Republic of the
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OFFICE OF THE COURT |
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A.M. No. RTJ-06-2030 |
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ADMINISTRATOR, |
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(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2166-RTJ) |
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Complainant, |
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JUDGE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, |
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Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, |
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Respondent. |
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OFFICE OF THE COURT |
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A.M. No. RTJ-07-2032 |
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ADMINISTRATOR, |
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(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2167-RTJ) |
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Complainant, |
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Members: |
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PUNO,
C.J. |
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QUISUMBING, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, |
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CARPIO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CARPIO-MORALES,
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AZCUNA,
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TINGA, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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GARCIA, |
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VELASCO, Jr., |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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JUDGE JESUS S. DELA PEÑA, |
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Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, |
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Promulgated: |
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Oslob, |
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October
5, 2007 |
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Respondent. |
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R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Per Resolution
dated May 16, 2005, the Court treated the Memorandum filed by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) dated January 24, 2004 as administrative
complaints against Judge Jesus S. dela Peña, (Judge dela Peña), Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 62, Oslob, Cebu, also formerly Assisting Judge, RTC Branch 56, Mandaue City; and Judge Augustine A. Vestil, (Judge Vestil), RTC
Branch 56, Mandaue City, for the
irregularities and procedural lapses in the conduct of trial in
connection with their handling of Civil Case No. MAN-3855, a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, entitled, “Mary Ann T. Castro-Roa v. Rocky Rommel D. Roa” (Roa case).
Mary Ann T. Castro-Roa
(Castro-Roa), an Assistant City Prosecutor
in
Castro-Roa
testified on
The next
thing that transpired is shown by the Minutes of
FOR FAILURE OF THE
DEF.COUNSEL TO APPEAR, THE CROSS EXAM.IS CONSIDERED WAIVED. THE
PETITIONER FORMALLY OFFER [sic] THEIRS [sic] EXHIBITS.[8]
On
the same day,
On
On
On
In its Memorandum dated January
24, 2004, the OCA stated that it agrees with the CA’s
findings that there were “very apparent fatal
irregularities” in the handling of the Roa case,[18] to wit: there
was no proof that the parties were given notice for the April 10, 2001 hearing;
the Minutes of the April 10, 2001 hearing was not in
the records, and it was not explained why it was reset to April 24,
2001; the Minutes of April 24, 2001 merely states that petitioner formally
offered her exhibits, and that for
failure of the defense counsel to appear, the cross-examination was deemed
waived, then on the same day, a Decision was prepared and
signed by Judge dela Peña; there was no transcript of stenographic notes (TSN)
of the April 24, 2001 proceedings, neither was there proof on record to show
that Castro-Roa formally offered her exhibits; and no notice
of hearing or any order for the April 24, 2001 setting was issued to show that
Rocky was given a chance to present his evidence.[19]
The
OCA, in addition, noted that Judge dela Peña dispensed with the
requirement of certification from the OSG to show that there was no
collusion among the parties, even though such was a requirement at the time. As to Judge Vestil, the OCA
found that there was no proof that Rocky was served a copy of Castro-Roa’s Motion and records show that the Order setting the
hearing of the Motion, on February
6, 2004 was received by Rocky only on February 12, 2004; despite this, Judge Vestil stated in his March 10, 2004 Order that
Rocky and his counsel, who had withdrawn in 2001,
were served a copy of the said motion.[20]
In Compliance with the Court’s
Resolution dated
In his Comment dated
He prays that he be extended compassion
by the Court since he acted in good faith, observed and applied proper
procedure, rendered the judgment honestly, speedily and fairly, and was
uncomplainingly obedient to the additional assignments given him by the Court.[23]
Judge dela Peña submitted a Supplemental Comment dated
In his Third Indorsement,
Judge Vestil submitted the following
comment: he never participated in the trial of the Roa case and
his only participation was in the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss Petition
filed by Castro-Roa; he granted the Motion
four months after it was filed and only after Rocky had been allowed ample time
to oppose the same; Rocky, as well as his counsel despite his withdrawal, was given
notice of the hearing as well as the Order granting the Motion;
while it is true that it was only on February 12, 2004 when
Rocky received the notice of hearing set for February 6, 2004, still it
was incumbent upon Rocky to exert efforts to verify the status of the said Motion
from the time of such actual receipt; to date, however, no
pleading was filed by Rocky in response to said Motion;
absolutely no damage was done to Rocky as regards his counterclaim for the
custody of the children, since the same can be threshed out in a
separate proceeding; also, with the granting of the Motion, there
was a restoration of the marital bonds between the Roas
which had been severed by the Decision of Judge dela Peña.[25]
In
Compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated
Undeniably, respondent Judge dela Peña failed to observe the requirements of
prior notice and hearing before rendering the decision in Civil Case No. MAN-3855, essentially depriving Rocky of his right to due process.
Firstly, there was an Order setting the case for hearing on
Secondly, there was a Minutes of the hearing on April 24, 2001 suggesting that
a Notice of Hearing on that date was sent to, and received by, the parties, as
there was a notation on the Minutes declaring that (1) Rocky waived his right
to cross-examine an adverse witness for his failure to appear, and (2) Castro-Roa formally offered her exhibits. However, no such notice or Order setting the
case for hearing on April 24, 2001, much less any proof of receipt thereof by
the parties was attached to the records.
All
told, the manner by which the April 24, 2001 Decision was rendered was
dubious. As Rocky was merely declared to
have waived his right to cross-examine the witness for the adverse party, the next step that respondent Judge dela Peña should have taken was to set the case
for the reception of Rocky’s evidence. He did not.
He opted instead to decide the case in clear violation of Section 5,
Rule 30 of the Revised Rules of Court, mandating the grant of opportunity for
the defendant to adduce evidence.
Respondent
Judge dela Peña’s attempt
at exculpation all the more proves his administrative culpability. He admitted deciding the case hastily to free
himself from going back to Branch 56 after having been designated as acting
presiding judge of Branch 61 in Bogo,
The
manner by which respondent Judge Vestil proceeded
upon the Motion to Dismiss Petition was likewise suspect. Knowing that Rocky received the Notice of Hearing of February 6, 2004 on February 12, 2004 only, or six
(6) days after that scheduled
hearing, respondent Judge dela Peña
went on to issue an Order on March 10, 2004 dismissing the petition without a
hearing. It did not matter to him that
Section 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure mandates that “(n)o written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of service thereof.”
Respondent
Judge Vestil blamed Rocky for not exerting efforts to
verify the status of the motion from the time he belatedly received the notice
of hearing, conveniently forgetting that he himself was also absent during the
scheduled hearing on
Respondent
Judges dela Peña and Vestil’s disregard of the basic requirements of notice and
hearing was too flagrant to be ignored.
Having accepted an exalted position as members of the judiciary, they
owe to the public and to the courts over which they preside to maintain professional
competence at all times and to have the basic rules at the palm of their
hands. They, however, failed to live up
to the standards. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. To
disregard the law when one has become familiar with it is worse because bad
faith comes in.
Gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is considered a serious charge under Section
8(9) of Rule 140, as amended, of the Rules [of] Court, for which a penalty
ranging from a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00 to
suspension or dismissal may be imposed.[27]
The OCA then recommended that:
1. [B]oth Judge Jesus S. dela Peña, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Oslob,
Cebu and Judge Agustin [sic] A. Vestil, Regional Trial Court Branch 56, Mandaue City be FOUND administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure;
2. Judges dela Peña and Vestil be FINED each in
the amount of P21,000.00, with a warning that a repetition
of a similar act or infraction will be dealt with more severely; and
3.
Atty. Emeline Bullecer-Cabahug, branch
clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 56,
The Court, in its Resolution[29] dated
June 13, 2007, considered the case submitted for resolution, in view of the
Manifestation of Judge dela Peña that he is submitting herein case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed; and the
failure of Judge Vestil to file any
manifestation within the period given in the Court’s Resolution dated February
7, 2007, despite due notice.
The
Court’s Ruling
The Court is in
full accord with the findings of the OCA but not
as to the recommended penalty insofar as Judge dela Peña is concerned.
Liability
of Judge dela Peña:
Judge dela Peña is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or
procedure tantamount to grave abuse of authority.[30] He completely disregarded the
basic provisions of the Rules of Court.
After
the direct testimony and cross-examination of Castro-Roa’s
witness on
The Minutes of the hearing held on
April 24, 2001, shows that Castro-Roa on that day
formally offered her exhibits and, for failure
of the defense counsel to appear, Judge dela Peña considered Rocky to
have waived his cross-examination of Castro-Roa.[32] As found by the CA, there were no transcripts
of stenographic notes of the hearing conducted on
Judge dela Peña flagrantly violated the basic order of
trial provided for in Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that after the plaintiff has adduced evidence in support of his complaint, the
defendant (in this case, Rocky) shall then adduce evidence in support of his
defense and his counterclaim.
It
is very glaring that Judge dela Peña
scandalously acted with such alarming undue haste in rendering a decision in
favor of Castro-Roa on the same day that the latter
purportedly offered her exhibits, without first affording Rocky the
opportunity to present his own evidence; and, as noted by the OCA, without
requiring the submission of the certification of the OSG as to whether he was
objecting to or was in agreement with the petition,
as then required in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals.[33]
In his Comments, Judge dela Peña could only say that it
was Rocky’s failure to cross-examine Castro-Roa’s witnesses and present his own witnesses “for the
reason that the lawyer has not conferred with his client [Rocky] despite his
advice to him which prompt[ed] the court to consider respondent [Rocky] to have
waived the cross-examination and the possible presentation of his evidence.”[34] However, Judge dela Peña failed to show
that there was a previous notice or warning given to Rocky that the presentation
of the latter’s evidence shall take place on the very same day,
In an attempt to show that Rocky was
fully aware of all the hearings and that it was his wish to submit the case for
decision on April 24, 2001, Judge dela Peña submitted to the Court an Affidavit
executed by Rocky on June 28, 2005
wherein Rocky stated that
he was notified of all the settings of the case and that in the morning of
April 24, 2001, he called
his lawyer to tell him that he was waiving his
right to present evidence and that he was submitting
the case for decision.[35]
Rocky’s
affidavit does not hold water. It has no
probative value, as it was executed only in 2005 after the CA had pointed out in its Decision the irregularities committed
by Judge dela Peña in the
hasty rendition of the Decision in favor of Castro-Roa;
and after the present administrative case was instituted. Evidently, it is self-serving.
More importantly, said affidavit is
absolutely inconsistent with the Minutes of
Judge
dela Peña
relies heavily on the admission of Rocky in his Affidavit that he had not been
appearing during the presentation of Castro-Roa’s
evidence despite due notice. To conclude
that Rocky was not interested in pursuing the case is not accurate. As Rocky stated in his Affidavit:
x x x In all the aforesaid proceedings, although I was properly notified and fully aware of, I did not appear by reason of financial constraints;
x x x x
That I appealed the case in the
Court of Appeals, but I thought it wise to no longer pursue the case, again
due to lack of funds.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Rocky’s Affidavit does not justify the act
of Judge dela Peña in rendering judgment without giving Rocky an
opportunity to present his own evidence.
It is well to emphasize that Judge dela
Peña’s Comment and the Minutes of
Moreover,
the allegation of Judge dela Peña
that he decided this case immediately in anticipation of an information he
received that he would be designated as acting presiding judge of another court
does not exculpate him from liability. As aptly observed by the OCA, it was not
sufficient justification to dispense with the presentation of evidence by
Rocky, as defendant, and outrightly render a decision
in favor of Castro-Roa on the same day.
A
judge should observe the usual and traditional mode of adjudication which
requires that he should hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep
the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. A judge must neither sacrifice for expediency’s
sake the fundamental requirements of due process nor forget that he must
conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply
the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially.[37] This is especially so since marriage, which
is the subject of the case before Judge dela Peña, is legally inviolable; thus, it is
protected from dissolution at the whim of the parties.[38]
True
is the principle that an administrative case is not the proper remedy for
alleged errors committed by a judge in deciding a case where a judicial remedy
exists. But in Roxas v. Eugenio,[39] the
Court held that until there is a final declaration by the
appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous,
there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent judge is administratively
liable; and in Senson v. Pangilinan[40] the Court
expounded that the existence of judicial remedy does not preclude
resort to an administrative remedy.[41]
And
while the CA may have already resolved the judicial remedy,
the ignorance of the judge of both substantive and procedural laws warrants an
administrative sanction.[42]
In
this case, the fact that the Solicitor General and Rocky elevated the Decision
of Judge dela Peña to the CA, and the CA thereafter rendered its Decision
on the same, does not bar this Court from taking cognizance of the
administrative liability of Judge dela Peña in rendering the assailed decision. The fact that the CA found that there were “very
apparent fatal irregularities” even
bolsters the administrative culpability of Judge dela Peña on the
matter.
As
the CA found very apparent fatal irregularities in Judge dela Peña’s Decision, clearly there exists sufficient ground to
find him administratively liable.
Finally,
the act of Judge dela Peña in
rendering a decision on the very same day that Castro-Roa
completed the presentation of her evidence without giving Rocky the opportunity
to present his evidence, thus, depriving him of due
process, is so gross, patent and deliberate that is tantamount to being
malicious and having been done in bad faith.
The
deplorable haste with which Judge dela Peña disposed of the Roa case, in complete disregard of the rights of
Rocky under the Rules of Court, shows his
utter lack of competence and integrity in the performance of his duties as a
presiding judge, tantamount to grave abuse of authority.
As
the Court held in De Leon v. Corpuz,[43]
x x x The observance
of the law, which respondent judge ought to know, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it; x x x failure
to consider a basic and elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of
his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position
and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
Canon 1 (Rule 1.01) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence. Canon 3 states that “A
judge should perform his official duties honestly and with impartiality and
diligence.” By his actuations, respondent
judge has shown his lack of integrity and diligence, thereby blemishing the
image of the judiciary.[44]
(Emphasis supplied)
For
his acts committed on April 24, 2001, Judge dela Peña committed gross ignorance of the law or procedure, which
is a serious offense under Section 2,[45] Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, punishable by dismissal from service, suspension
from office for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine
of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
under Section 10[46]
of the same Rule 140.
The
penalty of fine in the amount of P21,000.00
recommended by the OCA is inadequate and must be increased.
The
pendency of said administrative case against him
should have put Judge dela Peña on guard and made him more
cautious and circumspect in the discharge of duties. His failure to observe a basic rule, such as
the order of trial, manifests such gross ignorance of the law
that makes him unfit for the position of a judge or betrays a brazen attitude
in the discharge of his duties tantamount to grave abuse of judicial authority.
Judge dela
Peña’s infraction in the present case is akin to
rendering an unjust judgment. But the
difference between the present case and Neri
is that in the latter case, Judge dela
Peña awarded exorbitant damages. There is no showing or indication in this
case that there is any monetary consideration involved. On that premise, despite the warning made by
the Court in Neri, Judge dela
Peña deserves a penalty of fine of P40,000.00, pursuant to the De Leon case.
Liability of Judge Vestil
Judge Vestil is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law or procedure. His liability springs
from his injudicious issuance of the Order dated January 26, 2004, granting
Castro-Roa’s Motion despite the infirmities in
the notice of hearing and proof of service thereof. Like Judge dela Peña, Judge Vestil completely disregarded the basic rules provided for
in the Rules of Court.
Castro-Roa as
movant did not specify in her Motion the date and
time of its hearing; neither was Rocky furnished a copy thereof.[51] While there is an annotation in the Motion that Atty. Maninang was furnished a copy on “12/11/03,” it appears on
record that he had much earlier filed a motion to withdraw as Rocky’s counsel, with the conformity of Rocky, on July 31,
2001.[52] Evidently, Judge Vestil failed to familiarize himself with the records of
the Roa case before acting on the Motion.
It is a fundamental rule
that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant
except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party. The notice
of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date
of the hearing, with proof of service.[53] Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that every
written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served in such a manner as to ensure their receipt by the other party at
least three days before the date of hearing, while Section 6 states that no
written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof
of service thereof. Indeed, proof of
service is mandatory.[54] A motion without notice of hearing is pro
forma, or a mere scrap of paper which the court has no reason to
consider; while a motion without proof of service is nothing but an empty
formality deserving no judicial cognizance, and the rule mandates that the same
shall not be acted upon by the court.[55]
Judge Vestil’s
statement in his Order that Rocky and his counsel were served a copy of the Motion on
December 11, 2003, and yet no opposition or comment was filed thereto, does not
exculpate Judge Vestil from
liability. As found by the OCA, records
show that Rocky never received a copy of the Motion, either personally or
through counsel.[56]
Judge Vestil,
in granting Castro-Roa’s Motion, justifies the
same by citing, in his
Order, Sections 1[57] and 2[58] of Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court. Section 1 pertains
to dismissals as a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the
plaintiff before an answer or a motion for summary judgment has been served on
him by the defendant. The rule clearly does not apply to the
present case because not only was an Answer with Counterclaim already filed; a decision
was already rendered by the trial court which, however, was reversed by the CA
and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
On the other
hand, Section 2 refers to dismissals that are
discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is
filed by the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings other than before
service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment.[59] Section 2 provides that if a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint, and the dismissal
shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless, within 15
days from notice of the motion, he manifests
his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. It is imperative therefore
that Rocky should have been properly notified of said Motion, so that he
may be apprised of his rights under the Rules of Court.
The OCA also
found, and Judge Vestil admitted, that the January 26,
2004 Order which
set the hearing on the Motion for
Considering
that the Presiding Judge is in
Instead of correcting the improvident issuance by the Clerk of
Court, Judge Vestil issued the Order dated
The act of the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Bullecer-Cabahug, in issuing a Constancia on February
6, 2004, submitting the Motion to Dismiss Petition for
resolution was beyond her
duty as Clerk of Court. Such function is judicial in nature and it
was erroneous for Judge Vestil to have adopted the
same.
The Court is not swayed. Suffice it to be stated that the requirements
in Sections 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing and
proof of service thereof to the adverse party, far from being merely technical
and procedural, are necessary elements of procedural due process.[64] Failure to observe such simple rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
Under
Sections 8(9) and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the
law is a serious offense punishable by dismissal from service, suspension from
office for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
This
is not Judge Vestil’s first administrative infraction. In PDCP Development Bank v. Vestil,[65] Judge
Vestil was fined in the
amount of P5,000.00 and warned for issuing in grave
abuse of discretion a writ of preliminary injunction in interference with the
implementation of an order of another court of co-equal jurisdiction. In Sanchez
v. Vestil,[66] he was
suspended from office for one year without pay and fined P50,000.00 for gross dereliction of duty and grave misconduct
for failing to resolve 114 cases within the reglementary
period and to report such fact faithfully.
Considering that the act of
Judge Vestil in dismissing Castro-Roa’s
petition upon her motion despite lack of due notice of hearing, is not of the
same nature as in Sanchez, the Court finds the
penalty of fine of P21,000.00, as
recommended by the OCA to be reasonable and just.
A
verification from the Retirement Division, OCA, reveals that
Judge Vestil compulsorily retired on
The Court reiterates once more that although
a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous
order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be
negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse
the powers vested in them by the law, there will be not only confusion in the
administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements
of due process.[67] Further, it has been held that ignorance
of the law is the mainspring of injustice.[68] Members of the bench are therefore reminded
of their duty to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional
competence. They are called upon to
exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statues and procedural rules, for
their inexcusable failure to observe the same will render them administratively
liable.[69]
The Court has consistently held
that one who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the
public and the court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to
maintain professional competence at all times.
When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the confidence of the public in the courts.[70] Judges must be acquainted not only with legal
norms and precepts, but with procedural rules as well. They must be conversant with elementary rules
of procedure as well as settled authoritative doctrines.[71] They should strive for excellence surpassed
only by their passion for truth, to the end that they be the personification of
justice and the Rule of Law.[72]
WHEREFORE, Judge
Augustine A. Vestil, RTC, Branch 56, P21,000.00 to be
deducted from his accrued leave credits.
Judge Jesus dela
Peña, RTC, Branch 62, Oslob,
P40,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Emeline
Bullecer-Cabahug, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 56,
SO
ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 15 (TSN, January 29, 2001, p. 4).
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] “Mary Ann T.
Castro-Roa, Petitioner-Appellee,
v. Rocky Rommel T. Roa,
Respondent-Appellant, Republic of the
[19] Rollo, pp. 145-147.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] De
[31] Rollo, pp. 99, 110-116, 125.
[32]
[33] 335 Phil. 664, 679 (1997).
[34] Rollo, p. 199.
[35]
[36]
[37] Dayawon v. Garfin, 437 Phil. 139, 148 (2002).
[38]
Republic of the
[39]
A.M. No.
RTJ-06-2008,
[40] Senson v. Pangilinan, 457 Phil. 497 (2003).
[41]
[42]
De Jesus
v. Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1921,
[43] Supra note 30.
[44]
[45] Now Section 8,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by SC Administrative Memorandum No.
[46] Now Section 11, Rule 140, as amended, id.
[47]
A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1896,
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51] See rollo, p. 150.
[52]
[53] Boiser
v. Aguirre, Jr., G.R. No. RTJ-04-1886,
[54] Mutilan v. Adiong, 433 Phil. 25, 32 (2002).
[55] Boiser v. Aguirre, supra note 53.
[56] Rollo, p. 225.
[57] SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. --- A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim.
[58] SEC. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. --- Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.
[59] Limaco
v. Shonan Gakuen Children’s
House Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 158245,
[60] Rollo, p. 225.
[61] Supra note 16.
[62] Macias v. Macias, 457 Phil. 463, 471 (2003).
[63] Rollo, p. 212.
[64] Macias v. Macias, supra note 62.
[65] PDCP Development Bank v. Vestil, 332 Phil. 507, 512 (1996).
[66] 358 Phil. 477, 498 (1998).
[67]
[68] Abbariao v. Beltran,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1839,
[69]
[70] Bitoon v. Toledo-Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1598,
[71] Bitoon v. Toledo-Mupas, id. at 26; Vicente
v. Majaducon, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698,
[72] Vicente v. Majaducon, id..