Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, G.R. No. 105608
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
CARPIO
MORALES,
COURT OF APPEALS,
MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, VELASCO,
JR., and
REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, BRION, JJ.
PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR.,
SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE
MONTEROSO, FLORENDA
MONTEROSO, ALBERTO
MONTEROSO, HEIRS OF FABIAN
MONTEROSO, JR., REYNATO
MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO,
MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS,
ADELITA MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL,
and HENRIETO MONTEROSO,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
SOFIA
PENDEJITO VDA. DE G.R. No. 113199
MONTEROSO, SOLEDAD
MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG,
PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR.,
REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN,
FLORENDA MONTEROSO,
ALBERTO MONTEROSO, RUBY
MONTEROSO, MARLENE
MONTEROSO-POSPOS, HENRIETO
MONTEROSO, ADELITA
MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL, and
REYNATO MONTEROSO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO Promulgated:
D.
MONTEROSO,
Respondents.
April 30, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us
are two petitions for review under Rule 45, the first docketed as G.R. No. 105608, and the second docketed as G.R.
No. 113199, both assailing the Decision[1] dated
March 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 which
modified the June 9, 1987 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (
The Facts
It is not
unusual. Acrimonious litigation between and among siblings and immediate
relatives over inheritance does occur. It is unfortunate when the decedent had,
while still alive, taken steps to precisely avoid a bruising squabble over inheritance.
In a
sense, Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of the peace and municipal
mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, started it all. During his lifetime, Don Fabian married twice
and sired eight children, four from each union.
In
1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol.
Out of this marriage were born
A little
over a year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia
Pendejito. From this union were born
Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr.
After
the death of his first wife, but during the early part of his second marriage, Don
Fabian filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Agusan an intestate
proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife, Soledad D. Monteroso,
docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No.
309, apparently to obviate any dispute over the inheritance of his children
from his first marriage. Subsequently,
the CFI received––and later approved per an Orden[3]
(Order) dated
The
partition in SP No. 309 covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don
Fabian the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of Parcel F-5, while
the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel F-4
and one-half of Parcel F-5. The
intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso was partitioned and distributed to her
four children in equal shares.
Subsequently,
a Mocion[5] (Motion)
was filed for the delivery to Soledad D. Monteroso’s four children, her legal
heirs, their respective shares in her intestate estate, as adjudicated among
them under the duly CFI-approved Project of Partition.
In the
meantime, the children of Don Fabian from his first marriage married
accordingly: The eldest,
Before and
shortly after Don Fabian’s demise, conveyances involving certain of parcels
thus mentioned were purportedly made.
The following is an illustration of the lineal
relation of the parties or the family tree of the direct descendants of Don
Fabian from his two marriages:
This
brings us to the objects of the squabble: the conjugal patrimonies of Don
Fabian from his two successive marriages.
During
the lifetime of Don Fabian, the following properties were acquired, viz:
PARCEL F-ONE
A parcel of
coconut plantation on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan described as
follows: North by the property of
Telesforo Ago and Gregorio Cupay; East by Miguel Y Climaco Cabonce, Isidro
Maamo and Buenaventura Sandigan and Pandanon River, and West by Gregorio Axamin,
Alex Fores and Ventura Sandigan with a superficial extension of 10 has. 62 ares
and 42 centares.
PARCEL F-TWO
A parcel of
coconut land situated on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial
extension of 6 hectares, 50 ares bearing Tax No. 14801 of the Municipality of
Cabadbaran, Agusan, x x x.
PARCEL F-THREE
A parcel of
coconut land under Tax No. 17167 situated on sitio Calibunan, Cabadbaran,
Agusan with superficial extension of 8 hectares and 34 centares x x x.
PARCEL F-FOUR
A parcel of
coconut land under Tax No. 14600 situated on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran,
Agusan, with a superficial extension of 27 hectares, 96 ares and 28 centares x x
x.
PARCEL F-FIVE
A parcel of
residential lot under Tax No. 18477 situated within the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a house of strong materials found on
the same lot with a superficial extension of 660 square meters x x x.
PARCEL F-SIX
A parcel of
residential lot under Tax No. 5374 situated within the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 3,890
square meters x x x.
PARCEL F-SEVEN
A parcel of
coconut and corn land under Tax No. 1769 situated at Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan,
with a superficial extension of 8 hectares x x x.
PARCEL F-EIGHT
A parcel of
coconut land situated at Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan, under Tax No. 2944, with a
superficial extension of 7 hectares, 59 ares and 96 centares x x x.[6]
PARCEL S-ONE
A parcel of
land situated at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax Dec. No. 5396 with
an area of 24 hectares more or less x x x.
PARCEL S-TWO
A parcel of
coconut land situated at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax No. 69
with an area of 24 hectares more or less x x x.
PARCEL S-THREE
A parcel of
coconut land situated at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan, under Tax No.
21639 with an area of 1.4080 hectares more or less x x x.
PARCEL S-FOUR
A parcel of
land situated at Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax No. 3367 with an area of
1,000 sq. m. bounded x x x.[7]
The “F”
designation signified that the covered properties were acquired during the
first marriage, to distinguish them from those acquired during the second
marriage which are designated as “S” properties.
On July
28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin D. Monteroso, namely: Ruby Monteroso,
Marlene M. Pospos, Henrieto Monteroso, and Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel, filed with
the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property
with Damages against their uncle, Tirso D.
Monteroso. Docketed as Civil Case No.
1292, and later raffled to Branch 4 of the court, the complaint involved a portion of Parcel F-4, described in the
Project of Partition, as follows:
(1) One
parcel of coconut land with the improvements thereon existing, Tax No. 14600
with a superficial extension of 6 hectares, 99 ares and 32 centares, bounded as
follows: on the North, Regula Monteroso;
on the East by the Provincial Road Butuan-Cabadbaran; on the Sourth Tirso
Monteroso and on the West Diego Calo.[8]
As the heirs
of Benjamin alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with
the above-described one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share from
the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father per SP No. 309.
However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same when they
demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age.
Tirso countered
that the portion pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to him; it was in
the possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not
entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to exchange her
share in said property for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-7, then being occupied by her.
On
April 14, 1970, Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages with Receivership docketed as Civil
Case No. 1332, involving 12 parcels of land (i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-8 and Parcels S-1 to S-4, mentioned
above) against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings
and/or their representatives. The complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was subsequently
amended to include Perfecto, as co-defendant, and Pendejito, as guardian ad
litem for the minor children of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr., who died in 1970
after the filing of the complaint.
In
Civil Case No. 1332, Tirso, inter alia,
alleged the following: (1) the aforementioned 12 parcels of land belong to the
conjugal partnerships of the first and second marriages contracted by Don
Fabian; (2) SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially settled the intestate
estate of his mother, is null and void for the reason that the project of
partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the decedent as Parcels
F-6, F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-fourth
share or legitime over the said three parcels of land; and (3) Parcels S-1 to
S-4, having been acquired during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are not
paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso.
Answering,
the defendants in Civil Case No. 1332 contended that Don Fabian acquired Parcel
F-6 during the second marriage, while Parcels F-7 and F-8 were Don Fabian’s
exclusive properties having been acquired through a donation from the heirs of
one Benito Tinosa. They further maintained the validity of the judicial
partition under SP No. 309 which operates as res judicata insofar as
Parcels F-1 to F-5 are concerned. In
particular, they asserted that Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, and one-half of F-5 were
adjudicated to Don Fabian as his share in the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage, while Parcel F-4 and the other half of Parcel F-5 were equally
divided among the four children of the first marriage; that during his
lifetime, Don Fabian sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang; that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso D. Monteroso, and
Mauricia Nakila Vda. de Benjamin Monteroso donated Parcel F-6 to Reygula
Monteroso-Bayan; and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 are truly paraphernal properties
of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso as Parcel S-1 was acquired by her through
a homestead patent, Parcel S-2 through adverse possession, and Parcels S-3 and
S-4 by purchase.
The
Initial Ruling of the
Involving
practically the same properties and parties, Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332 were
consolidated and jointly heard. After a
long drawn-out trial spanning almost 15 years, with six different judges successively
hearing the case, the
What
appears to be a victory for Tirso was, however, short-lived. Acting on four
separate motions for reconsideration duly filed by the various defendants in
Civil Case No. 1332, a new judge, who took over the case from Judge Rallos who
inhibited himself from the case, rendered a new decision.
The
Subsequent Ruling of the
Dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, both complaints in Civil Cases No. 1292 and 1332 are
hereby given due course and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring, confirming and ordering that
(a.) Lot 380-A, Share of Soledad Monteroso Cagampang
with an area of 5.3376 hectares, with technical description therein;
(b.) Lot 380-B, Share of Reygula Monteroso
Bayan with an area of 5.3376 hectares, with technical description therein;
(c.) Lot 380-C, Share of the Heirs of Benjamin
D. Monteroso with an area of 5.3376 hectares with technical description
therein;
(d.) Lot 380-D, Share of Tirso D. Monteroso
with an area of 5.3376 hectares and
2. It is hereby ordered that Tirso D.
Monteroso must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim
immediately the area of 3.7815 hectares being portion of
3. It is hereby ordered that Reygula
Monteroso Bayan must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim
immediately the area of 1.6128 hectares which is part of Lot 380-C, Pls-736,
indicated in the subdivision survey plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records
(Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. ‘V’, to the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso
who are the absolute owners of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to pay, return and
deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso the net income
in arrears from 1948 to 1983 the total sum of One Hundred Six Thousand Nine
Hundred Sixty and 40/100 (P106,960.40) Pesos with interest of 12% per annum
compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the present and until fully
paid;
4. It is hereby ordered that Soledad
Monteroso Cagampang must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit
claim immediately the area of 1.0929 hectares being portion of Lot 380-C,
Pls-736, indicated in the subdivision survey plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72,
Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. ‘V’, to her sister Reygula
Monteroso Bayan who is the absolute owner of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to pay,
return and deliver immediately to the said Reygula Monteroso Bayan the net
income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, the total sum of Seventy Seven Thousand
Six Hundred Twenty Five and 96/100 (P77,625.96) Pesos with interest of 12% per
annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the present and until
fully paid, subject to deduction of whatever cash advances, if any, was ever
received by Reygula M. Bayan.
5. The three alleged Absolute Sale, Exh.
‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’ with all its submarkings are declared fictitious, simulated
and no consideration. It can never be
considered a donation because aside from being inofficious and impairing the
legitime of other heirs, the vendee had not signed therein which could be
considered acceptance and above all, these documents were prepared and
acknowledged by Notary Public squarely disqualified and highly prohibited. Therefore, all are declared null and void and
of no legal effect.
So, parcels
F-1, F-2, F-3, F-6, F-7 and F-8 [remain] as part of the intestate estate of Don
Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr.
6. The Register of Deeds and the
Provincial Assessor, both in the Province of Agusan del Norte are hereby
ordered to cancel as the same are cancelled and nullified, all transfer of
certificates and tax declarations now in the name of Soledad Monteroso de
Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. which parcels of land originally
were registered and declared in the name of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., and
to register and declare again in the name of Heirs of Don Fabian B. Monteroso,
Sr., more particularly the following:
(a.) [TCT No. RT-203] (420) for
(b.) TCT No. RT-205 (424) for
(c.) TCT No. RT-204 (423) for
(d.) Parcel of coconut land located at
Poblacion, Cabadbaran, known as F-3 with area of 6.3100 hectares under Tax Dec.
No. 02-001-1810, Series of 1980 and PIN-02-001-30-027;
(e.) Residential Lot, known as F-5 located at
Poblacion, Cabadbaran under Tax Dec. No. 18447 then under Tax Dec. No. 1922,
containing an area of 660 sq. meters bounded on the North by Washington Street;
on the East by Progresso Street; on the South by Rizal Street; and on the West
by Ramon Cabrera.
(f.) Residential
North – Andres Atega
South – Rill
East – Luis Jamboy now Celestino Udarbe,
Sixto Ferrer and New Road
West –
(g.) Coconut land known as F-7, located at
Ambajan, Tubay, Agusan del Norte under Tax Dec. No. 1769, Series of 1955 and
Tax Dec. No. 10-03-0273, Series of 1980 with an area of [8.000] hectares;
(h.) Parcel of coconut land known as F-8,
located at Ambajan, Tubay, Agusan del Norte with an area of 7.5996 hectares
under Tax Dec. No. 2944 and Tax Dec. No. 10-03-0273, Series of 1980;
(i.) Parcel of S-1, located at Tagbongabong,
Cabadbaran under Tax Dec. No. 11506, Series of 1963 with an area of 24 hectares
in the name of Sofia Vda. de Monteroso;
(j.) Parcel of S-2, located at Dal-as,
Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 1888, Series of 1948, Tax Dec. No. 669,
Series of 1952, and subsequently transferred in fraud of other heirs, in the
name of Florenda P. Monteroso under Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax
Dec. No. 3381, Series of 1972, Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series of 1974, Tax Dec. No.
02-006-0047, Series of 1980;
(k.) Parcel of S-3, located at Pandanon,
Mabini, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 5373, Series of 1949 with an area of
1.4080 hectares and bounded as follows:
North –
South – Crisanto
Dolleroso
East –
West –
Aznar;
(l.) Parcel S-4, located at Mabini,
Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 3367 with an area of 1.6500 hectares and bounded
as follows:
North – Hrs. of G.
Corvera
South – C. Vda. de
Alburo
East – Ellodoro Delleroso
West – A. Ventura
7. It is hereby declared that upon the
death of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. on
(a.) Whole parcel
(b.) Whole parcels
(c.) Whole parcel cocoland, Calibunan, F-3;
(d.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-5;
(e.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-6;
(f.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-7;
(g.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-8;
(h.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-1;
(i.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-2;
(j.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-3;
(k.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-4.
8. It is hereby ordered that Lot 432 under
TCT [No.] RT-203 (420) with an area of 10.0242 hectares under Tax Dec. No.
02-018-0224 (1980) is hereby divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight
(8) children of Don Fabian B. Monteroso and the one-ninth (1/9) share be held
in usufruct by the widow Sofia Pendejito Monteroso during her lifetime.
Sofia Pendejito
Monteroso being in possession and enjoying the fruits or income of F-1 is
hereby ordered to pay and deliver immediately to the following heirs the
corresponding amount of net income of F-1, Lot 432, from 1948 to 1983:
(a.)
To
(b.)
To Reygula Monteroso Bayan – P78,521.32
(c.)
To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso – P78,521.32
(d.)
To Tirso D. Monteroso –
P78,521.32
(e.)
To Florenda P. Monteroso – P78,521.32
(f.)
To Reynato P. Monteroso –
P78,521.32
(g.)
To Alberto P. Monteroso –
P78,521.32
(h.)
To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. – P78,521.32
The
above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for whatever cash
advance any heir may have received. Then
the net balance of said [amounts] shall be subject to interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from
9. It is hereby ordered that
Soledad
Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are ordered to deliver
to [their] co-heirs their shares in these parcels of land, F-2, free from any
lien and encumbrances whatsoever, and to pay each of them the net income in
arrears from 1948 to 1983, namely:
(a.)
To Reygula Monteroso Bayan – P34,976.85
(b.)
To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso – P34,976.85
(c.)
To Tirso D. Monteroso –
P34,976.85
(d.)
To Florenda P. Monteroso – P34,976.85
(e.)
To Reynato P. Monteroso –
P34,976.85
(f.)
To Alberto P. Monteroso –
P34,976.85
(g.)
To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. – P34,976.85
(h.)
To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) – P34,976.85
The
above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subjected to deduction of whatever amount
any heir may have received by way of cash advances.
The net amount
shall be subjected to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
compounded annually from
10. Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty.
Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. being in possession and enjoying the fruits and
income of Parcel F-3, are hereby ordered to pay to the following heirs, the net
income in arrears from 1948 to 1983:
(a.) To
Reygula Monteroso Bayan – P49,727.35
(b.) To
Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso – P49,727.35
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso – P49,727.35
(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso – P49,727.35
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso – P49,727.35
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso – P49,727.35
(g.) To
Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. – P49,727.35
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) – P49,727.35
The
above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for whatever cash
advance, if any, such heir may have received.
Then the net [amounts] shall be subject to interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from
Soledad
Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are both ordered to
deliver to the above-mentioned co-heirs their respective shares free from any
lien and encumbrances whatsoever.
11. Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7 and F-8 are
declared real properties belonging to the first marriage. Hence one-half (1/2) of each of these four
parcels shall equally be divided by the four (4) children of the first marriage
and the other half must be divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8)
children of Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., and one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in
usufruct by the widow, Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso.
Therefore, it
is hereby ordered that F-6 is divided as follows:
(a.) To
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - - - 702 sq. m.
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - - - 702 sq. m.
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - - 702 sq. m.
(e.) To Florenda P.
Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso -
- - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
(g.) To Alberto P.
Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq.
m.
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. - - - - - - 216 sq.
m.
(i.) To Sofia P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
12. It is hereby ordered, that Soledad
Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. must deliver to all
heirs their respective shares on F-7 and F-8 including usufruct of Sofia P.
Monteroso as declared in paragraph five (5) and in addition, must pay and
deliver the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, summarized as follows:
(a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P189,665.88
(b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - -
P189,665.88
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P189,665.88
(d.) To Florenda P.
Monteroso - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - -
- - - - - - - P 58,358.73
(f.) To Alberto P.
Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. - - - -
P 58,358.73
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) - - - -
P 58,358.73
all with interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from
13. The Deed of Donation in 1948, Exh. “F”,
over parcel known as F-5, is declared null and void because the same was
prepared and acknowledged before a Notary Public disqualified and prohibited to
do so under Notarial Law (Barretto vs. Cabreza, 33 Phil. Reports 112). Hence, the transfer of tax declaration is
hereby ordered cancelled and the same must be declared again in the name of the
Heirs of Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. and ordered partitioned in the proportion
stated in paragraph eleven (11) hereof.
14. Parcels of land known as S-1, S-2, S-3
and S-4 are declared conjugal properties of the second marriage. Hence, one-half (1/2) thereof belongs to
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso and one-half (1/2) shall be equally divided into nine
(9) shares for the eight (8) children of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. where the
one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by Sofia P. Monteroso during her
lifetime.
15. For the net income in arrears of S-1
located at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran, from 1948 to 1983, Sofia Pendejito
Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver to the following heirs the
corresponding share:
(a.) To
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P93,998.12
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - -
P93,998.12
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P93,998.12
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso -
- - - - - - - P93,998.12
(f.) To Reynato P.
Monteroso - - - - - - - - P93,998.12
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - -
- - - - - - - P93,998.12
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - - P93,998.12
However, all
these amounts shall be subject to deduction, if any cash advance was ever made
or received by any heir.
The
above-mentioned [amounts are] subject to an interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) compounded annually from
16. The alleged Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Sofia P. Monteroso in favor of Florenda P. Monteroso over a coconut
land located at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, consisting of 24 hectares is
hereby declared null and void being in fraud of other heirs. It is clearly inofficious and impairs the
legitime of her brothers, sisters and nephews and nieces. Therefore, the tax declaration in the name of
Florenda P. Monteroso under Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax Dec. No.
3381, Series of 1972, Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series of 1974 and Tax Dec. No.
02-006-0047, PIN-02-006-02-002 are hereby ordered cancelled and the said land
shall be declared again in the name of Heirs of Fabian B. Monteroso.
Sofia Pendejito
Monteroso is not required to render accounting as to the income of S-2 because
the coconut trees therein were planted by her while being already a widow. One-half (1/2) of the land where the coconut
trees are planted shall be her share and the other one-half (1/2) shall be
divided into nine (9) shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B. Monteroso
including her 1/9 usufruct thereon.
17. Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is hereby
ordered to pay and deliver immediately the net income in arrears of parcel S-3
located at Pandanon to the following heirs with the corresponding amount:
(a.) To
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P49,349.02
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - -
P49,349.02
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P49,349.02
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso -
- - - - - - - P49,349.02
(f.) To Reynato P.
Monteroso - - - - - - - - P49,349.02
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - -
- - - - - - - P49,349.02
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - -
P49,349.02
However, [the] above-mentioned
[amounts] shall be subject to deductions, if any cash advance was ever made or
received by any heir.
Then the net
amount receivable shall be subject to an interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) compounded annually from
18. For the net income in arrears of parcel
S-4, located at Mabini, Cabadbaran, from 1948 to 1983, Sofia P. Monteroso is
hereby ordered to pay and deliver to the following heirs their corresponding
shares:
(a.) To
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P6,477.54
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - -
P6,477.54
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P6,477.54
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso -
- - - - - - - P6,477.54
(f.) To Reynato P.
Monteroso - - - - - - - - P6,477.54
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - -
- - - - - - - P6,477.54
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - -
P6,477.54
However, all
these amounts shall be subject to deductions, if any cash advance was ever made
or received by any heir.
The
above-mentioned amount is subject to an interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) compounded annually from
Sofia Pendejito
Monteroso is ordered to deliver to the above-mentioned heirs their respective
shares free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever.
19. These cases involved inheritance, hence
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of Agusan del Norte at
20. That all the heirs are hereby directed,
and ordered to pay all taxes due in favor of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of judgment hereof,
otherwise, upon proper application or manifestation by appropriate or concerned
government agency, a portion of the intestate estate of Don Fabian B.
Monteroso, Sr., shall be sold at public auction for such purpose.
21. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Tirso D.
Monteroso or his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, is hereby ordered
to pay Ruby Monteroso, Marlene Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel
and Henrieto Monteroso the following sums of money:
(a.) P10,000.00 for moral damages;
(b.) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c.) P3,000.00 for costs of suit; and
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
22. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Soledad
Monteroso de Cagampang and Reygula Monteroso Bayan are hereby ordered jointly
and severally to pay Ruby Monteroso, Marlene Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita
Monteroso-Berenguel and Henrieto Monteroso the following sums of money:
(a.) P10,000.00 for moral damages;
(b.) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c.) P2,000.00 for costs of suit; and
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
23. Under Civil Case No. 1332, Soledad
Monteroso Cagampang, Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. and Sofia Pendejito Vda.
de Monteroso or their heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, are hereby
ordered to pay jointly and severally, unto and in favor of Tirso D. Monteroso
or his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, the following sums of money:
(a.) P20,000.00 for moral damages;
(b.) P20,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c.) P5,000.00 for costs of suit; and
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
24. It is hereby ordered that a judicial
administrator of the intestate estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. shall be
appointed by this Court upon written recommendation by all the parties within
thirty (30) days from promulgation of this decision. Should the parties fail to submit unanimously
a recommendee, the Court at its discretion may appoint an administrator, unless
none of the parties appeal this decision and this judgment is complied with by
all the parties and/or so executed in accordance with the provisions of the New
Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[10]
As
regards Civil Case No. 1292, the RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin have
indeed been deprived of their inheritance which corresponds to one-fourth share
due their father from the intestate estate of their grandmother, Soledad D.
Monteroso. Thus, the court ordered the
equal distribution of Parcel F-4, i.e.,
Turning
on the alleged sale of Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 by Don Fabian to
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, the RTC found the covering three deeds of absolute
sale[11]
to be null and void for the reason that the alleged conveyances were
fictitious, simulated, and/or without sufficient consideration. Alternatively,
the RTC ruled that the conveyances, even if considered as donation, would be inofficious for
impairing the legitime of the other compulsory heirs, not to mention the lack
of due acceptance of the donation by Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang. Adding a
vitiating element to the conveyances, as the RTC noted, was the fact that the corresponding
documents were prepared by and acknowledged before Perfecto, who happened to be
the husband of the alleged vendee, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang.
The RTC
also declared as null and void the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula
Monteroso-Bayan owing to clear legal infirmities attaching to the covering deed
of donation.[12] For
one, the parcel in question, while purportedly donated free from any liens or
encumbrance, was in fact the subject of a deed of absolute sale between Don
Fabian and the Cagampang spouses. For
another, one of the signatory-donors, Mauricia Nakila, Benjamin’s widow, did
not have the right to effect a donation because she was not a compulsory heir
of her husband by representation. The RTC added that the real owners of the
rights and interests of Benjamin over Parcel F-5 are her children as
representative heirs.
Finally,
the RTC declared the Order dated
The Ruling of the CA
From the
above June 9, 1987 Decision, Tirso, defendant in Civil Case No. 1292, appealed
to the CA, so did the Cagampang spouses, defendants in Civil Case No. 1332. The other defendants in Civil Case No. 1332,
namely: Sofia Pendejito Vda. de
Monteroso, Florenda Monteroso, Alberto Monteroso, Heirs of Fabian Monteroso,
Jr., Reynato Monteroso, and Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, also interposed their own
appeal. The separate appeals were
consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15805.
On
March 31, 1992, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming with modification
the June 9, 1987 RTC Decision, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
modified, as follows:
a) In
the event that a homestead patent over Parcel S-1 is issued by the Bureau of
Lands pursuant to the patent application of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso,
said patent shall issue not in the name of the applicant but in favor of the
eight heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. who thereafter shall be declared absolute
owners of the said parcel of land in the proportion stated in this decision but
who nevertheless shall allow Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso to exercise
during her lifetime usufructuary rights over a portion of the said parcel of
land equivalent to the share therein of each of the heirs of her deceased
husband;
b) The
said heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. are hereby declared absolute owners of
Parcel F-6 to the extent of their respective shares therein as presently
individually possessed by them pursuant to an extrajudicial partition of the
said parcel of land which the Court hereby declares as a valid contract among
the said heirs; and
c) With
the exception of those pertaining to Parcel F-4 as stated in this decision, the
parties thus found to have unjustly misappropriated the fruits of the subject
parcels of land are hereby directed to render an accounting thereof consistent
with our findings in the case at bar.
With the exception of the foregoing modifications,
the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The CA
summarized into three issues the multifarious assignments of errors raised by
the parties, to wit: first,
whether or not the intestate estate of Soledad Doldol Monteroso was settled in
SP No. 309, thus according the Project of Partition approved therein the effect
of res judicata; second, whether or not it was appropriate to
partition Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and half of Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7, F-8,
S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4; and third, whether or not Tirso D. Monteroso is
entitled to damages.
The CA
resolved the first issue in the affirmative, SP No. 309 being a valid and
binding proceedings insofar as the properties subject thereof are concerned, i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-5 of which the
whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5, as Soledad D. Monteroso’s
intestate estate, were distributed to her heirs. This is not to mention that the
authenticity and due execution of the documents filed or issued in relation
therewith––referring to the Proyecto de Particion dated February 12,
1935 which is a carbon copy of the original, the Orden issued by the CFI
on March 11, 1936, and the Mocion dated March 18, 1936––having duly been
established. Affirming the RTC, the CA
rejected Tirso’s claim that SP No. 309 is void for settling only a part of the estate
of Soledad D. Monteroso. The CA held that partial settlement is not a ground
for the nullification of the judicial partition under either the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 or the present Civil Code. The appellate court added that the proper
remedy in such a situation is to ask for the partition and the subsequent
distribution of the property omitted.
The CA likewise
disposed of the second issue in the affirmative, dismissing the opposition of
the Cagampang spouses and Reygulo Monteroso-Bayan who all claimed ownership
over some of the parcels of land on the strength of the deeds of conveyance
executed in their favor. The CA upheld the RTC’s finding that the three deeds
of absolute sale in which Don Fabian purportedly sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3,
F-7, and F-8 to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang were infirm. The CA noted that even
the Cagampang spouses recognized these infirmities, and instead of denying their
existence, they tried to justify the same and seek an exception therefrom.
On the
alleged donation of Parcel F-5 by Don Fabian to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, the CA
likewise agreed with the RTC’s finding on the nullity thereof. The CA pointed out that Reygula
Monteroso-Bayan did not controvert the RTC’s finding, except to gratuitously
say that the trial court’s declaration of nullity was wrong since nobody
questioned the authenticity of the donation in the first place.
Apropos
Parcel S-1, a disposable agricultural land of the public domain which is the
subject of a homestead patent application by Don Fabian, the CA, as opposed to
the RTC’s disposition, held that a patent, if eventually issued, ought to be in
the name of the legal heirs of Don Fabian, not of his surviving spouse,
Pendejito. This conclusion, so the CA explained, is in line with the provision of
Section 105 of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), as
amended.
As to
Parcel S-2, the CA agreed with the RTC that it is a conjugal property acquired
during the second marriage through a deed of sale[14] executed
on August 15, 1947 by Marcelo Morancel. Likewise,
the CA said that Parcels S-3 and S-4 are conjugal properties as no evidence was
adduced supporting the alleged purchase by Pendejito of said properties with her
own funds.
Anent
the RTC’s order partitioning Parcel F-6, the CA agreed with the defendants in
Civil Case No. 1332 that Parcel F-6 has long been partitioned equitably among
all the eight children of Don Fabian.
Thus, the CA further modified the RTC on this point.
On the
third and last issues, the CA set aside all awards of actual damages made by
the RTC premised on the income generating capacity of the subject properties, except
that of Parcel F-4, as an order of accounting of the fruits of the other
subject properties unjustly appropriated by them would address the issue of
damages.
It
bears to stress at this juncture that, save for the grant of damages and the
disposition of Parcels F-6 and S-1, the CA affirmed the questioned RTC Decision
on all other points. On
On the other hand, Pendejito, together
with the other defendants in Civil Case No. 1332, first interposed a joint motion
for partial reconsideration, which the CA denied per its equally assailed
December 16, 1993 Resolution,[15]
before elevating the case via a petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R.
No. 113199.
G.R.
No. 105608 Denied with Finality
Per its
Resolution[16] dated
In net
effect, the March 31, 1992 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 is final and
executory as to Tirso D. Monteroso, and the Court need not pass upon the issues
he raised in his petition under G.R. No. 105608, albeit we shall take stock of his Comment[19]
and Memorandum[20] in G.R.
No. 113199.
The Issues
Petitioners
in G.R. No. 113199 raise the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the finding that the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits
“C”, “D” and “E”) were not supported by valuable consideration and sham,
fictitious and simulated is supported by the evidence.
2. Whether the finding or conclusion that
petitioners Spouses Atty. Perfecto and Soledad Cagampang did not dispute the
finding of the trial Court that the Deeds of Sale in question are sham,
fictitious and simulated is supported by evidence.
3. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error
in concluding that, “By invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor,
the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a
co-ownership.”
4. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error
in upholding partition as the proper remedy of private respondent Tirso
Monteroso to recover the properties sold by Fabian Monteroso, Sr. to Soledad D.
Monteroso de Cagampang when co-ownership is not pleaded as theory in the
Complaint.
5. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error
in holding that the cause of action of private respondent Tirso Monteroso is
not barred by extinctive prescription and laches.
6. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error
in granting reliefs not prayed for in the Complaint in favor of parties who did
not assert or claim such relief, such as partition and accounting among the
parties and the nullification of the donation in favor of petitioner Reygula
Bayan when x x x Tirso Monteroso and the petitioners herein who are signatories
to the Deed of Donation did not question or ask for the nullification of the
donation in favor of Reygula Bayan.
7. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error
in ordering the partition of parcels S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4 which are admitted
in the Complaint to be in the exclusive, adverse possession of petitioners
Sofia vda. de Monteroso, Florenda, Alberto and Reynato and the Heirs of Fabian
Monteroso, Jr. since the death of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. in 1948, appropriating
the harvests unto themselves, to the exclusion of plaintiff (private respondent
Tirso Monteroso) who was deprived of his share continuously up to the present.[21]
The Court’s Ruling
After a
circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the parties and
in the light of the practically parallel findings of the RTC and CA, we find
the petition under G.R. No. 113199 to be devoid of merit.
It is a rule of long standing that:
[T]he
jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing errors of law.
Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following
instances: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[22]
None of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the
instant case.
First
and Second Issues: Simulated
In
connection with the first two related issues, petitioners maintain that the CA erred
when it affirmed the RTC’s conclusion on the fictitious or simulated nature, for
lack or inadequate consideration, of the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits “C,” “D,” and
“E”), noting that Tirso failed to present substantial evidence to support the
alleged infirmity of the underlying sale. The fact that one of the lots sold under Exhibit “C” on May 10, 1939 for PhP 2,500
was used as collateral for a PhP 600 loan is not, so petitioners claim, proof
that the amount of PhP 600 represents the maximum loan value of the property or
that the sale in question is not supported by valuable consideration.
Moreover,
petitioners belabored to explain that the trial court erred in concluding that
the property conveyed under Exhibit “C”
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-203 (420) in the name
of Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, married to Perfecto, was fictitious on the ground
that the certificate did not indicate that it was a conjugal property. Petitioners
assert that the registration of a property only in the name of one of the spouses
is not proof that no consideration was paid therefor. As petitioners would stress, what determines
whether a given property is conjugal or separate is the law itself, not what appears
in the certificate of title.
Lastly,
petitioners take exception from the appellate court’s posture that the
Cagampang spouses did not dispute the trial court’s finding that the deeds of
sale (Exhibits “C,” “D,” and “E”) were simulated and fictitious for lack of consideration.
Petitioners insist that they in fact contested such conclusion of the RTC in
their brief before the CA, adding they only raised the issue of prescription as
an alternative defense without conceding the RTC’s findings on contract
infirmity.
We are
not persuaded.
The
antecedent facts, as borne by the records, strongly indicate the simulated
character of the sale covered by the deeds of absolute sale over Parcels F-1
(Exhibit “C”), F-2 (Exhibit “D”), F-3, F-5, F-7, and F-8 (Exhibit “E”). As found below, Don Fabian never relinquished
possession of the covered properties during his lifetime. The first deed, Exhibit “E,” was executed on May 1, 1939; the second, Exhibit “C,” on May 10,
1939; and the third, Exhibit “D,” on September 24, 1939. Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang, however, only took possession of the subject properties
after Don Fabian’s death in 1948 or nine years after contract execution. The
gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the
sale never intended to be bound thereby.
The
more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially sought
the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife,
A
property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal. This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto
Cagampang went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of
land were effectively his wife’s paraphernal properties. No explanation was
given for this unusual move.
Hence, we
agree with the trial and appellate courts that the unexplained situations
described above sufficiently show that the purported conveyances were simulated.
We also accord credence to Tirso’s allegation that the Cagampang spouses
tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the properties which
have to be “hidden” by means of simulated conveyances to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang. The fact that only one of the subject lots
was used as collateral for a PhP 600 loan which the Cagampang spouses took out does
not weaken the conclusion on the simulated character of the contracts, as
logically drawn from the twin circumstances adverted to.
The Court
can allow that petitioners indeed attempted to traverse, before the CA, the RTC’s
findings on the area of simulated sale and that they only raised the matter of acquisitive
prescription as an alternative defense.
However, as we shall explain shortly, the fact of petitioners having
made the attempt aforestated will not carry the day for them.
Third Issue:
Recognition of Co-ownership in Acquisitive Prescription
In its
assailed decision, the CA declared, “By invoking the benefits of prescription in
their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of
a co-ownership x x x.” The petitioners tag this declaration as flawed since the
benefit of prescription may be availed of without necessarily recognizing
co-ownership. Prescription and co-ownership, they maintain, are so diametrically
opposed legal concepts, such that one who invokes prescription is never deemed
to admit the existence of co-ownership.
Petitioners
are mistaken; their error flows from compartmentalizing what the CA wrote. The
aforecited portion of the CA’s decision should not have been taken in
isolation. It should have been read in the context of the appellate court’s
disquisition on the matter of Tirso being a co-owner of the subject undivided properties
whose rights thereto, as a compulsory heir, accrued at the moment of death of
Don Fabian, vis-à-vis the defense of acquisitive prescription foisted by the
Cagampang spouses. For clarity, we reproduce
the pertinent portion of the assailed decision:
Nor do we find
any merit in the third. From the
allegation in the Complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 as well as from the
arguments advanced by the parties on the issues raised therein, this Court is
convinced that therein plaintiff Tirso Monteroso’s principal cause of action is
unmistakably one for partition which by its very nature is imprescriptible and
cannot be barred by laches x x x. The
only exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an action for partition
is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties sought to be
partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-owner at which instance the
remedy available to the aggrieved heirs lies not in action for partition but
for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription. By invoking the benefits of prescription
in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence
of a co-ownership among the heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. over the properties
forming the decedent’s estate.[23] (Emphasis ours.)
From
the foregoing disquisition, what the appellate court tried to convey is clear
and simple: partition is the proper remedy
available to Tirso who is a co-owner of the subject properties by virtue of his
being a compulsory heir, like siblings
Fourth
and Fifth Issues: Partition Proper, not Barred
by Laches
nor
by Acquisitive Prescription
Being
inextricably intertwined, we tackle both issues together. Petitioners, citing Article 494 of the Civil
Code[24]
and Art. 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code, aver that the right to ask partition
is proper only where co-ownership is recognized. They also suggest that no
co-ownership obtains in this case considering that no less than Tirso avers in
his complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 that from the time of Don Fabian’s death
in 1948, the lots in question have been in the exclusive, adverse, and public
possession of the Cagampang spouses. Assayed
against this perspective, petitioners submit that partition is not proper, ergo
unavailing, but an action for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on
extinctive prescription.
Corollary
to the posture above taken, petitioners assert that there being no co-ownership
over the properties sold by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso’s
cause of action, under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) in relation to
Art. 1116 of the Civil Code,[25]
had already prescribed, either in 1949, i.e.,
10 years after the subject properties were registered in Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang’s
name, or in 1958, i.e., 10
years after the cause of action accrued in 1948 (death of Don Fabian), citing Osorio
v. Tan.[26] Tirso’s complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was
commenced in 1970.
Petitioners
contend that the evidence adduced clearly demonstrates that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang
acquired ownership of the subject properties by virtue of the deeds of sale executed
in 1939 by Don Fabian. After the sale, she registered them under her name and then
took exclusive, adverse, and public possession over them. Thus, they submit that the prescriptive
period applicable to the instant case under Act No. 190 had long expired,
adding that the CA erred in finding that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang repudiated
the co-ownership only in 1961 when she and the other heirs ignored the demand
of Tirso for partition.
As a
final point, petitioners alleged that the exclusion of Tirso from the enjoyment
of the fruits of the subject properties since after the death of Don Fabian in
1948 is consistent with Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang’s claim of exclusive
ownership and dominion.
We
cannot subscribe to petitioners’ theory.
The
fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from
the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does
not per se argue against the
existence of a co-ownership. While Tirso
may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and
act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his
share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or
co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through
the instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the hereditary properties. By asserting his right as a compulsory heir,
Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses
were holding some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner
of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon.
Consequently,
we are one with the trial and appellate courts that partition is the proper
remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the
inheritance from the decedent. An action
for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.[27] Also, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real
estate. –– A person having the right to compel the partition of real
estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint
the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
(Emphasis ours.)
Being a
compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of the
properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his
hereditary share. His right as an heir
to a share of the inheritance covers all the properties comprising the
intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death,[28] i.e., on
Acquisitive
prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, “where there
exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised
of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.”[31] In the instant case, however, no extinctive
or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and other compulsory heirs
in favor of the Cagampang spouses because effective repudiation had not timely
been made against the former. As aptly put by the appellate court, the
repudiation which must be clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal
of the co-ownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were
executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the
other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand
by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don
Fabian. Since then, Tirso was deemed
apprised of the repudiation by the Cagampang spouses.
However,
considering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art. 1141 of
said Code[32] applies;
thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the
appropriate action in court. The records
show that Tirso’s cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action
for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express
repudiation. Besides, acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even
if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by the
Cagampang spouses since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required
extraordinary prescription period[33] of
30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such would still be true even if the period is
counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian when the Cagampang spouses
took exclusive possession of the subject properties.
Sixth
Issue: Partition Proper for Conjugal Properties
of Second Marriage
On the
ground of prescription under Act No. 190, petitioners assert that Tirso lost
the right to seek the partition of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4, he having
admitted, as early as 1948, the adverse, exclusive, and public possession thereof
by Pendejito and her children. This type
of possession, they maintain, works as a repudiation by Pendejito and her
children of the co-ownership claim of Tirso.
They further argue that Parcel S-1 pertains to Pendejito as her
paraphernal property since the homestead application therefor was under her
name.
We are
not persuaded.
Tirso’s
acknowledgment of Pendejito and her children’s possession of Parcels S-1, S-2,
S-3, and S-4 cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso from
pursuing his right to seek partition. Under the law on co-ownership, it
behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do
the repudiating. Verily, the records do
not show that Pendejito and her children performed acts clearly indicating an
intention to repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso and other
co-owners or co-compulsory heirs of such intention.
To be
sure, Tirso and his siblings from the first marriage have a stake on Parcels
S-2, S-3, and S-4, even if these parcels of land formed part of the conjugal
partnership of gains of the second marriage. There can be no serious dispute
that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share
of Don Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage.
Anent Parcel
S-1, we join the CA in its holding that it belongs to the heirs of Don Fabian under
Sec. 105 of CA 141, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 105.
If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of
the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or
while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the
Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights
and obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted or issued under
this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the
patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the
requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and
obligations for the purposes of this Act.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is
undisputed that Don Fabian was the homestead patent applicant who was
subrogated to the rights of the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan
and Severina Naranjo, by purchasing from the latter Parcel S-1 on
Assayed
against the foregoing undisputed facts in the light of the aforequoted Sec. 105
of CA 141, the heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1. Said Sec. 105 has been interpreted in Soliman
v. Icdang[34] as
having abrogated the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to
secure under Sec. 3 of Act No. 926, otherwise known as the Public Land Act of
1903, a patent in her own name, thus:
[W]e should
bear in mind that, although Adolfo Icdang was married to plaintiff when he
filed the homestead application, “an applicant may be said to have acquired a
vested right over a homestead only by the presentation of the final proof and
its approval by the Director of Lands”. (Ingara vs. Ramelo, 107 Phil., 498;
Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 498; Republic vs. Diamon, 97 Phil., 838.) In the case at bar, the final proof appears to
have been presented to, and approved by the Director of Lands, in 1954, or
several years after the death of Adolfo Icdang and the dissolution of his
conjugal partnership with plaintiff herein. Hence, the land in question could not have
formed part of the assets of said partnership. It belonged to the heirs of Adolfo Icdang,
pursuant to section 105 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, reading:
x x x x
It is worthy of
notice that, under the Public Land Act of 1903 (Act No. 926, section 3), “in
the event of the death of an applicant prior to the issuance of a patent, his
widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to her
upon showing that she has consummated the requirements of law for homesteading
the lands”, and that only in case the deceased applicant leaves no widow shall
his interest in the land descend and the patent issue to his legal heirs. Incorporated substantially in section 103 of
the Public Land Act of 1919 (Act No. 2874), this policy was changed by Act No.
3517, pursuant to which the deceased
shall be succeeded no longer by his widow, but “by his heirs in law, who shall
be entitled to have issued to them the patent—if they show that they have
complied with the requirements therefor”. And this is, in effect, the rule maintained in
the above quoted section 105 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.[35]
(Emphasis added.)
It
appearing that Don Fabian was responsible for meeting the requirements of law
for homesteading Parcel S-1, said property, following Soliman, cannot be categorized as the paraphernal property of
Pendejito. Thus, the homestead patent
thereto, if eventually issued, must be made in the name of the compulsory heirs
of Don Fabian. Over it, Pendejito shall be entitled, pursuant to Art. 834 of
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, only to a usufructuary right over the property
equal to the corresponding share of each of Don Fabian’s compulsory heirs, i.e., his eight children.
Seventh
Issue: Judgment Must not Only be Clear but
Must Also be Complete
Petitioners
bemoan the fact that both the trial and appellate courts granted relief and
remedies not prayed for by the parties. As argued, Civil Case No. 1292, initiated
by the heirs of Benjamin against Tirso, basically sought recovery of real
properties; while Civil Case No. 1332, a countersuit filed by Tirso, was for
partition and damages, the main thrust of which is to recover his alleged share
from properties in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of other heirs since the
death of Don Fabian in 1948. Thus,
petitioners take issue against both decisions of the trial and appellate courts
which ordered partition not only in favor of Tirso but also in favor of the other
petitioners he sued. What is particularly appalling, according to them, is the order
for accounting which no one requested.
Petitioners’
lament, while understandable, is specious. Our judicial system requires courts to apply
the law and grant remedies when appropriately called for by law and justice. In the exercise of this mandate, courts have the
discretion to apply equity in the absence or insufficiency of the law. Equity has been defined as justice outside
law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than
of law. It is grounded on the precepts
of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity finds no room
for application where there is law.[36]
In the
instant case, a disposition only ordering partial partition and without
accounting, as petitioners presently urge, would be most impractical and
against what we articulated in Samala v.
Court of Appeals.[37] There,
we cautioned courts against being dogmatic in rendering decisions, it being
preferable if they take a complete view of the case and in the process come up
with a just and equitable judgment, eschewing rules tending to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice.
Surely,
the assailed path taken by the CA on the grant of relief not specifically
sought is not without precedent. In National Housing Authority v. Court of
Appeals, where the petitioner questioned the competence of the courts a quo to resolve issues not raised in
the pleadings, and to order the disposition of the subject property when what
was raised was the issue of right to possession, this Court in dismissing the
challenge stated that “a case should be decided in its totality, resolving all
interlocking issues in order to render justice to all concerned and to end the
litigation once and for all.”[38] Verily, courts should always strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear
the seed of future litigation.[39]
Eighth Issue: Deed of Donation Null and Void
Finally,
as an incidental issue, petitioners asseverate that the deed of donation (Exhibit
“F”) executed on September 19, 1948, or after the death of Don Fabian, in favor
of Reygula M. Bayan, is valid, particularly so since Tirso and the heirs of
Benjamin, as represented by their mother, Nakila, do not question the validity
of said deed as they in fact signed the same. That the donated property was the
same property described and included in the deed of sale (Exhibit “E”) in favor
of Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang is not, they contend, an invalidating factor
since what Don Fabian sold under Exhibit
“E” did not extend beyond his conjugal share thereon.
Just
like the issue of the nullity of the three deeds of absolute sale (Exhibits “C,”
“D,” and “E”) heretofore discussed, we agree with the determination of the RTC
and CA as to the invalidity of the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula M. Bayan. We
need not repeat the reasons for such determination, except the most basic. We
refer to the authority of the person who executed the deed of donation. As it
were, the widow of Benjamin, Nakila, signed the deed of donation. She, however, cannot give consent to the
donation as she has no disposable right thereto. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet[40] applies
to this instance as Nakila only has usufructuary right equal to the share of
her children under Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Besides, Nakila signed the deed of donation
in her name and not in the name of her children who are the heirs in
representation of their father, Benjamin. Lest it be overlooked, the then minor
children were not under the legal guardianship of Nakila, a situation which
thus disqualifies her from signing on their behalf.
The
fact that nobody objected to the donation is of little consequence, for as the
CA aptly observed, “The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to
ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such
contract. It is axiomatic that void
contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or implied.”[41]
WHEREFORE, the
petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED
for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated March 31, 1992
and December 16, 1993, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 are hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBI NG
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice