THIRD
DIVISION
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LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI,
Petitioner, - versus- ROMMEL,
ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 151243 Present: PUNO, CJ * YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,[2] dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution,[3] dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set aside the Decision,[4] dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.[5] The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Nave’s successor-in-interest.
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty
Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as
Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land
located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged that on
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she
could not be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of
[Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of
the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her for her signature on
January 3, 1984. When she was informed
that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No.
T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to [Fernando] the said piece of paper
and at the same time repudiating the same.
Her repudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando]
tendered the partial down payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and
(2) she already sold the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller
and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984
after the complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy
thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando]
has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M.
Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the alleged Contract to
Sell. Even assuming that said entity is
the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of
the corporation there being no evidence to show that he was duly authorized to
do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to
Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject
property. Thus, the complaint was
amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial
court denied [Nave’s] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation
and Motion stating that she was adopting the allegations in her Motion to
Dismiss in answer to [Fernando’s] amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended
Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her defense
undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to appear as
widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of the transaction in
issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando]
and [the Pabale siblings], the trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended
Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended
Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings], this time including the
fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the
psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia
P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist.
Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a
quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof
asseverating that in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled “People vs. Nelly S.
Nave” she raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine
once and for all whether the contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to
the subject property is null and void, the Second Amended Answer and Amended
Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] should be admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted
upon, the proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of
the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On
“Under the circumstances,
specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides with the Brosas spouses has
categorically refused to be examined again at the
SO ORDERED.”
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not
appeal therefrom, while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina
Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the required docketing
fees within the reglementary period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on
On account of such development, a motion for the
dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of
the Decision dated
The case was then set for an annual conference. On
On
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984
executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and
void and of no force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property
covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over
the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of
reconveyance because the sale in their favor has been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the
property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its income from the time they
took over possession to the time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita
[Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and
severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorney’s fees in the sum
of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.[6]
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation,
still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question the portion of the P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as
appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the RTC erred in declaring in
its
The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision, dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its
President, Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by Rommel,
Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
No pronouncements as to costs.[7]
Alamayri sought reconsideration of
the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court, invoking the Decision,[8]
dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe
since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision already became final and
executory when no one appealed therefrom.
Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be
an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into
should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated
According to Alamayri, the Pabale
siblings should be bound by the findings of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having participated in the said guardianship
proceedings through their father Jose Pabale.
She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose Pabale
as among those present during the hearings held on
Atty. Gesmundo, Nave’s surviving
spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Nave’s
incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his
right to the subject property as owner upon Nave’s death in accordance with the
laws of succession. It must be
remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed transfer of
his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a quo
refrained from ruling thereon.
In
a Resolution, dated
Hence,
Alamayri comes before this Court via
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO.
146-86-C ON
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS
PABALES.[9]
It is Alamayri’s position that given
the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no
longer be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly, the rule
on conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res
judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” Res judicata lays the rule that an
existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in
all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.[10]
It is espoused in the Rules of Court,
under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39, which read:
SEC. 47.
Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final
order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto.
The
doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be
stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or
decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two
suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the
principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as
evidence.[11]
In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which
corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, is referred to as “bar by former judgment”; while the second
general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule,
is known as “conclusiveness of judgment.”
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang
v. Register of Deeds provides the following enlightening discourse on
conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually
embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b)
conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept — conclusiveness of
judgment — states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit
and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot
be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies,
in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the
same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by
proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action
can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment
will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive
in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in
the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell &
Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]),
reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the
distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and
conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or
issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or
cause of action.
The general rule precluding
the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially
connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to
questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific
finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were
directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the
judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it
will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions
between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises,
they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.[12]
Another
case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation,
further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as
follows:
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But
where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but
no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as
to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as
to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata
known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently, any right,
fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.[13]
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment
bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled
in a previous case. The second case,
however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same
fact or question adjudged in the first case.
Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and
parties, but not of causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayri’s assertion,
conclusiveness of judgment has no application to the instant Petition since
there is no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and
Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No
identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a
petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian
over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her
incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the
RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an incompetent, the latter being
described as a person “suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are
hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind,
and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation.”[14]
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court
governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for
appointment of guardian for resident. – Any relative, friend, or other
person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful
guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition
the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the
person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of
the
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. –
A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must show, so far as known
to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the
appointment necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the
relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their
care;
(d) The probable value and character of his
estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of
guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect
in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of
guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for
hearing. Notice thereof. – When a
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall
fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the
province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition.
– Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition, contest the
petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of the
alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are
prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of
guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the
opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for
letters to issue. – At the hearing of the petition the alleged incompetent
must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required
notice has been given. Thereupon the
court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective
allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it shall
appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers
and duties hereinafter specified.
x x x x
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. –
Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served upon the civil
registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person
resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.
A petition for appointment of a
guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e.,
petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for
Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no named
respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the
Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain the names, ages, and
residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those having
him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor
or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the
petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a
petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to
determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent
who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second,
who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people
who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are
closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely,
his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring for
him.
It is significant to note that the
rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be likewise
identified and notified. The reason is
simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
appointment of a guardian. It is almost
a given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed
minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to
preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or
incompetent obligated to comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that
the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took part in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C. They are not Nave’s relatives,
nor are they the ones caring for her.
Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general
or special notices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a
guardian, it was not established that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C.
Alamayri’s allegation that the
Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on two Orders,
dated 30 October 1987[15]
and 19 November 1987,[16]
issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence
of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during
the hearings held on the same dates.
However, the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale
was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his
children to appear in the said hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not
allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit and mark additional evidence to prove
that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of
Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals
conducts hearings and receives evidence prior to the submission
of the case for judgment.[17] It must be pointed out that, in this case,
Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on
The parties must diligently and
conscientiously present all arguments and available evidences in support of
their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed submitted for
judgment. Only under exceptional
circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered judgment;[18]
otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties may
continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any explanation
why she did not present her evidence earlier.
Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served if
she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify
deviation from the general rules of procedure.
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties
are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[19] Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended
to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is
not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.[20]
Moreover, contrary to Alamayri’s
assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion to Schedule Hearing to
Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated
While it is now alleged, for the
first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale siblings] participated in the
guardianship proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is
their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentary
evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this
late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father
is not notice to them there being no allegation to the effect that he
represented them before the Calamba Court.[21]
As the
appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do
prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October 1987 and
19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the Pabale
siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to represent his children
in the said proceedings. Worth stressing
is the fact that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated
Since it was not established that
the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding
therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No
identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues
between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the
latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Nave’s competency in
1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the
Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main
issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time of filing of the petition
with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian over her
person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and
Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the
issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of
the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings on
While both cases involve a
determination of Nave’s incompetency, it must be established at two separate
times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986.
A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean
that she was so in 1984. In Carillo
v. Jaojoco,[22] the
Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally
incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the execution of the
contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so when she executed the
contract. Hence, the significance of the
two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Nave’s mental condition in 1986
may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to
attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such
capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that
is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of
his mind.[23] The burden of proving incapacity to enter
into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.[24]
Nave was examined and diagnosed by
doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an incompetent
until
Alamayri capitalizes on the
declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated
All told,
there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case
No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Nave’s incompetency by
the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the
latter case that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she executed on
20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the
Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
Chairperson
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* In place of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, who was the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, who heard the early stages of Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-37.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Martin
S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Eliezer
R. de los
[3]
[4] Penned by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.; id. at 67-77.
[5] It must be noted that Civil Case
No. 675-84-C was originally instituted before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36. All cases
involving Nelly S. Nave (Nave cases) were then assigned to the same Calamba
RTC, Branch 36, to which Judge Salvador P. de Guzman was appointed effective
[6]
[7]
[8] Penned by Judge
[9]
[10] Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, 441 Phil. 551, 563 (2002).
[11] Vda. de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., G.R. No. 75109-10,
[12] G.R. No. 76265,
[13] Supra note 10 at 564.
[14] Rule 92, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
[15] Rollo, p. 60.
[16]
[17] Rule 51, Section 1 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 1. When case deemed submitted for judgment. – A case shall be deemed submitted for judgment:
A. In ordinary appeals. –
1) Where no hearing on the merits of the main case is held, upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules or by the court itself, or the expiration of the period for its filing.
2) Where such a hearing is held, upon its termination or upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum as may be required or permitted to be filed by the court, or the expiration of the period for its filing.
B. In original actions and petitions for review. –
1) Where no comment is filed, upon the expiration of the period to comment.
2) Where no hearing is held, upon the filing of the last pleading required or permitted to be filed by the court, or the expiration of the period for its filing.
3) Where a hearing on the merits of the main case is held, upon its termination or upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum as may be required or permitted to be filed by the court, or the expiration of the period for its filing.
[18] Newly Discovered Evidence. – In order that a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the following requisites must be present: (a) that the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, it will probably change the judgment. Accordingly, where the evidence was known to the movant and was obtainable at the trial, or if not known, it is not satisfactorily shown why it was not available at the trial, or that due diligence was not employed in securing it, the motion for new trial should be denied. So, also, where the evidence consists merely in improbable or unreasonable testimonies of witnesses, or is merely cumulative or corroborative, and will not thus alter the results, the motion will be denied. Forgotten evidence is not a ground for new trial. [People v. Evaristo, 121 Phil. 186, 200 (1965)].
[19] Clavecilla v. Quitain, G.R.
No. 147989,
[20] Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 780, 784 (1996).
[21] Rollo,
p. 50.
[22] 46 Phil. 957, 960 (1924).
[23] Standard Oil Company of
[24] Catalan v. Basa, G.R. No.
159567,
[25] Rollo,
p. 58.
[26]
[27]