Republic of the
Supreme Court
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UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS |
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G.R. No. 156337 |
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BANK, |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., |
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Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO and |
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JIMMY T. GO, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The
present petition originated from a
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Makati City
Prosecutor’s Office by
Angelo Manahan and Francisco Zarate, Senior
Vice-President and First Vice-President, respectively, of herein petitioner
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) accusing respondents Alberto T. Looyuko (Looyuko) and Jimmy T. Go
(Go) of violation of Article 315 (1-b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to Section 13 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.)
No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law.
After preliminary
investigation was conducted, the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution
dated
On a motion for reconsideration
filed by UCPB, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor approved the Resolution dated
Accordingly,
an Information for Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, in relation to P.D. No. 115 was
filed against herein respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Looyuko then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) assailing the
On
WHEREFORE, the
assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby directed to move for the withdrawal
of the information for estafa against respondents
Alberto T. Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 139,
SO ORDERED.[3]
UCPB
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the DOJ Secretary
in his Resolution of
In
the meantime, the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office
filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw
Information dated
Thereafter,
UCPB filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in the CA seeking
to nullify the DOJ Secretary’s Resolutions dated
In
a Decision dated
UCPB
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution of
the CA dated
Hence,
herein petition based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS
(A) DECIDED
THE
(B) SANCTIONED
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE’S DEPARTURE FROM
THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS; AND
(C) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DOJ SECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE
DOJ SECRETARY CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
AND INSTEAD ARBITRARILY RULED BASED ON BARE ALLEGATIONS CONTRARY NOT ONLY TO
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, BUT LOOYUKO'S OWN SWORN STATEMENTS
II
THE
DOJ SECRETARY VIOLATED UCPB'S RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
III
THE DOJ SECRETARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACCEPTING AS TRUTH WHAT WERE MATTERS OF DEFENSE WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVEN AT TRIAL.[5]
Petitioner contends that the conclusions arrived at by the
DOJ Secretary in his assailed Resolutions are based on mere allegations which
were not proven by respondents. Petitioner asserts that there is no evidence to
prove that: (a) respondent Looyuko offered to return
the goods subject of the trust receipt and that petitioner refused to accept
such offer; and
(b) there is a new loan granted by petitioner which extinguished Looyuko’s obligation under the trust receipt.
Petitioner
also contends that the CA erred in simply relying on the general rule that certiorari
is not available to correct the evaluation of evidence or factual findings of
the DOJ Secretary. Petitioner argues
that an established exception to this rule is when a board, tribunal or
officer performing a judicial or
quasi-judicial function fails to consider evidence adduced by the parties; or
acts capriciously and whimsically, in total disregard of evidence material to
or decisive of the controversy. Petitioner claims that, in the present case,
the DOJ Secretary’s act of totally disregarding the facts and evidence
presented amount to grave abuse of discretion and it was an error on the part
of the CA to rule otherwise.
Petitioner
further argues that the DOJ Secretary violated its right to procedural due
process when he failed to consider the evidence presented by petitioner; that
his conclusions are not supported by any evidence but are mere allegations of
respondent Looyuko.
Petitioner
avers that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in accepting
the allegations of respondent Looyuko as truth when
they have no evidentiary basis and they are consistently denied by petitioner. Petitioner contends that the allegations of Looyuko are matters of defense which should be proven
during trial.
In
his Comment and Memorandum, respondent Looyuko’s sole
contention is that the issues raised in the present petition entail a review of
the factual findings of the DOJ and the CA, which is proscribed in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent
Go echoes the argument of his co-respondent that the re-evaluation of evidence
is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. In addition, Go asserts that the CA did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner, because the
latter seeks the re-examination of the evidence presented by the opposing
parties; whereas the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the
review of DOJ Secretary’s evaluation of the evidence and his factual findings
thereon.
Go
also contends that the determination of probable cause is an executive function
and it is the policy of the Court to refrain from interfering in the conduct of
preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ ample latitude of discretion in
the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
At the
outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review before this Court.[6] However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits
of exceptions, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s
inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation
of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation
of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of
the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of
evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[7] This Court finds that the present case falls
under the third and sixth exceptions for reasons discussed hereunder.
The
pivotal question to be resolved in the present petition is whether or not the
CA erred in concluding that the DOJ Secretary did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing his Resolutions of
In its Petition for Certiorari filed with
the CA, herein petitioner’s main contention is that there is no evidence
to prove the conclusions reached by the DOJ Secretary. The CA dismissed the petition and ruled as
follows:
The subject
resolutions of public respondent [DOJ Secretary] embody his own findings in the
exercise of his official functions on whether or not there was sufficient
evidence adduced to warrant the filing of criminal charges against private
respondents.
His finding that
private respondents are not criminally liable involves his assessment and
evaluation of both parties' evidence and his interpretation and application of
the law to what he deems to be facts in the process of determining probable
cause for the criminal prosecution of persons.
The present petition cannot thus prosper for the extraordinary remedy of a special civil action for certiorari is available only and restrictively in those truly exceptional cases wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. For the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and does not include correction of the evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon (Flores v. National Labor Relations Commission, 253 SCRA 494 [1996] or of erroneous conclusions of law or fact (Tensorex Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 471 [1999]) which is what petitioner attempts to do in the petition at bench.[8]
It is
true that the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a correction of public respondent’s evaluation
of the evidence and factual findings thereon.[9]
However,
it is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order to resolve allegations
of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.[10]
In
Filadams Pharma,
Inc. v. CA,[11] one of the
issues resolved by this Court was whether or not the DOJ committed grave abuse
of discretion in affirming the dismissal of therein petitioner's
complaint-affidavit. In
resolving said issue, the Court proceeded to determine factual and evidentiary
matters in order to ascertain whether there was probable cause warranting the
filing of information for estafa against the private
respondent therein. In the same
manner, in NBI-Microsoft Corporation v. Hwang,[12] this Court,
in resolving whether the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
finding probable cause to charge therein respondents with copyright
infringement and unfair competition, proceeded to determine the sufficiency of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause against said respondents.
In
reviewing the findings of the DOJ in preliminary investigations, the settled
rule is that the determination of probable cause for the filing of an
Information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains at
the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary
of Justice.[13] For this
reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from
interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ
ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders.[14] Consistent
with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and
conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave
abuse of discretion.[15]
In other words, judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation.[16] Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch; it may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.[17]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[18] The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[19]
Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.[20] It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of facts.[21]
In the present case, this Court finds it necessary to
examine the reasons of the DOJ Secretary in directing the City Prosecutor of Makati to move for the withdrawal of the information for estafa against herein respondents before the RTC of Makati City because such examination is determinative of
whether or not the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion.
The
findings and conclusion of the DOJ Secretary, as embodied in his
x x x x
UCPB is a
corporation engaged in the business of banking. Through its senior vice
president Angelo V. Manahan, it alleges that respondent Looyuko
represented himself as the sole proprietor or owner of Noah's Ark Sugar
Refinery (Noah) engaged in the business of sugar milling. Noah is part of the
Noah's Group of Companies (Noah's Group) also owned by respondent Looyuko. Respondent Go is Noah's general manager.
On P50 million with a
corresponding obligation to reimburse UCPB whatever amount it may pay under the
credit/trust receipt line. The trust receipt has a term of sixty (60) days. The agreement further provided that all obligations of Noah's Group
shall be performed or paid to UCPB at its head office when due in accordance
with the terms of the notes or instruments applicable to the availment, without need of demand.
In a letter
agreement dated P175.0 million for the purpose of
financing the purchase of raw sugar. On
Respondents
failed to pay their indebtedness on the due date. They also failed to deliver
on the due date the proceeds of the sale of the goods either in their original
or manufactured form, or to return the goods in their original or manufactured
state. Demands were made on respondents but to date, respondents have not paid
the amount advanced on the letter of credit or delivered the sales of the goods
in original or manufactured form, or to return the goods in whatever form, to
the damage and prejudice of UCPB.
x x x x
In the case at bar, we are convinced that respondents did not commit the offense charged. While it is true that respondent Looyuko executed a trust receipt, the mere execution thereof does not make him liable. It sufficiently appears on record that respondent Looyuko has offered to return the goods that were the subject of the trust but his offer was not accepted by complainant UCPB which instead gave him a loan secured by a real estate mortgage. The proceeds of this loan were applied to discharge respondent Looyuko's obligation under the trust receipt. Such being the case, it can not be said that respondent Looyuko converted or misappropriated the subject goods or the proceeds of the sale thereof to the damage and prejudice of complainant UCPB. Without such conversion or misappropriation, there can be no consequent damage or prejudice to complainant UCPB. Without such conversion or misappropriation, there can be no consequent damage or prejudice to complainant UCPB. This being the case, a criminal complaint for estafa against respondents must necessarily fail.[22]
The Court agrees with petitioner that the DOJ
Secretary failed to cite any evidence to support his conclusions: (1) that
respondent Looyuko offered to return the goods that
were the subject of the trust but his offer was not accepted by UCPB; (2)
instead, UCPB gave Looyuko a loan secured by a real
estate mortgage; and (3) the proceeds of the loan were applied to
discharge Looyuko’s obligation under the trust
receipt. After a
careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds no evidence that
would prove the above-mentioned conclusions of the DOJ Secretary.
Respondents,
themselves, while insisting that the DOJ Secretary did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions of
On the
other hand, petitioner was able to present documentary evidence to prove the
allegations in its complaint, such as the Credit Agreement entered into with respondent Go for an
Omnibus Line of P175,000,000.00,[23] the Surety
Agreement executed by respondents,[24] and the Trust
Receipt dated
Respondents
are being charged with estafa as defined under
Article 315 (1-b) of the RPC,
in relation to Section 13 of P.D. No.
115.
Section 13 of P.D. No. 115 provides:
Sec. 13. Penalty clause. - The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three Hundred and Fifteen, Paragraph One (b) of Act Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense.
Jurisprudence
provides that the Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the entrustee fails to: (1) turn over the proceeds of the sale
of the goods, or (2) return the goods covered by the trust receipts if the
goods are not sold.[26] The mere failure to account or return gives
rise to the crime which is malum prohibitum.[27] There
is no requirement to prove intent to defraud.[28]
On the other hand, the elements of estafa under Article 315 (1-b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and, (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[29] Moreover, it is a settled rule that failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[30]
On the
basis of the above-quoted findings of the DOJ Secretary, coupled with the
documented allegations of petitioner in its complaint-affidavit, as well as the
failure of respondents to substantiate their defenses, it appears that there
exists a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315 (1-b), in relation to Section 13 of P.D.
No. 115, has been
committed; and that the
respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Hence, the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse
of discretion in directing the withdrawal of the information for estafa filed against them.
A
preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and its function is merely
to determine the existence of probable cause.[31] Probable
cause has been defined as “the existence of such fact and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecution, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.”[32]
The term does not mean actual and positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty.[33] It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief.[34] Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require
an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.[35] It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.[36] Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[37]
The Court
notes that the parties, in their respective pleadings filed before this Court,
are ventilating the merits of their respective causes and defenses.
This is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of their evidence.[38] The presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.[39] In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s
defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence,
are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation
level.[40] As earlier stated, this Court's task in the
present petition is only to determine if the CA erred in concluding that the
Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing his
assailed resolutions. Having
resolved this issue, the Court finds no cogent reason to discuss the other
matters raised in the present petition.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 15, 2002 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of Justice, and its Resolution dated November 29, 2002, denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated August 29, 2000, directing the
City Prosecutor of Makati to move for the withdrawal
of the information for estafa against respondents,
and his November 9, 2000 Resolution, denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion; and the Resolution of the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office dated April 10, 2000,
finding probable cause against herein respondents, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño; rollo, pp. 55-60.
[2] Penned by Justice Sergio L. Pestaño and concurred in by Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Eliezer R. delos
[3] Rollo, p. 166.
[4] Petitioner avers that as of the
filing of the instant petition, the Ex-Parte
Motion to Withdraw Information
remains unresolved, as the RTC of Makati City, Branch
58, per its Order of
[5] Rollo, p. 27.
[6] Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 63, 69.
[7] Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile, G.R. No. 154087,
[8] CA rollo, p. 261.
[9] Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, 438 Phil. 408, 413 (2002).
[10] Balba
v. Peak Development, Inc., G.R. No. 148288,
[11] G.R. No. 132422,
[12] G.R. No. 147043,
[13] First Women’s Credit Corporation
v. Perez, G.R. No. 169026,
[14]
[15]
[16] Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tonda, 392 Phil. 797, 814 (2000).
[17]
[18] Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing
Corporation, G.R. No. 152228,
[19]
[20] Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, 445 Phil. 154, 175 (2003).
[21]
[22] Rollo, p. 163-166.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Ong v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 691, 704 (2003).
[27]
[28]
[29] Libuit v. People of the
[30] Lee v.
People of the
[31] Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, 344 Phil. 323, 330 (1997).
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Andres v.
Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869,
[39]
[40]