MAYOR
FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO, G.R.
No. 140656
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
-
versus -
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION)
and THE PEOPLE OF
THE
Respondents.
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NORBERTO
N. LINDONG, G.R.
No. 154482
Petitioner,
-
versus -
PEOPLE
OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions,
the determination of both rests ultimately on whether Felipe K. Constantino
(Constantino), mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province, was indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019),
otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
In G.R. No. 140656, Constantino filed
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the 15 November 1999 decision[1] and
the 15 March 2000 resolution[2] of
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 23433 finding him and
his co-accused, petitioner Norberto N. Lindong (Lindong) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 154482 is
a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by Lindong questioning three (3)
orders[3] of
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) relative to the execution of judgment
against him also in Criminal Case No. 23433.
The Antecedents
In an Information dated
That on or about February 28, 1996,
in Davao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Felipe K. Constantino, a public officer, being then the
Mayor of the Municipality of Malungon, Sarangani Province, committing the crime
herein-charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of
his official functions, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through
gross inexcusable negligence, and conspiring and confederating with accused Norberto
N. Lindong, President and Chairman of the Board of the Norlovanian Corporation,
Davao City, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and criminally enter
into a Lease Agreement for the rental of various heavy equipments (sic) for a
period of six (6) years for and in consideration of the sum of PESOS: TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN and 11/100 (P257,111.11)
per month or a total consideration of PESOS: EIGHTEEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE and 92/100 (P18,511,999.92)
and a guaranty deposit of PESOS: ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (P1,780,000.00)
contrary to the express mandate of Resolution No. 2, series of 1995, of the
Municipal Planning and Development Council implementing Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 198, series of 1995 and Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 21
dated February 22, 1996 authorizing the Municipal Mayor of Malungon to enter
into an agreement for the purchase of heavy equipments (sic) on a five-year
term basis for and in consideration of the amount of PESOS: TWO
MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,200,000.00) per year or a total
consideration of only PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION (P11,000,000.00),
thus, giving said Norlovanian Corporation, which was fully paid for the
Guaranty Deposit and was actually paid heavy
equipment rentals for the
period March 5
to May 6,
1996 in the aggregate sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND NINETY and 91/100 (P2,177,090.91),
unwarranted benefits and advantage and causing undue injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Both accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge. In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Nazario B. Tomanan
(Tomanan), Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor III of the COA Regional Office No.
XI. In rebuttal, it presented Benjamin C. Asgapo (Asgapo), councilor of
Malungon,
The P2.2
Million per annum for a period of five (5) years beginning in 1996 for
the amortization of such purchase.[6]
Pursuant thereto, the municipality conducted two (2) public biddings for
suppliers of the required fleet of heavy equipment. Both attempts, however,
failed. Hence, the Sangguniang Bayan instead passed Resolution No. 21 on
On
The seven (7) units of heavy equipment
subject of the agreement were thus delivered to the municipality on P2,177,090.91 representing the guaranty deposit as well as the
rental for the period of
Thereafter, on
However, only five (5) days later, or
on
On
In particular, Tomanan testified that
he was directed by the COA Regional Office XI to conduct a special and
comprehensive audit of the P9,658,000.00 of government funds.[17]
Asgapo, on the other hand, testified
that he was present during the
The defense presented Lindong as its
sole witness. According to Lindong, after negotiations between himself and
petitioner Constantino, together with some members of the Sanggunian,
the parties agreed to a lease/purchase scheme in accordance with the mandate of
Resolution No. 21. They agreed that since the municipality did not have
sufficient funds to buy the fleet of heavy equipment outright at P8.9
Million, the latter would purchase the subject equipment on installment basis but
with allowance for Norlovanian Corporation to recover some incremental cost.
Thus, on the very same day,
Lindong further testified that he
attended the municipal council meeting on
Finally, Lindong averred that more
than two (2) months after he delivered the fleet of equipment to the
municipality, he received a Certificate of Concurrence dated 9 May 1996 issued
by Nemesio Liray, Chairman of the Committee of Finance of the Sangguniang
Bayan, certifying that the Lease Agreement was concurred in by the members of the Committee on 29 February 1996.
Likewise, he received a Certification dated
Finding that the prosecution had
proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Constantino and Lindong of the
offense as charged, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision sentencing
them both, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO and NORBERTO N. LINDONG GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” and said accused
are hereby sentenced, as follows:
(a) to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) month as maximum;
(b) to suffer perpetual disqualification
from public office;
(c) to jointly and severally indemnify the
Municipality of Malungon, Province of Sarangani the sum of Two Million One
Hundred Seventy-Seven Thousand [sic] and 91/1000 [sic] Pesos (P2,177,090.91),
representing the amount actually paid to Norlovanian Corporation, with interest
at the legal rate computed from March 6, 1996 until fully paid; and
(d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The Sandiganbayan held that neither
manifest partiality nor evident bad faith attended the commission of the
offense. However, it found that petitioner Constantino caused undue injury to
the
It appears that during trial, both
accused were represented by the same counsel. However, after judgment was
rendered against them, Constantino and Lindong filed separate appeals to the
Supreme Court which have taken disparate routes. On
Lindong himself likewise filed a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 142379, to seek a reversal
of the Sandiganbayan decision finding him guilty as Constantino’s co-conspirator.
On
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) issued three (3) orders relative to the execution of judgment against
Lindong, all of which are assailed by the latter, in his petition for
certiorari in G.R. No. 154482, for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The Sandiganbayan issued on
With the demise of Constantino during
the pendency of his appeal, the same should normally be regarded as moot and
academic following the norm that the death of the accused marks the extinction
of his criminal liability.[26] However, the present two petitions are so
intertwined that the absolution of Constantino is ultimately determinative of
the absolution of Lindong. Indeed, the exoneration of Constantino will necessarily
signify the injustice of carrying out the penalty imposed on Lindong. Thus, the
Court in this instance has to ascertain the merits of Constantino’s appeal to
prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against Lindong.
The "moot and academic"
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: First,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution;[27] Second,
the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;[28] Third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public;[29] and Fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.[30] In the instant case, the exceptional character of the appeals of
Constantino and Lindong in relation to each other, as well as the higher
interest of justice, requires that the Court determine the merits of the
petition and not dismiss the same outright on the ground of mootness.
The Ruling of the Court
G.R. No. 140656
Petitioner Constantino impugned his
conviction and asserted that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him based on
its finding that he violated Resolution No. 21 by entering into a “Lease
Agreement” with the Norlovanian Corporation and for his failure to sign the
accompanying “Undertaking.” Likewise, he argued that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence in his favor. Finally, Constantino contended that it was error for
the Sandiganbayan to disregard the findings of the Supreme Court en banc in the earlier case of Constantino v. Hon. Ombudsman Desierto.[31]
Constantino’s petition would have been
granted and he would have been absolved of criminal liability had he been still
alive today. This is why it is so.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
provides:
SEC.
3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
In order to be liable for violating the
law, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is a public
officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) he or
she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party; (3) the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions; (4) such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[32]
There are two (2) modes of committing
the offense, thus: (1) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government; or (2) the public officer gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.[33] An accused may be charged under either mode[34]
or under both should both modes concur.[35]
Additionally, Section 3(e) poses the
standard of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence before liability can be had under the provision. Manifest partiality
is characterized by a clear, notorious
or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other.[36] Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[37] Gross inexcusable negligence is defined as
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as
other persons may be
affected.[38] Mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per
se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of
bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest,
respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable.[39]
As discussed previously, the
Sandiganbayan held that manifest
partiality could not be rightfully imputed to Constantino.[40] The prosecution did not present proof that he
was actuated with malice or fraud sufficient to meet the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[41] However, the respondent court found that
Constantino’s act of entering into a purportedly pure lease agreement instead
of a lease/purchase agreement was a flagrant violation of Resolution No. 21. In
view of the rigid terms of the subject contract to which Constantino assented,
coupled by his failure to secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan
before entering into the agreement, the Sandiganbayan found that his conduct
constituted gross inexcusable negligence.[42] Likewise, the anti-graft court ruled that
Constantino’s acts resulted in undue injury to the
Undoubtedly, the standard of
culpability imposed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 is quite high which, in this
case, was not hurdled by the evidence presented against Constantino. Verily,
the prosecution failed to satisfy the requisite proof to demonstrate
Constantino’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While Constantino should have
exercised more prudence when he transacted with Norlovanian Corporation, he could
not however be held liable for “gross inexcusable negligence” as contemplated in
R.A. No. 3019. Indeed, in the earlier
case of Constantino v. Desierto,[45] the Court had already made an express finding
that petitioner Constantino did not violate the mandate of Resolution No. 21
but instead merely carried out its directive.
That case was a special civil action
for certiorari filed by Constantino to seek the invalidation of the
resolution of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of grave misconduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and/or gross neglect of duty, and on that
account, dismissing him from service. The controversy arose from the same
transaction entered into between Constantino and Norlovanian Corporation and
involved the same subject matter as in the case at bar. The administrative
complaint was initiated through a letter-complaint and joint affidavit signed
by Vice Mayor Espinosa and to it was appended a certification signed by the
Vice Mayor and Councilors Suson, Ingay, Asgapo, Espinosa and Octavio.
In exonerating Constantino from the
administrative charges, the Court found that the evidence against him was
inadequate to warrant his dismissal from service on the grounds of grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and gross
neglect of duty. More particularly, we made the following pronouncements:
The explicit terms of
Resolution No. 21, Series of 1996 clearly authorized Mayor Constantino to “lease/purchase
one (1) fleet of heavy equipment” composed of seven (7) generally described
units, through a “negotiated contract.” That resolution, as observed at
the outset, contained no parameters as of rate of rental, period of lease,
purchase price. Pursuant thereto, Mayor Constantino, representing the
One — an agreement(on a standard printed
form) dated Febr[ua]ry 28, 1996 for the lease
by the corporation to the municipality of heavy equipment of the number
and description required by
Resolution no. 21, and
Two — an undertaking for the subsequent
conveyance and transfer of ownership of the equipment to the municipality at the end of the term of the lease.
That the Members of the
Sangguniang Bayan knew of this “lease/purchase” is evident from
Resolution No. 38, Series of 1996 unanimously enacted by them shortly after
delivery of the equipment. In that resolution they (1) declared that “the
Municipal Government ** has just acquired its fleet of heavy equipment
leased/purchased from the Norlovanian Corporation,” and (2) requested Mayor
Constantino “to operate the newly acquired heavy equipment **
leased/purchase from the Norlovanian Corporation.” The Resolution is
consistent with the allegations of Mayor Constantino — which in any event are
not denied by the Councilors or Vice-Mayor Espinosa — that:
1) the equipment was
delivered to the Municipality by Norlovanian Corporation on
2) prior to the delivery
of the units, the Vice Mayor and other Members of the Sanguniang Bayan had
opportunity to read the “Lease Agreement” as well as the “Undertaking” but then
raised no objections thereto;
3) neither did they
raise any objections (a) at the session of the Municipal Council on
Now, it is germane to
advert to the deplorable inaccuracies in the Joint Affidavit of private
respondents (P.L. Espinosa, Suson, Sr., Ingay, W. P. Espinosa, Octavio,
Asgapo) submitted as part of their complaint in the Ombudsman’s Office. The
affidavit contains a clearly distorted version of Resolution No. 21 of
It is also relevant to
draw attention to the flagrantly inaccurate statements and inferences about the
Mayor’s “negotiated contract” regarding the heavy equipment, contained in
Resolution No. 47 approved only by four (4) Members of the Municipal Council at
its session of June 6, 1996 (the four (4) being Councilors Octavio, Espinosa,
Asgapo and Ingay). That Resolution No. 47, it will be recalled, stopped all
“rental payment/expenditures relative to the pool of heavy equipment of the
Norlovanian Company.” The stoppage was based on prior resolutions of the
Council — allegedly setting down the terms under which the heavy equipment
should be acquired, and which terms were supposedly violated by the Mayor. but —
unaccountably and again indicative of bad faith, if not malice, on the part of
private respondents — Resolution No. 47 made absolutely no reference to two (2)
resolution which on their face justify the Mayor’s contract with Norlovanian
Corporation, to wit: (1) Resolution No. 21 which, having been enacted after the
cited resolutions, must be deemed to have superseded them, and which, to
repeat, motivated and constitutes the justification for the lease-purchase agreement
entered into by the Mayor and Norlovanian Corporation, and (2) Resolution No.
38 in which the Councilors not only expressly aknowledged that “the municipal
government ** (had) just acquired its fleet of heavy equipment leased/purchased
from the Norlovanian Corporation,” but also “requested ** (the) Mayor ** to
operate the newly acquired heavy equipment of the municipality leased/purchased from the
Norlovanian Corporation.”
In light of the
forego[i]ng facts, which appear to the Court to be quite apparent on the
record, it is difficult to perceive how the Office of the Ombudsman could have
arrived at a conclusion of any wrongdoing by the Mayor in relation to the
transaction in question. It is difficult to see how the transaction between the
Mayor and Norlovanian Corporation — entered into pursuant to Resolution
No. 21 — and tacitly accepted and approved by the town Council through
its Resolution No. 38 — could be deemed an infringement of the same
Resolution No. 21. In truth, an examination of the pertinent writings (the
resolution, the two (2) instruments constituting the negotiated contract, and
the certificate of delivery) unavoidably confirms their integrity and
congruity. It is in fine, difficult to see how those pertinent written instrument,
could establish a prima facie case to warrant the preventive suspension
of Mayor Constantino. A person with the most elementary grasp of the English
language would, from merely scanning those material documents, at once realize
that the Mayor had done nothing but carry out the expressed wishes of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
x x x x
The investigator also
opined that Resolution No. 21 should be interpreted in light of other official
documents, executed a year earlier. He [Graft Prosecutor Buena] does not explain
why he did not adopt the more obvious construction of Resolution No. 21
indicated by the elementary doctrine that it is within the power and
prerogative of the town council to repeal its prior acts, either expressly, or
by the passage of essentially inconsistent resolutions. When the town
council passed Resolution No. 21 without any mention whatever of those prior
official documents respecting the acquisition to heavy equipment, the evident
intention was to supersede them and to have such acquisition governed solely by
Resolution No. 21. This conclusion is strongly supported by the fact that the
Sanggunian expressly admitted — in the Second Whereas Clause of its
Resolution No. 21 — that there had been a “failure of bidders to
submit bids despite of two biddings ... public announcement” [sic] —
the two biddings being obviously related to said earlier official acts of the
town council. The conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the Council (with
full awareness of said “negotiated contract,”) and of the delivery of
equipment thereunder, had requested the Mayor to put the equipment into
operation for the town projects. The Court is thus satisfied that it was in fact the Council’s intention, which
it expressed in clear language, to confer on the Mayor ample discretion to
execute a “negotiated contract” with any interested party, without regard to
any official acts of the Council prior to Resolution No. 21.
It is also difficult to
see why the patent inaccuracies in the affidavit-complaint and Resolution No.
47 were ignored — as difficult to understand how the execution of two writings
to embody one contract of “lease/purchase” could be regarded as fatally
defective, and even indicative of a criminal conspiracy, or why said two
writings should be interpreted in such a way as to magnify their seeming
inconsistencies. The fundamental and familiar legal principle — which
the Office of the Ombudsman ignored — is that it is perfectly legitimate
for a bilateral contract to be embodied in two or more separate writings, and
that in such an event the writings should be read and interpreted together in
such a way as to eliminate seeming
inconsistencies and render the parties’ intention effectual.
The statement in the
appealed Resolution — as to the absence of prior consent of the Council to the
“negotiated contract” executed by Mayor Constantino and Norlovanian Corporation
— flies in the teeth of the evidence; there is unrebutted proof that the heavy
equipment delivered to the Municipality pursuant to the contract, was inspected
by designated councilors and municipal officers; that shortly thereafter, the
negotiated contract — composed of two documents — was explained and discussed
at the session of the town Council of February 29, 1996; and that afterwards the
Council requested Mayor Constantino to put the equipment into operation.
(Emphasis supplied)[46]
Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino
involved an administrative charge, still the findings in the latter case are
binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both cases. What
is decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory
judgment preclude— by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the
doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of “law of the
case,” —the re-litigation of the same issue in another action.[47] It is well established that when a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them.[48]
The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to
be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence,
the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be
resurrected anew since such issue had already been resolved and finally laid to
rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by
conclusiveness of judgment.[49]
It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from
criminal liability as the purpose of administrative proceedings on the one hand
is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle
that a public office is a public trust.
On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the
punishment of crime.[50]
However, the dismissal by the Court of the administrative case against Constantino
based on the same subject matter and after examining the same crucial evidence
operates to dismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding that the
act from which liability is anchored does not exist.
It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino that the level of proof required in
administrative cases which is substantial evidence was not mustered therein.
The same evidence is again before the Court in connection with the appeal
in the criminal case. Ineluctably, the same evidence cannot with greater reason
satisfy the higher standard in criminal cases such as the present case which is
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The elementary principle is that it is perfectly legitimate for a
bilateral contract to be embodied in two or more separate writings, and that in
such an event the writings should be read and interpreted together in such a
way as to eliminate seeming inconsistencies and render the intention of the parties
effectual.[51] In construing a written contract, the reason
behind and the circumstances surrounding its execution are of paramount
importance to place the interpreter in the situation occupied by the parties
concerned at the time the writing was executed.[52] Construction
of the terms of a contract, which would amount to impairment or loss of right,
is not favored. Conservation and preservation, not waiver, abandonment or
forfeiture of a right, is the rule.[53] In
case of doubts in contracts, the same should be settled in favor of the
greatest reciprocity of interests.[54]
G.R. No. 154482
Lindong ascribes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent court in issuing the challenged orders. He
argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not holding in abeyance the execution of
judgment against him in light of the pending petition for review by his
co-accused before this Court of the same decision for which he was convicted.
Should the decision be set aside by the Supreme Court, petitioner Lindong
contends, he will be benefited to the extent that there can no longer be any
judgment to legally execute against both himself and Constantino.
The virtual acquittal of Constantino
inevitably puts a welcome end to the tribulations of Lindong. Thus, we grant
the petition.
One of the essential elements for
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
is that the respondent is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions, or that he or she is a private individual in conspiracy
with such public officer. In the instant case, the essential acquittal of
Constantino, as presaged in G.R. No. 140656 and presented in the
disquisition, renders an absence in the critical requisite of a public officer
with whom Lindong, the private individual, allegedly conspired to commit the crime
charged.
Hence, we now have before us an
incongruous situation where execution of judgment has been entered against a
private person accused with conspiring with a public officer for violation of
the anti-graft law, but at the same time said public officer would
unequivocably be entitled to exoneration had he not died in the meantime. Yet,
it is utterly illogical to absolve Constantino who entered into the contract on
behalf of the government and send the private person to prison.
The case of Marcos v. Sandiganbayan
(1st Division)[55] is
instructive. Here, the Court granted the motion for reconsideration filed by
former First Lady Imelda Marcos and acquitted her of the charge of violating Section
3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed
the subject lease agreement not as a public officer, but as a private person.
Thus, the Court found that the first element of the offense, i.e., that
the accused is a public officer, was lacking. However, the acquittal of the
former First Lady was taken in conjunction with the acquittal of the public
officer with whom she was accused.[56]
The case of Go v. The Fifth
Division, Sandiganbayan, et al.[57] further
elucidates the matter as illustrated in Marcos, to wit:
x x x [T]he acquittal of the former First Lady should be taken in the context of the Court’s Decision dated January 29, 1198, in Dans, Jr. v. People, which the former First Lady sought to reconsider and, finding merit in her motion, gave rise to the Court’s Resolution in Marcos. In Dans, the Information filed against the former First Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of Transportation and Communications, for violation of Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019, alleged that they were both public officers and, conspiring with each other, entered into the subject lease agreement covering the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a private entity, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Lady’s conviction for violation of Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019 but acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As stated earlier, upon the former First Lady’s motion for reconsideration, the Court reversed her conviction in its Resolution in Marcos.
It
can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that
the reversal of the former First Lady’s conviction was based on the fact that
it was later held that she signed the subject lease agreement as a private
person, not a public officer. However, this acquittal should also be taken in
conjunction with the fact that the public officer with whom she had supposedly
conspired, her co-accused Dans, had earlier been acquitted. In other words,
the element that the accused is a public officer, was totally wanting in the
former First Lady’s case because Dans, the public officer with whom she had
allegedly conspired in committing Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019, had
already been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could not be
convicted, on her own as a private person, of the same offense. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is therefore apparent that in light
of the prevailing milieu in the instant case, we cannot sustain the execution
of judgment against Lindong. The reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 23433 makes it legally absurd to execute any such judgment
against him.
Moreover, Rule 122, Section 11(a) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure operates in his favor. The Rule provides:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.—
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Although the rule states that a
favorable judgment shall benefit those who did not appeal, we have held that a
literal interpretation of the phrase “did not appeal” will not give justice to
the purpose of the provision. It should be read in its entirety and
should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not
join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is
favorable.[58]
In fact, the Court has at various
times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or
non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable
to him. In such cases, the co-accused already
withdrew his appeal,[59] failed
to file an appellant’s brief,[60] or
filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the same.[61] Even
more, in these cases, all the accused appealed from the judgment of conviction
but for one reason or another, their conviction had already become final and
executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable
judgment in favor of their co-accused.[62]
Therefore, we cannot find a reason to treat Lindong differently, especially so
in this case where the public officer accused of violating the anti-graft law
has been acquitted, and the appeal by Lindong was dismissed on a technicality.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No.
140656, although meritorious, is DENIED on the ground of mootness. The petition
in G.R. No. 154482 is
GRANTED. The challenged
orders of the
Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 23433 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
permanently enjoined from executing said orders.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo, G.R. No. 140656, pp. 38-65. Penned by Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and concurred in by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Associate Justice Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr.
[6]Municipality of Malungon Resolution No. 198, Series of 1995. See Exhibit “B.” See also Certification, Exhibit “C.”
[10]Folder of Exhibits; Delivery and Acceptance, Exhibit “G;” and Disbursement Voucher, Exhibit “I”.
[15]Folder of Exhibits, Report on the Comprehensive Audit of the Financial Transactions of the Municipality of Malungon, Province of Sarangani, Exhibits “K.”
[16]Section 27. Public Bidding as the Primary Mode of Procurement.— Except as otherwise provided herein, acquisition of supplies or property by local government units shall be through competitive bidding.
Section 28. Other Modes of Procurement. — Local government units may make procurement of their supply and property requirements without public bidding and through any of the following modes applicable in the circumstances, as provided hereunder:
a. personal canvass of responsible merchants;
b. emergency purchase;
c. negotiated purchase;
d. direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;
e. purchase from government entities.
x x x x
[27]David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 213-214, citing Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429
SCRA 736.
[30]Id. at
215, citing Albaña v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855,
July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA
656.
[32]Villanueva v. Ople, G.R. No. 165125, 18 November 2005, citing Peralta v. Desierto, GR No. 153152, 19 October
2005, 473 SCRA 322; Garcia-Rueda v. Amor,
365 SCRA 456, 20 September 2001.
[33]Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 131397, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 153, 159, citing Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, 387 Phil. 872, 881
[34]Id., citing Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101978, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 349 and Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, 219 SCRA 675.
[35]
[36]Reyes v. Atienza, G.R. No. 152243, 23 September 2005, 470 SCRA 670, 683 citing Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 69983, 14 May 1990, 185 SCRA 346.
[37]
[47]Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
148277, 29 June 2004, 433 SCRA 195, 204-205; De Villa v. Jacob, G.R. No. L-29420,
[48]
[49]
[50]Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141336,
[52]Agas v. Sabico, G.R. No. 156447, 26
April 2005, 457 SCRA 263, 276, citing Ridjo
Tape & Chemical Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131436, 31
May 2000, 332 SCRA 605.
[59]People v. Artellero, 395 Phil. 876, 889 (2000); See also People v. De Lara, 389 Phil. 756 (2000).