Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES ONESIFORO and G.R. No. 158040
ROSARIO ALINAS,
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES,
JJ.
SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA
ALINAS, Promulgated:
Respondents. April 14, 2008
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002, and the CA Resolution[2] dated March
31, 2003, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set
aside.
The factual antecedents of the case
are as follows.
Spouses Onesiforo
and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime
in 1982, with
Petitioner Onesiforo
Alinas (Onesiforo) and
respondent Victor Alinas (Victor) are brothers. Petitioners allege that they entrusted their
properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent
spouses) with the agreement that any income from rentals of the properties
should be remitted to the Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of
Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals were believed
sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners
discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name of respondent spouses.
Records show that after
P111,110.09. On
Onesiforo's
signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale[9] likewise
dated
On
After trial, the RTC rendered its
Decision dated
1. Plaintiffs have not proven that they
entrusted defendant spouses with the care and administration of their
properties. It was Valeria Alinas, their mother, whom plaintiff Onesiforo
requested/directed to “take care of everything and sell everything” and Teresita Nuńez, his elder sister,
to whom he left a “verbal” authority to administer his properties.
2. Plaintiffs have not proven their allegation
that defendant spouses agreed to pay rent of P1,500.00
a month for the occupancy of plaintiffs' house, which rent was to be remitted
to the SSS and Rural Bank of Oroquieta to pay off
plaintiffs' loan and to keep for plaintiffs the rest of the rent after the
loans would have been paid in full.
3.
Plaintiff Onesiforo's allegation that defendants
concocted deeds of conveyances (Exh. “M”, “N” &
“O”) with the use of his signatures in blank is not worthy of credence. Why his family would conspire to rob him at a
time when life had struck him with a cruel blow in the form of a failed
marriage that sent him plummeting to the depths of despair is not explained and
likewise defies comprehension. That his signatures appear exactly on the spot where they ought to
be in Exhs. “M”, “N” & “O” belies his
pretension that he affixed them on blank paper only for the purpose of
facilitating his sister Terry's acts of administration.
This
Court, therefore, does not find that defendant spouses had schemed to obtain
title to plaintiffs' properties or enriched themselves at the expense of plaintiffs.[12]
with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, this Court
renders judgment:
1.
declaring [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas
owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building (bodega) standing
thereon and affirming the validity of their acquisition thereof from the Rural
Bank of Oroquieta, Inc.;
2.
declaring [petitioners] Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas
owners of Lot 896-B-9-B with the house standing thereon, plaintiff Onesiforo's sale thereof to defendants spouses without the
consent of his wife being null and void and defendant spouses' redemption
thereof from the SSS not having conferred its ownership to them;
3.
ordering [petitioners] to
reimburse [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas
the redemption sum of P111,100.09, paid by them to the SSS (without
interest as it shall be compensated with the rental value of the house they
occupy) within sixty days from the finality of this judgment;
4.
ordering [respondents] to
vacate the subject house within thirty days from receiving the reimbursement
mentioned in No. 3 above; and
5.
reinstating TCT No. T-7248 in the name of [petitioners] and cancelling TCT No. T-17394 in the name of [respondents].
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Only respondent spouses appealed to the CA assailing the RTC's ruling that they acquired
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing disquisitions, the first paragraph of the dispositive
portion of the assailed decision is AFFIRMED and the rest MODIFIED as follows:
1.
declaring [respondents] Victor
Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of
2.
declaring Onesiforo's
sale of Lot 896-B-9-B together with the
house standing thereon to [respondents] in so far as Rosario Alinas, his wife's share of one half thereof is concerned,
of no force and effect;
3.
ordering [petitioners] Rosario Alinas
to reimburse [respondents] the redemption amount of P55,550.00 with
interest of 12% per annum from the time of redemption until fully paid.
4.
ordering the [respondents] to convey and transfer one half
portion of
5.
in the event of failure of [respondents] to execute
the acts as specified above, [petitioner] Rosario Alinas
may proceed against them under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
6.
on the other hand, failure of [petitioner] Rosario Alinas to reimburse the redemption price within sixty (60)
days from the finality of this decision will render the conveyance and sale of
her share by her husband to [respondents], of full force and effect.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but the CA denied said motion per herein assailed Resolution
dated
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
The Honorable Court of Appeals abuse [sic] its discretion in
disregarding the testimony of the Register of Deeds, Atty. Nerio
Nuńez, who swore that the signatures appearing on
various TCTs were not his own;
The Honorable Court of Appeals
manifestly abuse [sic] its discretion in
declaring the respondents to be the owners of Lot 896-B-9-A
with the building (bodega) standing thereon when they merely redeemed the
property and are therefore mere trustees of the real owners of the property;
It
was pure speculation and conjecture and surmise for the Honorable Court of
Appeals to impose an obligation to reimburse upon petitioners without ordering
respondents to account for the rentals of the properties from the time they
occupied the same up to the present time and thereafter credit one against the
other whichever is higher.[15]
The
first issue raised by petitioners deserves scant consideration. By assailing the authenticity of the
Registrar of Deeds' signature on the certificates of title, they are, in effect, questioning
the validity of the certificates.
Section 48 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 provides, thus:
Sec. 48. Certificate not
subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Pursuant to said provision, the Court ruled in De Pedro v. Romasan Development
Corporation[16] that:
It has been held that a certificate of title, once
registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. x x x
The action of the
petitioners against the respondents, based on the material allegations of the
complaint, is one for recovery of possession of the subject property and damages. However, such action is not a direct, but a collateral
attack of
TCT No. 236044.[17] (Emphasis
supplied)
As in De Pedro, the complaint filed by herein petitioners with the RTC
is also one for recovery of possession and ownership. Verily, the present case is merely a
collateral attack on TCT No. T-17394, which is not allowed by
law and jurisprudence.
With
regard to the second issue, petitioners’ claim that it was the CA which
declared respondent spouses owners of
It is a basic principle that no modification of judgment or affirmative
relief can be granted to a party who did not appeal.[18] Hence, not having appealed from the RTC
Decision, petitioners can no longer seek the reversal or modification of the
trial court's ruling that respondent spouses had acquired ownership of Lot
896-B-9-A by virtue of the sale of the lot to them by RBO.
Furthermore, the CA did not commit any
reversible error in affirming the trial court's factual findings as the records
are indeed bereft of proof to support the petitioners’ allegations that they
left the care and administration of their properties to respondent spouses; and
that there is an agreement between petitioners and respondent spouses regarding
remittance to the SSS and the RBO of rental income from their properties. Thus, respondent spouses may not be held responsible
for the non-payment of the loan with RBO and the eventual foreclosure of
petitioners'
Petitioners do not assail the
validity of the foreclosure of said lot but argues that respondent spouses
merely redeemed the property from RBO.
This is, however, belied by evidence on record which shows that
ownership over the lot had duly passed on to the RBO, as shown by TCT No.
T-11853 registered in its name; and subsequently, RBO sold the lot with its
improvements to respondent spouses. Needless
to stress, the sale was made after the redemption period had lapsed. The trial court, therefore, correctly held
that respondent spouses acquired their title over the lot from RBO and
definitely not from petitioners.
However, with regard to Lot
896-B-9-B (with house), the Court finds it patently erroneous for the CA to
have applied the principle of equity in sustaining the validity of the sale of Onesiforo’s one-half share in the subject property to
respondent spouses.
Although petitioners were married
before the enactment of the Family Code on
The CA ruling completely deviated
from the clear dictate of Article 124 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. x x x
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
In Homeowners Savings & Loan
Bank v. Dailo,[19] the
Court categorically stated thus:
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal
property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article
124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent
of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. x x x
x
x x x
x x x By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. [20]
Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the
Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made
by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety.
It is true that in a number of
cases, this Court abstained from applying the literal
import of a particular provision of law if doing so would lead to unjust,
unfair and absurd results.[21]
In the present
case, the Court does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family Code would
lead to injustice or absurdity. It
should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that
Verily, the sale of
However, in consonance with the
salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, the Court agrees
with the CA that petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption
price paid for P111,110.09 with legal interest
from the time of filing of the complaint.
In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes, the
husband's sale of conjugal property without the consent of the wife was
annulled but the spouses were ordered to refund the purchase price to the
buyers, it was ruled that an interest of 12% per annum on the purchase
price to be refunded is not proper. The
Court elucidated as follows:
The trial court, however, erred
in imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount due the respondents. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that
interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six
percent (6%) annually. If the purchase
price could be established with certainty at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the
complaint was filed until finality of the decision. In Lui vs. Loy, involving a suit for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by the first
buyer against the seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of
the first buyer and annulling the second sale, ordered the seller to refund to
the second buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase price of
the lots. It was held therein that the
6% interest should be computed from the date of the filing of the complaint by
the first buyer. After the judgment
becomes final and executory until the obligation is
satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim
period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00
due the respondent spouses which could be determined with certainty at the time
of the filing of the complaint shall earn 6% interest per annum from
Thus, herein petitioners
should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of filing of the complaint, and after the judgment becomes final and executory, the amount due shall earn 12% interest per annum until the
obligation is satisfied.
Petitioners pray that said redemption price and interest
be offset or compensated against the rentals for the house and bodega.
The records show that the testimonial evidence for rentals was only with regard to
the bodega.[25] However, the
Court has affirmed the ruling of the RTC that
As to rentals for
Respondent spouses, having knowledge of the flaw in their mode of
acquisition, are deemed to be
possessors in bad faith under Article 526[28] of the Civil Code. However, they have a right to be refunded
for necessary expenses on the property as provided under Article 546[29] of the same Code.
Unfortunately, there is no credible proof to support respondent spouses' allegation that they
spent more than P400,000.00
to repair and make the house habitable.
Set-off or compensation is governed by Article 1279 of the Civil Code which provides, thus:
Article
1279. In order that compensation may
be proper, it is necessary:
1.
That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and
that he be at the time a principal creditor of the other;
2.
That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the
things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same
quality if the latter has been stated;
3.
That the two debts be due;
4.
That they be liquidated and demandable;
5.
That over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the
debtor.
Therefore, under paragraph 4 of the
foregoing provision, compensation or set-off is allowed only if the debts of
both parties against each other is already liquidated and demandable. To
liquidate means “to make the amount of indebtedness or an obligation clear and
settled in the form of money.”[30] In the present case, no definite
amounts for rentals nor for expenses for repairs on
subject house has been determined. Thus, in the absence of
evidence upon which to base the amount of rentals, no compensation or
set-off can take place between petitioners and respondent spouses.
While the courts are empowered to set
an amount as reasonable compensation to the owners for the use of their property,
this Court cannot set such amount based on mere surmises and conjecture
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
1. declaring respondent spouses Victor Jr. and
Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building (bodega)
standing thereon and affirming the validity of their acquisition thereof from
the Rural Bank of Oroquieta, Inc.;
2. declaring Onesiforo's sale of
3. ordering petitioners
to jointly and severally reimburse respondent spouses the redemption amount of P111,110.09 with interest at 6% per
annum from the date of filing of the complaint, until finality of this
decision. After this decision becomes
final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal and
interest (or any part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment;
4. ordering the respondent spouses to convey and
transfer Lot 896-B-9-B to petitioners
and vacate said premises within fifteen (15) days from finality of this
Decision; and
5. in the event of
failure of respondent spouses to execute the acts as specified above,
petitioners may proceed against them under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with
Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 10-23.
[2]
[3] Exh. “7,” records, pp. 207-208.
[4] Exh. “6,” id. at 201-203.
[5] Exh. “7-C” to “7-G,” id. at 209-210.
[6] Exh. “11,” id. at 222-223.
[7] Exh. “M,” id. at 99-100.
[8] Exh. “Q,” id. at 27.
[9] Exh. “O,”
id. at 101.
[10] Exh. “9,” id. at 216-217.
[11] Exh. “15,” id at 227.
[12] Records,
p. 246.
[13]
[14] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[15]
[16] G.R.
No. 158002,
[17]
[18] Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65935,
[19] G.R.
No. 153802,
[20]
[21] Solid
Homes, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 145156-57,
[22] 457 Phil. 120 (2003).
[23]
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26]
[27]
[28] Article 526. He is
deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith
who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
x
x x x
[29] Article 546.
Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
x
x x x
[30] Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, 2000 Reprint, p. 530.