Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
ALICIA
F. RICAFORTE, G.R.
NO. 154438
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and
REYES,
JJ.
LEON
L. JURADO, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 5, 2007
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[1] dated
On
P431,555.00 each, which were
both issued by petitioner and when presented for payment were dishonored.
In
her Counter-Affidavit,
petitioner denied the accusation. She alleged that Aguilar who had lost
her Metrobank checkbook borrowed her checks to pay
off Aguilar’s obligations with Leon Jurado
(respondent); that she willingly lent her checks to Aguilar on condition
that these checks will be replaced with Aguilar’s own checks once her new checkbook is issued to her by Metrobank; that Aguilar then used petitioner’s checks to pay her rice procurement
with respondent; that in accordance with the arrangement, Aguilar issued two
replacement checks in favor of respondent in the amount of P431,555.00 each; that when Aguilar issued the
replacement checks, petitioner demanded from respondent the return of her
checks but respondent refused, thus she was constrained to request her bank to
issue an order of stop payment. Aguilar executed an Affidavit corroborating petitioner’s defense.
Respondent
filed his Reply denying that petitioner’s
checks were merely accommodation checks. Petitioner filed her rejoinder as well as
supplement to rejoinder.
In
a Resolution[4] dated
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[6] dated
Respondent appealed the dismissal of his complaint to the Department of
Justice. The Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution[7] dated
The
Justice Secretary found that while the dismissal of estafa
is correct, petitioner should be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. In so ruling, the Secretary
found that while petitioner has no business transactions with respondent and
merely issued the checks as a guarantee for
Aguilar’s obligation to respondent, the fact
remains that petitioner issued the subject checks and failed to pay respondent
the amount due thereon or make arrangements for their full payment within five banking days
after receiving a notice of dishonor; that the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing
worthless checks or those dishonored upon their presentment for payment; that the thrust of the law
is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation;
that to require the arrangement surrounding the issuance of the checks be first
looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provisions of
B.P. Blg. 22 on the basis of that arrangement would frustrate the very purpose for
which the law was enacted, i.e. to stop the proliferation of
unfunded checks; that B.P. Blg. 22 applies even when dishonored
checks were issued merely in the form of deposit or guarantee.
The Justice Secretary denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution[8] dated
Petitioner
filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
On
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
Hence, herein
petition on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS MODIFIED
RESOLUTION FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONER FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG.
22, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE HONORABLE SECRETARY HAS AGREED
WITH THE FINDING OF THE
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
PETITIONER’S CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE NOT ISSUED TO ACCOUNT OR FOR
VALUE BUT SOLELY TO GUARANTEE RUBY AGUILAR’S CHECKS, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING
THAT IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT PETITIONER HAD NO BUSINESS DEALINGS WHATSOEVER WITH
THE RESPONDENT REGARDING RICE PROCUREMENTS.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO GO
TO TRIAL IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE EVEN DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED BY THE QUEZON CITY PROSECUTION OFFICE, THE SAID PROSECUTION OFFICE
HAD FOUND THAT NO PRIMA FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO WARRANT THE FILING OF
THE COMPLAINTS OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
IV
THE AFFIRMANCE BY
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE MODIFIED RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DIRECTING THE FILING OFAN INFORMATION AGAINST PETITIONER
FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT WOULD
BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AT THE EXPENSE OF PETITIONER AND THE DEBTOR, MS RUBY
AGUILAR, IN THE FORM OF IMPOSITION OF A FINE WHICH IS DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF THE
BOUNCED CHECKS.[9]
The main issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in ruling that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
finding that there is probable cause for the filing of information against
petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner
alleges that the CA should not have sustained the modified resolution of the
Secretary of Justice because the Secretary misappreciated
her defense, i.e., that Aguilar lost her Metrobank checkbook and borrowed her check and that she
issued the subject checks on the condition that the same will be replaced when
Aguilar’s new checkbook is issued, thus the
subject checks are merely accommodation or guarantee checks; that it was
Aguilar who tendered them
to respondent in payment
of her rice procurements from him; that the subject checks were not
intended for encashment; that Aguilar subsequently issued her
own checks dated July 20, 1996 and August 20, 1996, for P431,555.00 each as
replacement for the subject checks; that such
substitution was with respondent’s
knowledge, since the arrangement was brought to his attention through a letter dated July 19,
1996.
Petitioner
insists that none of the elements of the
offense of B.P. Blg. 22 were present; the first element
is absent, since the subject checks were not
intended to apply on account or for value in favor of respondent, as petitioner had no business transaction on rice
procurements with respondent; the second element is also absent because it is
undisputed that at the time petitioner issued the checks, she had substantial deposits with FEBTC which can readily fund her
checks upon presentment or maturity; that the reason for the dishonor was “stop payment,” because she
requested the bank to do so due to a valid reason, i.e., her checks were already replaced by Aguilar’s checks dated July 20, 1996
and August 20, 1996. Petitioner cites Tan v. People,[10] in which the petitioner was acquitted of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because
in ordering the stop payment of her check, there were sufficient funds in her
account.
Petitioner
claims that the CA overlooked the fact that the Secretary of Justice absolved
her of estafa; thus, she should also be absolved of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, since both offenses arose from the same subject checks.
Petitioner
contends that the CA misappreciated the importance of
a preliminary investigation when it ruled that the trial on the merits must
ensue, and it is on said occasion when petitioner is granted the opportunity for a full and
exhaustive display of her evidence; that it erred in ruling that it is only
during trial that the presence or absence of the first element of B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., whether the subject checks were issued to apply to
account or for value, can be determined; that preliminary
investigation should be given due importance and the determination of whether
the first element of B.P. Blg. 22 is present should not be shifted to the trial
court; that contrary to
the CA’s finding, Sales is applicable, a case in which it was ruled that at the preliminary
investigation proper,
the question whether or
not an accused can be bound over for trial can already be determined; if it was determined at the preliminary investigation that
an accused had not committed the crime charged, then it is useless to still hold a trial to determine the guilt of the
accused, since it can already be determined
at the preliminary
investigation.
We are not
persuaded.
In
a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[11]
Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare
suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.[12] A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspect.[13] It does not call for the application
of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after
trial on the merits.[14] The complainant need
not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence.[15]
It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, credence is given to the finding and determination of
probable cause by the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation.[16]
Contrary
to petitioner’s claim, respondent sufficiently
established the existence of probable cause for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient
funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double
the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed
upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the
date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where
the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under
this Act.
To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the
following elements must be present:
1) The accused makes,
draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or it
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment.[17] In Lozano v. Martinez,[18] we have
declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of
worthless checks. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.[19] In People v. Nitafan,[20] we said
that a check issued as an evidence of debt — though not intended to be
presented for payment — has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall
within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
In
this case, petitioner issued the two subject checks in favor of respondent, and when respondent presented them for payment, they were
dishonored for reason of the
stop payment order
issued by petitioner. Notably, a certification[21] from the bank showed that they
returned the checks for that
reason.
In addition, contrary to the claim of petitioner, at the time the said checks were
presented for deposit/payment, there were no sufficient funds to cover the
same. The mere act of issuing a worthless check -- whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as
evidence of pre-existing debt -- is malum prohibitum.[22]
Petitioner
claims that the subject checks were merely accommodation checks in favor of
Aguilar, as they were not issued to account
or for value, since she had no business transactions with respondent-payee. However, petitioner admitted that she issued
the checks for the rice procurement of Aguilar from respondent which was a valuable consideration. Notably, in respondent’s
complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the subject checks were given to him by
Aguilar in payment of the latter’s rice procurements, with
the representation that the subject checks were her collection checks and
assuring respondent that they would be good upon
presentment.
On record is a letter[23] dated July 31, 1996 of respondent’s counsel to petitioner on the matter of petitioner’s subject FEBTC Check No. 08A096028P dated July 25, 1996, a letter in which the counsel wrote that the check
which was in partial payment of the obligation due from Aguilar, and that in return for petitioner’s issuance and delivery of the said check, Aguilar acquired a
temporary reprieve on her obligation.
The
validity and merits of a party’s defense and
accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.[24]
A finding of probable cause does not ensure a conviction or a conclusive
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The allegations adduced by the prosecution
will be put to test in a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence
or disproved.[25]
In
fact, petitioner’s argument that respondent was aware
of the fact that the subject checks were only accommodation checks in favor of
Aguilar is not a defense against
a charge for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. In Ruiz v. People of the Philippines,[26] where the accused interposed the defense
of accommodation party, we held:
It bears stressing that, whether a
person is an accommodation party is a question of intent. When the intent of the parties does not appear
on the face of the check, it must be ascertained in the light of the surrounding
facts and circumstances. Invariably, the
tests applied are the purpose test and the proceeds test. x x x. And even assuming she was such party, this
circumstance is not a defense to a charge for violation of B.P. 22. What the law punishes is the issuance itself
of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or of the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check, whether merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the
agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution
and conviction of the petitioner.[27]
In Meriz v. People of the
Philippines,[28] we held:
The Court has consistently declared that the cause or
reason for the issuance of the check is inconsequential in determining criminal
culpability under BP 22. The Court has
since said that a "check issued as an evidence of debt, although not
intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check" and
must thus be held to be "within the contemplation of BP 22." Once a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank gives it the usual course whether issued in
payment of an obligation or just as a guaranty of an obligation. BP 22 does not
appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties,
its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial
value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that
can easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks
are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an
appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made. The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for
payment. The act effectively declares
the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query then is whether the
law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check,
without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.[29]
Also, in Cruz v. Court
of Appeals,[30] we held:
It
is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are
issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any
distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in
payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In
accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the
law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be
made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of
subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition
all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor
of a guarantee. This intent may be
gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9)
which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill
was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent
checks, from becoming ‘useless scraps of paper’ and to restore respectability
to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the
checks. The legislative intent as above
said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original
text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the
coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of
the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in
the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying
proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more
effective (Batasan Record, First Regular Session,
December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).
Consequently, what are important are
the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to
cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless
of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee.[31]
Petitioner
invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[32] where the accused therein was
acquitted of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing checks to
collateralize an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of actual account
or for value. In Magno, the accused, who was in the
process of putting up a car repair shop, was provided with credit facilities by
LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance) to enable him to lease from
MANCOR the needed equipments. As part of their arrangement, LS Finance
required a 30% warranty deposit of the "purchase/lease" value of the
equipments to be transacted upon. Accused then asked the LS Finance
Vice President Joey Gomez to look for a third party who could lend him the
equivalent amount of the warranty deposit as he did not have such amount,
however, unknown to the accused, it was Corazon Teng
(Vice President of MANCOR) who advanced the deposit in question on condition
that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest. The accused
subsequently issued checks to collateralize an accommodation made by Teng amounting to Twenty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P29,700.00) as warranty deposit. Subsequently, the said checks bounced; thus the accused was prosecuted and the lower courts convicted him of B.P. Blg. 22. On a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we
however acquitted the accused and held that the "cash out" made by Teng was not used by the accused who was just paying rental
on the equipments. To charge him for the refund of a
"warranty deposit" he did not withdraw, because it was not his own account and it remained with LS Finance,
would be to make him pay an unjust "debt," to say the least, since he did not actually receive the amount
involved. We also held that this is a scheme whereby Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of Mancor, would be able to sell or lease its goods as in this
case, and at the same time privately finance
those who desperately needed petty
accommodations as obtaining
in said case; that this modus operandi,
in so many instances, victimized unsuspecting businessmen
who likewise needed protection from the law by availing themselves of the deceptively called “warranty
deposit,” not realizing that they would fall prey to a
leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement, when it was a scheme
designed to skim off a business client.
It bears stressing that Magno was decided after a full-blown trial, and the proof
needed to convict the accused was proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which was not established in that
case.
On the other hand, herein case is still in the preliminary investigation stage
which is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information.[33] It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty.[34]
It is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.[35] We are in accord with the Justice Secretary’s finding that there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by petitioner, thus, we refrain from prejudging the applicablity or inapplicability of Magno in this case.
Petitioner
alleges that at the time she issued the subject checks, she has substantial
funds in the bank to cover the value thereof. This is evidentiary in nature
which must be presented during trial more so in
the light of the bank certification that there were no sufficient funds to
cover the checks when presented for deposit/payment.
The
law itself creates a prima
facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of
insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee bank
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee.
Such
knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency
of funds.[36] If not rebutted, it suffices to
sustain a conviction.[37]
We
also find no merit in petitioner’s
claim that since the Secretary of Justice absolved her of estafa,
she should also be absolved of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, since both offenses arose from the
same subject checks. While deceit and damage are essential elements
in estafa, they are not required in B.P. Blg. 22. As already aforestated,
under B.P. Blg. 22, mere issuance of a check that
is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the
drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and is hence punishable.
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s argument that for Aguilar’s rice procurements from respondent, Aguilar had made substantial payments to
respondent through cashier’s checks totalling P313,255.00; that despite these substantial payments, respondent
still wanted to collect from petitioner’s
subject checks the total amount of P863,110.00;
that respondent wanted to collect from both petitioner and Aguilar for the
latter’s rice procurement. It is during the trial of this case that evidence may be
introduced to prove petitioner’s contentions. As of now, it has been
established that when the subject checks were deposited, they were all
dishonored.
Furthermore, the allegation of petitioner that if the information for B.P. Blg. 22 would be filed and in the remote
event that petitioner would be found guilty thereof, then the trial court may
impose a fine double the amount of the checks, which fine may amount to millions of pesos; and that this is unjust
enrichment on respondent’s part at the expense of petitioner
and Aguilar deserves scant consideration. Suffice it
to state that the fine that may be imposed by the court is not awarded to the
private complainant. Fine is imposed as a penalty and not as payment for a specific loss or injury.[38]
In fine, the CA did not commit any
error in upholding the findings of the Secretary of Justice that probable cause
exists that the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Eliezer R. delos
[2]
[3] Docketed as I.S. No. 97-3205.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 81-82.
[5] G.R. No. 96132,
[6] CA rollo, pp. 93-94; per Rosalina R. Datiles, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor,
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[10] 402 Phil. 833 (2001).
[11] Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No. 143169, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 157, 168, citing People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 401, 413 (1999).
[12] Ching
v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317,
[13]
[14] Ang v. Lucero, supra note 11, citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 224, 236.
[15] People of the
[16] Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 916, 927 (1996).
[17] Ngo v.
People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 155815,
[18]
[19]
[20] G.R. No. 75954,
[21] CA rollo, p. 24.
[22] People of the
[23] CA rollo, p. 25.
[24] Drilon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16, at 923.
[25]
[26] G.R. No. 160893,
[27]
[28] 420 Phil. 608 (2001).
[29]
[30] G.R. No. 108738,
[31]
[32] Supra note 5.
[33] Tandoc v. Resultas, G.R. Nos. 59241-44, July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 37, 43, citing People of the Philippines v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718, 731 (1926).
[34]
[35] Drilon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16, at 923.
[36] Ty v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 149275,
[37]
[38] People of the