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Attys.
Rowena V. Guanzon and Pearl R.
Montesino of the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosanna Saril-Toledano, Bacolod
City, and Atty. Erfe del
Castillo-Caldit, Complainants, - versus - Judge
Anastacio C. Rufon, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038
(formerly A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2250-RTJ) Present:
Puno, C.J. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, azcuna, TINGA, chico-nazario, GARCIA, velasco, jr., nachura, and reyes, JJ. Promulgated: October 19, 2007
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DECISION
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
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For our
resolution is the February 11, 2005 letter-complaint[1]
filed by complainants Atty. Rowena V. Guanzon and Atty. Pearl R. Montesino of
the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosanna Saril-Toledano,
Bacolod City, and Atty. Erfe del Castillo-Caldit against respondent Judge
Anastacio C. Rufon of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, same city, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Rule on Gender-Fair Language, use of foul, or obscene and discriminatory
language, discrimination against women lawyers and litigants and unethical
conduct.
In his comment[2]
dated
On
On
In view of the parties’ failure to
attend the proceedings, Justice Salvador resolved the case on the bases of the
pleadings and documents filed by the parties.
On
The
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT SUFFICIENT CAUSE EXISTS TO HOLD
RESPONDENT ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES
AND THE RULE ON GENDER-FAIR LANGUAGE, USE OF FOUL OR OBSCENE AND DISCRIMINATORY
LANGUAGE, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS AS WELL AS
UNETHICAL CONDUCT.
Findings
and Conclusions
A careful scrutiny of the record shows sufficient ground for a
reprimand and an admonition to respondent to act with utmost temperance,
sensitivity and circumspection in the discharge of his functions.
x x x x x x x x x
Concededly, complainants in administrative proceedings have the burden
of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaint (Araos v. Luna-Pison, 378 SCRA 246). The fact that, owing to the unavailability
of the parties, no hearings were conducted in the case to thresh out the issues
presented by their various pleadings and incidents did not, however, totally
discount the existence of factual bases for the charges leveled against
respondent. In her
x x x x
x x x x x
In one of the first hearings of my case, when Atty. Rowena Guanzon was
not assisting me but another counsel, I was shocked when Judge Anastacio Rufon,
inside the court with so many people present, said to me “next time you see
your husband, open your arms and legs.”
I felt humiliated and insulted, and was glad that the hearing did not
proceed because the respondent was not present.
The following day, I called Atty. Rowena Guanzon and reported Judge
Rufon’s foul language and intolerable conduct to her (p. 170, ibid.).
x x x x
x x x x x
Respondent had, of course, taken great pains to refute the foregoing
allegations (pp. 215-219, ibid.),
complete with transcript of stenographic notes taken in Civil Case No. 99-10985
(pp. 220-240, ibid.) as well as the
orders issued in the case (pp. 241-243, ibid.). In denying the charges leveled against him,
however, appropriate note may be taken of the fact that respondent’s January
20, 2006 comment admitted his use of “frank language” in court when exhorting
litigants to settle their differences and his resort to “strong and colorful”
words whenever he has had a drink or two, albeit after office hours (pp. 81-82,
ibid.). Even more significantly, the
x x x x
x x x x x
Respondent should bear in mind that a judge holds a position in the
community that is looked up to with honor and privilege (Ramos v. Barot¸ 420 SCRA 406).
Although judges are subject to human limitations (Misajon v. Feranil, 440 SCRA 298), it cannot be over-emphasized
that no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and
uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench (Resngit-Marquez v. Llamas, Jr., 385 SCRA 6). Because a judge is always looked upon as
being the visible representation of law and, from him, the people draw much of
their will and awareness to obey legal mandates (Garcia v. Bueser, 425 SCRA 93), it has been rightfully ruled that
moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue in the judiciary; it is a
necessity (Office of the Court
Administrator v. Sayo, Jr., 381 SCRA 659).
In closing, it would be remiss not to remind respondent of the fact
that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility (Fineza v. Aruelo, 385 SCRA 339) and also
be temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language (Fidel v. Caraos, 394 SCRA 47),
especially to those appearing before him (Lastimosa-Dalawampu
v. Yrastorsa, Sr.¸ 422 SCRA 26).
The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Imbang v. Del Rosario, 421 SCRA
523). In view of the fact that public
confidence in the judiciary is very easily eroded by irresponsible and improper
conduct of judges (Navarro v. Tormis, 428
SCRA 37), respondent should remember to avoid improprieties and the appearance
of impropriety in all of his activities (Veloso
v. Caminade, 434 SCRA 7).
Recommendation
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the REPRIMAND of respondent is recommended alongside a stern admonition
that he should, henceforth, take care to act with utmost temperance,
sensitivity and circumspection in the discharge of his functions.
We sustain the finding of Justice Salvador that
respondent judge uttered in open court intemperate and obscene language
injurious to the sensitivity and feelings of complainants who are all women.
Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all
times temperate in his language,[3]
refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting “to
language of vilification.”[4] It is very essential that they live up to
the high standards demanded by Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[5]
which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order
and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. x x x
In Fidel v.
Caraos,[6] we held that although respondent judge
may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in
the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the
court. Judges are demanded to be always
temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.[7]
Thus, we declare respondent judge guilty of vulgar
and unbecoming conduct considered a light charge under Section 10(1), Rule 140
of the Revised Rules of Court, punishable under Section 11(C) of the same Rule,
by:
1. A
fine of not less than P1,000.00, but not
exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure
3. Reprimand
4. Admonition
with warning
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon
is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00, with
a warning that a repetition of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO
ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
Recently, I was informed
of having attributed certain undesirable utterances to Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON
which was the basis for the filing of the instant administrative case against
him. While Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON may have
indeed uttered some improper words, the letter was written in such a
manner that aggravated its import.
Besides, as stated earlier, I never intended to file any complaint, much
less, an administrative case against Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON. I feel that I am
duty bound to inform the Honorable Court that I was made to understand by Atty.
ROWENA V. GUANZON that what I was signing was simply a letter requesting for
the relief of Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON as Family Court judge in
x x x x x x x x x
Although ostensibly written to withdraw respondent Caldit’s support for the complaint against respondent, the foregoing letter is replete with intimations that cast respondent’s claim of innocence in dubious light. Moreover, the rule is settled that withdrawal of a complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action (Aranes v. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402). This is attributable to the ineluctable fact that administrative cases involving misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the judiciary are of paramount public interest as the respondents are involved in the administration of justice, a sacred and solemn task (Manonggiring v. Ibrahim, 391 SCRA 673).
As to the proper sanction on respondent judge, our
ruling in Negros Grace Pharmacy, Inc. v. Judge Alfredo P. Hilario[8]
is pertinent. Here, respondent judge was
declared guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct, classified as a light charge
under Section 10(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court. Thus, we admonished him under Section 11(C)
4.
Further, in Turqueza v. Hernando,[9]
we admonished the respondent judge who failed “to exercise proper care and
restraint in his language” which “betrays a lack of judicial decorum x x x.”
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient,
attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead
of the courts for the litigants.
[1] Rollo, pp. 12-13.
[2]
[3] Turqueza v. Hernando, G.R. No. L-51626,
[4] Royeca v. Animas, G.R. No. L-39584,
[5] Agunday v. Tresvalles, A.M.
No. MTJ-99-1236,
[6] A.M. No. MTJ-99-1224,
[7] Seludo v. Judge Fineza, A.M.
No. RTJ-04-1864,
[8] A.M. No. MTJ-02-1422,
[9] Supra.