THE
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
Appellant.
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
Salvador Santos, Jr. y Salvador (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 with illegal sale and possession of shabu in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165[1] (R.A. 9165), to wit:
CRIMINAL
CASE No. 6365
That
on or about the 28th day of August 2002 in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell,
deliver and give away to another person one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of
white crystalline substance weighing 0.08 gram which was found positive result
(sic) to the screening and confirmatory test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[2]
CRIMINAL
CASE No. 6366
That
on or about the 28th day of August 2002 in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and control white crystalline substance placed in twelve (12)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachets with a total weight of 1.36 grams which
were found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[3]
Appellant entered a negative plea to both charges.[4]
The two cases were jointly heard. At the trial, the prosecution presented its
lone witness, PO3 Juanito L. Tougan.
Tougan, who was assigned at the
Intelligence Section of the P200.00
which bore Tougan’s initials, “JLT.” After taking the
money, appellant went back inside the house and returned with a plastic sachet
of shabu. Tougan got hold of
the plastic sachet of shabu, held appellant’s
hand and introduced himself as a policeman. Tougan
then directed appellant to empty his pockets of their contents. Tougan recovered the two (2) one hundred peso bills used as
marked money and twelve (12) plastic sachets of shabu
contained inside a white box. The
police officers thereafter brought appellant to the police station. There, Tougan wrote his initials on all the thirteen (13) sachets
of shabu. A document was prepared for these to be
examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. Tougan also stated
that he had executed a sworn statement regarding the buy-bust incident.[5]
On cross-examination, Tougan
stated that appellant had been included in a drug-watch list submitted by the barangay captain containing the names of drug pushers in
the area. At the time of appellant’s
apprehension, however, the barangay captain had
already discontinued submission of the said list to the police. Tougan was directed by the judge to bring to court the
watch list he had talked about. [6]
At the next hearing, Tougan
presented the watch list for the years 2000 and 2001. He explained that
appellant was not included in the said list as the latter was then detained in the
provincial jail for another criminal charge. He disclosed, however, that the
latest watch list in possession of the police department was dated July 2003.[7]
As lone witness for the defense, appellant testified that
at around P180.00. Meantime, Pontilla searched the table and got hold of a set of dart
pins owned by appellant’s son. Appellant asked the police officers why they came
to his house and they replied that they had been harboring a grudge against him
because he no longer wanted to serve as their informer. He saw Pontilla
take a box out of his pocket and heard
him say that it contained shabu and
drug paraphernalia. He told Pontilla that if the box
was his he would not have placed it on the table but instead hidden it from his
children. Pontilla replied, “tumigil
ka diyan, tumahimik ka.”
At the time of the commotion, appellant stated that the members of his family
stayed in another room and were very afraid.
Pontilla told appellant’s wife, “ilabas mo na iyan” to which she replied, “Ano
ang ilalabas ko? Pinerwisyo ninyo na nga
kami.” Afterwards, appellant was handcuffed and
dragged to the police station where he was detained at once without being
informed of his rights.[8]
Appellant also testified that aside from being a police
informer, he also worked as a tricycle driver. He likewise stated that he was
applying for a job at the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and that he had a
recommendation from police officer Amatong. He denied
being a drug pusher, as well as receiving the marked money. And while appellant
believed that the evidence against him had been planted, he did not file a
complaint against the police officers because nobody would attend to his
complaint.[9]
On cross-examination, appellant stated that he volunteered
to be a police informer and served as such from May to July 2002. During this
period, he reported to the police officers four times and had acted three times as a
poseur-buyer. He, however, decided to sever his ties with the police officers as
the latter reneged on their promise to give him money each time a drug pusher was
arrested. He also claimed that the police officers had him arrested in order to
conceal the illegal acts they had committed during arrests, such as
confiscating all the belongings and monies of the person arrested. But he admitted having been previously
indicted in two (2) cases for selling and possessing shabu.[10]
On re-direct examination, he revealed that he was released from imprisonment on
After trial, the trial court rendered a Decision[12]
dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, accused SALVADOR SANTOS Y SALVADOR is hereby found GUILTY as charged beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to Life
Imprisonment and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOSAND (sic) (P500,000.00) PESOS for Violation of Section 5, of R.A. 9165 and to
suffer an imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE DAY TO TWENTY YEARS (20) and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00)
PESOS for violation of Section 11, of
the same law.
SO
ORDERED.[13]
Appellant elevated the judgment of conviction to the Court
of Appeals. Before the Court of Appeals, he argued that the trial court erred: (1)
in convicting him of the crimes charged despite the prosecution’s failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) in giving credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witness.[14]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in lieu of an appellee’s brief, filed a Manifestation and Motion for Acquittal.[15]
It submitted that there existed
reasonable doubt on the culpability of appellant as the identity of the corpus
delicti was not sufficiently established and the
testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Tougan, was
of doubtful veracity.[16]
It further maintained that should there be
reservations regarding the innocence of appellant, the equipoise rule should
apply.[17]
The Court of Appeals in a Decision[18]
dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The appealed DECISION dated November 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is hereby instead sentenced in
Criminal Case No. 6366 to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal. Needless to add, the P300,000.00 fine STANDS.
The
regulated drug subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the Government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
With
costs against the accused-appellent.
SO
ORDERED.[19]
The Court of Appeals held that absent any arbitrariness or
oversight in the appreciation of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance, it would not disturb on appeal the trial court’s evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses. The Court of Appeals, moreover, stated that police
officers involved in buy-bust operations are presumed to have performed their
duties regularly. The fact that appellant’s name was not actually found in the
drug-watch list provided by Tougan did not constitute
inconsistency nor did it render doubtful his entire testimony. The watch list
was brought up by the prosecution only to highlight the fact that appellant was
previously involved in the illegal peddling of drugs and that the buy-bust
operation was prompted by reliable information.[20]
The Court of Appeals dismissed appellant’s defense of
frame-up as self-serving and uncorroborated. It ruled that the evidence on
record supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[21]
The appellate court, however, modified the penalty imposed by the trial court
in Criminal Case No. 6366. The appellate court reduced the prison term of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, imposed by the trial court, to
an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. The fine of P300,000.00
stood.[22]
Appellant is now before the Court reiterating his previous
submissions. Through his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary Brief)[23]
dated
There is merit in the appeal.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
has the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the
quantum of evidence required. Corollarily, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of
the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence,
the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which
case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and hence, the accused shall
be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the
defense bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation
of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind
rest each upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict a criminal charge, but moral certainty is
required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.[25]
In the case at bar, the testimony for the prosecution and for
the defense are diametrically opposed to each other. The prosecution’s version
of events solely consisted of Tougan’s testimony
regarding the buy-bust operation whereas appellant, who cried frame-up, was
presented as the lone witness for the defense. In resolving such conflict,
which involves the credibility of witnesses, the usual rule is for the Court to
respect the findings of the trial court, it having had the opportunity to hear
the witnesses themselves and to observe their deportment and manner of
testifying during trial. Nonetheless, the rule admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, the factual findings of the trial court may be reversed if, by the
evidence or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.[26]
The trial court decreed appellant’s guilt as follows:
His
admission of knowing drug violators in
Accused,
himself admitted he was arrested and convicted by RTC Branch 77 San Mateo, Rizal and records of this Court confirms this fact. He averred, thus:
x x x
The
two (2) drug cases previously filed with this Court, against the accused were
Criminal cases nos. 3483-98 and 3484-98, which resulted to his convictions for
possession and drug pushing and was sentenced to a jail term of two (2) years
for each case. Two (2) more cases were filed against him with another Court,
RTC. Br. 75 for violation of Section 16, R.A. 6425, as amended which also
resulted to his convictions and a jail term of one (1) year for each case,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3711 and 3819.
Accused
allegation (sic) that he was illegally arrested because the police harbored a
grudge against him for refusing to continue to be their informer deserves scant
consideration. The police has at their disposable several informants who can
help them in gathering information in their area of jurisdiction. The loss of
one (1) informant will not adversely affect their police operations on illegal
drug activities.
Another
allegation of the accused that the evidence against him was planted because he
came to know their illegal activities in apprehending drug violators by taking
their belongings or their money is unsubstantiated by evidence and cannot be
given any credence.
x x x
If
the policemen planted the drugs as alleged by the accused why did he not tell
it to his wife or to any member of his family or to anybody in their community
or better still filed (sic) a complaint against the abusive policemen. But not
a whimper of the protest was heard from him belying his claim of being
framed-up.
The court has ruled in a litany of cases that
frame-up, like alibi, is viewed with disfavor for it is self-serving, it can
easily be fabricated and is a common standard defense ploy in most prosecution
for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Clear and convincing evidence is
required to prove the defense, which the accused in this case failed to
sustain.
What the
police operatives did was in accordance with law and absence of any proof of
any wrong-doing or ill-motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of their official functions prevail.
The
elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs have been
complied and proven. The identity of the buyer and seller, the object and
consideration and the delivery of the thing sold and payment thereto.
In
this case the buyer was the prosecution witness Tougan
who acted as poseur – buyer and the seller was the herein accused. The object
was the shabu sold in consideration of two (2)
hundred pesos which was received by the accused. The prohibited drugs
confiscated were presented and identified by the prosecution witness in Court,
which was not objected to by the defense. No doubt the transaction or sale
found in the possession of the accused and they were all presented and
identified by the accused with his initials “JLT.”[27]
x x x
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.[28]
What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of the dangerous drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt of the marked money consummates the buy-bust transaction between
the entrapping officers and the accused.[29]
An examination of the decision of the trial court reveals
that apart from heavily relying on the sole testimony of Tougan,
it used appellant’s admission of his previous convictions, his declaration as a
police informer and the presumption of regularity of Tougan’s
performance of his duties as anchor for finding appellant guilty.
The Court, however, finds such reliance on Tougan’s testimony misplaced. Other than his bare
statements, Tougan’s testimony is unsubstantiated by
other proof that the alleged buy-bust operation, through which appellant was
apprehended, took place. In light of appellant’s theory that he was framed up,
it is imperative that the prosecution present more evidence to support Tougan’s allegations. The prosecution could have easily
presented the other police officers, namely Arrellano
and Pontilla, who Tougan
claimed were members of his backup team. As it is, the lack of any other
evidence to buttress Tougan’s declaration reduces it
into a self-serving assertion. Curiously, the prosecution never offered
rebuttal evidence to refute appellant’s defense of frame-up. This omission does not hold well for the
cause of the prosecution. It creates doubts on whether there has actually been
any buy-bust operation at all.
The Court also agrees with the OSG’s contention that the
inconsistencies in Tougan’s testimony on the matter
of the list should not be ignored.[30]
During trial, when Tougan was asked whether appellant’s
name appeared in the list, he categorically answered in the affirmative. Then
again, it surfaced that this assertion was untruthful as the list he had brought
to court did not contain appellant’s name. The Court believes that Tougan’s lack of candidness on this detail renders the rest
of his testimony doubtful.[31]
Moreover, the Court finds that the trial court erred in
allowing Tougan to use the mantle of regularity of
official functions to prop up his allegations.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot
by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. As the Court ruled in People v. Ambrosio:[32]
The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant’s
conviction because, [f]irst, the presumption is
precisely just that—a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this
case, x x x [it] cannot be
regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
While buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is well
to recall that —
x x x
by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment
procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which
sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug
deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be
extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower
court should have exercised the utmost diligence and prudence in deliberating
upon accused-appellant’s guilt. It should have given more serious consideration
to the pros and cons of the evidence offered by both defense and the State and
many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in determining the
merits of the present case.[34]
Consequently, courts are
required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe
testing, and the presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than
casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of
the accused.[35]
Significantly, the Court agrees with the OSG’s observation that the identity of the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently established. Tougan’s testimony does not definitively express that the confiscated plastic sachets of shabu have been marked/initialed at the scene of the crime, according to proper procedure. Tougan testified as follows:
PUBLIC PROS. MAJOMOT
Q After
that, what did you do after you recovered or confiscated these plastic sachets
from the accused?
A After he was arrested, sir, we brought
him to the police station.
Q After
that, what happened next?
A When we
reached the police station, sir, he gave his name as Salvador Santos.
Q What
happened to the plastic sachets?
A I wrote my initials on all the plastic
sachets or the evidence confiscated from him, sir, and a document was prepared
for them to be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.[36]
The case of People v. Lim[37] specifies that any apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was the same drug and/or paraphernalia as that actually recovered from the accused. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.
On the point that appellant has previously been charged with and convicted of similar offenses, the Court believes that the trial court wrongly considered such circumstance for the purpose of showing that he was likely to commit the crimes charged in the indictment. Evidence of collateral offenses must not be received as substantive evidence of the offenses on trial.[38]
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated.
This, however, cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[39]
Moreover, when the circumstances are
capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with
guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.[40]
All told, given the attendant circumstances, the Court
entertains serious doubts as to the culpability of appellant and its mind
cannot rest easily upon the certainty of his guilt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 17 November 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77
in Criminal Case Nos. 6365 and 6366 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant SALVADOR
SANTOS, JR. y
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to
implement this decision forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5)
days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[12]CA
rollo, pp. 13-23; Penned by Honorable
Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr., now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
[18]Rollo, pp. 2-19; Penned by Associate Justice Martin
S. Villarama, Jr.,
with the concurrence of Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin
and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo.
[37]G.R.
No. 141699,