EN BANC
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QBE INSURANCE PHILS., INC., represented
by MARCELINA VALLES, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE CELSO D. LAVIÑA, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 71, Respondent. |
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A.M. No. RTJ-06-1971 (Formerly OCA IPI No.03-1775-RTJ) Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO
MORALES, AZCUNA,*
TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
This is an administrative complaint[1]
filed by QBE Insurance Phils., Inc. (QBE Insurance), represented by Marcelina Valles,
against Judge Celso D. Laviña (Judge Laviña), Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch
71, for Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Knowingly
Rendering Unjust Interlocutory Orders, relative to Civil Case No. 68287
entitled, “Lavine Loungewear Mfg., Inc. v.
Philippine Fire and Marine Insurance Corporation, Inc., Rizal Surety and
Insurance Company, Tabacalera Insurance Company, First Lepanto-Taisho Insurance
Corporation and Equitable Insurance Corporation.”
Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing, Inc.
(Lavine) insured its buildings and supplies against fire with Philippine Fire
and Marine Insurance Corporation (PhilFire), Rizal Surety and Insurance Company
(Rizal Surety), Tabacalera Insurance Company (TICO), First Lepanto-Taisho
Insurance Corporation (First Lepanto), Equitable Insurance Corporation
(Equitable Insurance), and Reliance Insurance Corporation (Reliance Insurance).
On P112,245,324.34.
Lavine
demanded payment of the insurance proceeds from the insurers. The latter paid minimal amounts but refused
to pay the balance.
A complaint for collection of unpaid
fire insurance proceeds was filed by Lavine
against PhilFire, Rizal Surety, TICO, First Lepanto and Equitable Insurance
before the RTC of Pasig, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 68287.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
x x x x
B. Defendant Rizal Surety and Insurance Company
to pay plaintiff through Intervenors the amount of P17,100,000.00
representing unpaid insurance proceeds as actual or compensatory damages, with
twenty–nine (29%) per cent interest per annum from
On P17,100,000.00
representing unpaid insurance proceeds as actual or compensatory damages, with
twenty–nine per cent (29%) interest per annum from
Apparently,
notices of garnishment were served on all banks wherein Rizal Surety and TICO
maintained bank accounts/deposits. On
That in this particular case, due to deliberate haste by which simultaneous move to immediately implement said writ, the bank deposits of Rizal Surety and Insurance Company and Tabacalera Insurance Company were inadvertently garnished/levied considering that both insurance companies were not properly served and/or they have not officially received and acknowledged copy of the writ of execution pending appeal, hence, the Court has no jurisdiction over them as far as the execution of the said writ is concerned;
That
the copy of the writ of execution against Rizal Surety and Insurance Co., has
not been served because said defendant recently changed its corporate name to
QBE Insurance (Phils.) Inc., and that Tabacalera Insurance Company was under
receivership with the Insurance Commission;
That under the circumstances, it is necessary that an Order be issued directing the Sheriff to lift and/or cancel the notice of garnishment served to all banks wherein Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., and Tabacalera Insurance Company maintained bank accounts/deposits. (Underscoring supplied.)
On
Considering
that defendant Rizal Surety and Insurance Company has recently changed its name
and transferred its operation to Q.B.E. Insurance Philippines, Inc., the writ
may be implemented against said defendant Rizal Surety under its new name
Q.B.E. Insurance Philippines, Inc.
The Urgent Ex-parte Manifestation/Motion filed by Branch Sheriff IV Cresenciano Rabello, Jr. to allow him to lift and/or cancel the notices of garnishment previously served upon banks wherein defendant Rizal Surety and Insurance Company and defendant Tabacalera Insurance Company maintained their bank accounts/deposits, with its merit, is hereby NOTED and GRANTED. The previous notices of garnishment, without service yet of the special order and the writ are LIFTED.
Almost
a year later, or on
On
It appears that QBE Insurance also
filed with the sheriff an affidavit[6]
of third-party claim on
On
15 May 2003, Judge Laviña denied[7]
QBE Insurance’s urgent motion to lift the previously issued Order and Notice of
Garnishment on the basis of his finding that QBE Insurance was merely a conduit
or alter ego of Rizal Surety and they were one and the same, apparently basing
his conclusion on the manifestation dated 24 May 2002 of Sheriff Rabello that
Rizal Surety recently changed its corporate name to QBE Insurance. In the same Order, Judge Laviña deleted the
phrase “recently changed its name” mentioned in his previous Order dated
The Orders dated 27 May 2002, 15 May 2003
and 19 May 2003 were the subjects of a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77073,
wherein the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 31 May 2004 nullifying
said Orders on the basis of its finding that the same were issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The Decision was
elevated to this Court, where it is now docketed as G.R. No. 165855 and is still
pending up to this time.
It must be emphasized that although
this case assails the orders of Judge Laviña (Orders dated
QBE
Insurance filed an administrative complaint[9]
against Judge Laviña for Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Knowingly Rendering Unjust Interlocutory Orders. QBE Insurance alleged that on 24 March 2003,
Deputy Sheriff Cresenciano Rabello, Jr. of Branch 71, RTC, Pasig City, served a
notice of garnishment levying on the bank accounts of Rizal Surety and
Insurance Company “and/or QBE Insurance, Phils., Inc.,” as a result of which, QBE
Insurance’s bank accounts were frozen and were not allowed to earn interest by
the banks. It was only then that QBE
Insurance learned that the garnishment was in connection with the execution pending
appeal of a Decision dated 2 April 2002 against Rizal Surety in Civil Case No.
68287 entitled, “Lavine Loungewear Mfg.,
Inc. v. Philippine Fire and Marine Insurance Corporation, Inc., et al.” of
Branch 71, RTC, Pasig City. Judge Laviña
allegedly acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued the Order dated 27
May 2002, directing the execution of the judgment against QBE Insurance which
was not a party to the case. The Order
dated 27 May 2002 was based on the mere manifestation and motion of Judge
Laviña’s sheriff who was not required to present any evidence to prove that Rizal
Surety had changed its corporate name to QBE Insurance Phils., Inc. Judge Laviña also rendered unjust
interlocutory Orders dated 15 May 2003 and 19 May 2003 which respectively denied
QBE Insurance’s urgent motion to lift the 27 May 2002 Order and the 24 March
2003 Notice of Garnishment and held that the motion to quash the third-party
claim of QBE Insurance had been mooted. QBE
Insurance also averred that Judge Laviña totally disregarded the overwhelming
evidence it presented in support of said motion to lift the 27 May 2002 Order
and 24 March 2003 Notice of Garnishment, as Judge Laviña mistakenly relied on
the “Business Run-Off Agreement” between Rizal Surety and QBE Insurance. Said agreement was terminated in 2002, and it did
not make QBE Insurance answerable for any of Rizal Surety’s obligations. Further, QBE Insurance averred that Judge
Laviña disregarded the certifications issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Insurance Commission showing that Rizal Surety and QBE
Insurance were separate entities.
In
his Comment, Judge Laviña alleged that his Order dated 15 May 2003 denying QBE
Insurance’s motion to lift the Order dated 27 May 2002 and Notice of
Garnishment dated 24 March 2003 were issued after hearing, wherein the parties
presented their respective evidence; that he was personally convinced that
there was sufficient proof to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate
existence due to the close relationship between Rizal Surety and QBE Insurance.
It was not correct for QBE Insurance to
claim that his Order of
In
its Reply[10]
to the Comment of Judge Laviña, QBE Insurance alleged that his admission that
he had taken the word of his sheriff that Rizal Surety had recently changed its
corporate name to QBE Insurance, showed his abuse of discretion, gross
ignorance of the law and deliberate issuance of the Order dated 27 May 2002. Judge Laviña’s Order of 27 May 2002 clearly
authorized the sheriff to execute the judgment against QBE Insurance. The fact that no execution was made from 27 May
2003 until the issuance of the Notice of Garnishment on 27 March 2003 is of no
moment, because the non-service by the sheriff of the writ was pursuant to a request
made by the judgment obligor not to proceed with its implementation. The Orders dated 15 May 2003 and 19 May 2003
were not based on the hearings conducted because Judge Laviña relied solely on
the “Business Run-Off Agreement” and the “Affidavit of Cessation of
Underwriting Business.”
Pursuant
to the report and recommendation of the Court Administrator, the case was
re-docketed as an administrative matter in a Resolution dated 13 February 2006
and referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. for
investigation, report and recommendation, but the latter inhibited himself from
handling the case.
Per
Resolution[11]
dated
Whether the issuance by respondent
of the subject Ordered dated
On
Re: Order dated
The foregoing considerations show
that [Judge Laviña] acted with gross ignorance of the law and procedure
(Section 8, paragraph 9, Rule 140, Rules of Court) when he denied [QBE
Insurance] the opportunity to be heard before issuing the Order of May 27, 2002
on the basis solely of the sheriff’s ex parte manifestation/motion. Under Section 11, paragraph (A) of Rule 140,
Rules of Court, [Judge Laviña] may be dismissed, suspended or meted a fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Since [Judge Laviña], as found by
the Office of the Court Administrator, had been sanctioned to pay a fine of P5,000.00
in another case, A.M. RTJ-00-1553, it is recommended that [Judge Laviña] be
meted a fine of P30,000.00 in the present case. This recommendation, however, is without
prejudice to the Supreme Court’s determination of the petition filed in G.R.
No. 165855 involving the validity of the same Order dated
Re: Orders dated May 15 and 19, 2003
Inasmuch as [Judge Laviña] eventually afforded
[QBE Insurance] the opportunity to be heard when the latter filed its motion to
lift Order dated May 27, 2002 and notice of garnishment dated March 24, 2003,
and there being no clear showing that [Judge Laviña] acted with fraud,
dishonesty, bad faith, corrupt motives or manifest partiality, the Orders dated
May 15, 2003 and May 19, 2003, even if they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion, cannot be said to have been knowingly issued in bad faith. As noted in his Order dated May 15, 2003, [Judge
Laviña] pierced the veil of corporate fiction and treated [QBE Insurance] and
Rizal Surety as one and the same, not merely on the basis of one circumstance,
such as the common directors of [QBE Insurance] and Rizal Surety, but also the
several other circumstances borne by the Affidavit of Cessation of Underwriting
Business, Business Run-off Agreement and lease contract, among others. Thus, [Judge Laviña] found that the notion of
separate personality of a corporation was being used to evade payment of Rizal
Surety’s unpaid insurance liabilities to Lavine. Hence, the undersigned recommends the dismissal
of the administrative charges against [Judge Laviña] insofar as the Orders
dated May 15 and 19, 2003 are concerned.
Unlike the earlier recommendation
for the imposition of fine with respect to the Order dated
We reiterate the rule that not every
error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders
him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate
intent to do an injustice. Good faith
and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.
On the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, the OCA was correct in absolving respondent. As a rule, the acts of judges pertaining to their judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary power, unless such acts are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. In the absence of proof to the contrary, an erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith. [QBE Insurance], in this case, failed to show that [Judge Laviña] had rendered the questioned judgment with ill motives.[12]
We partially agree in the
recommendation of the Investigating Justice, in the sense that we find Judge
Laviña guilty of Gross Ignorance of Law in issuing the Order dated
The issues for our consideration in
this case are (1) whether Judge Laviña erred in issuing the following orders:
(1) Order dated
(2) Order dated 15 May 2003 denying QBE Insurance’s motion to lift the Order dated 27 May 2002 and 24 March 2003 notice of garnishment; and
(3)
Order dated
and (2) whether Judge Lavina is administratively
liable therefor.
The case hinges on the legal effects
of the implementation of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 68287 to
which QBE Insurance was not a party. The
writ was issued by virtue of the judgment rendered by the RTC, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
B. Defendant Rizal Surety and
Insurance Company to pay plaintiff through Intervenors the amount of P17,100,000.00
representing unpaid insurance proceeds as actual or compensatory damages, with
twenty–nine (29%) per cent interest per annum from
It must be noted that QBE
Insurance was not a party to Civil Case No. 68287 wherein the writ of execution was issued. Neither was it included in the Writ of
Execution issued by Judge Laviña.
Generally accepted is the
principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the
court. In the same manner an execution
can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day
in court.[14] In Lorenzana
v. Cayetano,[15]
this Court held that only real parties-in-interest in an action are bound by
judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition
issued pursuant thereto.
Indeed, a judgment cannot
bind persons who are not parties to the action. It is elementary that strangers to a case are
not bound by the judgment rendered by the court and such judgment is not
available as an adjudication either against or in favor of such other person. A decision of a court will not operate to
divest the rights of a person who has not and has never been a party to a
litigation, either as plaintiff or as defendant. Verily, execution of a judgment can only be
issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not
being a party to the action, has not yet had his day in court.[16] That execution may only be effected against
the property of the judgment debtor, who must necessarily be a party to the
case.[17]
The writ of execution must
conform to the judgment which is to be executed,[18] as it may not vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of
the judgment which is sought to be executed.
Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it
life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the
constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due
process of law.[19]
In
the case at bar, there is no basis for the immediate issuance of the Order
dated 27 May 2002, directing the implementation of the Writ of Execution
against QBE Insurance. The same was
issued hastily without giving QBE Insurance an opportunity to defend itself and
oppose the request of the intervenors in Civil Case No. 68287 for the issuance
of a writ of execution against it. In
fact, it does not appear that QBE Insurance was at all furnished with a copy of
intervenors’ letter requesting for the Execution of Judge Laviña’s Decision in
Civil Case No. 68287. QBE Insurance was
suddenly made liable upon the Order of Execution issued based on Judge Laviña’s
expedient conclusions that Rizal Surety and QBE Insurance are one and the
same. Until the issuance of the Writ of
Execution, QBE Insurance was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as
having any participation in the insurance contract between Lavine and Rizal Surety. Hence, the action
of Judge Laviña directing the implementation of a writ of execution against a
person not party to the case disregards the most basic tenets of due process
and elementary fairness.
There is no question that the writ of
execution was issued against the judgment debtors (Rizal Surety, among other
insurance companies) in Civil Case No. Q-68287, before the RTC of
Hence, QBE Insurance remains a third
person to the judgment in Civil Case No. 68287 and cannot be bound by it. Nor can the writ of execution issued pursuant
to said judgment be enforced against QBE Insurance since it was not afforded
its day in court.
We agree with the Investigating
Justice that Judge Laviña is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he issued
the
As can be seen, the law involved is
simple and elementary; lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know
the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence
requires no less.[20]
A judge owes it to himself and his
office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal
know-how correctly and justly. When a
judge displays utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance
of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. As an advocate of justice and a visible
representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the
interpretation of our laws. When the law
is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound
to know, excuses no one - not even judges.
Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire
tenetur non excusat.[21]
As we held in Monterola v. Judge
Caoibes, Jr.[22]:
Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross ignorance of the law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one - not even judges - from compliance therewith x x x. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious in the principles of law. Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is to vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.[23] (Emphasis supplied.)
Competence is a mark of a good
judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules,
he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts.[24]
It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal
principles.[25]
Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.[26]
Also, Judge Laviña had ignored QBE
Insurance’s fundamental right to due process. He acted too precipitately
in ordering the implementation of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 68287 against QBE Insurance, a corporation which was not a party to the
said case, based on an unproven allegation that said corporation is one and the
same as Rizal Surety, one of the defendants in said case against whom judgment
was rendered. As a judge, Judge Lavina
is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence.[27]
Unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of incompetence.
Clearly, in the case at bar, Judge
Laviña displayed gross ignorance of the law in failing to observe the
requirements of due process. He was ignorant of the basic and simple
procedural rules in implementing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 68287.
Judge Laviña’s actions visibly indicate his lack of sufficient grasp of
the law.
While judges should not be disciplined
for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of
judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with
fundamental and basic legal principles in order to merit the confidence of the
citizenry. Judge Laviña has shown lack
of familiarity with our laws, rules and regulations as to undermine the public
confidence in the integrity of the courts.[28]
With respect to
the Orders dated 15 and
We further hold
that, for the same act, Judge Laviña is liable for Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Interlocutory Order. The facts show that
all the necessary elements are present in the case at bar: (1) that the
offender is a judge; and (2) that he performs any of the following acts: (a) he
knowingly renders an unjust interlocutory order or decree; OR (b) he renders a
manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence[29]
or ignorance.[30]
Judge Laviña cannot be said to be unaware that a hearing is required before
issuing a writ of execution. The
requirement of a hearing is a basic tenet. It was completely defiled when Judge Laviña,
hastily and without hearing, directed the implementation of the writ of
execution against QBE Insurance which was not a party to the case and was not
given an opportunity to explain its side, upon mere manifestation of Branch
Sheriff, Cresenciano Rabello, Jr., who stated that Rizal Surety had changed its
corporate name to QBE Insurance.[31] In fact, a notice of garnishment against the
bank account of QBE Insurance was served almost one year later. Thus, his failure to observe the basic
requirements of due process is inexcusable.
Moreover,
Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure already
provide for the proper procedure if the judgment is unsatisfied against the
judgment obligor, or if another person or other juridical entity has property
of such judgment obligor. Whichever rule
is applied, there is a requirement that the judgment obligor, or the person who
has property of such judgment obligor, to appear before the court and be examined
concerning the same. The failure of respondent
to observe the procedure in Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 contributed to the
finding of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Interlocutory Order.
The records show that
this is not Judge Laviña’s first administrative case. It may not be amiss to mention that Judge Celso
Laviña has been administratively sanctioned by the
Court in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1553 wherein
he was fined P5,000.00, for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Administration of Justice for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1818[32]
and Supreme Court Circulars No. 13-93[33]
& No. 68-94[34];
and in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1957 where he was fined P20,000.00 for Ignorance
of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.
Under Rule 140, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No.
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the
respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Judge
Laviña is liable for two administrative offenses - first, for Gross Ignorance
of the Law and second, for Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Interlocutory Order. As abovementioned, both offenses are
classified as serious charges and carry the same penalty. Section 17, Rule XIV of the CSC Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides that when the
respondent is guilty of two or more charges, the penalty for the most serious
charge should be imposed and the other charges may be considered as aggravating
circumstances. Following said civil
service rule, we thus impose only the penalty for the most serious charge. In other words, we only impose one penalty
for the two charges.
Given the foregoing premises,
we find that the imposition of the fine in the amount of P40,000.00,
reasonable.
Judge Laviña compulsorily retired from the service on
WHEREFORE, Judge
Celso Laviña is found LIABLE for
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Interlocutory
Order in issuing the Order dated P40,000.00) PESOS, to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.
Let
a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Laviña’s 201 File.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
On official leave
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
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ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
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On official leave
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
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DANTE O. TINGA
Associate
Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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Associate Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-39272,
[15]
168 Phil. 637, 643-644 (1977).
[16]
St. Dominic Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70623
and No. L-48630,
[17] De Guzman v. Ong, 363 Phil. 548, 556-557 (1999).
[18]
Buan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101614,
[19]
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 331
Phil. 795, 811 (1996).
[20]
Villanueva v. Almazan, 384 Phil. 776, 786 (2000).
[21]
Español v. Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348,
[22] 429 Phil. 59 (2002).
[23]
[24]
Fr. Guillen v. Judge Cañon, 424 Phil. 81, 88 (2002).
[25] Borja-Manzano
v. Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329,
[26] Pesayco
v. Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889,
[27]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Veneracion, 389 Phil.
483, 493 (2000).
[28]
Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510,
[29] There is inexcusable negligence on
the part of the judge when he fails to observe in the performance of his duties
that degree of diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in
the rendition of any public service. (Cuaresma
v. Enriquez, A.M. No. MTJ-91-608,
[30]
Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr., 380 Phil. 318, 324 (2000).
[31]
Notably, Sheriff Rabello was
already held administratively liable precisely for that act in a Resolution
dated
[32] Prohibiting courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure and natural resource development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the Government.
[33] Subject: Presidential Decree No. 1818.
[34]
Strict observance of Section 1
of Presidential Decree 1818 envisioned by Circular No. 13-93, dated
[35] Re: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re Discipline of Justice and Judges.