Republic of the
Supreme Court
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PHILIPPINE
SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY
TO ANIMALS, |
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G.R. No. 169752 |
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Petitioners, |
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Members: |
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PUNO, C.J. |
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QUISUMBING, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, |
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CARPIO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO-MORALES, |
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AZCUNA,
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TINGA, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. |
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COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, DIR.
RODULFO J. ARIESGA (in
his official capacity as Director of
the Commission on Audit), MS. MERLE
M. VALENTIN and MS. SUSAN
GUARDIAN (in their official capacities
as Team Leader and Team Member,
respectively, of the audit Team
of the Commission on Audit), |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
in relation to Section 2 of Rule 64, filed by the petitioner assailing Office
Order No. 2005-021[1] dated September
14, 2005 issued by the respondents which constituted the audit team, as well as
its September 23, 2005 Letter[2]
informing the petitioner that respondents’ audit team shall conduct an audit
survey on the petitioner for a detailed audit of its accounts, operations, and
financial transactions. No temporary
restraining order was issued.
The
petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by
virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on
At
the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act
No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Act
No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Important to note is that the nature of the petitioner as a corporate
entity is distinguished from the sociedad anonimas under the Spanish Code of Commerce.
For
the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing
laws for the protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under
its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share
one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for
violations of the laws related thereto.
As originally worded, Sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 1285 provide:
SEC. 4. The said society is authorized to appoint not to exceed five agents in the City of Manila, and not to exceed two in each of the provinces of the Philippine Islands who shall have all the power and authority of a police officer to make arrests for violation of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals, and to serve any process in connection with the execution of such laws; and in addition thereto, all the police force of the Philippine Islands, wherever organized, shall, as occasion requires, assist said society, its members or agents, in the enforcement of all such laws.
SEC. 5. One-half of all the fines imposed and collected through the efforts of said society, its members or its agents, for violations of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and for their protection, shall belong to said society and shall be used to promote its objects.
(emphasis supplied)
Subsequently,
however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion
of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by
virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 148,[4]
which reads, in its entirety, thus:
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the
Section 1. Section four of Act Numbered Twelve hundred and eighty-five as amended by Act Numbered Thirty five hundred and forty-eight, is hereby further amended so as to read as follows:
Sec. 4. The said society is authorized to appoint not to exceed ten agents in the City of Manila, and not to exceed one in each municipality of the Philippines who shall have the authority to denounce to regular peace officers any violation of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals and to cooperate with said peace officers in the prosecution of transgressors of such laws.
Sec. 2. The full amount of the fines collected for violation of the laws against cruelty to animals and for the protection of animals, shall accrue to the general fund of the Municipality where the offense was committed.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved,
Immediately
thereafter, then President Manuel L. Quezon issued
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 63 dated
Whereas, during the first regular session of the National Assembly, Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty Eight was enacted depriving the agents of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of their power to arrest persons who have violated the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals thereby correcting a serious defect in one of the laws existing in our statute books.
x x x x
Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound to enforce;
Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, hereby decree, order, and direct the Commissioner of Public Safety, the Provost Marshal General as head of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, every Mayor of a chartered city, and every municipal president to detail and organize special members of the police force, local, national, and the Constabulary to watch, capture, and prosecute offenders against the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to animals. (Emphasis supplied)
On
Section 1. General Jurisdiction. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and officers that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government, and for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner explained thus:
a. Although the petitioner was created
by special legislation, this necessarily came about because in January 1905
there was as yet neither a Corporation Law or any other general law under which
it may be organized and incorporated, nor a Securities and Exchange Commission
which would have passed upon its organization and incorporation.
b. That Executive Order No. 63, issued
during the Commonwealth period, effectively deprived the petitioner of its
power to make arrests, and that the petitioner lost its operational funding,
underscore the fact that it exercises no governmental function. In fine, the government itself, by its overt
acts, confirmed petitioner’s status as a private juridical entity.
The
COA General Counsel issued a Memorandum[6]
dated
Petitioner
thereafter filed with the respondent COA a Request for Re-evaluation dated
Acting
on the said request, the General Counsel of respondent COA, in a Memorandum
dated
In
a Memorandum dated
Petitioner
received on
Hence,
herein Petition on the following grounds:
A.
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ITS AUDIT AUTHORITY.
B.
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF
SOUGHT, THERE BEING NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW AVAILABLE TO IT.[10]
The
essential question before this Court is whether the petitioner qualifies as a
government agency that may be subject to audit by respondent COA.
Petitioner
argues: first, even though it was created by special legislation in 1905
as there was no general law then existing under which it may be organized or
incorporated, it exercises no governmental functions because these have been
revoked by C.A. No. 148 and E.O. No. 63; second, nowhere in its charter
is it indicated that it is a public corporation, unlike, for instance, C.A. No.
111 which created the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, defined its powers and
purposes, and specifically stated that it was “An Act to Create a Public
Corporation” in which, even as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460, the law
still adverted to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines as a “public corporation,”
all of which are not obtaining in the charter of the petitioner; third,
if it were a government body, there would have been no need for the State to
grant it tax exemptions under Republic Act No. 1178, and the fact that it was
so exempted strengthens its position that it is a private institution; fourth,
the employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the Social
Security System at the latter’s initiative and not through the Government
Service Insurance System, which should have been the case had the employees
been considered government employees; fifth, the petitioner does not
receive any form of financial assistance from the government, since C.A. No.
148, amending Section 5 of Act No. 1285, states that the “full amount of the
fines, collected for violation of the laws against cruelty to animals and for
the protection of animals, shall accrue to the general fund of the Municipality
where the offense was committed”; sixth, C.A. No. 148 effectively
deprived the petitioner of its powers to make arrests and serve processes as
these functions were placed in the hands of the police force; seventh,
no government appointee or representative sits on the board of trustees of the
petitioner; eighth, a reading of the provisions of its charter (Act No.
1285) fails to show that any act or decision of the petitioner is subject to
the approval of or control by any government agency, except to the extent that
it is governed by the law on private corporations in general; and finally, ninth,
the Committee on Animal Welfare, under the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, includes
members from both the private and the public sectors.
The
respondents contend that since the petitioner is a “body politic” created by
virtue of a special legislation and endowed with a governmental purpose, then,
indubitably, the COA may audit the financial activities of the latter. Respondents in effect divide their
contentions into six strains: first, the test to determine whether an
entity is a government corporation lies in the manner of its creation, and,
since the petitioner was created by virtue of a special charter, it is thus a
government corporation subject to respondents’ auditing power; second,
the petitioner exercises “sovereign powers,” that is, it is tasked to enforce
the laws for the protection and welfare of animals which “ultimately redound to
the public good and welfare,” and, therefore, it is deemed to be a government
“instrumentality” as defined under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose
of which is connected with the administration of government, as purportedly
affirmed by American jurisprudence; third, by virtue of Section 23,[11]
Title II, Book III of the same Code, the Office of the President exercises
supervision or control over the petitioner; fourth, under the same Code,
the requirement under its special charter for the petitioner to render a report
to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the Office of the
President, clearly reflects the nature of the petitioner as a government
instrumentality; fifth, despite the passage of the Corporation Code, the
law creating the petitioner had not been abolished, nor had it been
re-incorporated under any general corporation law; and finally, sixth,
Republic Act No. 8485, otherwise known as the “Animal Welfare Act of 1998,”
designates the petitioner as a member of its Committee on Animal Welfare which
is attached to the Department of Agriculture.
In
view of the phrase “One-half of all the fines imposed and collected through
the efforts of said society,” the Court, in a Resolution dated January 30,
2007, required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the parties to
comment on: a) petitioner's authority to impose fines and the validity of the
provisions of Act No. 1285 and Commonwealth Act No. 148 considering that there
are no standard measures provided for in the aforecited
laws as to the manner of implementation, the specific violations of the law,
the person/s authorized to impose fine and in what amount; and, b) the effect
of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions on whether petitioner continues to exist or
should organize as a private corporation under the Corporation Code, B.P.
Blg. 68 as amended.
Petitioner
and the OSG filed their respective Comments.
Respondents filed a Manifestation stating that since they were being
represented by the OSG which filed its Comment, they opted to dispense with the
filing of a separate one and adopt for the purpose that of the OSG.
The
petitioner avers that it does not have the authority to impose fines for
violation of animal welfare laws; it only enjoyed the privilege of sharing in
the fines imposed and collected from its efforts in the enforcement of animal
welfare laws; such privilege, however, was subsequently abolished by C.A. No.
148; that it continues to exist as a private corporation since it was created
by the Philippine Commission before the effectivity
of the Corporation law, Act No. 1459; and the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions.
The
OSG submits that Act No. 1285 and its amendatory laws did not give petitioner
the authority to impose fines for violation of laws[12]
relating to the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals;
that even prior to the amendment of Act No. 1285, petitioner was only entitled
to share in the fines imposed; C.A. No. 148 abolished that privilege to share
in the fines collected; that petitioner is a public corporation and has
continued to exist since Act No. 1285; petitioner was not repealed by the 1935
and 1987 Constitutions which contain transitory provisions maintaining all laws
issued not inconsistent therewith until amended, modified or repealed.
The
petition is impressed with merit.
The
arguments of the parties, interlaced as they are, can be disposed of in five
points.
First,
the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot be
applied.
Essentially,
the “charter test” as it stands today provides:
[T]he test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or
controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter
for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject
to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service
Insurance System. xxx (Emphasis
supplied)[13]
The
petitioner is correct in stating that the charter test is predicated, at best,
on the legal regime established by the 1935 Constitution, Section 7, Article
XIII, which states:
Sec. 7. The
National Assembly shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations
are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.[14]
The foregoing proscription has been carried over to the 1973
and the 1987 Constitutions. Section 16
of Article XII of the present Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general
law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or
controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in
the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Section 16 is essentially a re-enactment of Section 7 of
Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution and Section 4 of Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution.
During the formulation of the 1935 Constitution, the
Committee on Franchises recommended the foregoing proscription to prevent the
pressure of special interests upon the lawmaking body in the creation of
corporations or in the regulation of the same.
To permit the lawmaking body by special law to provide for the
organization, formation, or regulation of private corporations would be in
effect to offer to it the temptation in many cases to favor certain groups, to
the prejudice of others or to the prejudice of the interests of the country.[15]
And since the underpinnings of the charter test had been
introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test
cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No.
1285, enacted on
There
are a few exceptions. Statutes can be
given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so
expressly provides; (2) in case of remedial statutes; (3) in case of curative
statutes; (4) in case of laws interpreting others; and (5) in case of laws
creating new rights.[18] None of the exceptions is present in the
instant case.
The
general principle of prospectivity of the law
likewise applies to Act No. 1459, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, which
had been enacted by virtue of the plenary powers of the Philippine Commission
on
SEC. 75. Any corporation or sociedad anonima formed, organized, and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands and lawfully transacting business in the Philippine Islands on the date of the passage of this Act, shall be subject to the provisions hereof so far as such provisions may be applicable and shall be entitled at its option either to continue business as such corporation or to reform and organize under and by virtue of the provisions of this Act, transferring all corporate interests to the new corporation which, if a stock corporation, is authorized to issue its shares of stock at par to the stockholders or members of the old corporation according to their interests. (Emphasis supplied).
As pointed out by the OSG, both the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions contain transitory provisions maintaining all laws issued not
inconsistent therewith until amended, modified or repealed.[19]
In
a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied, the mere fact
that a corporation has been created by virtue of a special law does not
necessarily qualify it as a public corporation.
What
then is the nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity? What legal regime governs its rights, powers,
and duties?
As
stated, at the time the petitioner was formed, the applicable law was the
Philippine Bill of 1902, and, emphatically, as also stated above, no
proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein.
The
textual foundation of the charter test, which placed a limitation on the power
of the legislature, first appeared in the 1935 Constitution. However, the petitioner was incorporated in
1905 by virtue of Act No. 1258, a law antedating the Corporation Law (Act No.
1459) by a year, and the 1935 Constitution, by thirty years. There being neither a general law on the
formation and organization of private corporations nor a restriction on the
legislature to create private corporations by direct legislation, the
Philippine Commission at that moment in history was well within its powers in
1905 to constitute the petitioner as a private juridical entity.
Time
and again the Court must caution even the most brilliant scholars of the law
and all constitutional historians on the danger of imposing legal concepts of a
later date on facts of an earlier date.[20]
The
amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a
private corporation and not an agency of the government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63,
issued by then President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon,
declaring that the revocation of the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents
with powers of arrest “corrected a serious defect” in one of the laws existing
in the statute books.
As
a curative statute, and based on the doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148
has to be given retroactive effect, thereby freeing all doubt as to which class
of corporations the petitioner belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public
corporation, a kind of private domestic corporation, which the Court will
further elaborate on under the fourth point.
Second,
a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or
supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled
corporations. No government
representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors
of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in
accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded
to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be
sued, to use a common seal, and so forth.
It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall
be managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its by-laws in
force.” The pertinent provisions of the
charter provide:
Section 1. Anna L. Ide, Kate S. Wright, John L. Chamberlain, William F. Tucker, Mary S. Fergusson, Amasa S. Crossfield, Spencer Cosby, Sealy B. Rossiter, Richard P. Strong, Jose Robles Lahesa, Josefina R. de Luzuriaga, and such other persons as may be associated with them in conformity with this act, and their successors, are hereby constituted and created a body politic and corporate at law, under the name and style of “The Philippines Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.”
As incorporated by this Act, said society shall have the power to add to its organization such and as many members as it desires, to provide for and choose such officers as it may deem advisable, and in such manner as it may wish, and to remove members as it shall provide.
It shall have the right to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, to receive legacies and donations, to conduct social enterprises for the purpose of obtaining funds, to levy dues upon its members and provide for their collection to hold real and personal estate such as may be necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the society, and to adopt such by-laws for its government as may not be inconsistent with law or this charter.
x x x x
Sec. 3. The said society shall be operated under the direction of its officers, in accordance with its by-laws in force, and this charter.
x x x x
Sec. 6. The
principal office of the society shall be kept in the city of
Third. The employees of the petitioner are
registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latter’s
initiative, and not through the Government Service Insurance System, which
should be the case if the employees are considered government employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s
nature as a private entity. Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as
the Social Security Act of 1997, defines the employer:
Employer – Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government: Provided, That a self-employed person shall be both employee and employer at the same time. (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth.
The respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body politic” because
its primary purpose is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which,
in turn, redounds to the public good.
This
argument, is, at best, specious. The
fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does
not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch
as a corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a
public character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class of corporations may be considered
quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that render public
service, supply public wants,[21]
or pursue other eleemosynary objectives.
While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they
are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility,[22]
railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and
transportation companies.[23] It must be stressed that a quasi-public
corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying
factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it performs
a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.[24]
Authorities
are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a
safe guide, for the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays created
to promote the interest, good, or convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a private
corporation; yet, it is created for a public benefit. Private schools and universities are likewise
private corporations; and yet, they are rendering public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged with
heavy social responsibilities. More so
with all common carriers. On the other
hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with gifts or
donations from private individuals.
The
true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or
private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as
the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its
governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise,
it is private. Applying the above test,
provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can
best exemplify public corporations. They
are created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of
parts of its own public works.[25]
It
is clear that the amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 revoked the powers of
the petitioner to arrest offenders of animal welfare laws and the power to
serve processes in connection therewith.
Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter
of the petitioner requires the latter to render periodic reports to the Civil
Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the President, the petitioner
is, therefore, a government instrumentality.
This
contention is inconclusive. By virtue of
the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence and powers to the
State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of
whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private
corporations—as creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature
to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted
within its powers. In other words, the
reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it
that its creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon
it. These principles were extensively
discussed in Bataan Shipyard &
Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government.[26] Here, the Court, in holding that the subject
corporation could not invoke the right against self-incrimination whenever the
State demanded the production of its corporate books and papers, extensively
discussed the purpose of reportorial requirements, viz:
x x x The
corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for
the benefit of the public. It received certain special privileges and
franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations
of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not
authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only
preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a
reserve[d] right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out
whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold
that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises,
could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had
been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of
the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to
this, that an officer of the corporation which is charged with a criminal
violation of the statute may plead the criminality of such corporation as a
refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While
an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless
protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation vested
with special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged
with an abuse of such privileges. (
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is DECLARED a private
domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The respondents are ENJOINED from investigating, examining
and auditing the petitioner's fiscal and financial affairs.
SO
ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES Associate
Justice |
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 29.
[2]
[3] Act
No. 1285, §2 (1905).
[4] Entitled
“AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION FOUR OF ACT NUMBERED TWELVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIVE SO
AS TO WITHDRAW FROM AGENTS OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS OF THE PHILIPPINES THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO MAKE ARRESTS FOR
VIOLATION OF THE LAW AGAINST CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND TO ABOLISH THE PRIVILEGE
GRANTED TO SAID SOCIETY TO SHARE IN THE AMOUNT OF THE FINES COLLECTED FOR SAID
VIOLATIONS.”
[5] Rollo, p.
101.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Section
23. The Agencies under the Office of
the President. – The agencies under the Office of the President refer to
those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the
supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and
program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order
creating them under any special department. (Emphasis supplied)
[12] Act No. 3547 (1928) and R.A. No. 8485 (1988).
[13] Baluyot v. Holganza, 382 Phil. 131, 136-137 (2000); Camporedondo v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 370 Phil. 901, 906 (1999).
[14] Section
7 should be read with Sections 1 and 2 of Article XI of the same Constitution:
ARTICLE
XI—General Auditing Office
Section
1. There shall be a General Auditing Office under the direction and control of
an Auditor General, who shall hold office for a term of ten years and may not
be reappointed. The Auditor General shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, and shall receive an annual
compensation to be fixed by law which shall not be diminished during his
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Auditor
General shall receive an annual compensation of twelve thousand pesos.
Sec.
2. The Auditor General shall examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from
whatever source, including trust funds derived from bond issues; and audit, in
accordance with law and administrative regulations, all expenditures of funds
or property pertaining or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or
municipalities thereof. He shall keep the general accounts of the Government
and preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto. It shall be the duty of the
Auditor General to bring the attention of the proper administrative officer
expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant. He shall also perform such other
functions as may be prescribed by law.
[15] 2 Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution
678 (1935); Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
[16] See Civil Code of the Philippines, R.A. No. 386, as amended, Art. 4 (1950) & Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Art. 3.
[17] 1 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the
[18]
[19] Section 7, Article VII, Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Philippine Constitution reads:
Section 7. All existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly.
Section 3, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the 1985 Philippine Constitution reads:
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
[20] See
Helen
[21] Ruperto G. Martin, Public Corporations 2
(1983)
[22]
[23]
[24]
See id.
[25] See id. at 1-3.
[26] No.
L-75885,
[27]