SPECIAL
THIRD DIVISION
ERNESTO M. FULLERO, Petitioner,
-versus – PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
|
G.R. NO.
170583 Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: September 12, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,[1]
petitioner Ernesto M. Fullero seeks to set aside the
Decision[2]
dated 19 October 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072,
affirming in toto
the Decision[3] dated 9
October 2003 of the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 7712, finding petitioner guilty of
falsification of public document as defined and penalized in paragraph 4,
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
In an
Amended Information[4] dated
That sometime in 1988,
in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice and defraud, being then the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga City Telecommunication’s Office, while acting in said
capacity and taking advantage of his official function, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or caused to be falsified a
genuine public document, that is when he prepared his CSC 212 (Personal Data
Sheet) for submission to Bureau of Telecommunication Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, he made it appear that he passed the Civil
Engineering Board Examinations given by Professional Regulation Commission on
May 30 and 31, 1985 with a rating of 75.8%; however, upon verification issued
by PRC, said accused took the examination in May 1984 and another one [in] May,
1985 with general ratings of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively.
When
arraigned on
Culled
from the records are the following facts:
In
1977, petitioner was employed as a telegraph operator at the Bureau of
Telecommunications Office in
A
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) [Civil Service Form 212] dated
A
letter dated
Upon
inquiry made by Florenda B. Magistrado
(Magistrado), a subordinate of petitioner in the BTO,
Iriga City, with the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC), it was verified that petitioner never passed the board
examination for civil engineering and that petitioner’s name does not appear in
the book of registration for civil engineers.[10]
Petitioner denied executing and submitting the subject PDS
containing the statement that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination
for civil engineering. He likewise
disowned the signature and thumbmark appearing
therein. He claimed that the stroke of
the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine
signature.[11] He
added that the letters contained in the PDS he accomplished and submitted were
typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have small
letters. As such, the subject PDS could
not be his because it had both small and capital typewritten letters.
Moreover, petitioner claimed that Magistrado
had an ill motive in filing the instant case against him because he issued a
memorandum against her for misbehavior in the BTO,
After trial, the Legazpi City RTC
rendered a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the accused Ernesto M. Fullero is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification defined and penalized
under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum to ten (10) years
of prision mayor medium as the maximum and to pay
a fine of three thousand P3,000.00 Pesos. Costs against the
accused.[14]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
In sum, the
Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established all the elements
of the offense of falsification of a public document and that the trial court
correctly rendered a judgment of conviction against appellant.
WHEREFORE,
the appeal at bench is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the appealed
On
I.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID LOWER COURT CONVICTED THE
ACCUSED IN THE ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE I.E., PROOF TO SHOW THAT THE
ACCUSED ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE ACT OF FALSIFICATION HE IS ACCUSED OF;
II.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT, EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED
FILLED UP THE PERSONAL DATA SHEET (PDS) INCLUDING THE STATEMENT THAT HE IS A
LICENSED ENGINEER, ACCUSED WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO STATE SAID DATA AND NO
CRIMINAL INTENT WAS SHOWN.
III.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID RTC ADMITTED EVIDENCES NOT
PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AND THEREAFTER CONSIDERED THE SAME IN DETERMINING THE
ALLEGED GUILT OF THE ACCUSED;
IV.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
Apropos the first issue, petitioner maintained that none of the
prosecution witnesses actually saw him accomplish and sign the PDS; that the
prosecution failed to establish that he took advantage of his position in
falsifying the PDS; that a person need not be an Acting Chief Operator to be
able to falsify a PDS; that he never became the custodian of the PDS nor did he
have any special access to it by reason of his office; and that the identity of
the person who falsified the PDS has not been established by the prosecution.[16]
In establishing its charge of falsification against petitioner, the
prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: Magistrado,
Joaquin C. Atayza (Atayza),
Romeo Brizo (Brizo), Emma
Francisco (Francisco) and Edith C. Avenir (Avenir).
Magistrado, a subordinate of petitioner at the BTO,
Atayza, Regional Director of the PRC in
Brizo, Human Resource Management Officer and Acting Records Officer of
the BTO,
Francisco was the Officer-In-Charge of the Records Section of the PRC,
Avenir was the Special Investigator III in the Legal Affairs Division of
the CSC, Regional Office No. 5,
The prosecution also presented documentary evidence to bolster the
foregoing testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) a certification
issued by Jose A. Arriola, Director II, PRC, Manila, attesting
that petitioner’s name is not registered in the book of registry for licensed
civil engineers; (2) certifications issued by Francisco affirming that
petitioner failed in the 30-31 May 1985 board
examination for civil engineering;[22]
(3) the PDS where petitioner stated that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board
examination for civil engineering with a rating of 75.8% and which was signed
by him;[23]
(4) certifications issued by Francisco attesting that petitioner failed the May
1990 board examination for civil
engineering;[24] (5)
transcript of stenographic notes in the perjury case filed by petitioner
against Magistrado which states that, during the
trial thereof, petitioner affirmed before the court hearing the case that he is
a licensed civil engineer;[25]
(6) a letter signed and submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the
CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, claiming to
be a licensed civil engineer and applying for the position of either a Junior
Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor;[26]
(7) an Order dated 20 December 2001 of the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, finding
petitioner administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and imposing upon him a penalty of six months suspension for
falsifying his PDS which is also the subject matter of the instant case;[27]
(8) a certification submitted by the petitioner to the CSC, Regional Office No.
5, Legazpi City, showing that he is a licensed civil
engineer;[28]
(9) the daily time records of Magistrado signed by
petitioner as the former’s superior;[29]
and (10) other documents bearing the signature of petitioner in blue ballpen.[30]
On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as its sole
witness. No documentary evidence was
proffered.
Petitioner interposed denials and alibi to support his
contentions. Petitioner denied that he
executed and submitted the subject PDS containing the statement that he passed
the board examinations for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He averred that the PDS he accomplished and
submitted was typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have
small letters; thus, the subject PDS could not be his since the letters were
typewritten in small and capital letters; that the stroke of the signature
appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine signature; that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case
against him since he issued a memorandum against her for the latter’s misbehavior
in the BTO, Iriga City; that he is not a licensed
civil engineer; and that he accomplished a different PDS in the BTO, Iriga City.
Petitioner testified that he cannot recall the exact date when he
issued the alleged memorandum against Magistrado[31]
and when during the trial of his perjury case against Magistrado,
he claimed that he is a licensed civil engineer.[32] He cannot also remember if he submitted a
letter to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5,
The initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between the
prosecution and defense is credible.
Case law dictates that an accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence had been
presented by the prosecution.[35]
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
if:
(a)
There is more than one circumstance;
(b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[36]
Although none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the petitioner
falsifying the PDS, they, nonetheless, testified that that they are very
familiar with the petitioner’s handwriting and signature. Magistrado testified
that, being a subordinate of petitioner, she is very familiar with petitioner’s
signature and actually witnessed petitioner affixing his signature on her daily
time records for September 1987 to May 1988.[37]
Brizo testified that he is also familiar with
petitioner’s signature because he personally knows petitioner and that he
regularly received petitioner’s daily time records and other documents bearing
petitioner’s signature.[38]
Both Magistrado
and Brizo opined that the signature in the PDS
belongs to petitioner.
The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the documentary
evidence submitted by the prosecution. The
RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Magistrado
and Brizo as trustworthy and believable.
More significant are the documentary evidence consisting of petitioner’s
signature in certain authentic instruments which are apparently similar to the
signature in the PDS. The RTC and the
Court of Appeals have compared petitioner’s signatures in Magistrado’s
daily time records and petitioner’s signature in his application letter to the
CSC, Regional Office No. 5,
Appellant’s
allegation that he did not execute the subject PDS is unavailing. First, the informations
entered in the PDS, such as his accurate personal data and precise employment
history, are matters which only the accused could have known. Second, a visual analysis of appellant’s
signatures in the Certificate of Arraignment and Notice of Hearing, vis-a-vis his
signature in the PDS would show no significant disparity, leading to the
conclusion that appellant himself prepared the PDS and affixed his signature
therein. Third, the signature of
appellant in the PDS and in the Daily Time Records (Exhibits “J” to “Q”) of
prosecution witness Florenda Magistrado,
were glaringly identical. x x x.[40]
The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings,
are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.[41]
This is more true
if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court’s findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court.[42]
In absolute disparity, the evidence for the defense is comprised
of denials. Petitioner denied having
accomplished and signed the PDS. He
tried to impart that someone else had filled it up. However, aside from this self-serving and
negative claim, he did not adduce any convincing proof to effectively refute
the evidence for the prosecution.
It is a hornbook doctrine that as between bare denials and
positive testimony on affirmative matters, the latter is accorded greater
evidentiary weight.[43]
The subsequent matter to be determined is whether the elements of falsification for which petitioner is charged
were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 171, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART.
171. Falsification by
public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts:
x x x x
4. Making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
The elements of falsification in the above provision are as
follows:
a)
the offender makes in a public
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
b)
he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
c)
the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.[44]
In addition to the aforecited elements, it
must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of
his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public
document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official
position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene
in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the
document which he falsifies.[45]
All of the foregoing elements of falsification of public documents
under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, have been
sufficiently established.
First, petitioner was a public
officer, being then the Acting Chief Operator of the BTO,
Second, in Inting v. Tanodbayan,[47]
we ruled that the accomplishment of the PDS being a requirement under the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government,
the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately
connected with such employment. Hence,
the filing of a PDS is required in connection with promotion to a higher
position and contenders for promotion
have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their
qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified
aspirants to the same position.[48]
Petitioner
was legally obliged to disclose in the PDS that he is not a licensed civil
engineer since, as evidenced by his application letter, he was applying for
positions to be occupied only by licensed civil engineers. Further, petitioner was also legally obliged
to make truthful statements in his PDS since he affirmed therein “under the penalty of perjury” that his
answers to the queries are “true and
correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief.”[49]
Third, petitioner’s statement in the
PDS that he passed the civil engineering board examination given on 30-31 May
1985 in
Finally, as a public officer, petitioner
is duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS pursuant to the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations.[51]
Were it not for his position and employment in the government, he could not
have accomplished the PDS. In People v. Uy,[52]
Santiago Uy, a field agent of the National Bureau of
Investigation, was charged with falsification of public document under
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for making false statements
in his Personal Information Sheet. We ruled therein: “[T]hat the defendant (Santiago Uy) took
advantage of his position may be gathered from the fact that he himself filled
the information sheet which obviously was to be submitted by each and every
officer or employee of the NBI.” In the same vein, petitioner also had the
responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS at the time he made a
false statement therein that he is a licensed civil engineer. Hence, it is
clear that petitioner took advantage of his position as Acting Chief Operator
of BTO,
Anent the second issue, petitioner posited that being a licensed
civil engineer is not a qualification for him to hold office and such is not a
requirement for his promotion; that the false statement caused no prejudice to
any private person as he did not have any competitor in his position nor was
the government damaged by such false statement; that the false statement would
not in any way redound to his benefit and, as such, no criminal intent could
have impelled him to make such false claim; and that no evidence was produced
showing that he had intent to cause injury.
The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused
to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of
falsification of public document.[53]
It is jurisprudentially settled that in
the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers
or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain
or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction
to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.[54]
In falsification of public documents,
therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document;
and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the
intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.[55]
The fact that the petitioner’s false statement in the PDS did not
redound to his benefit, and that the government or any private individual was
not thereby prejudiced, is inconsequential. What is clear and decisive in this case is
that petitioner made an entry in his PDS that he passed the 30-31 May 1985
board examination for civil engineering despite his full awareness that such is
not true.
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecution’s
documentary evidence, consisting of Exhibits A, C, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N,
O, P, Q and R and their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence based on the
following reasons:
(1) Exhibit A, which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998,
confirming that petitioner’s name does not appear in the registry books of
licensed civil engineers, was not properly identified during the trial. The proper
person to identify the certification should have been the signatory therein
which was PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his
absence, a person who actually witnessed the execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza,
who was not present when the certification was executed, had identified the
certification during the trial. Thus,
the contents of the certification are mere hearsay; (2) Exhibit C, which is,
according to petitioner, a machine copy of the PDS, does not show that it was the
petitioner who prepared and submitted the PDS to BTO, Legazpi
City. There was nothing in the PDS which
requires a periodic submission of an updated PDS. Prosecution witness Brizo
does not know whether petitioner’s PDS was personally delivered or mailed. Hence, the identification and subsequent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the PDS are mere hearsay; (3) Exhibit F, which is the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury case filed by
petitioner against Magistrado where petitioner
allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer, lacks proper identification as
the stenographer or records officer was not presented in court; (4) Exhibit G, which is the alleged
letter of petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a Junior
Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit I, which is a machine copy of a
certification allegedly issued by the PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed
civil engineer and which was allegedly submitted by petitioner to the Regional
Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, as his
credential in applying for the aforesaid positions, are merely machine copies
and the loss and unavailability of their original were not proven; and (5)
Exhibits J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R, which are the daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner and which were offered to
compare petitioner’s alleged signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are
devoid of factual basis. Petitioner’s signatures in the said exhibits are,
“with the use of naked eye,” not the same as his signature in the PDS. The Legazpi City RTC should have submitted these documents to a
handwriting expert for examination instead of relying on the testimony of Magistrado.[56]
Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which
are derived from his perception. A
witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others
either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may
not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.[57]
This is known as the hearsay rule.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay
rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the
performance of duty by a public officer.[58]
In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of
whether the officer or person who made them was presented and testified in
court, since these entries are considered prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience
and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify
to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public
business. The trustworthiness consists
in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public
officer.[59]
Exhibit A, or the Certification of the PRC dated
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides
that an evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law or rules. Exhibit
C, which according to petitioner is the machine copy of the PDS, is very
relevant to the charge of falsification and is not excluded by the law or
rules. It was offered precisely to prove that petitioner committed the crime of
falsification by making false statements in the PDS. Further, the information specifically accuses
petitioner of falsifying such PDS. A scrutiny of Exhibit C would show that it is the very PDS which petitioner
falsified and not a mere machine copy as alleged by petitioner. Being the original
falsified document, it is the best evidence of its contents and is therefore
not excluded by the law or rules.[61]
Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, explicitly
provides that a transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the
official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima
facie a correct statement of such proceedings.
Petitioner failed to introduce proof that Exhibit F, or the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17 March
1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner against Magistrado
in which petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer, is not what
it purports to be. Thus, it is prima facie correct. Moreover, as earlier elucidated, one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule is the entries in official records made in the
performance of duty by a public officer. Exhibit
F, being an official entry in the court’s records, is admissible in
evidence and there is no necessity to produce the concerned stenographer as a
witness.[62]
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides
that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit G, which is the alleged letter of petitioner to the
Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City,
applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or
Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit
I, which is the machine copy of a certification allegedly issued by the PRC
attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and which was allegedly
submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, as his credential in applying for the
aforesaid positions, are certified true copies of their original documents
recorded or kept in the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi
City[63]
and, thus, admissible to prove the contents of their originals.
Exhibits J to R, which are the
daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner
and which were offered to compare petitioner’s alleged signature in the PDS
with the said exhibits, are admissible in evidence since they are relevant and
material to the charge of falsification against petitioner. The signatures of petitioner in the said
exhibits, the authenticity of which were not denied by petitioner, were
presented to prove that these signatures were similar to petitioner’s signature
in the PDS where he made the alleged falsification.
Well-entrenched is the rule that resort to handwriting experts is
not mandatory. Handwriting experts,
while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwritings or signatures.[64]
This is so since under Section 22, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he
has seen the person write; or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or has been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of
the handwriting of such person. Moreover,
the opinion of a non-expert witness, for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding the handwriting or signature of a person with
which he has sufficient familiarity.[65]
The Legazpi City RTC was, therefore, not
obliged to put a handwriting expert on the witness stand and direct the latter
to examine petitioner’s signatures in the foregoing exhibits before ruling on
their admissibility. It can, as it did,
rely on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are familiar with
petitioner’s handwriting/signature in determining the admissibility of the
aforesaid exhibits. It can, by itself,
also compare petitioner’s signature in the PDS with the petitioner’s signatures
in the subject exhibits with or without the aid of an expert witness and
thereafter rule on the admissibility of such exhibits based on its own
observation. In short, it can exercise
independent judgment as regards the admissibility of said exhibits.
As to the fourth issue, petitioner argued that since none of the
prosecution witnesses testified that they actually saw him fill up the PDS,
then there is no evidence showing that the alleged falsification took place in Legazpi City; that when the PDS was allegedly falsified, he
was stationed at BTO, Iriga City, and was a resident
of Iriga City; that, even assuming without admitting
that he filled up the PDS, the same was, “in all probability,” filled up in Iriga City and, as such, the crime of falsification was
consummated therein; that, consequently, the instant case should have been
tried in the Iriga City RTC and not in the Legazpi City RTC.[66]
There are three important requisites which must be present before
a court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases. First,
the court must have jurisdiction over the offense or the subject matter. Second,
the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was
committed. And third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.[67]
There is no dispute that the Legazpi City RTC has
jurisdiction over the offense and over the person of petitioner. It is the territorial jurisdiction of the Legazpi City RTC which the petitioner impugns.
The territorial
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or
information as regards the place where the offense charged was committed.[68]
It should also be emphasized that where
some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation
occur in one province or city and some in another, the court of either province
or city has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the court
first taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others.[69]
In the case at bar, the information specifically and positively
alleges that the falsification was committed in
We find no reason to disturb the prison term and fine imposed on petitioner
by the Legazpi City RTC and the Court of Appeals, as
they are in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-20.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with
Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Aurora
Santiago-Lagman concurring; rollo, pp.
24-35.
[3] Penned
by Presiding Judge Vladimir B. Brusola; rollo, pp. 36-42.
[4] Records,
p. 40.
[5]
[6] TSN,
[7] Records,
p. 256.
[8] TSN,
[9] Records,
p. 361.
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13] Records,
p. 264.
[14] Rollo, pp. 41-42.
[15]
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19]
[20] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22] Exhibit B and its sub-markings, Records, pp. 254-255.
[23] Exhibit C, id. at 256.
[24] Exhibit E and its sub-markings, id. at
258-260.
[25] Exhibit F, id. at 323-360.
[26] Exhibit G and its sub-markings, id. at
361.
[27] Exhibit F, id. at 362-368.
[28] Exhibit
I, id. at 367.
[29] Exhibits J-R, id. at 370.
[30] Exhibits S-V, id. at 371-375.
[31] TSN,
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] People v. Yatar,
G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504, 513; People v. Lagao, Jr., 337 Phil. 497, 510
(1997).
[36] Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
[37] TSN,
[38] TSN,
[39] Rollo, p. 41.
[40]
[41] People v. Aguila,
G.R. No. 171017,
[42]
[43] People v. Comiling,
468 Phil. 869, 890 (2004); Olivarez v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
163866, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 465, 483; People
v. Gusmo, 467 Phil. 199, 219 (2004).
[44]
[45] Luis
B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law (Fourteenth
Edition, Revised 1998), Book Two,
Arts. 114-367, p. 216, citing People v. Uy, 101 Phil. 159, 163 (1957)
and
[46] Lumancas v. Intas,
G.R. No. 133472,
[47] G.R.
Nos. 52446-48,
[48] People v. Aguila, supra
note 41.
[49] At
the back page of Exhibit C, Records, p. 256.
[50] TSN,
[51] People v. Aguila,
supra note 41.
[52] Supra
note 45.
[53] People v.
[54] Lastrilla v. Granda,
G.R. No. 160257,
[55] Syquian v. People, G.R. No. 82197,
[56] Rollo, pp. 13-15.
[57] D.M. Consunji,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 137873,
[58] Section 44, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
[59] VI
Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rules 131-133 (1999 ed.), p.
290, citing Antilon v. Barcelona, 37 Phil. 148, 151 (1917).
[60] Records,
p. 46.
[61] Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
[62] Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
[63] Records,
p. 361 and p. 367.
[64] Bautista v. Castro, G.R. No. 61260,
[65] Section 50(b), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
[66] Rollo, pp. 11-13.
[67] Cruz v. Court of Appeals,
436 Phil. 641, 654 (2002).
[68] People v. Olermo,
454 Phil. 147, 164 (2003).
[69]