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FREDERICK
DAEL, Petitioner, -
versus - SPOUSES BENEDICTO and VILMA BELTRAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 156470
Present: Quisumbing, J.,
Chairperson, Carpio Morales, Tinga, VELASCO,
JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: April 30, 2008 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure raising pure questions of law, and
seeking a reversal of the Resolution[1] dated May 28, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City,
in Civil Case No. 13072, which dismissed with prejudice, petitioner’s complaint
for breach of contract and damages against the respondents. Also assailed is the trial court’s Resolution[2] dated
The facts are as follows:
On P775,100. Petitioner argued that respondents’
non-disclosure of the extrajudicial foreclosure constituted breach of contract
on the implied warranties in a sale of property as provided under Article 1547[4] of the New Civil
Code. He likewise claimed that he was entitled
to damages because he had to pay for the property twice.
On
On
The RTC on the same day ordered petitioner to clarify
whether or not he and Frederick George Ghent Dael were one and the same person;
whether or not they were Filipinos and residents of Dumaguete City; and whether
or not Frederick George Ghent Dael was of legal age, and married, as stated in
the Contract to Sell.[6] Petitioner
did not comply. Instead, he filed
a Notice of Dismissal on
Plaintiff, through counsel, unto this Honorable Court, respectfully
files this notice of dismissal of the above-captioned case without prejudice by
virtue of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. By this notice, defendants[’] Motion to
Dismiss is then rendered moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Frederick Dael respectfully prays that this Honorable Court dismiss
the above-captioned case without prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[7]
On
WHEREFORE, finding merit to defendants’ contention that plaintiff
Frederick Dael has no cause of action against them since said plaintiff is not
one of the contracting parties in the Contract to Sell, which is allegedly
breached, the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants is granted. Consequently, the case at bar is DISMISSED,
with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[8] [Emphasis
supplied.]
Arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint
with prejudice based on respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, and not without
prejudice based on his Notice of Dismissal, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[9]
but it was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues for our
resolution:
I.
WHETHER [OR]
NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT AND DAMAGES BASED ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY HEREIN RESPONDENTS
AND NOT ON THE NOTICE OF DISMISSAL PROMPTLY [FILED] BY HEREIN PETITIONER BEFORE
RESPONDENTS COULD FILE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING, UNDER RULE 17, SECTION 1 OF THE
1997 RULES O[F] CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT AND DAMAGES WITH PREJUDICE.[10]
On the other hand, respondents raise the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ACTION FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT AND DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE
DEFENDANT AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE NOTICE OF DISMISSAL FILED BY THE
PLAINTIFF.
II.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE CASE WITH PREJUDICE.
III.
WHETHER OR
NOT PETITIONER’S RECOURSE UNTO THIS HONORABLE COURT BY WAY OF PETITION FOR
Essentially, the issues are (1) Did the RTC err in
dismissing the complaint with prejudice? and (2) Was petitioner’s recourse to
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure proper?
Petitioner, citing Serrano v.
Cabrera and Makabulo[12] in his
Memorandum,[13] argues that the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that before the defendant has
served his answer or moved for a summary judgment, he has, as a matter of
right, the prerogative to cause the dismissal of a civil action filed, and such
dismissal may be effected by a mere notice of dismissal. He further argues that
such dismissal is without prejudice, except (a) where the notice of dismissal
so provides; (b) where the plaintiff has previously dismissed the same case in
a court of competent jurisdiction; or (c) where the dismissal is premised on
payment by the defendant of the claim involved.
He asserts it is the prerogative of the plaintiff to indicate if the
Notice of Dismissal filed is with or without prejudice and the RTC cannot
exercise its own discretion and dismiss the case with prejudice.
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum,[14] counter that the
RTC is correct in dismissing the case with prejudice based on their Motion to
Dismiss because they filed their motion on
Further, they point out that petitioner deceived the
court when he filed the action knowing fully well that he was not the real
party-in-interest representing himself as Frederick George Ghent Dael.
Respondents also argue that petitioner’s recourse to
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari was not proper since
the proper remedy should have been to file an appeal of the order granting the
Motion to Dismiss. He contends that the
petitioner should have appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41[15] instead of
assailing the ruling of the RTC by way of a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
As to the propriety of dismissal of the complaint with
prejudice, Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. – A
complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall
issue an order confirming the dismissal.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon
the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent
court an action based on or including the same claim. [Emphasis supplied.]
Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial
court issue an order confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in
the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by the
plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to
approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso
facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the
notice.[16] The trial court has no choice but to consider
the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a
matter of right, regardless of the ground.[17]
Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they
filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by petitioner and hence, the trial
court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion.
This argument is erroneous. Section 1 of Rule 17 does
not encompass a Motion to Dismiss. The
provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal
before service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal
by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and
academic and the trial court should have dismissed the case without prejudice
based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with
prejudice would erroneously result in res judicata[18] and imply that
petitioner can no longer file a case against respondents without giving him a
chance to present evidence to prove otherwise.
As to the second issue,
petitioner’s recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is proper. An order of
dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory
because the proceedings were terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by
the lower court. Therefore, the remedy
of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.[19] Under the Rules of Court, a party may
directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the trial court only on
pure questions of law.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Records, pp. 50-52. Penned by Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr.
[2]
[3]
[4] Art. 1547. In a contract of sale, unless a
contrary intention appears, there is:
(1) An implied warranty on the
part of the seller that he has a right to sell the thing at the time when the
ownership is to pass, and that the buyer shall from that time have and enjoy
the legal and peaceful possession of the thing;
(2) An implied warranty that the
thing shall be free from any hidden faults or defects, or any charge or
encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer.
This article shall not, however, be held to render liable a sheriff, auctioneer, mortgagee, pledgee, or other person professing to sell by virtue of authority in fact or law, for the sale of a thing in which a third person has a legal or equitable interest.
[5] Records, pp. 32-37.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 65-74.
[10]
[11]
[12] 93 Phil. 774 (1953).
[13] Rollo, pp. 143-157.
[14]
[15] APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS.
[16] O.B. Jovenir Construction and Development Corporation v.
Macamir Realty and Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 135803,
[17]
[18] Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of
the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. (Republic v. Yu, G.R. No.
157557,
[19] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 138.
[20] Cebu Woman’s Club v. De la Victoria, G.R. No. 120060, March 9, 2000, 327 SCRA 533, 537.