SAN
MIGUEL CORPORATION and G.R. Nos.
146121-22
GERIBERN ABELLA,
Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.
Chairperson,
-
versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,**
CARPIO MORALES,
J.,
TINGA, and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
(First Division),
LABOR ARBITER PEDRO
RAMOS Promulgated:
and ERNESTO IBIAS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
In
this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45, petitioners San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and Geribern Abella, Assistant
Vice President and Plant Manager of SMC’s Metal Closure
and Lithography Plant, assail the
Decision[2]
dated 28 June 2000 and the Resolution[3]
dated 17 November 2000, both of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases
of Ernesto M. Ibias v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. and San
Miguel Corporation Metal Closure and Lithography Plant, et al. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al., docketed
as CA G.R. SP No. 54684 and CA G.R. SP No. 54709, respectively.
The factual and legal antecedents
follow.
Ernesto M. Ibias (respondent) was
employed by petitioner SMC on
According to SMC’s Policy on Employee
Conduct,[4] absences
without permission or AWOPs, which are absences not covered either by a certification
of the plant doctor that the employee was absent due to sickness or by a duly
approved application for leave of absence filed at least six (6) days prior to
the intended leave, are subject to disciplinary action characterized by
progressively increasing weight, as follows:
|
VIOLATIONS |
1ST Offense |
2nd Offense |
3rd Offense |
4th Offense |
5th Offense |
|
2. ABSENCE WITHOUT
PERMISSION (within one calendar year) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
A. Each day absent not
exceeding two (2) days |
Written warning |
|
|
|
|
|
B. 3rd AWOP |
3 Days’ suspension |
|
|
|
|
|
C. 4th AWOP |
|
5 Days’ suspension |
|
|
|
|
D. 5th AWOP |
|
7 Days’ suspension |
|
|
|
|
E. 6th AWOP |
|
10 Days’ suspension |
|
|
|
|
F. 7th AWOP |
|
15 Days’ suspension |
|
|
|
|
G. 8th AWOP |
|
30 Days’ suspension |
|
|
|
|
H. 9th AWOP |
|
Discharge |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3. ABSENCE WITHOUT
PERMISSION FOR SIX (6) OR MORE CONSECUTIVE WORKING DAYS IS CONSIDERED
ABANDONMENT OF WORK |
Discharge[5] |
|
|
|
|
The same Policy on Employee Conduct
also punishes falsification of company records or documents with discharge or
termination for the first offense if the offender himself or somebody else benefits
from falsification or would have benefited if falsification is not found on
time.[6]
It appears that per company records, respondent
was AWOP on the following dates in 1997: 2, 4 and 11 January; 26, 28 and 29 April; and
5, 7, 8, 13, 21, 22, 28 and 29 May. For
his absences on 2, 4 and 11 January and 28 and 29 April, he was given a written
warning[7] dated
In a Notice to Explain dated
On
Not satisfied with the explanation, SMC
conducted an administrative investigation on 17 and
During the investigation, respondent
admitted that he was absent on 28 and 29 April and 7 and 8 May 1997 and had not
sought sick leave permission for those dates, and also denied falsifying or
having had anything to do with the falsification of his medical consultation
card.
Ferdinand Siwa (Siwa), staff assistant,
and Dr. Angelito Marable (Marable), retainer-physician, testified for SMC.
Siwa
testified that sometime in May 1997, he called respondent’s attention to AWOPs he incurred on 28 and 29
April. He admitted having given respondent
a written warning for his absences on 2, 4 and 11 January and on 28 and 29 April.
Respondent admitted his absences on 28 and 29 April but
reasoned that he was on sick leave on those dates, producing his medical
consultation card from his locker to prove the same. Siwa was surprised that the medical consultation card was in respondent’s
possession since this should have been in the rack beside the plant clinic. His medical consultation showed that he was
purportedly granted sick leave for 28 and 29 April. However, upon verification with the plant clinic,
Siwa found that respondent was not granted sick leaves on those dates. When Siwa confronted respondent about the
falsification, respondent allegedly
replied that he resorted to falsification to cover up his AWOPs which he was
forced to incur because of personal problems.
Marable testified that sometime in
May 1997, he together with the plant nurse and Siwa counter-checked respondent’s
sick leaves with the daily personnel leave
authority report. The examination
revealed that the clinic had not granted any sick leave on 28 and 29 April and
7 and
After the completion of the
investigation, SMC concluded that respondent committed the offenses of
excessive AWOPs and falsification of company records or documents, and accordingly
dismissed him.[13]
On
The labor arbiter believed that respondent
had committed the absences pointed out by SMC but found the imposition of
termination of employment based on his AWOPs to be disproportionate since SMC
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it had strictly
implemented its company policy on absences. It found nothing in the records that would
show that respondent was suspended for his previous AWOPs before he was meted
the maximum penalty of discharge from service and thus, it ruled that
management was to be blamed for the non-implementation of and lax compliance
with the policy. It also noted that termination
based on the alleged falsification of company records was unwarranted in view
of SMC’s failure to establish respondent’s guilt. It
observed that the medical card was under the care of Siwa and thus it was he
who should be responsible for its loss and the insertion of falsified entries
therein.
SMC appealed the decision to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on
The NLRC, on
On
On
WHEREFORE, the decision of the public respondent modifying the
decision of the labor arbiter is SET
ASIDE and the decision of the labor arbiter is hereby REINSTATED with the modification that the payment of the full
backwages and other benefits would be from
SO ORDERED.[18]
The Court of Appeals believed that contrary
to SMC’s claims, it was more consistent with human experience that respondent
did not make an admission, especially in view of his consistent denials during
the administrative investigation and of his written explanation dated 5 June
1997. The Court of Appeals also stayed firm in its determination that the testimonies
of Marable and Siwa could not be given weight as they were uncorroborated, and
that it was Siwa who was liable for the falsification of respondent’s
consultation card.
The appellate court also held that respondent’s AWOPs did not warrant his
dismissal in view of SMC’s inconsistent implementation of its company
policies. It could not understand why respondent
was given a mere warning for his absences on 28 and 29 April which constituted his
5th and 6th AWOPs, respectively, when these should have
merited suspension under SMC’s policy. According
to the appellate court, since respondent was merely warned, logically said absences
were deemed committed for the first time; thus, it follows that the subject
AWOPs did not justify his dismissal because under SMC’s policy, the 4th
to 9th AWOPs are meted the corresponding penalty only when committed
for the second time.
The Court of Appeals, however,
disagreed with the NLRC’s application of the doctrine of “strained relations,”
citing jurisprudence[19]
that the same should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally
dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement, and that since every labor
dispute almost always results in “strained relations,” the phrase cannot be
given an over-arching interpretation.[20] Thus, it ordered that respondent’s backwages
be computed from the date of his dismissal up to the time when he was actually
reinstated. Since respondent was placed
on payroll reinstatement on
Both
parties separately moved for reconsideration of the decision but the Court of
Appeals denied the motions for lack of
merit in the Resolution dated
In this present petition for review, SMC
raises the following grounds:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ABSENCES OF IBIAS ON 28TH AND 29TH OF APRIL 1997 “WERE
COMMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME.” SUCH
FINDING IS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE AND A RESULT OF A
MANIFESTLY ABSURD INFERENCE.[21]
On the first ground, SMC contends
that the Court of Appeals allegedly disregarded the basic rule on evidence that
affirmative testimony is stronger than negative testimony. It claims that the testimonies of Marable and Siwa that respondent
admitted having committed the falsification should be given more weight than his
mere denial. SMC adds that the falsified
medical consultation card by itself proves
respondent’s falsification of the card. The fact that he used the falsified
consultation card to falsely represent that he had been granted sick leave on
28 and 29 April and 7 and
On the second ground, SMC points out respondent’s absences on 28 and 29 April 1997 were his 5th
and 6th AWOPs, respectively, and following the Court of Appeals’
ruling, the same should have been meted the penalty of five (5) days’
suspension for the 5th AWOP and 10 days’ suspension for the 6th
AWOP under SMC’s Policy on Employee Conduct.
Respondent incurred fourteen (14)
AWOPs but when SMC imposed the penalty of discharge, the Court of Appeals
disagreed since SMC had supposedly failed to strictly implement its company
policy on attendance. Such reasoning
would have respondent’s AWOPs justified by SMC’s lax implementation of
disciplinary action on its employees, and would place on SMC the burden of
proving strict conformity with company rules.
SMC argues that this is contrary to the ruling in Cando v. NLRC[22]
that it should be the employee who must show proof of condonation by the
employer of the offense or laxity in the enforcement of the company rules since
it is he who has raised this defense.
SMC directs our attention to the Court of Appeals’ observation that Ibias’
5th and 6th AWOPs should be considered as though “said
absences were committed for the first time” since respondent “was merely given
a warning” for said AWOPs. To SMC, it
seems that that the appellate court would count the
employee’s AWOPs not on the basis of the number of times that he had been
absent, but on the basis of the penalty imposed by the employee. This is clearly contrary to the dictates of
the Policy. Such a ruling also deprives
SMC of its management prerogative to impose sanctions lighter than those
specifically prescribed by its rules.
The issues to be resolved are whether
the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the findings of the labor arbiter and
the NLRC and in dismissing SMC’s claims that respondent was terminated from service with just cause.
The petition is meritorious as
regards one of the issues.
At the outset, it should be stressed
that whether respondent had falsified his medical consultation card and whether
he incurred unauthorized absences are
questions of fact which the Court of Appeals, the NLRC, and the labor arbiter
had already resolved. We see no reason
to disturb the same. After all,
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, particularly where it is in absolute
agreement with that of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, as in this case, are
accorded not only respect but even finality and are deemed binding upon this
Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[23] Nevertheless, while the Court subscribes to the
factual findings of the lower tribunals, it finds that these tribunals
misapplied the appropriate law and jurisprudence on the issue of respondent’s
dismissal due to his unauthorized absences.
But first the falsification issue.
The settled rule in administrative
and quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required in determining the legality of an employer’s dismissal of an employee,
and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary as substantial evidence
is considered sufficient. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise. Thus, substantial evidence is the least demanding
in the hierarchy of evidence.[24]
The Court agrees with the
tribunals below that SMC was unable to prove the falsification charge against
respondent. Respondent cannot be legally
dismissed on the basis of the
uncorroborated and self-serving
testimonies of SMC’s employees. SMC
merely relied on the testimonies of Marabe and Siwa, who both stated that
respondent admitted to them that he falsified his medical consultation card to
cover up his excessive AWOPs. For his
part, respondent denied having had any knowledge of said falsification, both in
his testimony during the company-level investigation and in his handwritten
explanation. He did not even claim that
he had requested for, nor had been granted any sick leave for the days that the
falsified entries were made. Siwa,
being responsible for the medical cards, should take the blame for the loss and
alleged tampering thereof, and not respondent who had no control over the
same.
Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required as a basis for judgment on the legality
of an employer’s dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence
for that matter, substantial evidence being sufficient. In the instant case, while there may be no
denying that respondent’s medical card
had falsified entries in it, SMC was unable to prove, by substantial evidence,
that it was respondent who made the unauthorized entries. Besides, SMC’s (Your) Guide on Employee
Conduct[25]
punishes the act of falsification of company records or documents; it does not
punish mere possession of a falsified document.
The issue of the unauthorized absences,
however, is another matter.
Respondent’s time cards showed that
he was on AWOP on the dates enumerated by SMC: 2, 4 and 11 January; 26, 28 and
29 April; and 5, 7, 8, 13, 21, 22, 28 and 29 May 1997. The Labor Arbiter even found that respondent was
on AWOP on all said dates.[26] Respondent also admitted being absent on 28 and 29 April
and 7 and
The
Court observes that respondent admitted during the company-level investigation
that that his absences incurred on 28 and 29 April, and 7 and 8 May 1997 were
without permission.[29] He explained that during those times, he had
a family problem which needed his attention; he was confused and was unable to
inform or seek permission from his superior.[30]
However,
while respondent has admitted these absences, before the Court, he also seeks
to belittle the plain by countering that SMC has not been too rigid in its
application of company rules pertaining to leave availments. In the proceedings below he claimed that
during the days that he was absent, he had attended to some family matters. Thus, he presented copies of two (2)
medical certificates and a barangay certification that he attended hearings on
some of the days when he was absent.
These certifications, however, cannot work to erase his AWOPs; respondent
had never submitted these documents to
SMC and it is only when the case was pending before the Labor Arbiter that he
produced the same.[31]
Respondent cannot feign surprise nor
ignorance of the earlier AWOPs he had incurred.
He was given a warning for his 2, 4, and 11 January and 26, 28, and
Thus, even if he was not punished for
his subsequent AWOPs, the same remained on record. He was aware of the number of AWOPs he incurred and should have known that these were punishable under company
rules. The fact that he was spared from suspension cannot be used as a reason
to incur further AWOPs and be absolved from the penalty therefor.
The Court of Appeals, NLRC, and the labor arbiter found that respondent incurred
unauthorized absences, but concluded
that the penalty of discharge or
determination was disproportionate to respondent’s absences in view of SMC’s
inconsistent and lax implementation of
its policy on employees attendance. The
Court disagrees. Respondent’s dismissal
was well within the purview of SMC’s management prerogative.
What the lower tribunals perceived as
laxity, we consider as leniency. SMC’s
tendency to excuse justified absences actually redounded to the benefit of
respondent since the imposition of the corresponding penalty would have been
deleterious to him. In a world where “no
work-no pay” is the rule of thumb, several days of suspension would be
difficult for an ordinary working man like respondent. He should be thankful that SMC did not exact
from him almost 70 days suspension before he was finally dismissed from
work.
In any case, when SMC imposed the
penalty of dismissal for the 12th and 13th AWOPs, it was
acting well within its rights as an employer.
An employer has the prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations necessary for the proper conduct of its business, to provide
certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules and to assure
that the same would be complied with.[35] An employer enjoys a wide latitude of
discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on
work-related activities of the employees.[36]
It is
axiomatic that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of
management imposition.[37] Thus, in the implementation of its rules and
policies, the employer has the choice to do so strictly or not, since this is
inherent in its right to control and manage its business effectively. Consequently,
management has the prerogative to impose sanctions lighter than those
specifically prescribed by its rules, or to condone completely the violations
of its erring employees. Of course, this prerogative must be exercised free of grave
abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the requirements of justice and fair
play. Indeed, we have previously stated:
Management also has its own rights, which, as such,
are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.
Out of its concern for those with [fewer] privileges in life, the Supreme Court
has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his
conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the
Court to rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed
in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine.[38]
All told, we
find that SMC acted well within its
rights when it dismissed respondent for
his numerous absences. Respondent was
afforded due process and was validly dismissed for cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
**As replacement of J. Arturo D. Brion who took no part due to a party being a former client per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
[2]
[29]NLRC
records, pp. 102-108. Minutes of the Administrative Meeting held on
Investigator: Ginoong
Ibias, Ikaw ba ay pumasok sa iyong trabaho noong April 28 & 29, at May 7 at
8, 1997?
E.Ibias: Hindi
po.
Investigator: Sa mga araw
na nabanggit, ang iyo bang pagliban o pag-absent ay may permiso ba mula sa
iyong supervisor o manager?
E. Ibias: Wala
po. (
[30]
[31]
[36]Coca Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. v.
Kapisanan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca Cola-FFW, G.R. No. 148205,
[37]Lopez v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 167385,