THIRD
DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- ARMANDO SAN ANTONIO, JR., Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 176633 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson,
J., AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: September 5, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For
review is the Decision[1] dated
31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01212, which
affirmed the Decision[2]
dated 19 January 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
138, in Criminal Case No. 98-024, finding herein appellant Armando San Antonio,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA.[3]
Appellant
Armando San Antonio, Jr. was charged with raping AAA in an Information[4]
which reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor, based on the sworn statement/complaint of AAA, a 14-year old[5] minor, duly assisted by her mother BBB, x x x, accuses ARMANDO SAN ANTONIO, JR. y DELA CRUZ of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with complainant AAA, against her will and consent. [Emphasis supplied].
Upon
arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The
prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the victim; Anabel
Lopez-Medrano (Ana), the victim’s cousin; BBB, the victim’s mother; and Dr.
Antonio S. Vertido (Dr. Vertido), Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation. As rebuttal witness,
the prosecution offered the testimony of Lydia Sarte (
AAA
testified that at around
Ana corroborated AAA’s testimony that when
she went home, coming from the house of her mother, on 12 December 1997, about
10 minutes after 11:00 o’clock in the morning, she saw the appellant lying on top of AAA in the wooden bed. When the appellant saw her, he stood up, wore
his shorts and left. AAA also stood up
and went out. Ana noticed that AAA was
so afraid and teary eyed. She then went
out of the house to report the incident to the mother of AAA.
BBB,
the mother of AAA, confirmed the testimony of Ana that at about
Dr.
Vertido testified that he was the one who conducted the medical examination on
AAA with the conclusions, contained in AAA’s Living Case No. MG-97-1691,[10]
as follows:
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries
noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
2. Hymen,
intact, distensible and its orifice
wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow
complete penetration by an average-sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any hymenal injury.[11] [Emphasis supplied].
Dr. Vertido explained that AAA has a distensible hymen, which means that AAA’s
hymen is incapable of being ruptured
even if penetrated by the male organ.
On
the other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of the following
witnesses: the appellant, Francisco Portugal (Francisco), Wendy Cilomen
(Wendy), Jacqueline dela Cruz (Jacqueline) and BBB, the victim’s mother, as
hostile witness, to testify on the condition of AAA seven or nine months after
the rape incident.[12]
Appellant
invoked the “sweetheart defense.” He admitted having sexual intercourse with
AAA on
Wendy
Cilomen was presented by the defense to corroborate the testimony of the
appellant. She stated that at around
To
refute the testimony given by the appellant that prior to
As
a result of the sexual assault, AAA got pregnant and on
After
trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated
The issue in this case is credibility.
x
x x x
The testimony of [AAA] is clear and categorical. x x x.
[AAA] was [14] years old when she testified in Court. Her testimony was given in a credible manner, sometimes haltingly but consistent and without gross inaccuracies. It has not been shown that she was motivated by ill-will or bad intention in charging the [appellant]. Her deportment during the time her testimony was being taken still shows traces of youthful innocence but with obvious sadness about her predicament. The Court has observed that during the direct and cross-examination when scandalous matters (sic) or matters which induce pain if remembered were asked, there was marked expression of embarrassment and noticeable anguish on the face of [AAA], which deportment, the Court considered as indication that she was telling the truth. The spontanety (sic) with which she proceeded to lodge her complaint against the [appellant] with the police barely hours after the commission was also considered by the Court and taken as another indication of truthful narration. On the other hand no fact or circumstance in the narration of [AAA] or in her conduct was observed or made of record which could lead the Court to doubt her testimony.
Given the foregoing findings, the burden to prove his innocence was shifted to the [appellant]. Unfortunately[,] his evidence failed to overturn the facts established by the evidence for the prosecution.
On the claim that he and [AAA] are
sweethearts and that they have an understanding (nagkakaunawaan), the only evidence to support this claim is his
word which is self-serving and has little or of no value at all. No letter, picture or other article which
indicate amorous relationship was presented in Court. x x x.
x x x x
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds the [appellant] Armando San Antonio, Jr. y dela Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Applying the scale of penalties provided in Republic Act No. 8353,[20]
in relation to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the offense
charged, the Court hereby impose upon the [appellant] the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further following the provisions of Article
345 of the Revised Penal Code, [appellant] is ordered to indemnify [AAA] of the
amount of P50,000.00 as and for moral damages. [Appellant] is unmarried, hence he should be
further directed to acknowledge the minor child [CCC], and to provide him
support which the Court initially set at P1,000.00 per month. Cost de
oficio.[21]
[Emphases supplied].
The records of this case were originally
transmitted to this Court on appeal.
In
his brief, appellant’s lone assignment of error was: the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of rape.[22]
Pursuant to People v. Mateo,[23] the records of the present case were
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
on
Feeling aggrieved, appellant filed a
Notice of Appeal[24] before
this Court.
This Court required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. Both the Office of the Solicitor General and
the appellant manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs filed
before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs.
After a careful review of the records
of this case, this Court affirms appellant’s conviction.
A rape charge is a serious matter
with pernicious consequences both for the appellant and the complainant; hence,
utmost care must be taken in the review of a decision involving conviction of
rape.[25] Thus, in the disposition and review of rape
cases, the Court is guided by these principles:
First, the prosecution has to
show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt or that degree
of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. Second,
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Third,
unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially
regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal. Fourth, an accusation for rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; and Fifth,
in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution.[26]
Right off, it is clear that appellant
does not deny the sexual intercourse between him and AAA. By way of exculpation, appellant argues that
the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape because the
complainant has not been raped as the sexual intercourse between him and the
complainant was consensual as they were sweethearts. This is specious.
The “sweetheart defense” is a
much-abused defense that rashly derides the intelligence of the Court and
sorely tests its patience.[27] Being an affirmative defense, it must be
established with convincing evidence - by some documentary and/or other
evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.[28] Likewise, the “sweetheart theory” appellant
proffers is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and
consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by
substantial evidence. To be worthy of
judicial acceptance, such a defense should be supported by documentary,
testimonial or other evidence.[29] In this case, however, the appellant failed
to discharge this burden. Other than his
self-serving assertions, there was no support to his claim that he and AAA were
lovers. His “sweetheart defense” cannot
be given credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes, mementos,
pictures or tokens, that such romantic relationship really existed. Moreover, even the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense, i.e.,
Francisco and Wendy, proved that, indeed, the appellant and AAA were not lovers. Although the other defense witness,
Jacqueline, claimed that the relationship of the appellant and AAA was of
general knowledge to the community, she cannot name even a single person who
knew of such relationship. We quote the
testimonies of Francisco, Wendy and Jacqueline:
Witness: FRANCISCO
Atty. Bargas: We are offering the testimony of this witness your Honor to prove and establish the fact that it was almost of general knowledge within the barangay about the relationship of the complaining witness and the [appellant] as lovers.
x x x x
Q: Do you know the [appellant] in this case Armando SanAntonio, [Jr.]?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Do you also know [AAA]?
A: Yes sir.
x x x x
Q: Do you know of any relationship between Armando and [AAA]?
A: None sir.[30] [Emphasis supplied].
x x x x
Q: Please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?
A: WENDY CILOMEN, 15 years old, single, jobless, x x x.
x x x x
Q: How did you come to know [AAA]?
A: We were schoolmates.
x x x x
Q: How did you come to know [appellant]?
A: When we were in
x x x x
Q: Do you know if there is any relation between [AAA] and [appellant] if
you know?
A: No, sir.
Cross Examination
Q: She never mentioned to you that [appellant] was courting her?
A: No, sir.
Q: She never mentioned to you that [appellant] was her boyfriend?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you know if [AAA] had a boyfriend?
A: No, sir.[31] [Emphasis supplied].
x x x x
Witness: JACQUELINE DELA CRUZ, 23 years old, married, housewife, x x x.
x x x x
Q: Did you know at all before [appellant was encarcerated (sic) now detained and facing this trial if he was courting [AAA], is that a public knowledge in the place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know that as a matter of fact known in the neighborhood, in the vicinity, in the barangay?
A: Yes, sir.
Cross Examination
Q: Aside from [appellant], can you tell the Honorable Court at least another name, the person who told you that [appellant] is courting [AAA]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who told you?
A: Barkada nila [appellant], sir.
Q: What is the name of the barkada?
A: Hindi ko masabi ang pangalan, sir.[32]
Appellant also avers that the failure
of the complainant to shout or make an outcry, despite the fact the he was unarmed,
belies the claim of rape.
Case
law has it that the failure of the
victim to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the
victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused.[33] Not all rape victims can be expected to act
conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral
responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant
episode. It is well-settled that
different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation.[34] There
is no standard form of reaction for a woman, much more a minor, when facing a
shocking and horrifying experience such as a sexual assault. The workings of the human mind placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may
shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility while others
may openly welcome the intrusion.[35] In the present case, it is noteworthy that at
the time the complainant was raped, she was only 14 years old,[36]
while the appellant was already 23 years old, thus, her failure to shout could
be attributed to the shock and horror which she felt as a result of appellant’s
sexual assault.
Also, at the time that she was raped,
appellant threatened to punch her if she will not accede to his desire. It is settled that force or intimidation is
not limited to physical force. As long
as it is present and brings the desired result, all consideration of whether it
was more or less irresistible is beside the point. The force or violence that is required in
rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or
irresistible. That it enables the
offender to consummate his purpose is enough.
The parties’ relative age, size and strength should be taken into
account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of
rape. The degree of force which may not
suffice when the victim is an adult, may be more than enough if employed
against a person of tender age.[37] Considering the age of the complainant in this
case, i.e., 14 years old, she was not
in the possession and exercise of sufficient mental capacity to make an
intelligent decision of whether to submit herself to sexual intercourse that
will bring dishonor to herself and her family.
At that age, the offended party was not in the right mind to balance,
with deliberation, the good or evil effect of submitting to such sexual act.[38] Hence, the appellant’s simple threat of
punching her if she will not give in to his bestial desire was enough
intimidation to make the complainant succumb to the will of the appellant.
Likewise, appellant’s assertion that
the complainant has not been raped because the medical examination conducted on
the complainant the day after she was allegedly raped showed no sign of any physical
injury, deserves scant consideration.
It
is well-settled that proof of physical injuries sustained by reason of
resistance to the sexual attacker is not an essential element of the crime of
rape. It is enough to show that the appellant
did succeed in having sexual intercourse with the complainant against her will.[39] Hence, even if a man lays no hand on a woman,
if by an array of physical forces he so overpowers her mind that she fails to
resist or ceases resistance because of fear or greater harm, the consummation
of the sexual act between them is rape.[40] Also, a freshly broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape. Even if the
hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled
out. The rupture of the hymen or laceration
of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for
rape.[41] In the instant case, the medical findings
revealed that the hymen of the complainant was still intact despite the sexual
intercourse between the appellant and the complainant. Nevertheless, the same does not negate the
fact of rape committed by the appellant against the complainant as Dr. Vertido
clearly explained that AAA’s hymen was characterized as distensible, meaning,
AAA’s hymen is incapable of being ruptured even if penetrated by the male
organ.
Finally,
appellant’s contention that the testimony of the complainant is not credible,
is untenable.
Time and again, we have held that
when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective
testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great
respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter
the result of the case. The trial judge
enjoys the advantage of observing the witness’ deportment and manner of
testifying, her “furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant
or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath”
- all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness’
honesty and sincerity. The trial judge,
therefore, can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being
in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity
to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and
detect if they are lying.[42] The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[43]
This Court, upon examining the
records of the present case, fully agrees in the findings of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the testimony of the complainant is
credible. Her testimony on how she was
raped by the appellant was characterized by the trial court and affirmed by the
appellate court as candid, clear and categorical. The trial court even went on to say that
during the direct and cross examination of the complainant, there were marked
expressions of embarrassment and noticeable anguish on her face especially when
she was asked to recall her painful experience in the hands of the appellant. Likewise the act of the complainant in filing
a complaint against the appellant, few hours after the rape incident happened,
can be regarded as an indication of a truthful narration that indeed, she was
raped by the appellant. It is settled
that no woman, least of all a child,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts
and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been
a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-victims are given full
faith and credit, since when a girl says she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.[44] It is also an accepted doctrine that in the
absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely
testify against the accused, her testimony deserves credence.[45] And in this case, it was never shown that the
complainant had an ill motive in filing a case against the appellant other than
seeking justice to what had happened to her.
Moreover, the appellant failed to
overturn the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. First,
the complainant testified that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina,
meaning there was indeed a penetration.[46] The appellant even admitted in his direct
examination that his organ penetrated the vagina of the complainant;[47]
however, during his cross-examination he claimed that he was not able to insert
his penis into the vagina of the complainant because Ana barged in.[48] Second,
the complainant had proven during trial that at the time that she was raped by
the appellant she was wearing cycling shorts[49]
and the same was presented in court as part of the prosecution’s evidence.[50] Also, during Ana’s testimony, she affirmed
that on the day the complainant was raped, the complainant was wearing shorts
and not jogging pants.[51] The appellant, on the other hand, insisted
that the complainant was wearing jogging pants at the time the rape incident
happened.[52] Lastly,
the testimony of the complainant that the appellant was the one on top of her
was corroborated by the testimony of Ana that when she barged in she saw the
appellant on top of the complainant.[53] However, the appellant averred that the
complainant was the one on top of him when Ana saw them because it was the
complainant who initiated the sexual intercourse.[54] But the said contention of the appellant was
belied by the defense’s very own witness, Wendy. During Wendy’s testimony, she stated that
when she peeped inside the house of Ana she saw the appellant on top of the
complainant.[55]
Given the foregoing, this Court finds
no reason to deviate from the general rule that factual findings of the trial
court, more so if affirmed by the Court of Appeals, should not be disturbed on
appeal, as they are not clearly arbitrary or unfounded.
Appellant is guilty of simple rape[56]
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.[57]
As regards the award of damages, the appellate
court merely affirmed the award of the trial court without any modification. In simple rape, the Court awards P50,000.00[58]
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00[59]
as moral damages to the rape victim. As
the award of moral damages is separate and distinct from the civil indemnity
awarded to rape victims, the moral damages cannot take the place of the civil
indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages,
and is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[60] Hence, this Court also awards an additional
amount of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, to the complainant, apart from
the P50,000.00 moral damages already awarded by the lower courts.
It is also proper for the appellate
court to require the appellant to support[61]
the child, CCC, born from the appellant’s act committed against the complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01212 finding herein
appellant Armando San Antonio, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape committed against AAA is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the
complainant is also granted civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
in addition to P50,000.00 granted by the lower courts as moral
damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES – SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Working Chairperson’s attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-14.
[2] Penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr., CA rollo, pp. 30-48.
[3] This is pursuant
to the ruling of this Court in the case of People
of the
The Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on the utmost confidentiality of proceedings involving violence against women and children set forth in Sec. 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as, Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act; Sec. 44 of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as, Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as, Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children effective November 15, 2004.
[4] CA rollo, p. 9.
[5] Records, p. 5.
[6] This is also the address of the victim, AAA.
[7] TSN,
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10] Records, p. 6.
[11]
[12] TSN,
[13] TSN,
[14]
[15] TSN,
[16] Records, pp. 114-116.
[17]
[18] TSN,
[19] Records, p. 113.
[20] Otherwise known as, “The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.”
[21] CA rollo, pp. 40-41, 48.
[22]
[23] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[24] CA rollo, pp. 196-197.
[25] People
v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90,
[26] People
v. Lou, 464 Phil. 413, 421 (2004).
[27] People
v. Rapisora, G.R. No. 147855,
[28] People
v. Bautista, G.R. No. 140278,
[29] People
v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269,
[30] TSN,
[31] TSN,
[32] TSN,
[33] People
v. Capareda, G.R. No. 128363,
[34] People
v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599,
[35] People
v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269,
[36] As proven by her Certificate of Live Birth, records p. 5.
[37] People v. Antonio, supra note 35 at 624-625.
[38]
[39] People v. Lucban, 379 Phil. 325, 333 (2000).
[40] People v. Cabuntog, 420 Phil. 137, 151-152 (2001).
[41] People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342, 350 (2004).
[42] People v. Belga, 402 Phil. 734, 742-743 (2001).
[43] People
v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019,
[44] People v. Dimacuha, supra note 41 at 349.
[45] People v. Managbanag, 423 Phil. 97, 110 (2001).
[46] TSN,
[47] TSN,
[48]
[49] TSN,
[50] Records, p. 67; TSN,
[51] TSN,
[52] TSN,
[53] TSN,
[54] TSN,
[55] TSN,
[56] ART. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed.-Rape is committed:
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
x x x. (Revised Penal Code).
[57] ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceeding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. (Revised Penal Code).
[58] People v. Biong, 450 Phil. 432, 448 (2003); People v. Invencion, 446 Phil. 775, 792 (2003).
[59] People v. Pagsanjan, 442 Phil. 667, 687 (2002).
[60] People v. Tuada, 419 Phil. 835, 844 (2001).
[61] ART. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity.-Persons guilty of rape, seduction or abduction, shall also be sentenced:
1. To indemnify the offended woman.
2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing.
3. In every case to support the offspring.
x x x. (Revised Penal Code).