FIRST
DIVISION
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, G.R. No. 164733
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s
- CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September
21, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Whereas,
mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. (Final preambular clause of the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child)
This is a petition for review[1] of the
decision[2] dated
July 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25925 affirming
with modification the decision[3] of
Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in Criminal Case No.
00-0691 which found petitioner Michael John Z. Malto guilty for violation of paragraph
3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA 7610,[4] as
amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in
an information which read:
The
undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED,
committed as follows:
That
on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce and/or seduce his
student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to
indulge in sexual intercourse for several times with him as in fact said
accused had carnal knowledge.
Contrary
to law.[5]
This was subsequently amended as
follows:
The
undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED,
committed as follows:
That
on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert
influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his
student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to
indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him
as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.[6]
Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned;
hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of “not guilty.” After the
mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the
following:
At the time of the incident, private
complainant AAA was 17 years old.[7] She was
a college student at the Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati
City. Petitioner, then 28, was her professor in her Philosophy II class in the
first semester of the school year 1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having
lunch with her friends when petitioner joined their group. He told them to address
him simply as “Mike.” He handed them his organizer and asked them to list down their
names and contact numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her
friends were discussing the movie Kama Sutra, petitioner butted in and bragged
that it was nothing compared to his collection of xxx-rated films. To the shock
of AAA’s group, he lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts he had already experienced.
He then invited the group to view his collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner
reiterated his invitation to AAA and her friends to watch his collection of
pornographic films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA and two of her friends
went with him. They rode in his car and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on
Harrison St. in Pasay City. They checked in at a “calesa room.” Petitioner was
disappointed when he found out there was neither a video cassette player (on
which he could play his video tapes) nor an x-rated show on the closed-circuit
television. He suggested that they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends
ignored him but he pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They
resisted until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having
accepted petitioner’s invitation. For fear of embarrassment in case their
classmates got wind of what happened, they agreed to keep things a secret. Meanwhile,
petitioner apologized for his actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to
show AAA amorous attention. He called her on the phone and paged[8] her
romantic messages at least thrice a day. When semestral break came, his calls
and messages became more frequent. Their conversation always started innocently
but he had a way of veering the subject to sex. Young, naive and coming from a
broken family, AAA was soon overwhelmed by petitioner’s persistence and slowly
got attracted to him. He was the first person to court her. Soon, they had a “mutual
understanding” and became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in
Philosophy II at the start of the second semester, petitioner told her that he
gave her a final grade of “3.” She protested, stating that her mid-term grade was
“1.2.” He gave her a grade of “1.5” when she promised not to disclose his intimate
messages to her to anyone. He also cautioned her not to tell anyone about their
affair as it could jeopardize his job.
On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00
a.m., AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner outside the premises of the college.
Since she was not feeling well at that time, he asked her to lie down in the
backseat of his car. She was surprised when he brought her to Queensland Lodge[9] on
Harrison St. in Pasay City. Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at the back
and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse. She resisted
his advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped only when she got angry
at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked
AAA to come with him so that they could talk in private. He again brought her to
Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room, he took off his shirt,
lay down in bed and told her, “halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap.”
She refused but he dragged her towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck and
breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop him but he
overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her pants and touched her private
part. He tried to penetrate her but she pushed him away forcefully and she sat
up in bed. He hugged her tightly saying, “Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I
won’t hurt you.” She refused and said, “Mike, ayoko.” He angrily stood
up saying, “Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap. Don’t come to the faculty
room anymore. You know I need this and if you will not give in or give it to
me, let us end this.” She replied, “Mike, hindi pa ako ready and it was
you who said it will be after my debut” on December 3, 1997. He insisted that
there was no difference between having sex then and after her debut. He told her,
“kung hindi ko makukuha ngayon, tapusin na natin ngayon.” Pressured and
afraid of his threat to end their relationship, she hesitantly replied “Fine.”
On hearing this, he quickly undressed while commenting “ibibigay mo rin
pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako” and laughed. They had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship
with petitioner. She learned that he was either intimately involved with or was
sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and in other colleges
where he taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La Salle
University-Aguinaldo for having sexual relations with a student and sexually
harassing three other students. His employment was also terminated by
Assumption College for sexually harassing two of his students. It was then that
AAA realized that she was actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and
distressed, she confided all that happened between her and petitioner to her
mother, BBB.
On learning what her daughter
underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an administrative complaint in
Assumption College against him. She also lodged a complaint in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No.
00-0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial
and alibi. He claimed that the alleged incidents on October 3, 1997 and October
10, 1997 did not happen. He spent October 3, 1997 with his colleagues Joseph
Hipolito and AJ Lagaso while he was busy checking papers and computing grades on
October 10, 1997. The last time he saw AAA during the first semester was when
she submitted her final paper on October 18, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m.
and 1:00 p.m., he sorted out conflicts of class schedules for the second
semester at the Assumption College. On November 26, 1997, he was at St.
Scholastica’s College (where he was also teaching) preparing a faculty concert
slated on December 12, 1997. At lunch time, he attended the birthday treat of a
colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.
On
November 29, 1997, he attended AAA’s 18th birthday party. That was
the last time he saw her.
According
to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was already 19 years old and after
he was dismissed from Assumption College. On December 27 and 28, 1998, they spent
time together, shared their worries, problems and dreams and kissed each other.
On January 3, 1999, he brought her to Queensland Lodge where they had sexual
intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at least 20 times from
January 1999 until they broke up in July 1999, some of which were done at
either his or her house when no one was around.
The trial court found the evidence
for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. On March 7,
2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty.[10] The dispositive
portion read:
In view of the foregoing, the Court
finds the accused Michael John Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610[,] as
amended and hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its medium
period or an imprisonment of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php
75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages of Php 50,000.00 to minor complainant
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[11]
Petitioner
questioned the trial court’s decision in the CA. In a decision dated July 30,
2004,[12] the
appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not
covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. It further observed that the trial court failed to fix the minimum term
of indeterminate sentence imposed on him. It also ruled that the trial court
erred in awarding P75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was
proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under
which the death penalty was authorized by law.[13] Hence,
the CA modified the decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that (1) appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS
is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1)
Day of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is DELETED.[14]
Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred
in sustaining his conviction although it found that he did not rape AAA. For
him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape. He also claims that
he and AAA were sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
The Offense Stated in the Information Was
Wrongly Designated
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.[15]
Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against him should be sufficient
in form and substance. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the
place where the offense was committed.[16]
The complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.[17]
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.[18] The
acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.[19]
The designation of the offense in the
information against petitioner was changed from “violation of Section 5(b),
Article III” of RA 7610 to “violation of Section 5(a), Article III” thereof. Paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:
Section
5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who, for
money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
(a)
Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce
child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:
1.
Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2.
Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute
by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
3.
Taking advantage of influence or relationship to
procure a child as a prostitute;
4.
Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage
him as a prostitute; or
5.
Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary
benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b)
Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph
3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1.
the
accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2.
the
act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a.
acting as a
procurer of a child prostitute;
b.
inducing a person
to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements
or other similar means;
c.
taking advantage
of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d.
threatening or
using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute or
e.
giving monetary
consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution;
3.
the
child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4.
the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
On the other hand, the elements of
paragraph (b) are:
1.
the
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2.
the
act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse and
3.
the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes
acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates sexual
abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a),
the child is abused primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b)
punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited
in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It
covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct.[20]
The information against petitioner
did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
did not aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that
petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was her
professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA was a
17-year old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation of
paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined
by Facts Alleged in the Information, Not By the Designation
The designation in the information of
the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused
and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However,
the failure to designate the offense by statute,[21] or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act,[22] or an
erroneous specification of the law violated[23] does
not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged.[24] What
controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but
the actual facts recited in the information.[25] In
other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not
the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the
information.[26]
The facts stated in the amended
information against petitioner correctly made out a charge for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate
courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be
convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information
and duly proven during trial.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III
of RA 7610, as
amended
The first element of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused. The
second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The
third element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party.
The first element was present in this
case. Petitioner committed lascivious conduct against and had sexual
intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on November 19, 1997, when
he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand
inside her blouse to gratify his lust; (2) on November 26, 1997, when, with
lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the motel room and forcibly
kissed her on the lips, neck and breasts and (3) when he exerted moral
influence on her and pressured her until she surrendered herself to him on
November 26, 1997. His acts were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and
lascivious conduct under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on
the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement
the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:
(g) “Sexual
abuse” includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution,
or incest with children;
(h) “Lascivious
conduct” means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or
the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
public area of a person. (emphasis supplied)
The second element was likewise present
here. The following pronouncement in People v. Larin[27] is
significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
(emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the
influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious acts with or allowed him to
commit lascivious acts on her. This was repeated on November 26, 1997 on which
date AAA also indulged in sexual intercourse with petitioner as a result of the
latter’s influence and moral ascendancy. Thus, she was deemed to be a “child
subjected to other sexual abuse” as the concept is defined in the opening
paragraph of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.
The third element of the offense was
also satisfied. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) “Children”
refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition; (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 2007 and November 26,
2007, AAA was a child as she was below 18 years of age. She was therefore
within the protective mantle of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime
were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
and Rape are Separate and Distinct Crimes
Petitioner was charged and convicted
for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense
for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony
under the Revised Penal Code.[28] They
have different elements.[29] The two
are separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did
not commit rape.
Consent of the Child is Immaterial in Criminal
Cases Involving Violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his
kisses and touches and consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged
in these acts out of mutual love and affection. But may the “sweetheart theory”
be invoked in cases of child prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted
under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts
of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without the consent
of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It
requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she
consented to the sexual relations.[30]
For purposes of sexual intercourse
and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart
defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
The language of the law is clear: it
seeks to punish
[t]hose who
commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is
immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with
a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a
contract under our civil laws.[31] This is
on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk
of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully.[32] Those
of tender years deserve its protection.[33]
The harm which results from a child’s
bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than
a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences[34]
of her attempts at adult sexual behavior.[35] For
this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult
sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical
intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against
abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like
petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view
her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by
law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.[36]
This must be so if we are to be true
to the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth.[37] This is
consistent with the declared policy of the State
[T]o
provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their commission
and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis
intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.[38]
(emphasis supplied)
as well as to
intervene
on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having
care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against
abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts against the child
are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having
care and custody of the same.[39]
(emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the
foremost consideration of the child’s best interests in all actions concerning
him or her.
The best interest of children
shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles
of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and
happy life.[40]
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner May Enjoy the Benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law
The penalty prescribed for violation
of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal
in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the
law.[41] Notwithstanding
that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[42] Since
the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the
Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.[43] Thus,
he is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the range of the proper
imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging
from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years
and 8 months).
The Award of Damages Should Be Modified
The trial court awarded AAA P75,000
as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages. The CA deleted
the award for civil indemnity. It correctly reasoned that the award was proper
only in a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by law. Consistent, however, with the objective of
RA 7610 to afford children special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination and with the principle that every person who contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
for the same,[44]
civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610. Every person criminally liable is civilly liable.[45] The rule is that, in crimes and
quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.[46] Thus, P50,000
civil indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded in cases of violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.[47]
Moreover, the CA erred in affirming
the grant of P50,000 as “moral and exemplary damages.” The rule is that,
in every case, trial courts must specify the award of each item of damages and
make a finding thereon in the body of the decision.[48] Thus,
moral damages and exemplary damages should be separate items of award.
AAA testified that she was
“emotionally devastated” and “lost touch of her inner self” as a result of what
petitioner did to her. Because of the mental anxiety and wounded feelings
caused by petitioner to her, she had several sessions with the dean for student
affairs[49] and the
guidance counselor of Assumption College as well as with a psychiatrist. This
was corroborated by her mother and the dean of student affairs of Assumption
College. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages of P50,000. However, in
the absence of an aggravating circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is
unwarranted.[50]
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner Michael John Z. Malto is hereby found guilty of
violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended, for which he is
sentenced to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 for moral damages.
Costs against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
W E C O N C U R :
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Mariano C. del Castillo of the Special Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 33-45.
[3] Dated March 7, 2001. Penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez. Id., pp. 57-89.
[4] Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. It is also known as the “Anti-Child Abuse Law.”
[5] Trial court records, vol. I, p. 2.
[6] Id., p. 96.
[7] Her birth certificate (Exhibit “H”) showed that she was born on December 3, 1979. Id., p. 229.
[8] Before cellular phones and text messaging came in vogue, the status symbol were pagers/beepers used for paging/beeping messages.
[9] Queensland Motel in some parts of the records.
[10] Supra note 3.
[11] Id.
[12] Supra note 2.
[13] RA 9346 (“An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty” enacted on June 24, 2006) subsequently repealed the death penalty.
[14] Supra note 2.
[15] Section 1(b), Rule 115, Rules of Court.
[16] Section 6, Rule 110, id.
[17] Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 465.
[18] Section 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
[19] Section 9, id.
[20] People v. Larin, 357 Phil. 987 (1998).
[21] U.S. v. de Dao, 2 Phil. 458 (1903).
[22] People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 (1958).
[23] People v. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252 (1952).
[24] Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, volume IV: Criminal Procedure, Rex Bookstore, 1992 edition, p. 59.
[25] People v. Resayaga, G.R. No. L-49536, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 426; Santos v. People, G.R. No. 77429, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 487.
[26] People v. Elesterio, G.R. No. 63971, 9 May 1989, 173 SCRA 243.
[27] Supra note 20.
[28] At the time of the commission of the offense, rape was still classified as a crime against chastity punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. It is now a crime against persons defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
[29] In contrast to the offense punished under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, the crime of rape has the following elements: (1) the offender is a man who had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. (People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 142899, 31 March 2004, 426 SCRA 648)
[30] People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 140278, 03 June 2004, 430 SCRA 469.
[31] Article 1327, Civil Code. A contract between a child and another person who is of legal age is voidable at the instance of the child. The rule is, however, subject to the following exceptions: (a) upon reaching the age of majority, the contract is ratified by the party who was a child when he entered into it, (b) the contract was entered into thru a guardian and approved by a CA competent jurisdiction, (c) it is a contract for necessities, such as food, but the person legally bound to give them support should pay therefor and (e) the child misrepresented his age and pretended to be of majority age and is thus in estoppel.
It should also be noted that under our present criminal laws, the age of exemption from criminal liability was raised from 9 years old to 15 years old. (RA 9344) Thus, a child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense is exempt from criminal liability. A child above 15 but below 18 years of age is presumed not to have acted with discernment and will be criminally liable only upon rebuttal of that presumption by proof that he acted with discernment. Thus, there is a presumption of lack of discernment on the part of a child (which presumption is conclusive if she is 15 years of age and below and disputable if she is over 15 but below 18 years of age).
[32] People v. Baylon, G.R. No. L-35785, 29 May 1974, 57 SCRA 114.
[33] Id.
[34] These harmful consequences include teenage pregnancy, mothering or fathering an illegitimate child and contracting sexually transmitted disease(s).
[35] The recognition that copulation is an adult activity is reflected in the way films or shows are classified as rated “R” or “R-18.” Under the Guidelines of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), a movie or show classified as “Restricted–18” (“R-18”) may be viewed only by those who are 18 years old and above. As to its sexual content, the movie may portray sexual activity. (Section 1(D), Chapter IV, 2004 Guidelines of the MTRCB) Moreover, Section 9 of PD 1986 (Creating the MTRCB) makes it unlawful for (a) any person below 18 years of age to enter, to misrepresent or make use of any false evidence about his or her age in order to gain admission into a movie house or theater showing a motion picture classified as “Restricted” or “For Adults Only” by the MTRCB and (b) for any employee of a movie house or theater to sell to, or receive from, another person known to the former to be below 18 years of age any admission ticket to the exhibition of motion pictures classified as “Restricted” or “For Adults Only.”
[36] People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, 02 February 2007.
[37] Section 13, Article II, Constitution. The Constitution also provides that the State shall defend “the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.”(Section 3, Article XV)
[38] Section 2, Article I, RA 7610.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] People v. Delantar, supra note 36.
[42] People v. Bon, G.R. No. 149199, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 506.
[43] Cadua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123123, 19 August 1999, 312 SCRA 703 citing People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994). Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
SECTION 1.
Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (emphasis supplied)
Simon ruled:
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that
‘if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.’ We hold that this quoted portion of
the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was
not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as
discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the
‘offense is punished’ under that law. (emphasis supplied)
Cadua applied this rule by analogy and extension.
[44] Article 20, Civil Code.
[45] Article 100, Revised Penal Code. It provides:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. – Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
It may be applied in this case pursuant to Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code which states that the Code shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. [See People v. Moreno, 60 Phil. 712 (1934).]
[46] Article 2202, Civil Code.
[47] This rule does not apply where, pursuant to the proviso of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, the accused is prosecuted under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and a higher civil indemnity is warranted under the circumstances.
[48] People v. Masagnay, G.R. No. 137364, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 572.
[49] Mrs.
Ma. Socorro Villafania.
[50] Article 2230, Civil Code. It provides:
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.