THIRD DIVISION
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LILIBETH
ARICHETA, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE
OF THE
Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 172500 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, AZCUNA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25540 which affirmed with modifications the
Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
In an Information
filed on
That
sometime in April 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
being then the owner of a parcel of land located at Bo. Bagumbong, Novaliches,
Kalookan City containing an area of forty-eight (48) sq. meters more or less,
with improvements thereon which she acquired from the National Housing
Authority (NHA) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARGARITA VASQUEZ, in the
following manner, to wit: the said
accused well knowing that she had already sold the said lot to a third party,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sold the same lot to MARGARITA VASQUEZ
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with assumption of Mortgage executed between her
and MARGARITA VASQUEZ on 27th April, 1994 before Notary Public Nonilo
A. Quitangon and recorded in the latter’s Notarial Register as Doc. No. 238,
Page 49, Book XV, Series of 1994, in consideration of which the said MARGARITA
VASQUEZ paid accused P50,000.00 and to assume the sum of P191,075.00
with the NHA, without the knowledge and consent of MARGARITA VASQUEZ, which
amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of MARGARITA Vasquez
in the amount of P50,000.00, Philippine currency.[3]
When arraigned on
On
The prosecution presented private
complainant Margarita Sevilla Vasquez and Norita A. de Guzman.
Private complainant testified that petitioner
was a family friend whom she had known for more than ten years. She used to buy viands from petitioner’s mother,
who was the latter’s sister-in-law’s officemate at the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
Petitioner agreed to sell to private
complainant her rights over a house and lot described as P50,000.00
and to assume payment of the monthly amortization to the NHA for twenty-five
(25) years. The former was able to see the
property twice -- first, in April 1994 before she agreed to buy the same; and
second, in May 1994. The property was
without water and electricity, not yet finished, and still unoccupied. The ground floor had no partition, while the
second floor had no room and ceiling.
On
P50,000.00 to petitioner
was made by private complainant in the latter’s office located at 329 NDC
Compound, Pureza St., Sta. Mesa,
In May 1994, private complainant asked petitioner
about the gate pass, but was told that its issuance was being delayed. Almost everyday, private complainant called petitioner,
but she was told the gate pass was not yet available. She even went to the house of petitioner who
told her that a case between the NHA and the developer was the cause of the
delay.
In October 1995, private complainant went
to the NHA and was informed by a certain Amy Cruz that the gate pass had already
been obtained by petitioner.
Consequently, she went to Barangay Bagumbong,
Under the circumstances, private
complainant orally asked petitioner to return the P50,000.00 she paid
her. Thereafter, private complainant
sent petitioner a demand letter,[7]
which the latter ignored. She then filed
both civil and criminal cases against petitioner.
Private complainant explained that she
did not submit the deed of sale to the NHA because she trusted the petitioner. However, she said that when she tried to
secure the gate pass, she presented the deed of sale to a certain Amy Cruz who
told her that only petitioner was authorized to get the gate pass, and that she
already did. She added that petitioner
did not tell her to submit the deed of sale to the NHA.
Private complainant further said that although
her sister-in-law, Rexelita Cordero -- petitioner’s best friend, kumare and officemate at the NHA --
convinced her to buy the house and lot subject of this case, Ms. Cordero was
not an agent of petitioner.
Mrs. Norita A. de Guzman, an officemate
of private complainant at Kibono Manufacturing Company, confirmed the transaction
between private complainant and petitioner regarding the sale of the right of
the petitioner over the house and lot involved in this case. She narrated that on
Mrs. De Guzman testified she saw private
complainant give to petitioner the amount of P50,000.00 in cash. Thereafter, the contract was signed and she,
together with another officemate, was asked by private complainant to act as
witnesses. During the transaction, she
was two feet away from private complainant and petitioner. After the signing, she said they appeared
before Atty. Nonilo A. Quitangon who notarized the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage.
For the defense, petitioner took the
witness stand.
Petitioner testified that the house and
lot, subject matter of this case, was awarded to her through a raffle at the
NHA. She has to pay monthly
amortizations for twenty-five (25) years to the NHA. She said the property cannot be sold during
this period.
Petitioner denied personally knowing the
private complainant. She insisted that
she did not sell the house and lot to private complainant but merely mortgaged
it to her. She narrated that she first
mortgaged the property to Margarita Galang who occupied the property with the
condition that she would vacate the same when the money she loaned is
returned. Petitioner then mortgaged the
same property to private complainant because her kumare was borrowing money from her. She, however, did not inform private
complainant of the first mortgage. She
signed a deed of sale but did not totally read the document. What she understood was that if she cannot
redeem the property within six months, the property is deemed sold. Since petitioner has not returned the amount
she borrowed from Margarita Galang, the latter is entitled to occupy the
property which, according to petitioner, is still in her name.
Petitioner further explained that despite
the prohibition to sell or mortgage the property within the 25-year period, she
still mortgaged the property to Margarita Galang within one year from the award
of the property to her. She said she has
no proof that she mortgaged the property to Ms. Galang, but she signed a
document as evidence that she received money.
Although she signed the deed of sale, she claimed she is still the owner
per notice of the NHA.
On
WHEREFORE,
this Court finds the accused, LILIBETH ARICHETA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ESTAFA and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS, ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor minimum as minimum to
EIGHT (8) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS, ONE (1) DAY of the medium of prision mayor
medium as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay
the costs.[8]
Via
a notice of appeal, accused-petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.[9]
In its decision dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
dated
The Court of Appeals, in upholding petitioner’s
conviction, ratiocinated:
The
Deed of
x x x x
At
the time accused-[appellant] signed the deed of sale in favor of Margarita
Vasquez she represented to the latter that she was the absolute owner of the
property subject matter of the sale.
Accused-[appellant] warranted to defend said transaction from the claim
of anybody whomsoever. Whether the
previous transaction in favor of Magdalena Galang was a sale or a mortgage,
aforesaid written guaranty embodied in the sale to Margarita Vasquez was
violated. The representation, therefore,
that accused-[appellant] was the absolute owner of the property sold to
Margarita Vasquez and it was free from the claim of anybody was
fraudulent. Said false pretense was
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.
Margarita Vasquez was induced to deliver the sum of P50,000.00 on
account of said fraudulent misrepresentation.
Margarita Vasquez suffered damage.[11]
Petitioner is now before us via a petition for review on certiorari raising a sole issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS THAT THE PETITIONER IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA.
Petitioner contends that the element of
deceit which, in this case is the making of false representations that she is
the owner of the subject property when she transacted with private complainant,
is not present in the case at bar because at the time she transacted with
private complainant, she was still the owner thereof. She claims that nowhere in the records of the
case was it shown that she previously sold or mortgaged the subject property
and that the records of the NHA show that the property remained in her name at
the time she dealt with private complainant.
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2,
of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by
using a fictitious name; or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of fraud.[12] Under this class of estafa, the element of
deceit is indispensable.[13]
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit
as defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
(2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3)
that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (4) that
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[14]
Fraud,
in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive,
including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to
another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of
another. It is a generic term embracing
all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted
to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions
or by suppression of truth; and includes all forms of surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling and any other unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a species of fraud.[15] And deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations,
or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal
injury. The false pretense or fraudulent
act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud,[16]
it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the
very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his
money. In the absence of such requisite,
any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it might
appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said
provision.[17]
As
can be gleaned from the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged
with Estafa for allegedly selling to private complainant the subject property
knowing fully well that she had already sold the same to a third party. From this, it is therefore clear that the supposed
false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to private
complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when she sold it
to private complainant.
The prosecution relies heavily on the
provision contained in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage “That the Vendor
is the absolute owner of said property and hereby warrants the Vendee from any
lawful claim of whomsoever over the same.”
It argues that petitioner, in executing said document in favor of
private complainant, fraudulently represented that she is the absolute owner of
the property and warranted that the transfer of rights over the property is
free “from any lawful claim of whomsoever over the same” because at the time
she made this representation, she had already sold/mortgaged the property to
another person.
The question to be resolved is
whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the alleged false
representation or false pretense contained in the information.
As above explained, the alleged false
representation or false pretense made by petitioner to private complainant was
that she was still the owner of the property when she sold it to private
complainant. To prove such allegation,
the prosecution should first establish that the property was previously sold to
a third party before it was sold to private complainant. The prosecution utterly failed to do
this. The fundamental rule is that upon
him who alleges rests the burden of proof.[18] It made this allegation but it failed to
support it with competent evidence.
Except for private complainant’s bare allegation that petitioner told
her that she (petitioner) sold the property to another person, the records are
bereft of evidence showing that the property was indeed previously sold to a
third person before it was sold again to private complainant. What was shown by the prosecution and
admitted by the defense is the fact that the property is being currently
occupied by a person other than private complainant. This fact does not prove that the property
was previously sold to another person before being sold again to private
complainant. Even assuming arguendo
that the property was previously mortgaged, this does not prove that petitioner
is no longer its owner when she sold the same to private complainant. At most, it only shows that the property is
encumbered and that there was no change in ownership which is contrary to the
prosecution’s claim that there was already a transfer of ownership before the
property was sold to private complainant.
The prosecution cannot rely on the warranty
contained in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that “the Vendor
warrants the Vendee from any lawful claim of whomsoever over the same” for the
reason that the same is not alleged in the Information. This is not part of the charge against petitioner. Petitioner was indicted for making false
representations to the private complainant that she is the owner of the
property involved when this property was supposedly already sold to another
person. The allegations were made
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 110[19]
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
She was not charged with falsely representing to private complainant
that the property was not mortgaged or being occupied by a third person. The charge in the information is
specific. The charge cannot be broadened
to include what is not alleged to the detriment of the petitioner. If this were to be done, the petitioner’s
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her
would be violated.[20]
In Andaya v. People,[21]
this Court said:
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and an accused’s right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.
We are not saying that petitioner did
not commit any wrongdoing. There was
indeed an injustice committed to private complainant when she was not able to
occupy the property she bought from petitioner.
The problem, however, is we cannot convict petitioner for an act not
alleged in the information. To do so
would be violative of the fundamental law of the land.
Where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused while the other may be compatible
with the finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the accused because the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for conviction.[22]
In the present case, the prosecution,
which has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the essential
elements of the felony, failed to discharge this burden. It failed to establish, as alleged in the
information, the false representation or false pretense that petitioner
supposedly committed; that is, the property in question was previously sold to
another person before it was sold to private complainant. With this failure, the presumption of
innocence in favor of petitioner prevails and we are thus constrained to render
an acquittal.
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting
petitioner of Estafa in CA-G.R. CR No. 25540 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Lilibeth Aricheta is acquitted
of said charge on ground of reasonable doubt.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices
[2] Records, pp. 132-138.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Exhibit A, Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
[7] Exhibit B,
[8] Records, p. 138.
[9]
[10] CA rollo, p. 171.
[11]
[12] Paredes
v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055,
[13] People v. Billaber, 465 Phil. 726, 744 (2004).
[14] Cosme,
Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 149753,
[15] Sim, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159280, 18 May 2004, 428 SCRA 459, 468.
[16] Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 462 Phil. 72, 89 (2003).
[17] Preferred
Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593,
[18] People
v. Petralba, G.R. No. 137512,
[19] SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
[20] Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution; People v. Galido, G.R. Nos. 148689-92, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 502, 512; Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 459 Phil. 794, 806 (2003).
[21] G.R. No. 168486,
[22] People v. Malbog, 396 Phil. 784, 807 (2000).