Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
TIBLE & TIBLE COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 155806
HEIRS OF EMILIO G. TIBLE, JR.,
namely: ALMABELLA MENLA
VDA. DE TIBLE, EMILIO M. Present:
TIBLE IV, MA. MYLENE TIBLE,
VICTOR M. TIBLE, ERIC M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
J.,
TIBLE, ALLAN M. TIBLE, Acting Chairperson,
NORMAN M. TIBLE and JOHANN TINGA,**
EMIL M. TIBLE, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Petitioners, NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
- versus
-
ROYAL
SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION
(now assigned to
COMSAVINGS
BANK) and
GODOFREDO
E. QUILING,
Deputy
Provincial Sheriff of Promulgated:
Calamba,
Laguna,
Respondents.
April 8, 2008
x - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Certiorari being an
extraordinary remedy, the party which seeks to avail of it must observe the
Rules strictly.
This is a Rule 45 petition
for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which dismissed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari on procedural
flaws.
The Facts
The facts, as reflected in the
petition and its annexes, are as follows:
Sometime in June 1997, petitioners
Tible & Tible Company, Inc. (TTCI) and Emilio G. Tible, Jr. (now deceased),
jointly and severally, obtained a loan and/or credit accommodation from
respondent Royal Savings and Loan Association (RSLA) in the total amount of one
million five hundred thousand and eighty pesos (P1,500,080.00). The loan amount was released to petitioner
TTCI in four instalments, as follows:
|
Date Released |
Amount |
Due Date |
|
|
|
|
|
|
250,040.00 |
|
|
|
250,040.00 |
|
|
|
250,000.00 |
|
|
TOTAL |
|
|
Securing the loan were the following
mortgages:
(a) Chattel
Mortgage executed on P3,123,035.00;
and
(b) Chattel
Mortgage on 2,243 pieces of logs, with total volume of 683,818 board feet.
The
loan was intended to finance the logging and lumber business of petitioner TTCI. Unfortunately, between 1977 to 1980, TTCI did
not come up to its projected capacity of 12,000 board feet per 8-hour operation
due to mechanical and design deficiencies.
Despite remedial measures undertaken, it was unsuccessful in its efforts
to rehabilitate the sawmill. TTCI was
thus able to pay only P418,317.40 through dacion en pago by delivery of its lumber products.
In
a Decision dated P2,428,290.20, inclusive of interests, attorney’s
fees service charges, stamps collection costs and expenses of suit, to be restructured
for 18 months commencing
Also
stipulated in said compromise agreement is the mode of payment, to wit:
2.
That defendants,
after having fully examined and verified the said sum of P2,428,290.20
to be correct and/or untainted by any illegality or any imperfection in law and
in fact, do hereby expressly propose to pay the said sum of P2,428,290.20
strictly according to the fallowing schedule:
a.
P156,176.58 – on or before
b.
P156,176.58 – on or before
The compromise agreement further stated that
“failure on the part of the defendants to pay any one of the installments as
and when the same is due and payable, shall make the whole obligation
immediately due and payable and shall
entitle the plaintiff to immediately execute without further verbal or written
notice to the defendants x x x.”[4]
After TTCI defaulted in its monthly payments, RSLA
moved for immediate
execution of the
For failure of the
defendants to comply with the decision rendered by the Court on
WHEREFORE, in view thereof,
let a writ of execution be issued in this case and the same be implemented by the
City Sheriff of Naga City.
SO ORDERED.[5]
In its manifestation with ex parte motion dated
Considering the manifestation
with ex parte motion, dated
SO ORDERED.[6]
Accordingly, an alias writ of execution[7] was issued.
In a public auction sale conducted on P950,000.00.
On
Upon another ex
parte motion by now respondent Comsavings Bank, the former
Aggrieved by these developments, petitioners filed
an action for “Annulment of Execution
In an Order[11] dated
Opting against elevating the said order of
dismissal to the appellate court, petitioners filed the same complaint, which
is now the case involved in the present petition, with the
Instead of filing an answer, respondent Comsavings
bank filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners’ claim or demand
has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished.
On
Acting on the motion for
reconsideration dated
the decision dated
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA on
On
On
(1) the “Verification Affidavit of Non-Forum
Shopping” was signed by one Almabella Menla Vda. de Tible, but there is no
Special Power of Attorney, Board Resolution nor Secretary’s Certificate was
attached thereto authorizing said signatory to sign the Verification and
Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping in behalf of the other petitioners; (Sec. 3,
Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended)
(2) there is no written explanation to justify
service by mail in lieu of the required personal service of copies of the
petition upon the respondents was made (Section 11, Rule 13, Id.; Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon.
Ricafort, et al., 293 SCRA 661).
Further, even a
perfunctory reading of the petition reveals that the same is seriously infirmed
in that it is not the proper remedy from the assailed decision dismissing
petitioners’ complaint for “Annulment of Execution Sale and T.C.T. Nos. 27994,
24002, 24003, 24005 and other related documents, and/or Reconveyance of Real
Property with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order with
Damages” in Civil Case No. N-6619 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite
City, Branch 16, but ordinary appeal therefrom under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.[15]
On
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The two main issues are both
procedural in nature:
1.
Is petitioners’ proper remedy an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 or a
petition for certiorari under Rule
65?
2.
May the CA relax the application of the rules requiring verification and
certification of non-forum shopping under Section 3, Rule 46, as well as
compliance with the rule regarding priorities in modes of service and filing of
pleadings under Section 11, Rule 13?
Our Ruling
The CA aptly dismissed the petition for
certiorari for being an improper remedy.
In
the assailed Resolution of
The
SECTION 1. Subject
of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter therein when declared
by these Rules to be appealable.
The
CA was, therefore, correct when it dismissed outright the petition for certiorari. This Court has invariably upheld dismissals
of certiorari petitions erroneously filed,
appeal being the correct remedy. It is a
very basic rule in our jurisprudence that certiorari
cannot be availed of when the party has adequate remedy such as an appeal.
Section
1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure explicitly states when a
petition for certiorari may be
availed of, to wit:
SECTION
1. Petition
for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has exhaustively enumerated and
painstakingly discussed the differences between these two remedies in Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday
Holdings Corporation,[16]
viz.:
Appeal and Certiorari
Distinguished
Between
an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial
distinctions which shall be explained below.
As
to the Purpose.
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason
for the rule in this light:
“When
a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it
of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This
cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil
action of certiorari.”
The
supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari
cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a
judgment of the lower court – on the basis either of the law or the facts of
the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are
incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact – a mistake of judgment – appeal
is the remedy.
As
to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its
original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision
over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation
of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and
independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original
parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari
are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower
court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As
to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court
so declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original
action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of
the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As
to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and
served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the
petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment
or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
On
the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than
sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial
of the motion.
As
to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to
afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note
also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under
the law. Such motion is not required before appealing
a judgment or final order.[17]
With
these distinctions, it is plainly discernible why a party is precluded from
filing a petition for certiorari when
appeal is available, or why the two remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.[18] Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion.[19]
More
than that, We find no grave abuse of discretion here. Applying the settled jurisprudence on the
matter, appeal would have been an adequate remedy, especially since the
dismissal by the
After
a thorough review of all the arguments of petitioners, We are unconvinced that
the alleged errors referred to are acts of “grave abuse of discretion” that would
fall under the definition of this phrase. As We explained in Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Pilipino Telephone Employees
Association:[20]
For
a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be proven to have acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of discretion” has been defined
as “a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it
must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”[21]
It
should be stressed that it is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise
of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave.[22]
Non-compliance with the
rules is fatal to a petition for certiorari.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the petition for certiorari
filed with the CA is the correct remedy, still, petitioners’ defective
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping as required by Section 3, Rule
46, as well as the absence of any written explanation to justify service by
mail in lieu of personal service, as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rule of Civil Procedure, are fatal to their cause.
In
Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes,[23] the Court stressed that “certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy,
the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid
down by the law.” The Court further
explained in Athena:
The
acceptance of a petition for certiorari as
well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Although the
court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only (1) when the
petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency,
or branch of the government; or (2) when there are procedural errors, like
violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court Circulars. Clearly petitioners in their petition before
the Court of Appeals committed procedural errors.
The
verification of the petition and certification of non-forum shopping before the
Court of Appeals were signed only by Jimenez.
There is no showing that he was authorized to sign the same by Athena,
his co-petitioner.
Section
4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his knowledge and belief.
Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by
Jimenez but also by Athena’s duly authorized representative.
In
Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the
certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or
plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is
insufficient. The attestation on
non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner
cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by
his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current
petition.[24]
As noted by the CA in its Resolution of
The CA refused to reverse its earlier
dismissal upon petitioners’ motion for reconsideration despite subsequent
compliance by submitting the required special power of attorney,[25]
secretary’s certificate,[26]
and board resolution.[27]
In Digital
Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[28] the
Court affirmed the CA dismissal of a petition on the same ground, noting –
x x x That petitioner did not in the first instance comply with the
requirement of Revised Circular No. 2-91 by having the certification against
forum shopping signed by one of its officers, as it did after its petition before the Court of
Appeals had been dismissed, is beyond
our comprehension.[29]
(Emphasis supplied)
At any rate, it must be noted that subsequent compliance does not ipso facto entitle a party to a
reconsideration of the dismissal order.
As the Court aptly observed in Batoy
v. Regional Trial
x x x the requirement under
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a party’s
failure to comply therewith in the
first instance. In those cases where this Court excused the non-compliance
with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping,
it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the
strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. x x x[31]
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, petitioners failed to include any written explanation to
justify service by mail in lieu of the required personal service of copies of
the petition upon respondents. Section
11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:
In Solar Team Entertainment v.
Ricafort,[32] the
Court has unequivocally stated that “for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar,
strictest compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 is mandated x x x.”[33] The Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the
same strict standard to petitioners.
The doctrine of liberal application of Procedural
rules applies when there is justifiable cause for non-compliance or compelling
reason to relax it.
Much reliance is placed on
the rule that “Courts are not slaves or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been,
as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other
way around.”[34] This rule must always be used in
the right context, lest injustice, rather than justice would be its end result.
It must never be forgotten
that, generally, the application of the rules must be upheld, and the
suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception. This Court previously explained:
The Court is not impervious to
the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter in
procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long been recognized that strict
compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business.
Procedural rules are not to be
disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law is
important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through
the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper
litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under
which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the
prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
acknowledge.
It cannot be overemphasized that
procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice. Justice has
to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al., that:
“Rules of procedure are intended
to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of
substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive
law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as often suggested,
that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will
result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much
misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the
policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other,
in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is
equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it
the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
x x x x
“x x x (T)hey are required to be
followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons them may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x
While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this
does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to
the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and
their just resolution. Justice eschews
anarchy.”[35]
For the exception to come into play, first and foremost should be the
party litigant’s plausible explanation for non-compliance with the rules he
proposes to be exempted from. Absent any
acceptable explanation, the party’s plain violation of the rules will not be
countenanced.
Thus, in Suzuki v. De Guzman,[36] the
Court held:
As a general rule, these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance
therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. While the Court is not unmindful of
exceptional cases where this Court has set aside procedural defects to correct
a patent injustice, concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
at least explain his failure to comply
with the rules. There must be at
least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[37]
(Emphasis supplied)
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals,[38] the
CA dismissed the petition for review outright for failure of petitioners to
sign the certification of non-forum shopping.
The certification was signed only by their lawyer. In affirming the dismissal of the petition,
the Court said:
Regrettably, we find substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance as provided
for in Circular No. 28-91. The
attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires
personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court’s consideration, petitioner here must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
justice. However, the petitioner did not
give any explanation to warrant their exemption from the strict application of
the rule. Utter disregard of the rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[39]
(Emphasis supplied)
Too, the party litigant must convince the Court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.[40] The Court’s pronouncements in Pet Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[41] are
illustrative:
x x x In Loquias
vs. Office of the Ombudsman (338 SCRA 62, 68 [2000]), we held that failure
of one of the petitioners to sign the verification and certificate against
forum shopping constitutes a defect in the petition, which is a ground for
dismissing the same. While we have held
in rulings subsequent to Loquias that
this rule may be relaxed, petitioners must comply with two conditions: first, petitioners must show justifiable
cause for their failure to personally sign the certification, and; second, they must also be able to prove
that the outright dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly
administration of justice. x x x[42]
Recapitulating, the two pre-requisites for the relaxation of the rules
are: (a) justifiable cause or plausible reason for non-compliance; and (b) compelling reason to convince the
court that outright dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly
administration of justice.
Perusing the records, We find neither justifiable cause nor compelling
reason to relax the rules in petitioners’ favor.
Petitioners do not have any plausible reason for non-compliance. In their motion for reconsideration[43]
of the CA dismissal, petitioners claimed that co-petitioners of Almabella Vda.
de Tible, who signed the verification in their behalf, had executed a Special
Power of Attorney (
inadvertence committed by petitioners’ counsel” which may easily be alleged, do
not per se constitute an acceptable
explanation for non-compliance.
Also, the Court finds nothing on record which constitutes compelling
reason for a liberal application of procedural rules.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O.
TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Vice Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
Chairperson, who is on official leave per Special Order No. 497 dated
** Designated as additional member per Special
Order No. 497 dated
[1] Rollo,
pp. 45-46. Dated
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Ten (10) parcels of land were covered only by tax declarations, while thirteen parcels of land were covered by eight (8) transfer certificates of titles.
[9] Rollo,
pp. 86-94.
[10]
[11]
[12] 92 Phil. 525 (1953).
[13] Rollo, p. 130. Cited in
[14]
[15]
[16] G.R.
No. 156067,
[17] Madrigal Transport,
Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, id.
at 134-136.
[18]
[19] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings
Corporation, supra note 16, at 136-137.
[20] G.R.
No. 160058,
[21] Pilipino Telephone
Corporation v. Pilipino Telephone Employees Association, id. at 376-377, citing Salinguin
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166046,
[22] Benito v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 134913,
[23] G.R.
No. 156905,
[24] Athena Computers,
Inc. v. Reyes, id. at 348.
[25] Rollo, p. 55.
[26]
[27]
[28] G.R.
No. 128550,
[29] Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals, id. at 290.
[30] G.R.
No. 126833,
[31] Batoy v. Regional Trial
[32] G.R.
No. 132007,
[33] Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort, id. at 670.
[34] Grand Placement Services Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142358,
[35] Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209,
[36] G.R.
No. 146979,
[37] Suzuki v. De Guzman, id. at 662.
[38] G.R.
No. 127393,
[39] Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, id. at
711-712.
[40] United Paragon Mining Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 150959,
[41]
G.R. No. 148287,
[42] Pet
Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 520.
[43] Rollo, p. 69.