RONALD K. GO (Former Municipal G.R. Nos. 150329-30
Mayor
of the Municipality of
Kapatagan), ROLANDO T. LABITAD, Present:
PRAXEDES
V. DUHAYLUNGSOD,
LAUREANO O. DELA CRUZ, (All QUISUMBING,
J.,
former Sangguniang Bayan members), Chairperson,
JESSICA R. MAMA-CHAN and CARPIO,
ANECITA C. GO (Incumbent Sangguniang CARPIO MORALES,
Bayan members), TINGA, and
Petitioners, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
- versus
- Promulgated:
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
(First Division); THE HON. ANIANO
DESIERTO, in his official capacity as
Ombudsman; and MAYOR BENNY BAGUIO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] with a
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction under
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioners Ronald K. Go
(Former Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Kapatagan),
Rolando T. Labitad, Praxedes
V. Duhaylungsod, Laureano
O. Dela Cruz (all former Sangguniang
Bayan members), Jessica R. Mama-chan,
and Anecita C. Go (incumbent Sangguniang
Bayan members).
In this petition, petitioners assail: (a) the
Order[2] dated
15 October 2001 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case Nos. 26285-26286 (the criminal cases) denying petitioners’
motion to quash; (b) the Resolution[3] dated
11 September 2000 of the Graft Investigation Officer II, approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, finding
probable cause to indict petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended; and (c) the disapproval[4] dated
17 August 2001 by Ombudsman Desierto of the
Memorandum dated 26 January 2001 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) recommending
the dismissal of the criminal cases. In addition, petitioners seek to prohibit
the Ombudsman from further prosecuting the criminal cases and the Sandiganbayan from trying the same.[5]
The
antecedents follow.
On
After
posting bail, petitioners filed a motion for re-investigation of the criminal
cases.[8] On
However, after perusal
of the evidence on record, it is submitted that the allegations in the Motion
have not changed the complexion of the case, such that contrary to the
recommendation of the OSP, prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 26285 & 26286
for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g), R.A. [No.] 3019 should proceed.
As previously found by this Office, the terms and
conditions of the lease contract in favor of Noel Lim are grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the P112.00 for 56 sq. meters while Globe
pays a monthly rental of P5,000.00 for 100 sq. meters. Third, the
duration of the contract with Lim is ten (10) years, which is twice longer than
the lease contract of Globe which has a period of five (5) years.
It is also observed that the award of the lease contract
of Noel Lim was objected to by Sangguniang Bayan member Joselito C. Deloria on the ground that there was a previous applicant
and Noel Lim was the son-in-law of accused Mayor (Minutes of the SB session
dated May 20, 1988). The apparent conflict-of-interest may be gleaned as Noel
Kim is related by affinity to the accused Mayor.
x x x
x
As to the third issue raised by the accused, this Office
believes that no prejudicial question exists in the present case.
As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined (Alfredo Ching
v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. 110844, April 27, 2000).
In the instant case, the criminal liability of the
accused for violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g) of R.A. [No.] 3019,
may still be shown through the presentation of evidence to the effect that the
accused is a public officer; that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The act treated in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum: it is the commission of that act as defined
by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. This construction would be in consonance with the
announced purpose for which R.A. [No]. 3019 was enacted, which is the
repression of certain acts of public officers constituting graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto (Section 1, R.A. [No.] 3019).
Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be first
proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the Act. For what
would prevent the officials from entering into those kinds of transactions
against which R.A. [No.] 3019 is directed, and then deliberately omit the
observance of certain formalities just to provide a convenient leeway to avoid
the clutches of the law in the event of discovery and consequent prosecution (Luciano v. Estrella,
34 SCRA 769).
WHEREFORE, x x x it is respectfully recommended that accused’s
motion for reinvestigation/reconsideration be DENIED, and the accused be
accordingly prosecuted.[12]
On
On
In an Order[15]
dated
The Motion to Quash filed by accused Ronald K. Go for
reasons therein stated, namely[,] to obtain a determination of probable cause
in the exercise of the very functions of this Court, is denied for lack of
merit. While the accused premises his motion on the conflict of views between
the Ombudsman and the prosecution at the preliminary investigation, the fact is
that the Ombudsman’s conclusion is what controls the filing of the Information
and the Court itself had already found probable cause. All the matters of fact
earlier raised by the accused before this Court and at review by the
prosecution are matters of evidence proper for presentation at trial.[16]
Petitioners did not move
for a reconsideration of the order and instead filed the instant petition. In this petition, petitioners impute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of:
(1) the Sandiganbayan, when it allegedly refused to
independently assess the Ombudsman’s disapproval of the OSP recommendation; and
(2) the Ombudsman, (a) when he disregarded the OSP recommendation for the
dismissal of the criminal cases; (b) when he excluded the OSP’s
statement that no unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference had been given
to petitioner Go’s son-in-law, Noel Lim; and (c) when
he overlooked the presence of a prejudicial question and ignored the political
undertones manifested by private respondents’ filing of similarly baseless
complaints.[17]
In his Comment[18]
dated
In a Resolution[22]
dated
On
This Court finds that the evidence of the
prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019 is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of herein accused.
x x x
x
It bears to stress that
the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019 filed by
the prosecution against herein accused even failed to allege an essential
element thereof, i.e., that the
unwarranted benefits allegedly given to Noel Lim resulted in undue injury to
the government. Logically, without undue injury or damage to any party, the
lease contract in favor of Noel Lim cannot be said to be irregularly executed.
x x x
x
Neither was the prosecution able to prove the fourth and
fifth elements of Section 3(e) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019, i.e., that the
accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence in giving unwarranted benefits or advantage to Noel Lim. Again, the
instant information insufficiently made out an accusation of violation of
Section 3(e) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019 as it did not even allege that the accused
were motivated by manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence in approving the contract in favor of Noel Lim. In the absence of such
imputation, this Court cannot presume, solely from the accused’s
act of approving Resolution No. 98-02-055 which granted the lease contract in
favor of Noel Lim, that the accused were so actuated. Evident bad faith
connotes a manifest, deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong
or cause damage. Bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the
onus of proving it. In the instant cases, the prosecution, relying solely on
its presentation of the lease contracts of Noel Lim and Globe Telecom as proof
that the accused gave unwarranted benefits to Noel Lim, failed to establish
with convincing evidence that the accused were actuated by a dishonest purpose
or ill will partaking of a fraud or furtive design or ulterior purpose to do
wrong and cause damage.
x x x
x
Anent the charge for violation of Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.]
[No.] 3019, the elements thereof are the following: (1) the offender is a
public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the
government; and (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. And, as previously discussed herein, there
is no dispute as to the presence of the first and second elements of Section 3(g)
of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019. The only issue left to be resolved then is whether the
evidence of the prosecution sufficiently established that the contract or
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
x x x
x
x x x
Hence, the accused cannot be blamed for
the higher rental rate of Globe Telecom considering that it was the latter that
offered and fixed a higher rate per square meter for a chosen and specified lot
for its particular use, which is not among the commercial lots priced at P1.50
per square meter, and to the exclusion of other telecommunication networks.
x x x
x
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, this Court is constrained to GRANT, as it hereby GRANTS, the Demurrer to Evidence filed by herein accused as the
evidence of the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the essential
elements of the offenses charged and to overcome the presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused. Accordingly, the cases against the accused are hereby DISMISSED.
The cash bond posted by accused Laureano O. Dela Cruz is hereby
ordered released to him upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing
payment thereof and subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. As
to those accused who posted bail bonds, the same are hereby ordered cancelled.
The hold departure order dated
SO ORDERED.[26]
Evidently, in view of the foregoing resolution
of the Sandiganbayan in the criminal cases, the
present petition has become moot and academic. An issue is said to have become
moot and adacemic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical use or value.[27]
The prayer in the instant petition is
for the nullification of: (a) the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated 15 October 2001 denying
petitioners’ motion to quash; (b) the Resolution dated 11 September 2000,
approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
finding probable cause to prosecute the criminal cases against petitioners; and
(c) the disapproval[28] dated
17 August 2001 by Ombudsman Desierto of the OSP
memorandum recommending the dismissal of the criminal cases. In addition,
petitioners pray that the Sandiganbayan be enjoined
from further hearing the criminal cases.
With the dismissal of the criminal cases
by the Sandiganbayan, the Court’s opinion on whether the
same should proceed and whether the Sandiganbayan
should try the cases will serve no useful purpose other than as a theoretical
exercise. Be it noted that the Sandiganbayan
resolution is immediately final and executory since the rule against double
jeopardy does not brook any appeal from an order dismissing the case against a
criminal defendant.[29]
Courts
of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions where no actual interests are involved. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over moot cases because there is no substantial relief to which
petitioner will be entitled and which WILL anyway be negated by the dismissal
of the petition. This Court, therefore,
ought to abstain from expressing its
opinion in the case at bar where no legal relief is needed or called for.[30]
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the instant
petition for having become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[25]Sandiganbayan Records, Vol. II, pp. 289-301; Penned by
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro and Roland B. Jurado.
[27]Vda. de Dabao v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116526, 23 March 2004, 426 SCRA 91, 97; Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., G.R. No. 132795, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA
129, 134.