FIRST DIVISION
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GILBERT G. GUY, Petitioner, - versus - Respondent. |
G.R. No. 174874
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
|
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In
this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Gilbert G. Guy (Guy, for short) seeks to annul and set aside
the Decision[1] dated
September 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94361, reversing the Resolution[2] dated
April 20, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice[3] in
I.S. No. 05-01-00365 and I.S. No.
Undisputed are the following factual antecedents:
In 1993, herein
respondent Asia United Bank (AUB) granted 3D Industries, Inc. (3D, hereafter) a
loan in the form of stand-by letter of credit (L/C) in the amount of P30
million. To guarantee
the loan accommodation, Guy, as then Vice President for Operations of 3D and a
member of its Board of Directors, and then 3D President Paulino Delfin Pe (Pe)
executed on P11,287,264.00, more or less. For the import transactions, Pe signed
several trust receipts in favor of AUB before the imported goods were released
to 3D. As specifically provided in the trust receipts thus signed, 3D shall
sell the goods for the account of, and, thereafter, remit the proceeds of the sale to, AUB not
later than the fixed periods therein stated, or to account for the same, if
unsold.[4]
The succeeding relevant events are summarized in the
assailed CA Decision, as follows:
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However, 3D failed to comply with its
obligation as expressly specified in the trust receipts. Consequently, [respondent] AUB sent [two]
demand letters … to 3D [and], to [petitioner] GUY, for the latter to remit the
proceeds of the goods in the total amount of P12, 148,816.90 covered by the
subject trust receipts. When said
demands went unheeded, … AUB filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasig City two (2) complaints against … GUY, as majority and controlling
stockholder [of 3D] and by virtue of his continuing guaranty, for estafa under
Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code [RPC] in relation to P.D. No. 115
or the Trust Receipts Law, docketed as I.S.
No. 05-01-00365 and I.S. No. 05-03-02371, respectively.
During
the preliminary investigation, … GUY alleged that PE, 3D’s former President,
who executed and signed the subject trust receipts, should have been charged
instead of him because it was PE who actively managed the business affairs of
3D at the time when the subject trust receipts were issued. He claimed that being the majority and
controlling stockholder of 3D did not automatically make him liable for the
offenses charged because he … had no hand in the management of 3D.
[Petitioner] GUY further alleged that the
goods [covered by] the trust receipts …
were subsequently delivered [by 3D] to Northern Islands Company, Inc. (NICI),
the exclusive distributor of 3D, for the sale and distribution thereof. Thus, when the said goods or the proceeds of
the sale thereof were not accounted for by NICI after demands to account for
the same were made by 3D, the latter filed several cases against NICI. This circumstance purportedly prevented 3D
from complying with the terms and conditions provided for under the subject
trust receipts.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 13, 2005, the Investigating
Prosecutor, Emmanuel L. Obungen, … came out with the Joint Resolution, in I.S.
No. 05-01-00365 and I.S. No. 05-03-02371, finding probable cause for the
offenses charged. Accordingly, he filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 67, Pasig City two (2)
Informations for estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the [RPC] in relation to
P.D. No. 115, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 131883 and 131884.
Aggrieved, [Guy] filed with the DOJ
[Department of Justice] a Petition for Review, to which [AUB filed] a comment
….
On
[Petitioner] GUY admittedly received a copy
of the
[Respondent] AUB filed its … its
Comment/Manifestation [to the motion for reconsideration] on
xxx xxx xxx
On April
20, 2006, [DOJ Secretary] GONZALEZ, issued the assailed Resolution, in
I.S. No. 05-01-00365 and I.S. No. 05-03-02371, this time, granting the
petition for review and reversing his December 22, 2005 Resolution, [disposing] … as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for
Review filed by respondent-appellant Gilbert G. Guy is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Resolution
dated
SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets
added.)
In gist, the Secretary
of Justice predicated his reversal order on the absence of evidence to prove (a)
the actual and direct participation of Guy in the trust receipts transactions;
(b) Guy’s receipt of the goods covered by the trust receipts; and (c) finally Guy’s
misappropriation or conversion of the goods subject of the trust receipts and/or
the proceeds of the sale thereof.
On
By Resolution[5] dated
Eventually, on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The April 20, 2006 Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The October 13,
2005 Joint Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
which found probable cause for estafa against [petitioner Guy], and the
December 22, 2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, which denied [Guy’s]
petition for review, are hereby REINSTATED.
SO
ORDERED. (Words in brackets added; emphasis in the original.)
The CA confined and predicated its reversal action
on the lone issue of loss of jurisdiction, as reflected on the ensuing
statements embodied in its challenged decision:
This
decision is purely about the [DOJ Secretary’s) loss of jurisdiction. It
is basic that all [his] Resolutions are void after his loss of
jurisdiction. There is no weighing
evidence nor any discretion at all when loss of jurisdiction is the issue. The law is explicit … that Resolutions
rendered without jurisdiction produce no legal effect whatsoever.
In this case, Secretary of Justice GONZALES
acted without jurisdiction in issuing the April 20, 2006 Resolution which was
issued long after his first … December 22, 2005 Resolution that held that there
was probable cause against accused, had already become final and executory
when no motion for reconsideration or appeal filed thereto within the
reglementary period of appeal. When … GONZALES issued his second April 20,
2006 Resolution that reversed his earlier finding and held that there was
no probable cause against accused, the DOJ had already lost jurisdiction
over the case because [of the finality of the December 22, 2005
Resolution]…. Emphasis and words in
brackets added.)
Hence, the instant petition for review on three (3)
grounds. Under the second and what easily is his main submission, petitioner
alleged that the CA committed a grave error in finding that the DOJ Resolution
dated December 22, 2005 was already final and executory and that the Secretary
of Justice, having meanwhile lost jurisdiction over the case, is precluded
from recalling or setting aside such resolution, and directing the withdrawal
of the Informations in question for estafa, as his April 20, 2006 resolution
did.
How the CA arrived at its conclusion that the DOJ resolution – the
December 22, 2005 Resolution[9]
- became final and executory and, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Justice to set aside, is made simple by a consideration of the following
premises excerpted from the assailed CA
decision, thus:
1. Petitioner Guy received a copy of the one-paged DOJ
Resolution dated
3. Section
13 of the DOJ Circular No. 70, series of 2000, on the subject: National Prosecution Service (NPS) Rule on
Appeal, gives a party aggrieved by the decision of the DOJ Secretary in
criminal investigation cases ten (10) days from notice within which to
file a motion for reconsideration; and
4 The
motion of the petitioner for reconsideration was filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period prescribed under the NPS
Rule on Appeal and thus concluded that when Secretary Gonzales issued the
April 20, 2006 Resolution “the DOJ had
already lost jurisdiction over the case because the December 22, 2005
Resolution of the DOJ had already become final and executory and therefore the
loss of jurisdiction wrote finis to the case.”
Petitioner admits to the belated filing, due
to an inadvertent miscalculation of and misapprehension on the period of
filing, of his motion for reconsideration. Among others, he argues, however,
that it was proper for, and within the jurisdictional discretion of, the DOJ
Secretary to resolve the motion for
reconsideration on the merits and set aside technicalities in the higher
interest of justice.
Respondent counters that the DOJ
Secretary’s Resolution of
The petition is impressed with merit.
First
off, it should be stressed that the determination of probable cause to warrant
prosecution in court is, under our criminal justice system, entrusted at the
first instance to public prosecutors and finally to the Secretary of Justice as
reviewer of the findings and resolutions of the prosecutors in preliminary investigation
cases.[10] In
this regard, the authority of the Secretary
of Justice to review and order the withdrawal of an information in instances
where he finds the absence of a prima
facie case is not time-barred, albeit subject to the approval of the court
if its jurisdiction over the accused has meanwhile attached.[11]
And it is not prudent or even permissible for a court to compel the Secretary
of Justice or the fiscal, as the case may be, to prosecute a proceeding
originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence
relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction.[12] Now, then, if the Secretary of Justice
possesses sufficient latitude of discretion in his determination of what
constitutes probable cause and can legally order a reinvestigation even in
those extreme instances where an information has already been filed in court,
is it not just logical and valid to
assume that he can take cognizance of and competently act on a motion for
reconsideration, belatedly filed it might have been, dealing with probable
cause? And is it not a grievous error on the part of the CA if it virtually orders the filing of an
information, as here, despite a categorical statement from the Secretary of
Justice about the lack of evidence to proceed with the prosecution of the
petitioner? The answer to both posers should be in the affirmative. As we said
in
[C]ourts
cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating
the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the
charge insufficient in form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he may
proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and
in proper form. The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is
dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately,
that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion.
There
can be no quibbling that the motion interposed by the petitioner for reconsideration of the December 22, 2005 DOJ
Resolution was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period, or four days late
to be precise, prescribed by the NPS
Rule on Appeal (DOJ Circular No. 70, s. of 2000) which pertinently
provides:
SEC.
13. Motion for reconsideration.- The
aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on appeal with [the Secretary
of Justice] …. No second or further motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained. (Words in bracket added.)
But
to strike down the
And
lest it be overlooked, the DOJ Secretary, when he took cognizance of the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, effectively excepted such motion from
the operation of the aforequoted Section 13, supra, of DOJ Circular No. 70, s. 2000. This show of liberality is,
to us, within the competence of the DOJ Secretary to make, and the Court
loathes to disturb the same absent compelling proof, as here, that he acted
out of whim and that the petitioner was out to delay the proceedings to the
prejudice of AUB, as private complainant in I.S. Nos. 05-01-00365 and
05-03-02371, when he (petitioner) interposed his motion for reconsideration.
While perhaps not in all fours, what the Court said in Yao v. Court of Appeals[15]
augurs well for the petitioner:
In
the interest of justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in
terms of compliance may be relaxed. In other words, if strict adherence to the
letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustices, or where
the merit of a party’s cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance
with certain formal requirements, procedural rules should definitely be
liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity
to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to
lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.
So
does Amorganda v. Court of Appeals[16] where
the Court allowed the belated filing by Amorganda of
a motion for reconsideration
in the CA so as not to prejudice the cause of movant-petitioner
Amorganda whom the Court determined not to
have been motivated by an impulse to delay the proceedings
or obstruct the administration of justice. Citing Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals[17] we went on to state in Amorganda that in the absence of an indication of malice to delay
the proceedings, the Court would grant relief where a stringent application of
the requirement of timeliness of pleadings would deny a litigant, with a
meritorious case, substantial justice.
To
reiterate what we said in Ginete v.
Court of Appeals[18] and other cases, the rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity
when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their
conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
peculiarities of this case impel us to sustain the validity the DOJ
Secretary’s taking cognizance of Guy’s motion for reconsideration in question
and eventually resolving the same on the merits.
In
the light of the foregoing considerations, we rule that the Secretary of
Justice has not, contrary to the assailed holding of the CA, lost jurisdiction
over I.S. No. 05-01-00365 and I.S. No. 05-03-02371 due to the perceived
finality of his December 22, 2005 Resolution when he issued his Resolution of April 20,
2006. Stated a bit differently, the Secretary of Justice had full power and
authority to issue his subsequent resolution dated
Respondent AUB’s claim respecting the flaw of
the verification aspect of the instant petition is clearly untenable.
Respondent states that the verification attached to the petition is not a
proper verification because the
petitioner, instead of stating that he has read the petition as required under Rule 7 (Sec. 4) of
the Rules of Court, wrote that he has caused
the preparation of the herein Petition x x x and the allegations contained
herein are true and correct to my personal knowledge, as well as on the basis
of the authentic records.
Respondent
is wrong. For, the statement in the verification that the allegations in the
petition are true and correct of his [petitioner’s]
own personal knowledge presupposes
that the petitioner, as affiant, has read the petition for he could not have
had attested, in the first place, to the
veracity of the allegations if he has not first read the petition. It would perhaps be different had petitioner merely stated reading the petition since a
mere reading is not an assurance
that the reader has understood what he had read. It is in understanding what
is written that one can logically say that the allegations in the petition are
true and correct of one’s own personal knowledge.
In
any event, the purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith, or are true
and correct, not merely speculative.[19] The requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of
pleadings and non-compliance therewith is neither jurisdictional nor renders the
pleading fatally defective.[20] A perusal of the verification in question
shows sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Rules and the perceived
defects, if that be the case, are not
so material as to justify the dismissal of the petition.
As
in the perceived flaw in the verification, respondent also urges that the present
petition be expunged or summarily denied considering that it fails to comply
with the requirements on forum shopping. In the concrete, respondent alleges that the petition contains
a “false certification against forum shopping,”
noting, in this regard that,
while the petitioner attests that “to
(his) knowledge, there is no
similar action or proceedings involving the same issues pending in…
any tribunal or agency,” he did not
mention four (4) such actions/cases, namely: People
v. Gilbert G. Guy, Crim. Case No. PSG-131-883-84,
pending before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 67; Asia United
Bank v. Gilbert G. Guy, I.S. No. 05-12-11759 which resulted in the
filing of Criminal Case No. 133244 (People
v. Gilbert G. Guy) now on appeal with the CA; and Asia
United Bank v. Hon. Raul Gonzales, CA-G.R. SP No. 97850, respondent
AUB’s petition for certiorari filed
with the CA. Respondent AUB asserts
that these cases involve very similar issues
as those raised in this petition and
stem from the same series of transactions, the only basic difference being in the
trust receipts subject thereof.
Respondent’s stance fails to
persuade.
As
it were, the petitioner’s failure to mention the cases immediately adverted to
above did not in any way detract from the correctness of the certification on
non-forum shopping or breach the
purpose behind the rules on forum shopping. And as the petitioner aptly
explained without controversion, People
v. Guy (Crim. Case No. 131-883-84) is the case filed pursuant to the December
22, 2005 DOJ resolution before the same was reconsidered or reversed by the
DOJ in its subsequent resolution of
April 20, 2006, which, in turn, AUB elevated to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 94361, whose decision thereon is now the subject of
the instant petition. The differing issues in Crim. Case No. 131-883-84 and the
present petition need no belaboring.
As
to AUB v. Guy (I.S. No.
05-12-11759), petitioner claims that his defense of non-receipt of the goods subject of
the trust receipts involved therein was, among other defenses, found by the
DOJ to be tenable, which thus led to the issuance of DOJ resolution dated October 4, 2006 ordering
the withdrawal of the corresponding information earlier filed in court.
People v. Guy (Criminal Case No.
133244), on the other hand, appears to
have already been withdrawn pursuant to
aforementioned DOJ resolution of October 4, 2006 and, thus, there is not even
an issue to speak of in that terminated case.
And
AUB v. Gonzales (CA-G.R. SP No.
97850) is another offshoot of I.S. No. 05-12-11759 filed by respondent AUB,
assailing the aforementioned DOJ resolution of October 4, 2006, by way of
petition for certiorari dated
February 8, 2007, i.e., long after
the filing of the instant petition on November 27, 2006.
Parenthetically,
all four (4) cases were initiated by the respondent. And since it insists that all four involve similar
or identical issues as that presented in the present case, perhaps the
accusing finger of violating the rule against forum shopping ought to be
pointed at respondent.
The
essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment,[21] through means other than by appeal or certiorari.[22]
The rule thus does not apply to cases that arise from an initiatory or
original action which has been elevated by way of appeal or certiorari to higher or appellate
courts or authorities. This is so not
only because the issues in the appellate courts necessarily differ from those
in the lower court, but also because the appealed cases are a continuation of
the original case and treated as only one case. For, it would be absurd to require, say in
this instant petition, to make mention in the certification against non-forum
shopping the CA case that is being sought to be reviewed in the petition at
bench.
And
while it is perhaps anti-climactic to so state as this juncture, a certificate of non-forum shopping is not
required or necessary in criminal cases and distinct causes of action.[23] The
absence of a provision on non-forum shopping in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, unlike in the Rules on Civil Procedure, suggests as much.
With
the foregoing disquisitions, the question of whether or not the petition ought
to be summarily dismissed because it allegedly sets forth question of facts
need not detain us long.
Reading
the petition juxtaposed with the assailed ruling and the premises holding it
together wherein the CA stressed that
its “decision is purely about public
respondent’s (DOJ Secretary’s) loss of jurisdiction,” it is at once apparent that the principal, if not the only issue to be
considered in this case, is whether or not the DOJ Resolution of April 20,
2006 is, on jurisdictional ground, a nullity which, definitely is a question
of law rather than of fact. For, a
question of law exists when a) the controversy concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; b) the issue
does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsity of the facts being admitted.[24] A question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsity of facts or when the query invites calibration
of the whole evidence and relevancy of specific surrounding as well as those in
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[25]
While the petitioner may have interspersed his arguments with matters which
are factual in nature, the desired dismissal of the petition cannot be granted
on that basis. For the petition and the core question pivoting on the DOJ
Secretary’s jurisdiction to issue his
We must make it clear, however, that
the withdrawal of the Informations against the petitioner in Criminal Case
Nos. 131883 and 131884 of Branch 67 of the RTC of Pasig City, as directed in
the April 20, 2006 Resolution of the DOJ Secretary, is a matter addressed to
the sole discretion of that court, consistent with our ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated September 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 94361 is NULLIFED and SET ASIDE and
the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated April 20, 2006 is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C.
GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with then Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 10 et seq.
[2]
[3] Sec. Raul M. Gonzales.
[5] Rollo,
pp. 593 et seq.
[6]
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Supra note 2.
[9] Rollo, p. 517.
[10] Punzalan
v. Dela Pena, G.R. No. 158543,
[11] Crespo v. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373,
[12] Ibid.
[13] G.R.
No. 156081,
[14] G.R. No. 164268,
[15] G.R.
No. 132428,
[16] G.R.
No. L-80040,
[17] G.R.
No. 52007,
[18] G.R. No. 127596,
[19] Yujuico v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No.
164282,
[20] Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, G.R.
No. 13042, September 23, 1999, 315 SCRA 150;
Heavylift Manila, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 154410, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 541.
[21] Melo
v. CA, G.R. No. 123686,
[22] Ligon
v. CA, G.R. No. 127683,
[23] Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, supra, citing People v. Ferrer, 279 SCRA 695, 703.
[24] Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 138463, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 56, 70 citing cases.
[25] Ruiz
v. People, G.R. No. 1260893,
[26] Supra note 11.