RUBEN
LASCANO, G.R.
No. 166241
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,*
Chairperson,
-
versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,**
CARPIO, ***
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 7,
2007
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
In this
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Ruben
Lascano seeks the reversal of the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, Branch
128 finding him guilty of the crime of homicide.
Petitioner
was initially charged[3]
as a co-conspirator, together with Eduardo Altabano (Eduardo), Benjamin Caro
(Benjamin), Cynthia Caro (Cynthia) and Corazon Lascano (Corazon), with the
crime of murder perpetrated against Arnold Fernandez (Fernandez).[4] He absconded and remained at large while his
co-accused were on trial. But when the case was submitted for decision,
he surfaced[5] and
forthwith underwent a separate trial for the same charge[6]
after his arrest.
Meanwhile, Eduardo
and Benjamin were found guilty of murder as co-conspirators and meted out the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, while the
rest were acquitted for lack of the requisite evidence against them.[7]
On automatic review to this Court, Eduardo
and Benjamin were found guilty of homicide only.[8]
In view of
the decision of the Supreme Court in People v. Altabano, et al.,[9]
the charge in the present case was downgraded to homicide[10]
on petitioner’s motion.[11]
He pleaded not guilty to the charge.[12]
As stipulated by the prosecution and the
defense at the pre-trial conference, the testimonial and documentary evidence
in the previous case were deemed introduced in the present case, subject to
cross-examination of the witnesses and without prejudice to the presentation of
additional evidence.[13]
Twelve
witnesses testified for the prosecution, among whom were Ofelia Ibacuado (Ibacuado), Estrellita Mallari (Mallari), SPO3 Eduardo Roderno, SPO1 Antonio Peñaranda and Dr.
Antonio Vertido (Dr. Vertido) who had already
testified in the previous case.[14]
The
eyewitness account of Ibacuado of
the operative facts follow. At
around 9:00 in the evening of 31 August 1994, Fernandez, drinking beer by
himself, was sitting on the two-step cement stairs in front of a sari-sari store situated in L. Lupa
Street.[15] Ibacuado had gone to the sari-sari store
to use the telephone and saw Fernandez there with a beer in hand. She was busy making a call when suddenly, petitioner
arrived, uttered the words, “Walanghiya ka, oras mo na!” and then
proceeded to kick Fernandez who instantly fell to the ground. Eduardo, Benjamin,
Corazon, and Cynthia then arrived and simultaneously shouted, “Sige, barilin
mo na!” Petitioner then pulled out a gun from his
waist and shot the victim. Thereafter, he casually walked away while his
companions went back to their houses.[16]
Mallari, the other eyewitness at the scene,
basically had the same recollection of the events. Fernandez was drinking beer by himself when petitioner
arrived and kicked him down. Benjamin and Eduardo followed suit in mauling the
victim. A moment later, Corazon and Cynthia entered the scene. Corazon said, “Sige,
barilin mo na, Ben!” Fernandez was struggling to stand when petitioner shot
him.[17]
Fernandez
was immediately rushed to the Ospital ng Caloocan but was unfortunately
declared dead on arrival. Dr. Vertido, the medico-legal officer who
administered the post-mortem examination on the victim’s body, identified the
cause of death to be the gunshot wound on the left breast that hit the lower
portion of the heart and penetrated the middle lobe of the right lung.[18]
At the
trial, both Ibacuado and Mallari positively identified in open court petitioner
as the gun-wielder. Being long-time neighbors of both Fernandez and petitioner,[19]
with Ibacuado only a meter away from petitioner at the scene and the place illuminated
by a lamp post, the two were able to see and recognize him.[20]
For his
defense, petitioner relied on denial and alibi. He testified that coming home from work at
6:00 in the evening on the date in question, he was informed by his wife,
Corazon, that she had had an altercation with Fernandez. They proceeded to the police station to have
the incident recorded in the police blotter, after which he went back to his
house, packed his belongings, and drove to the residence of his employer,
Renato Alipio. At the time of the
incident, he and Alipio, were already on board a Nelbusco bus en route to
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya from which place they would proceed to Isabela to verify
the registration of a certain car. The bus, according to petitioner, departed
from the terminal at 7:45 in the evening and arrived at the place of
destination at 3:00 the following morning. The two then located the residence
of one T/Sgt. Jean Dela Cruz who would accompany them to Isabela.[21] Petitioner produced in court two (2) bus
tickets[22]
issued by Nelbusco.
Dela Cruz testified that between 3:00 and 4:00 in the
morning of 1 September 1994, he was roused from his sleep when appellant and
Alipio arrived at his residence. After a short interval over coffee, he,
together with the two, headed to the Land Transportation Office in Ilagan,
Isabela to verify the registration of a certain motor vehicle.[23]
After
weighing the evidence, on 11 March 2003, the RTC rendered its decision finding
petitioner guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing considerations, finding accused Ruben Lascano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the offended party the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages. The period of his preventive
detention during trial shall be credited in his favor.
The City Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the accused Ruben Lascano to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City for the Service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED.[24]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated on 8 July 2004 its
decision affirming the trial court’s decision, except for the prison sentence
which it modified. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision is hereby affirmed with modification.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the appellant Ruben Lascano is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The period of his preventive detention during
trial is credited in his favor.
Accused
is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO
ORDERED.[25]
Undaunted,
petitioner filed the present petition for review with this Court, attributing
error to the Court of Appeals in relying on the alleged conflicting testimonies
of prosecution witnesses Ibacuado and Mallari and in not sustaining his defense
of alibi.[26]
As found by
the courts below, the evidence for the prosecution more than meets the
requisite evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner’s challenge of the decisions a quo is starkly puerile.
It is doctrinal that findings of
trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court
had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could reverse a judgment of conviction.[27] In fact, in some instances, such findings are
even accorded finality.[28] This is so because the assignment of value to
a witness’ testimony is essentially the domain of the trial court, not to
mention that it is the trial judge who has the direct opportunity to observe
the demeanor of a witness on the stand which opportunity provides him unique
facility in determining whether or not to accord credence to the testimony[29]
or whether the witness is telling the truth or not.[30]
This Court is not the proper forum
from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, except only where the
factual findings of the trial court do not find support in the evidence on
record or where the judgment appealed from was based on a misapprehension of
facts.[31] None of the exceptions obtains in this case,
thus; we find no compelling reason to depart from the rule.
Petitioner points to certain alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Ibacuado and
Mallari. He notes that when Ibacuado testified in court in the previous case,
she stated that she was facing the victim when the latter was shot but at the
trial of the present case, the same witness recounted that she was on the left
side of the victim when petitioner delivered the shot.[32]
At another hearing, petitioner points out, the same witness stated that
Fernandez was standing when he was shot,[33] contrary to the statement offered in
the previous case by another eyewitness, Mallari, who positively stated that
Fernandez was lying down on the ground when the gun was fired at him.[34]
We are not persuaded.
As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the supposed inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively
trivial and minor[35]
and do not go into the substance of Ibacuado’s and Mallari’s testimonies.
The important portions thereof—which the alleged disparities cannot
override—are that which coherently narrated the principal occurrence and
established with certainty the identity of petitioner as the one who opened
fire at Fernandez. Indeed, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimony of
a witness which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy
credibility.[36] On the contrary, they are in fact taken as
badges of truth which bolster the probative value of the testimony.[37]
Regarding
alibi, nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that it is
the weakest of all defenses and must be received with much suspicion and with
extreme caution, not only because of its intrinsic weakness and unreliability
but also because of the facility available to the accused in fabricating and
concocting such defense.[38] In order that alibi may be accorded
credibility, the accused himself must positively demonstrate his presence at
another place at the time of the commission of the offense as well as the
physical impossibility for him to be at the locus criminis at that same
time.[39] And by “physical impossibility” we refer to
the distance and the facility of access between the locus criminis and
the place where the accused says he was when the crime was committed.[40]
The defense
of alibi all the more loses credibility, if it had any, and crumbles when
weighed against the positive identification of the accused by credible
witnesses to the crime. The rule is that the positive identification of the
accused, when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part
of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over both alibi and
denial.[41]
The
testimonies of Ibacuado and Mallari in open court
identifying petitioner as the one who fired the gun at Fernandez were
categorical, coherent, and consistent, devoid of any suspicious implausibility
of a character likely to discredit the same.
Notably, it was not shown that the said witnesses were harboring ill
motives against petitioner that might have urged them to hurl false accusations
against the latter. This only serves to
strengthen the presumption that they were not so moved to testify falsely and
thereby entitles their testimonies to full weight and credit. The unavoidable conclusion is that the
identification made of petitioner by Ibacuado and Mallari—an affirmative
testimonies no doubt—must prevail over the negative and self-serving alibi of
the defense. Suffice it to say that the
strength of an affirmative testimony is far greater than a negative one, especially when it proceeds from a
credible witness.[42] Thus, no reversible error was committed by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals in rejecting the defense of alibi
advanced by petitioner when the latter’s identity has already been sufficiently
established.
In fact, another prosecution witness,
Jonathan Siluran, credibly refuted petitioner’s alibi. He testified that while he was waiting for a
passenger jeep at around 8:30 that night, he saw petitioner in his owner-type
jeep cruising L. Lupa Street. He was
about a meter away from him and the place was heavily illuminated by the
headlights of the vehicles caught in traffic which, according to him, gave
facility in identifying petitioner.[43]
The bus tickets which petitioner
presented to prove his trip on the night of the incident do not even
corroborate his alibi. Assuming he did
purchase the tickets for himself and his alleged companion, there is nothing on
the face thereof which evinces for what particular trip they were purchased or
at what exact time the bus they allegedly boarded left the terminal. Moreover, as correctly found by the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, it rouses reasonable suspicion in
our mind why he had kept intact the said tickets for a considerable length of
time since 1994 when it is customary practice for public transport passengers
to throw away or otherwise dispose of their tickets after having made use of
them.[44]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On
Official Leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]CA rollo, pp. 152-157. Promulgated on 8 July 2004 and penned by Associate
Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok
with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Danilo B. Pine concurring.
[3]The criminal information was filed with the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 121 presided
by Judge Adoracion Angeles.
[4]See People v. Eduardo Altabano,
Benjamin Caro, Cynthia Altabano,
Corazon Lascano and Ruben Lascano,
G.R. No. 121344, 29
October 1999, 317 SCRA 708.
[6]The information was filed with the same RTC Branch (Caloocan City, Branch 121), but in view of the judgment of
conviction rendered by the said court in the previous case of People v. Altabano,
petitioner filed a petition for inhibition against the judge. The petition was granted and Judge Angeles
ordered that the records of the present case be forwarded to the Office of the
Executive Judge for re-raffle. Accordingly,
the case was re-raffled to Branch 126 but petitioner moved for another raffle
in view of the retirement of Presiding Judge Oscar Payawal
of Branch 126. The case was then
re-raffled to Branch 122, presided by Judge Modesto Juanson.
Finally, in view of Supreme Court Circular No. 96 dated 3 May 1996, the case was
raffled to Branch 128, presided by Judge Silvestre Bello,
Jr. It was docketed as Criminal Case No.
C-47820.
[8]Id. at 355.
The prosecution in that case had established that Lascano was the person who shot the victim. The defense of
Eduardo and Benjamin was that they could not be held liable for the shooting
inasmuch as they did not agree to kill the victim, and the most that they could
be liable for was physical injuries only.
However, on account of the finding of conspiracy that attended the
commission of the crime, Eduardo and Benjamin were found guilty of homicide. See People v. Altabano,
et al., supra note 4.
[10]Records, Vol. I, p. 371. The second amended information reads:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses
EDUARDO ALTABANO Y ELLORIN, BENJAMIN CARO Y YU, CYNTHIA ALTABANO-CARO, CORAZON
CARO-LASCANO AND RUBEN LASCANO @ BENTOT of the crime of HOMICIDE, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 31st day
of August 1994, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, did
then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one ARNOLD FERNANDEZ Y MCOLL, with the
use of a gun, hitting the latter on the left breast, thereby inflicting upon
the latter serious physical injuries, which injuries ultimately caused his
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[11]Id. at 341-343.
[12]Id. at 400.
[14]CA rollo,
p. 164.
[20]Id. at 22-23.
[26]Id. at 19-26.
[27]People v. De Leon, 428 Phil. 556, 572 (2002); People v. Sanidad, 450 Phil. 449, 458
(2003); People v. Espero,
400 Phil. 461, 624 (2000).
[29]Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 460 Phil. 290, 296-297 (2003); People v. Orcula, Sr., 390 Phil. 427, 444-445 (2000).
[30]People v. Manalili, 355 Phil. 652, 670 (1998).
[33]Id. at 6.
[38]People v. Emoy, 395 Phil. 371, 383 (2000); People v. De Leon,
428 Phil. 556, 575 (2000); People v. Penaso, supra
note 28, at 210.
[39]People v. Sanidad, supra note 27, at 461; People v. De Leon, supra;
People v. Emoy, supra; People v. Manguera, 446 Phil. 808, 820-821 (2003); People v.
Drew, 422 Phil. 614, 624-625 (2001).