, 2008 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 and Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a Complaint for Sum of Money in favor of the plaintiff.
The antecedents are as follows:
Spouses
Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises[3]
namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood
Industries. The couple had seven
children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy Phen;
Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On P415,487.20.[4]
On
December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir[5]
(Deed of Partition, for brevity), wherein the heirs settled their interest in
Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof will pertain to the surviving
spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half,
equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven
children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00
each.[6] In
said document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily
renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua
Sioc Huan.
In
May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked
respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use
for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be
payable within six (6) months without interest.[7] On P200,000.00
which he delivered to the couple’s house in Marilao, Bulacan. Antonio later encashed
the check.
On
P255,000.00 in favor
of respondent.[9]
Meantime,
the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent within
the designated period. Respondent sent the couple a demand letter,[10]
dated
Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a Complaint
for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the RTC. The complaint alleged
that on P200,000.00, payable within six
months without interest, but despite several demands, the couple failed to pay
their obligation.[11]
In
their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw contended that the
P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioner’s share in the profits of
Hagonoy Lumber, one of her family’s businesses. According to the spouses, when they
transferred residence to Marilao, Bulacan, petitioner asked respondent for an
accounting, and payment of her share in the profits, of Capital Sawmills
Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber. They
claimed that respondent persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego her demand
as it would offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the
family businesses. To insure that she will defer her demand, respondent allegedly
gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber.[12]
In his Reply, respondent averred
that the spouses Gaw did not demand from him an accounting of Capitol Sawmills
Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries, and Hagonoy Lumber. He asserted that the
spouses Gaw, in fact, have no right whatsoever in these businesses that would entitle
them to an accounting thereof. Respondent insisted that the P200,000.00
was given to and accepted by them as a loan and not as their share in Hagonoy
Lumber.[13]
With leave of court, the spouses
Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended Compulsory Counterclaim) wherein they
insisted that petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs, is entitled to
one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy Lumber, which the respondent has arrogated to
himself. They claimed that, despite repeated demands, respondent has failed and
refused to account for the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver her
share therein. They then prayed that respondent make an accounting of the operations
of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver to petitioner her one-sixth (1/6) share
thereof, which was estimated to be worth not less than P500,000.00.[14]
In his Answer to Amended
Counterclaim, respondent explained that his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, became the
sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when the
heirs executed the Deed of Partition on
Defendants, in their reply,[16]
countered that the documents on which plaintiff anchors his claim of ownership
over Hagonoy Lumber were not true and valid agreements and do not express the
real intention of the parties. They claimed
that these documents are mere paper arrangements which were prepared only upon
the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could reach and sign a final and
binding agreement, which, up to such time, has not been executed by the heirs.[17]
During
trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section 10,
Rule 132. On direct examination, respondent testified that Hagonoy Lumber was
the conjugal property of his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both
Chinese citizens. He narrated that, initially, his father leased the lots where
Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his
father constructed the two-storey concrete building standing thereon. According
to respondent, when he was in high school, it was his father who managed the business
but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc
Huan, managed Hogonoy Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters. He
stated that he also managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school, but he
stopped when he got married and found another job. He said that he now owns the
lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating.[18]
On cross-examination, respondent
explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold
his shares of stock to the other stockholders on
On re-direct examination, respondent
stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00,
which payment he received in cash. He also paid the purchase price of P255,000.00
for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a separate receipt
as he merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas, Valenzuela. Although he
maintains several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng Bayan, and China Bank,
the amount he paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the amount in the house because he
was engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public market. [20]
On
On
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the
Court hereby renders judgement ordering defendant Concepcion Chua Gaw to pay
the [respondent] the following:
1. P200,000.00 representing the principal
obligation with legal interest from judicial demand or the institution of the
complaint on
2. P50,000.00
as attorney’s fees; and
3. Costs of suit.
The defendants’ counterclaim is hereby dismissed for
being devoid of merit.
SO ORDERED.[22]
The RTC held that respondent
is entitled to the payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with interest. It
noted that respondent personally issued Check No. 240810 to petitioner and her
husband upon their request to lend them the aforesaid amount. The trial court
concluded that the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the respondent from
his own funds and not remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor
petitioner’s advance share in the profits of their parents’ businesses.
The trial court further held
that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of
Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to
respondent, was never impugned. Although
respondent failed to produce the originals of the documents, petitioner
judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even
acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best
evidence rule. As for the Deed of Sale, since the contents thereof have not
been put in issue, the non-presentation of the original document is not fatal
so as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its contents. Also,
the parties to the documents themselves do not contest their validity.
Ultimately, petitioner failed to establish her right to demand an accounting of
the operations of Hagonoy Lumber nor the delivery of her 1/6 share therein.
As for petitioner’s claim
that an accounting be done on Capitol Sawmill Corporation and Columbia Wood
Industries, the trial court held that respondent is under no obligation to make
such an accounting since he is not charged with operating these enterprises.[23]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the
CA, alleging that the trial court erred (1)
when it considered the amount of P200,000.00 as a loan obligation and
not Concepcion’s share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber; (2) when it considered as evidence for the
defendant, plaintiff’s testimony when he was called to testify as an adverse
party under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; and (3) when it
considered admissible mere copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of Sale to
prove that respondent is now the owner of Hagonoy Lumber.[24]
On
The CA likewise found untenable petitioner’s claim that
Exhibits “H” (Deed of Sale) and Exhibit “I” (Deed of Partition) were merely
temporary paper arrangements. The CA agreed with the RTC that the testimony of petitioner
regarding the matter was uncorroborated — she should have presented the other
heirs to attest to the truth of her allegation. Instead, petitioner admitted
the due execution of the said documents. Since petitioner did not dispute the
due execution and existence of Exhibits “H” and “I”, there was no need to produce
the originals of the documents in accordance with the best evidence rule.[26]
On
Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for
review on certiorari, raising the
following errors:
I.
THAT ON THE
PRELIMINARY IMPORTANT RELATED ISSUE, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN
COMMITTED IN THE APPLICATION AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RULE ON EXAMINATION
OF ADVERSE PARTY OR HOSTILE WITNESS UNDER SECTION 10 (d) AND (e) OF RULE 132,
CAUSING SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE LOWER COURT’S APPEALED DECISION’S
OBJECTIVITY, ANNEX “C”.
II.
THAT ON THE
IMPORTANT LEGAL ISSUE RELATIVE TO THE AFORESAID TWO OPPOSING CLAIMS OF
RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED
UNDER THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION ANNEX “C” AND THE QUESTIONED DECISION
OF MAY 23, 2003 (ANNEX “A”) AND THE RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 2, 2003, (ANNEX
“B”) IN DEVIATING FROM AND DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ENJOINING COURTS NOT TO OVERLOOK OR MISINTERPRET IMPORTANT FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES, SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND WHICH
ARE OF GREAT WEIGHT AND VALUE, WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE RESULT OF THE CASE AND
ARRIVE AT A JUST, FAIR AND OBJECTIVE DECISION. (Citations omitted)
III.
THAT FINALLY, AS
TO THE OTHER LEGAL IMPORTANT ISSUE RELATIVE TO CLAIM OR OWNERSHIP OF THE “Hagonoy Lumber” FAMILY BUSINESS, CLEAR
AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED ON THE REQUIREMENTS AND CORRECT
APPLICATION OF THE “BEST EVIDENCE RULE” UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT.[28]
The
petition is without merit.
Petitioner contends that her
case was unduly prejudiced by the RTC’s treatment of the respondent’s testimony
as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of her
evidence. Petitioner argues that the adverse witness’ testimony elicited during
cross-examination should not be considered as evidence of the calling party. She
contends that the examination of respondent as adverse witness did not make him
her witness and she is not bound by his testimony, particularly during
cross-examination by his own counsel.[29]
In particular, the petitioner avers that the following testimony of the
respondent as adverse witness should not be considered as her evidence:
(11.a) That RESPONDENT-Appellee became
owner of the “HAGONOY LUMBER” business when he bought the same from Chua Sioc
Huan through a Deed of Sale dated
(11.b) That the “HAGONOY LUMBER,” on
the other hand, was acquired by the sister Chua Sioc Huan, by virtue of
Extrajudicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in favor of a
Co-Heir (EXH. I);
(11.c) That the 3 lots on which the “HAGONOY LUMBER”
business is located were acquired by Lu Pieng from the
We do not agree that petitioner’s
case was prejudiced by the RTC’s treatment of the respondent’s testimony during
cross-examination as her evidence.
If there was an error committed by the RTC in
ascribing to the petitioner the respondent’s testimony as adverse witness
during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitute a harmless error
which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.
In the first place, the delineation
of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the other is only
significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies the burden
of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the
burden. In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish
her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s evidence. Thus,
it barely matters who
with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to
consider the entirety of the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance
of evidence is then determined by considering all the facts and circumstances
of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless
of who actually presented it.[31]
That the witness is the
adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the former’s testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance
that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party
may impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party,[32]
except by evidence of his bad character.[33] Under
a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party
does not vouch for the witness’ veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his
testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.[34]
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latter’s testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.[35] A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.[36] This, the petitioner failed to do.
In
the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the
respondent’s testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The
petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the
transfer of the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary. On
cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was executed to
indicate that the transfer of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary
arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did not
initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her
counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim over
the business.
Due process requires that in
reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented.[37]
All the parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the favorable
or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.[38]
As already mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence
presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in
evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of
evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the
apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is
evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such
evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict
his testimony.
Significantly, the RTC’s finding
that the P200,000.00 was given to the petitioner and her husband as a
loan is supported by the evidence on record. Hence, we do not agree with the petitioner’s
contention that the RTC has overlooked certain facts of great weight and value
in arriving at its decision. The RTC
merely took into consideration evidence which it found to be more credible than
the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.
At this juncture, we reiterate the well-entrenched doctrine that the findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court. Only errors of law, not of fact, may be reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45.[39] A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record.[40] There is no reason to apply the exception in the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the trial court. These findings are buttressed by the evidence on record. Moreover, the issues and errors alleged in this petition are substantially the very same questions of fact raised by petitioner in the appellate court.
On
the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was really a loan, it is well to
remember that a check
may be evidence of indebtedness.[41]
A check, the entries of which are in writing, could prove a loan transaction.[42]
It is pure naiveté to insist that an entrepreneur who has several sources of
income and has access to considerable bank credit, no longer has any reason to
borrow any amount.
The petitioner’s allegation
that the P200,000.00 was advance on her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber is
implausible. It is true that Hagonoy Lumber was originally owned by the parents
of petitioner and respondent. However, on December 8, 1986, the heirs freely
renounced and waived in favor of their sister Chua Sioc Huan all their hereditary
shares and interest therein, as shown by the Deed of Partition which the
petitioner herself signed. By virtue of this deed, Chua Sioc Huan became the
sole owner and proprietor of Hagonoy Lumber. Thus, when the respondent
delivered the check for P200,000.00 to the petitioner on June 7, 1988, Chua Sioc Huan
was already the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. At that time, both petitioner and
respondent no longer had any interest in the business enterprise; neither had a
right to demand a share in the profits of the business. Respondent became the
sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber only after Chua Sioc Huan sold it to him on August
1, 1990. So, when the respondent delivered to the petitioner the P200,000.00 check on June 7,
1988, it could not have been given as an advance on petitioner’s share in the
business, because at that moment in time both of them had no participation,
interest or share in Hagonoy Lumber. Even assuming, arguendo, that the check was an advance on the petitioner’s share
in the profits of the business, it was highly unlikely that the respondent
would deliver a check drawn against his personal, and not against the business
enterprise’s account.
It is also worthy to note
that both the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale were acknowledged before a
Notary Public. The notarization of a private document converts it into a public
document, and makes it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.[43]
It is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.[44]
A notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity. Such a document must be given full force and effect
absent a strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on
account of some flaws or defects recognized by law.[45]
A public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary
public is, generally, evidence of the facts therein express in clear
unequivocal manner.[46]
Petitioner, however, maintains
that the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of
Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best evidence rule. In addition, petitioner insists that the Deed
of Sale was not the result of bona fide
negotiations between a true seller and buyer.
The “best evidence rule” as
encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,[47]
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue
is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is
likewise admissible without need to account for the original.[48] Moreover,
production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s
discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.[49]
Accordingly, we find that
the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was
no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in
evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their
due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.[50] As for the
Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due
execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the
rules.[51] The
petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not express the true agreement
and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper
arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.[52] Apparently,
the petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that
there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to
Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.
An agreement or the contract
between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties and
obligations. It is the best evidence of
the intention of the parties.[53]
The parties’ intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the
contract, not from the unilateral post
facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who are
strangers to the contract.[54] Thus, when the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[55]
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
A T
T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis
and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo,
pp. 8-24.
[2] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[3]
[4] Records Vol. II, p. 203.
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 119.
[8] Records, Vol. I, p. 5.
[9] Records Vol. II, p. 201.
[10] Records, Vol. I, p. 6.
[11]
[12]
[13] Records, Vol. I, p. 53.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Records, Vol. I, pp. 138-139.
[18] Rollo, pp .108-110.
[19]
[20]
[21] Records, Vol. II, pp. 174-177.
[22] Rollo, p. 126.
[23] Id.
at 119-126.
[24] CA
rollo, pp. 20-27.
[25] Rollo, pp. 8-24.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Supreme Transliner , Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 692, 699 (2001).
[32] REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 132, Section 11 provides how the witness may be impeached, thus:
SECTION 11. Impeachment of adverse
party's witness. — A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by
evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense.
[33] REVISED
RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 132, Section 12.
[34] Landau v. Landau, 20 Ill.2d 381, 385, 170 N.E. 2d 1, 3 (1960)
[35] See: Eviddence by Ricardo J. Francisco,Third Edition (1996), p. 487, citing 58 Am.Jur. 443.
[36] Leonard
v.
[37] Equitable
PCI Bank v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 159170,
[38] Arwood
Industries, Inc. v D.M. Consunji, Inc., G.R No. 142277,
[39] Union Refinery Corporation v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 155653, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 613,
618.
[40] Changco
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, March 20, 2002, 379 SCRA 590, 594.
[41] Pacheco
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126670,
[42] Tan v. Villapaz, G.R. No. 160892,
November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 721, 730.
[43] Tigno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 129416,
November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 61, 75.
[44] Mendezona v. Ozamis, G.R. No. 143370,
February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 482, 495-496.
[45] Herbon
v. Palad, G.R. No. 149572, july 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 544, 555-556
[46]
[47] Sec.
3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
[48] Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano, G.R. No. 156132,
[49] Estrada
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15,
[50] TSN,
[51] RULES OF COURT, Rule 8, Section 8.
[52] Records, Vol. I, pp.138-139.
[53] Arwood
Industries, Inc. v D.M. Consunji, Inc., G.R No. 142277,
[54] Herbon
v. Palad, G.R. No. 149572,
[55] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 9.