THIRD
DIVISION
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ESTHER S. PAGANO,
Petitioner, - versus
- JUAN NAZARRO, Jr., ROSALINE Q. ELAYDA,
RODRIGO P. KITO and ERNESTO M. CELINO, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 149072 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: September 21, 2007 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]
dated
While the petitioner was employed as Cashier IV of the Office
of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet, it was
discovered that in her accountabilities she had incurred a shortage of P1,424,289.99. On
On
On
On
On
On
In
the course of the audit and examination of the petitioner’s collection
accounts, the Commission on Audit (COA) discovered that the petitioner was
unable to account for P4,080,799.77, and not just the initial cash
shortage of P1,424,289.99. Thus, the COA
Provincial Auditor, Getulio B. Santos, reported these
findings to the Office of the Ombudsman in a letter dated
In its Decision, dated
Any person holding
a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the
Thus, it declared that even if the
committee created by the Provincial Governor had the jurisdiction to hear the
administrative case against the petitioner, such case was now moot and
academic.[14] The dispositive
part of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner Esther Sison Pagano and against herein respondents:
1. Finding that the Committee of which the respondents are members has no longer jurisdiction to conduct any investigation or proceedings under civil service rules and regulations relative to the administrative case filed against the petitioner;
2. Finding that the Committee has acted with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioner in Administrative Case No. 98-01;
3. Declaring as null and void all acts, orders, resolutions and proceedings of the Committee in Administrative Case No. 98-01;
4. Ordering the respondents, their agents, representatives and all persons acting on their behalf, to desist from proceeding with Administrative Case No. 98-01; and
5. Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 07, 1998 as permanent.
No pronouncement as to costs.[15]
Respondents
filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In reversing the Decision of the trial court, the appellate court
pronounced that even though petitioner’s separation from service already bars
the imposition upon her of the severest administrative sanction of separation
from service, other imposable accessory penalties such as disqualification to
hold government office and forfeiture of benefits may still be imposed.[16]
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
which was denied in a Resolution dated 10 July 2001.[17]
Hence, in the
present Petition, the sole issue is being raised:
WHETHER OR NOT A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN SEPARATED FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE BY OPERATION OF LAW PURSUANT TO SECTION 66 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881 (THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE) MAY STILL BE ADMINISTRATIVELY CHARGED UNDER CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS[18]
Petitioner argues that a government
employee who has been separated from service, whether by voluntary resignation
or by operation of law, can no longer be administratively charged. Such argument is devoid of merit.[19]
In
Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan,[20]
this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government
employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative
case against him. Resignation is not a
way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative
sanction. The resignation of a public
servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
he or she shall still be answerable.[21]
A case becomes moot and academic only
when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case.[22] The instant case is not moot and academic,
despite the petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative
sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion
the precipitate act of a government employee in effecting his or her separation
from service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated against him
or her. An employee’s act of tendering his
or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the anomalous transaction
is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in criminal cases.[23]
In the present case, the Provincial
Treasurer asked petitioner to explain the cash shortage of P1,424,289.99,
which was supposedly in her custody on
Public service requires utmost
integrity and discipline. A public
servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity
for no less than the Constitution mandates the principle that “a public office
is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency.”[24] The Courts cannot overemphasize the need for
honesty and accountability in the acts of government officials. In Baquerfo v. Sanchez,[25]
this Court reproached a government employee for the theft of two unserviceable
desk fans and one unserviceable stove.
Moreover, the Court refused to take into account the subsequent
resignation of the said government employee.
In the aforecited case, this Court emphatically
declared that:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondent’s resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.[26]
Unlike the previously discussed case
(Baquerfo), the present one does not involve
unserviceable scraps of appliances. The
petitioner was unable to account for an amount initially computed at P1,424,289.99,
and later recomputed by the COA at P4,080,799.77. With all the more reason, this Court cannot
declare petitioner immune from administrative charges, by reason of her running
for public office.
In
the very recent case, In re:
Non-disclosure before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case
Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity
as the then Assistant Regional Director of the National Police Commission,
Regional Office XI, Davao City,[27]
this Court pronounced the respondent judge guilty of grave misconduct, despite
his resignation:
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance — without prejudice — by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. x x x. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
This Court cannot countenance the
petitioner’s puerile pretext that since no administrative case had been filed
against her during her employment, she can no longer be administratively
charged. Section 48, Chapter 6, Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, provides for the initiation of administrative proceedings by the
proper personalities as part of the procedural process in administrative cases:
Section 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. (1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.
At the time petitioner filed her
certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the Provincial
Treasurer that she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be
filed against her, after it discovered the cash shortage of P1,424,289.99
in her accountabilities. Moreover, she
had already filed her answer. To all
intents and purposes, the administrative proceedings had already been commenced
at the time she was considered separated from service through her precipitate
filing of her certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner’s bad faith was manifest when she filed it, fully knowing
that administrative proceedings were being instituted against her as part of
the procedural due process in laying the foundation for an administrative case.
To support her argument that
government employees who have been separated can no longer be administratively
charged, petitioner cites the following cases: Diamalon v. Quintillian,[28] Vda. de Recario v. Aquino,[29] Zamudio v. Penas, Jr.,[30] Pardo v. Cunanan,[31]
and Mendoza v. Tiongson.[32] A piecemeal reference to these cases is too
insubstantial to support the petitioner’s allegation that her separation from
government service serves as a bar against the filing of an administrative case
for acts she committed as an appointive government official. In order to understand the Court’s
pronouncement in these cases, they must be examined in their proper contexts.
In Diamalon v. Quintillian,[33] a
complaint for serious misconduct was filed against the respondent judge
questioning his issuance of a warrant of arrest without the presence of the
accused. A cursory review of the facts
in this case shows that the administrative complaint lacks basis, as there is
nothing irregular in the act of the respondent judge in issuing a warrant of
arrest without the presence of the accused during the hearing for such
issuance. After the case was filed, the
respondent judge became seriously ill and his application for retirement
gratuity could not be acted upon because of the pending administrative case against
him. Thus, the Court, out of Christian
justice, dismissed the administrative case against the respondent who was to
retire and desperately needed his retirement benefits.
In
Vda. de Recario v. Aquino,[34]
an administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for failure to
immediately act on a case for prohibition.
In dismissing the complaint against the judge, the Court ruled that
“there are no indications of bad faith on the part of the respondent judge when
he set for hearing in due course Civil Case No. 13335. If the complainants were prejudiced at all x x x, it was because of
complainant’s own error in not asking for a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order and not due to respondent’s error or delay in taking action
or any other fault.” It was only an
aside that the Court even mentioned that the respondent judge had already
resigned. Thus, this case cannot be the
basis for enjoining the administrative case against herein petitioner.
In
Zamudio v. Penas, Jr.,[35]
an administrative complaint for dishonorable conduct was filed against the
respondent judge. The Court did not
exculpate him from administrative liability, despite his retirement. The Court
unequivocally declared: “The
jurisdiction of the Court over this case was, therefore, not lost when the
respondent retired from the judiciary and, in the exercise of its power over
the respondent as a member of the bar, the Court may compel him to support his
illegitimate daughters.”[36]
The Court merely mitigated the penalty when it took into account the fact that
respondent’s dishonorable conduct occurred before his appointment as a judge,
along with the fact that he had reached compulsory retirement age during the pendency of the administrative case.[37]
In
Pardo v. Cunanan,[38]
the Court did not dismiss the administrative case against the respondent
government employee, but merely imposed a lesser penalty of one-month
suspension for her failure to disclose the fact that she had a pending
administrative case when she applied for another government post. In mitigating the penalty, the Court
considered her good faith, as well as her resignation from her previous
post. The Court took into account the
notice of acceptance of her resignation, stating that her “services while
employed in this office have been satisfactory and your future application for
reinstatement may be favorably considered.”[39]
In Mendoza v. Tiongson,[40]
this Court refused to accept the resignations filed by the respondents, which
were intended solely to allow them to evade the penalties this Court would
impose against them. This ruling cannot
be construed as a bar against filing administrative cases against government
employees who have been separated from their employment, for what would stop
the latter from merely abandoning their posts to evade administrative charges
against them? To the contrary, this
ruling can only strengthen this Court’s resolve to diligently continue hearing
administrative cases against erring government employees, even after they are
separated from employment.
To
summarize, none of the rulings in the aforecited
cases can justify the dismissal of the administrative case filed against herein
petitioner simply because she had filed her certificate of candidacy. The circumstances of the instant case are
vastly different from those in Diamalon v. Quintillian[41]
and Vda. de Recario v. Aquino,[42] in
which the respondent judges were able to present valid and meritorious defenses
in the administrative complaints filed against them. Petitioner in this case did not even attempt
to properly account for the cash shortage of P4,080,799.77 from the
checks and funds that were in her custody.
On the other hand, the respondent government employees in Zamudio v. Penas, Jr.[43]
and Pardo v. Cunanan,[44]
were not absolved of their administrative liability; rather, the Court merely
mitigated the penalty it imposed upon them.
In
Petitioner relies on Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code to exculpate her from an administrative charge. The aforementioned provision reads:
Any person
holding a public appointive officer or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code should be read in connection with Sections 46(b)(26) and 55, Chapters 6
and 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:
x x x x
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
x x x x
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office.
x x x x
Section 55. Political Activity. – No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body.
Clearly, the act of filing a
Certificate of Candidacy while one is employed in the civil service constitutes
a just cause for termination of employment for appointive officials. Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
considering an appointive official ipso
facto resigned, merely provides for the immediate implementation of the
penalty for the prohibited act of engaging in partisan political activity. This provision was not intended, and should
not be used, as a defense against an administrative case for acts committed
during government service.
Section 47[46]
of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides for the authority of heads of
provinces to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions
against employees under their jurisdiction.
Thus, the Provincial Governor acted in accordance with law when it
ordered the creation of an independent body to investigate the administrative
complaint filed against petitioner for dishonesty, grave misconduct and malversation of public funds through falsification of official
documents in connection with acts committed while petitioner was employed as
Cashier IV in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 53323, promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with
Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Bernardo P.
Abesamis, concurring.
Rollo,
pp. 16 - 21.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Id. at 37-38.
[18]
[19]
[20] A.M.
No. P-03-1726,
[21] Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974,
[22] Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar,
G.R. No. 156128,
[23] Re: (1) Lost Checks Issued to the Late
Roderick Roy P. Melliza, Former Clerk II, MCTC, Zaragga, Iloilo and (2) Dropping from the Rolls of Ms.
Esther T. Andres, A.M. No. 2005-26-SC, 22 November 2006, 507 SCRA 478, 493.
[24]
[25] Supra
note 21.
[26]
[27] JBC
No. 013,
[28] 139 Phil. 654 (1969).
[29] Adm. Case No. 212-J, 22 November 1974, 61 SCRA 144.
[30] 350 Phil. 1 (1998).
[31] A.M. No. P-87-73,
[32] 333 Phil. 508 (1996).
[33] Supra
note 28.
[34] Supra
note 29 at 145.
[35] Supra
note 30.
[36]
[37]
[38] Supra
note 31.
[39]
[40] Supra note 32.
[41] Supra
note 28.
[42] Supra
note 29.
[43] Supra
note 30.
[44] Supra
note 31.
[45] Supra
note 32.
[46] Section
47 Disciplinary Jurisdiction. x x x
x x x x
(2) The Secretaries and heads of
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action
against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. x x
x. (Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V.)