FIRST DIVISION
BMG RECORDS (PHILS.), G.R. No. 153290
INC. and JOSE
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
-
versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
AIDA C. APARECIO and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September
5, 2007
X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the November 20, 2001 Decision[1]
and April 26, 2002 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No. 65403 affirming the August 23,
2000 Decision[3] of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed and set aside the
October 27, 1998 Decision[4] of
the Labor Arbiter finding that private respondent voluntarily resigned and was
not illegally dismissed.
Petitioner BMG Records (Phils.), Inc.
(BMG) is engaged in the business of selling various audio records nationwide.
On P181.00 per day.
On
x x
x
b.
That she was illegally dismissed
or terminated [from] employment on April 30, 1998; that before said date[,]
however, she was asked by respondent to resign and will be paid (sic) all
her benefits due – like a one-month pay for every year of service, payment of
services rendered, overtime and holiday pay, rest day, 13th month,
service incentive leave and separation pay – and to [execute] a letter of
resignation;
c.
That in view of respondent’s
insistence to prepare and [execute] a letter-resignation[,] even without proper
accounting of any accountability, the complainant was lured, induced and
compelled to submit a letter of resignation believing on respondent’s promise
and assurance to pay all the benefits due her as aforesaid;
d.
That after executing said
resignation letter, the respondent did not make good its promise and [instead]
did an accounting by themselves in the absence of herein complainant and
arrived on a computation that complainant’s liability per their accounting
reached to the staggering amount of P8,000.00; that since they offered
to pay a separation pay of only P12,000.00, minus complainant’s alleged
accountability of P8,000.00, they are ready to pay the balance thereof
any time;
e. That herein complainant was under respondent’s employ for seven (7) years, seven (7) months and twenty-eight (28) days when illegally terminated [from] her employment xxx. [6]
Petitioners, however, proffer a different
version of the facts. They narrate that Aparecio was initially performing well
as an employee but as years passed by she seemed to be complacent in the
performance of her job and had been comparing the salaries of promo girls in other
companies. It appeared that she was no longer interested in her job. In April
1998, Aparecio and two other promo girls, Jovelina V. Soco and Veronica P.
Mutya, intimated to their supervisor that they were intending to resign and
were requesting for some financial assistance. BMG made it clear that, as a
company policy, an employee who resigns from service is not entitled to financial
assistance, but considering the length of their service and due to humanitarian
consideration it would accede to the request after they secure their respective
clearances. Forthwith, the three employees tendered their resignations, which
were accepted. When they processed the required individual clearance, it was
found out that they had incurred some shortages after inventory. Per agreement,
said shortages were deducted from the amounts due them. Thus, Soco and Mutya
received their last salary, a proportion of the 13th month pay, tax
refund and financial assistance less the deductions, and they executed their
releases and quitclaims. Except for the financial assistance, Aparecio also
obtained the same yet refused to sign the release and quitclaim, protesting the
amount of P9,170.12 deducted from the financial assistance. She was
adamant but BMG stood by the previous agreement.
Attached to petitioners’ Position
Paper[7]
were the sworn statements of Jose Yap, Jr. and Evangeline A. Magno, supervisor
of BMG.
On P18,824.00 (fixed
at half month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six
[6] months being considered as one year) instead of P9,170.12 which was
not amply substantiated.[8]
Upon appeal, however, the NLRC found
that Aparecio was illegally dismissed from service, disposing in its
WHEREFORE,
prescinding from the foregoing consideration, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one ENTERED finding the dismissal of
complainant illegal thus ordering the respondent to pay her backwages from
April 30, 1998 up to date hereof and in lieu of reinstatement, the respondent
is further ordered to pay complainant separation pay computes at the rate of
one (1) month pay for every year of service from date of hiring on September 2,
1990 up to the finality of this decision.
All
other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[10]
The NLRC admitted its dilemma in
determining whether Aparecio offered to resign on the condition that she would
be paid with termination benefits or whether the resignation was triggered by
BMG which offered the monetary consideration. While saying that Aparecio
“offered no other evidence except her bare allegations,” it was held that the
sworn statement of Magno was not sufficient to establish the position of
petitioners. For the NLRC, the testimonies of Soco and Mutya would have been
helpful had these been presented by either side. Notwithstanding the “scanty
data” available, it concluded:
x x x We find that the elements of a valid
resignation are not obtaining in this case. It must be stressed that
resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the complaint. Moreover, even in
the absence of physical force, duress or compulsion applied upon complainant
when she executed the alleged resignation letter, factual circumstances tend to
show the strong and irresistible economic pressure originating from respondent
if only to push the complainant into accepting the offer. For, as ever, “[i]n
the matter of employment bargaining, there is no doubt that the employer stands
on higher footing than the employee. First of all, there is greater supply than
demand for labor. Secondly, the need for employment by labor comes from vital,
and even desperate, necessity. Consequently, the law must protect labor, at
least, to the extent of raising him to equal footing in bargaining relations
with capital and to shield him from abuses brought about by the necessity of
survival. It is safe therefore to presume that an employee or laborer who
waives in advance any benefit granted him by law does so, certainly not in his
interest or through generosity, but under the forceful intimidation or urgent
need, and hence, he could not have done so acted freely and voluntarily.” xxx
(citations omitted)[11]
A motion for reconsideration of the
Decision was filed by petitioners. Attached therein were the sworn statements
of Soco and another promo girl, Marietta Cinco, both dated
On
appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the NLRC. In its
x x
x
Based
on the evidence submitted, the [petitioners] failed to support [their] claim
that [Aparecio’s] resignation was made out of her own volition. Granting arguendo
that [Aparecio] executed a resignation letter, it appears that she did it in
consideration of the separation pay and other benefits promised by the
petitioner.
Resignation,
moreover, is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.
It would have been illogical for the employee to resign and then file a
complaint for illegal dismissal x x x Thus, had the private respondent been
determined to resign and relinquish her position in the petitioner company, she
would not have commenced an action for illegal dismissal.
It must be remembered that the petitioner is in a more advantageous position than [Aparecio] considering the ratio of the demand for workers and the number of unemployed persons, so much so that the employee is vulnerable to submit to whatever offer the employer may give. Most often than not, employees are placed in a position where there is only one choice which is to accede to the employer’s proposal.[14]
x x
x
Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied on
In a Resolution dated
(a.)
failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that
the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decision
and resolution as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case; and
(b.)
failure of the petition to show extraordinary
circumstance justifying a departure from the established doctrine that findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are well-nigh conclusive on this Court and
will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal.[16]
Considering, however, the Motion for
Reconsideration[17] filed and
the Comment[18] as well
as the Reply[19] thereon,
this Court resolved[20] on
The petition is meritorious.
As a rule, only questions of law may
be raised in and resolved by this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts; it
is not duty-bound to re-examine and calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover,
findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA,
are generally conclusive on this Court.[21] In
exceptional cases, however, we may be constrained to delve into and resolve
factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support
the findings of the tribunal or court below, or when too much is concluded,
inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties.[22] The
present case is an exception to the rule. Hence, this Court finds the need to
review the records to determine the facts with certainty not only because the
NLRC and the labor arbiter have come up with conflicting positions but also
because the findings of the NLRC, as supported by the CA on substantial matters,
appear to be contrary to the evidence at hand.
In her memorandum of appeal before
the NLRC, Aparecio asserted in main:
xxx
The arbiter should have seriously considered the temper of the time in relation
to our deteriorating economy on the issue [of] whether or not the resignation
letter was voluntary. But he did not. To the arbiter[,] resignation letter can
only be set aside if it is shown that it was made through duress or compulsion.
What about FRAUD? The complainant did not offer to resign. She was offered by
respondents that all labor standard benefits including but not limited to
payment of overtime, salary differentials and separation pay should be given if
she [would] resign. This she was made to believe by the respondents. And
complainant really believed them. Unfortunately, however, complainant found
herself jobless and penniless. Her resignation was obtained through fraud xxx
It is clear that complainant submitted her resignation letter not because she
has some accountabilities but because of respondents’ offer which was hard to
resist xxx[23]
On the other hand, her Comment before
the CA stated further:
x x x
At
any rate, respondents wish to point out that the finding of the NLRC that
private respondent (employee) did not voluntarily resign but was illegally
dismissed is well-supported by evidence. The following considerations clearly
show this, to wit:
One.
It is admitted by both petitioners and the respondents that the supposed
resignation of private respondent was conditional in nature. It
was premised on petitioners’ (employers) performance of certain prestations or
petitioners’ compliance with certain conditions.
Two.
The supposed decision of private respondent to tender a resignation is vitiated
by vices of consent. The resignation letter was wrongfully obtained
from private respondent on petitioners’ inducement and promise to pay
employment benefits and financial assistance without any deductions. However,
it is now very clear that right from the start, petitioners did not intend to
comply with their promise. After private respondent handed in a resignation
letter, petitioners raised all obstacles to prevent private respondent from
actually receiving the promised employment benefits and financial assistance.
Accordingly, it can be easily said that fraud vitiated private respondent’s
consent.
Three.
The resignation letter was also obtained from private respondent through undue
pressure and influence which again vitiates the same. The respondent NLRC made
this finding:
“Moreover,
even in the absence of physical force, duress or compulsion applied upon
complainant when she executed the alleged resignation letter, factual
circumstances tend to show the strong and irresistible economic pressure
originating from respondent if only to push the complainant into accepting the
offer.” (NLRC Decision, 23 August 2000, p. 5; underscoring ours)
Four.
At the very least, it could be easily said that the decision to resign is
vitiated by mistake. It is unrebutted that private respondent handed in a
resignation letter on the firm belief that petitioners would pay her the
promised employment benefits and financial assistance without deductions.
Resignation is also a form of contract. Like any other contracts, it can be
vitiated by mistake and other vices of consent x x x
Five.
Finally, it could also be said that the resignation letter was ineffective
because there was no meeting of the minds on the matter of
resignation. As pointed out earlier, it is an admitted fact that the supposed
resignation was conditional in character in the sense that it was
premised on certain conditions. Accordingly, the resignation letter could only
be considered as a mere offer. Since the petitioners obviously did not accept
the conditions attendant to the offer to resign, there is no resignation to
speak of. (emphasis supplied) [24]
x x
x
In a nutshell, Aparecio submits that
fraud, undue influence, intimidation, and/or mistake were attendant upon her
resignation from BMG. As her consent was allegedly vitiated, the act of
resigning became involuntary; hence, petitioners are guilty of illegal
dismissal.
The argument is not tenable.
Based on the pleadings, this Court
finds nothing to support Aparecio’s allegation that fraud was employed on her to
resign. Fraud exists only when, through insidious words or machinations, the
other party is induced to act and without which, the latter would not have
agreed to.[25] This
Court has held that the circumstances evidencing fraud and misrepresentation
are as varied as the people who perpetrate it, each assuming different shapes
and forms and may be committed in as many different ways. Fraud and
misrepresentation are, therefore, never presumed; it must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence and not mere preponderance of evidence.[26]
Hence, this Court does not sustain findings of fraud upon circumstances which,
at most, create only suspicion; otherwise, it would be indulging in
speculations and surmises.[27]
In this case, Aparecio alleged that
her resignation was wrongfully obtained when petitioners did not keep the promise
of giving her employment benefits and financial assistance without any
deductions. Without a showing of the nature and extent of such “inducement,”
however, such submission fails to establish that there was in fact a deception
on the part of petitioners. Even if it is considered that there was an
assurance given by petitioners and that they later reneged on their promise,
this Court still finds no injustice made since Aparecio, who only questioned
the manner by which the inventory was conducted – that it was held without her
presence – but did not categorically deny her accountabilities with BMG, would
unjustly be enriched without the deduction.
Likewise, Aparecio did not adduce any
competent evidence to prove that force or threat was applied by petitioners.
For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be present:
(1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the
threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious,
there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all
men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the
person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear
from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or
ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property. In the
instant case, not one of these essential elements was amply proven by Aparecio.
Bare allegations of threat or force do not constitute substantial evidence to
support a finding of forced resignation.[28]
On the contrary, petitioners
correctly point out that the NLRC finding, which the CA erroneously affirmed,
of a “strong and irresistible economic pressure originating from [petitioners]
if only to push [Aparecio] into accepting the offer” is not supported by any
evidence in the records but is merely based on conjectures and guesswork.
Truly, the factual circumstances upon which the legal conclusion was based were
lacking as no less than the NLRC itself admitted the absence of proof of any
kind of pressure, economic or otherwise, that petitioners applied to force
Aparecio’s resignation. What is clear is that there is no concrete evidence,
direct or circumstantial, showing that undue influence was used by petitioners
in such a way that it took improper advantage of its power over the will of
Aparecio and deprived the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.[29] Granting
for the sake of argument that BMG was in a “more advantageous position,” as the
CA had opined, it would nonetheless be unfair to presume that it utilized the
same against Aparecio. Indeed, the allegation of exploitation is a very serious
matter and should not be taken lightly. Proof is absolutely essential.
Resignation is the voluntary act of
an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no
other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the
intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts
of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in
determining whether in fact, he or she intended to sever from his or her
employment.[30]
Thus, this Court agrees with
petitioners’ contention that the circumstances surrounding Aparecio’s
resignation should be given due weight in determining whether she had intended
to resign. In this case, such intent is very evident:
First, Aparecio already communicated to
other people that she was about to resign to look for a better paying job since
she had been complaining that employees like her in other companies were
earning much more;
Second, prior to the submission of her
resignation letter, Aparecio and two other promo girls, Soco and Mutya,
approached their supervisor, intimated their desire to resign, and requested
that they be given financial assistance, which petitioners granted on the
condition that deductions would be made in case of shortage after
inventory;
Third, Aparecio, Soco, and Mutya submitted
their duly signed resignation letters, which were accepted by petitioners; and
Fourth, Aparecio already initiated the
processing of her clearance; thus, she was able to receive her last salary, 13th
month pay, and tax refund but refused to receive the financial assistance less
the deductions made.
The foregoing facts were affirmatively
narrated and attested to in the notarized affidavit of Soco and Cinco and have remained
incontrovertible as they were never denied by Aparecio. The NLRC, thus, erred
when it did not give probative weight to their testimonies even if belatedly
presented in petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Now, the acceptance by petitioners of
Aparecio’s resignation rendered the same effective.[31]
Upon such acceptance, it may not be unilaterally withdrawn without the consent
of petitioners.[32] When
the employee later signified the intention of continuing his or her work, it
was already up to the employer to accept the withdrawal of his or her resignation.
The mere fact that the withdrawal was not accepted does not constitute illegal
dismissal, the acceptance of the withdrawal of the resignation being the
employer’s sole prerogative. As held in Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v. NLRC:[33]
Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine whether or not his service would be continued. If the employer accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not x x x the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal for the employer has the right to determine who his employees will be. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them.[34]
Subsequently, in Philippine Today,
Inc. v. NLRC,[35]
it was further held that:
Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment". If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment.
A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor, and he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including hiring. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[36]
Certainly, what transpired here was caused
by an employee’s error of judgment and not by the employer’s application of
means vitiating the consent to resign. It would be utterly unfair to attribute
to petitioners the commission of illegal dismissal and to impose upon them the
burden of accepting back Aparecio who unequivocally manifested her intent and
willingness to sever her employment ties.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED and the November
20, 2001 Decision and April 26, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. SP No. 65403 affirming the August 23, 2000 Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The October 27, 1998 Decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that
private respondent was not illegally dismissed is hereby REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CANCIO C.
GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos, with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Rodrigo V. Cosico concurring.
[2] Rollo, p. 41.
[3] Penned by Commissioner Bernabe S. Batuhan, with Commissioners Irenea E. Ceniza and Edgardo E. Enerlan concurring.
[4] Penned by Ernesto F. Carreon.
[5] CA rollo, p. 49.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo, p. 51.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Acevedo v. Advanstar Company,
Inc., G.R. No. 157656, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 656, 664.
[22] Pascua v. NLRC (3rd
Div.), 351 Phil. 48, 61 (1998).
[23]
[24] CA rollo, pp. 153-155.
[25] See Art. 1338, New Civil Code.
[26] Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao
Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No. 153535, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 409, 426; Republic
of the Philippines v. Institute for Social Concern, G.R. No. 156306,
January 28, 2005, 449 SCRA 512, 521-522; Spouses Morandarte v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 123586,
[27] Republic of the
[28] St.
[29] See Art. 1337, New Civil Code.
[30] Fortuny Garments v. Castro,
G.R. No. 150668,
[31] See Shie Jie Corporation/Seastar
Ex-Im Corp. v. National Federation of Labor, G.R. No. 153148,
[32] See Digitel Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 166039, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA,
704, 743 and Philippine Today, Inc. v. NLRC, 334 Phil. 854, 877 (1997),
citing Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81087, June 19, 1991,
198 SCRA 318.
[33] Supra.
[34]
[35] Supra.
[36]