THIRD
DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 175783 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review
is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799
entitled, “People of the Philippines v.
Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas,” affirming the Decision[2]
dated 14 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch
71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425,[3]
as amended.
The
Information filed against appellant alleged:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON
y NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A. 6425, as
amended, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999,
in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control seven (7) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags each containing 97.92 grams, 95.46 grams, 40.47 grams,
5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and 3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74
grams of white crystalline substance, which after the corresponding laboratory
examination conducted gave positive result to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride also known as “shabu” a regulated drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.[4]
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly
assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty.[5]
The prosecution’s version of the case relied heavily on the
testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who testified that in the morning of
In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3
Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated that when they frisked appellant, they
discovered “2 big plastic bag (sic) and 5 medium size plastic (sic) and a 9 mm.
pistol marked Parabellum bearing serial number C-9890 with one loaded magazine
with eleven ammunition.”[7]
The white
crystalline substance confiscated from appellant was then forwarded to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated
specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a regulated drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A-1 through A-7 contains Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.[8]
Expectedly, appellant presented a
vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment. According to him, he used to work as a
caretaker of “Curacha,” a beer house/videoke bar located along
The trial court found the evidence
presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict and imposed
upon appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[9]
On
In
addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary pleading in
which he questioned the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the
evidence presented against him. He contends
that at the time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within
Marville Subdivision. He had not
committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime which
could have justified his apprehension.
He goes on to argue that even if he had waived the issue regarding the
validity of his arrest by his failure to raise the matter before entering his
plea, such waiver did not affect the unlawfulness of the search and seizure
conducted by the police. Appellant
claims that as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the police
for three weeks prior to his arrest, the authorities were already informed of
his identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior
surveillance and then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized from him should be excluded from evidence. [11]
On
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion
of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals’ Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found
PO3 Bueno’s testimony to be “clear and unequivocal”[14] and should therefore prevail over appellant’s
defense of denial.[15] The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside
appellant’s contention that he was a victim of frame-up as this defense has
been viewed with disfavor and has become a standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[16] It also took note of appellant’s failure to
give any credible reason why the police singled him out considering that they
were strangers to one another prior to the date of the incident.[17]
Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence
by making a lone assignment of error –
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE
III, REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.[18]
Appellant contends that the trial court’s reliance on the
prosecution’s evidence was erroneous considering that he, as a mere grade
school graduate, could not have concocted his narration of the events that led
to his arrest.[19] He also maintains that he was an easy target
of police operatives, since he was a new employee in the videoke bar and was
therefore unfamiliar with the people who frequented said establishment. In addition, he insists that the prosecution
failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty required for conviction and
that the trial court should not have applied the presumption of regularity in
the performance of duties on the part of the police officers. [20]
Appellant likewise points out the trial court’s supposed
failure to substantiate the factual and legal bases for his conviction. He notes that the court a quo’s evaluation of the facts and evidence was contained in only
two paragraphs and was utterly lacking in substantial discussion, in
contravention of this Court’s edict that the decisions must distinctly and
clearly express their factual and legal bases.[21]
On
The appeal must fail.
In
insisting that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony
of PO3 Bueno, appellant is basically making an issue about a witness’s credibility. In this regard, we reiterate the rule that
appellate courts will generally not disturb factual findings of the trial court
since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying.[24] Thus, unless attended with arbitrariness or
plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are
accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal.[25] Our careful review of the records of this
case reveals that the trial court did not err in relying on the testimony of
PO3 Bueno. In open court, PO3 Bueno
recounted their encounter with appellant as follows:
PROS. LUNA:
Thank you, your honor.
Q: Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer
sometime in the month of March 1999?
WITNESS:
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you come to know him?
A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.
Q: If the accused in this case is present before this Court,
will you please point him out?
A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.
LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS
INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to a male person
inside the courtroom when confronted give his name as Bernardo Tuazon.
PROS. LUNA:
Q: Do you recall where were you at about
WITNESS:
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: What were you doing then at that time?
A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.
Q: Who were your companions at that time?
A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.
Q: While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual
incident at that time?
A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru
telephone, sir.
Q: About what?
A: About delivery of shabu
of undetermined amount in the area of Marville Subdivision,
Q: Do you know that person involved or who is the person
supposed to deliver an undetermined amount of “shabu”?
A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the telephone
that the car is a Gemini bearing plate number PFC 411 who will deliver at said
place.
Q: Upon receipt of said information what did you do next?
A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana?
A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.
Q: What did you do next?
A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked
vehicle and proceeded to the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.
Q: Where is this located?
A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in
Q: Upon reaching that place what happened?
A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with
plate number PFC 411, sir.
Q: If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be
able to identify it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,.
B-1 and B-2. What relation has this to
the one you mentioned?
A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.
Q: Upon seeing the car what did you do?
A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.
Q: Specifically, what did you do?
A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.
Q: What happened after flagging down the car?
A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as
police officers, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?
A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as
members of the Antipolo City Police Station, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver?
A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on
his waist.
Q: What did you do next?
In your case what did you do?
A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.
COURT:
Q: Did you know what Padlan did?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do?
A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no
pertinent document for his gun.
Q: What do you mean “he was asked”? Who was asked?
A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
PROS. LUNA:
Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?
WITNESS:
A: He said that the gun is not his.
Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon
what did you do as police officer?
A: I ordered him to get down from the car.
COURT:
Q: After he got down from the car, what happened?
WITNESS:
A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the driver’s seat.
Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?
A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that
it contained shabu, sir.
Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?
A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with
the evidence, sir.
Q: What did you do with the “shabu”?
A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination,
sir.
Q: What was the result of the examination, if you know?
A: It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride sir.[26]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony
of PO3 Bueno establishes beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s culpability. His
testimony regarding the circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7
March 1999 – from the moment their office received a confidential tip from
their informer up to the time they accosted appellant – deserved to be given
significance as it came from the mouth of a law enforcement officer who enjoys
the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Police officers are presumed to have acted
regularly in the performance of their official functions in the absence of
clear and convincing proof to the contrary or that they were moved by ill-will.[27]
Appellant’s
bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative
testimony offered by the prosecution. It
is well-settled that positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail
over the bare denials of an accused.[28] A defense of denial which is unsupported and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and
self-serving, deserving no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on
affirmative matters.[29] Denial is an inherently weak defense which
must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[30]
We shall
now resolve the issue raised by appellant regarding the admissibility of the
physical evidence presented against him.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. This right is
encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary
rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article –
(2) Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
It is
recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless
searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[31]
In the
case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,[32]
this Court had the occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the exemption of
searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on
the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity. We might
add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground
that “it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.”
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant
when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled
discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned
constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate
police distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the
exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on
the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse,
jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause
exist in order to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.[33]
In Caballes v. Court
of Appeals,[34] the
term “probable cause” was explained to mean –
[A] reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the
case.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long
as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.[35]
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to
effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said
car was going to deliver shabu at
Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said
lead, the
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the
admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that the same was
obtained through a warrantless search.
His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of the
search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police. It was only proper for the trial court to
admit said evidence. [36]
Appellant
also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the Constitutional
requirement that “(n)o decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.”[37] Again, we disagree.
Faithful
adherence to the aforementioned constitutional provision is a vital component
of due process and fair play.[38] The rule takes an even more important
significance for the losing party who is entitled to know why he lost so that
he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision needs to be reversed. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and
is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.[39]
In this
case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court substantially
complied with the requirements of the Constitution. The decision contained a summary of the facts
of the case as presented by the prosecution and by the defense. It likewise contained an explanation as to
why it found appellant guilty as charged.
Admittedly, the decision is brief but to our mind, it sufficiently
informed appellant as regards the bases for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that the trial
court disregarded his defense of bare denial in favor of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties enjoyed by police officers.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01799 dated 31 July 2006, finding appellant Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose
C. Mendoza with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Arturo G. Tayag,
concurring; rollo, pp. 3-12.
[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Felix S. Caballes. Records, pp. 84-89.
[3] Also known as “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.”
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5]
[6] In the Joint Affidavit of PO3 Glenon Bueno and PO1 Manuel Padlan as well as the picture of the Gemini car marked as Exhibits “B,” “B-1,” and “B-2,” the plate number of the car was identified as PMZ 411; id.
[7]
[8] Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.
[9] Records, p. 89.
[10] CA rollo, p. 22.
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo,
p. 11.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] CA rollo, p. 32.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Rollo,
pp. 14-15.
[23]
[24] People
v. Baygar, 376 Phil. 466, 473 (1999).
[25] People
v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 24 (2004).
[26] TSN,
[27] People
v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301,
[28] People
v. Vargas, 327 Phil. 387, 397 (1996).
[29] People
v. Gonzales, 417 Phil. 342, 353 (2001).
[30] People
v. Hivela, 373 Phil. 600, 605 (1999).
[31] People
v. Gonzales, supra note 29 at 357.
[32] G.R. No. 88017,
[33] Caballes
v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 279 (2002).
[34]
[35] People
v. Bagista, G.R. No. 86218,
[36]
[37] 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 14.
[38]
[39] Nicos
Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, 11 February
1992, 206 SCRA 127, 132.