THIRD
DIVISION
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FEDERICO M. LEDESMA, JR., Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC-SECOND
DIVISION) HONS. RAUL T. AQUINO, VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY and ANGELITA A. GACUTAN ARE THE COMMISSIONERS,
PHILIPPINE NAUTICAL TRAINING INC., ATTY. HERNANI FABIA, RICKY TY, PABLO
MANOLO, C. DE LEON and TREENA CUEVA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 174585 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
This a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, filed by petitioner Federico Ledesma,
Jr., seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,[1]
dated 28 May 2005, and the Resolution,[2]
dated 7 September 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79724.
The appellate court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, affirmed
the Decision dated
The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant
petition are as follows:
On
On
On
In view of de Leon’s
report, private respondent’s Human Resource Manager, Trina Cueva
(HR Manager Cueva), on
On
In his Position Paper,[7]
petitioner averred that in view of the complaint he filed against de Leon for
his abusive conduct as site administrator, the latter retaliated by falsely
accusing petitioner as a drug user. VP
for Administration Ty, however, instead of verifying
the veracity of de Leon’s report, readily believed his allegations and together
with HR Manager Cueva, verbally dismissed petitioner
from service on
Petitioner alleged that he was asked to report at private
respondent’s main office in España,
Petitioner was then asked by HR Manager Cueva
to sign a resignation letter and also remarked that whether or not petitioner
would resign willingly, he was no longer considered an employee of private
respondent. All these events transpired
in the presence of VP for Administration Ty, who even
convinced petitioner to just voluntarily resign with the assurance that he
would still be given separation pay.
Petitioner did not yet sign the resignation letter replying that he
needed time to think over the offers.
When petitioner went back to private respondent’s training site in Dasmariñas,
On the following day, petitioner immediately went to St.
Dominic Medical Center for a drug test and he was found negative for any drug
substance. With his drug result on hand,
petitioner went back to private respondent’s main office in
On
For its part, private respondent countered that petitioner
was never dismissed from employment but merely served a Notice to Explain why
no disciplinary action should be filed against him in view of his superior’s
report that he was suspected of using illegal drugs. Instead of filing an answer to the said
notice, however, petitioner prematurely lodged a complaint for illegal
dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.[11]
Private respondent likewise denied petitioner’s allegations
that it banned the latter from entering private respondent’s premises. Rather, it was petitioner who failed or
refused to report to work after he was made to explain his alleged drug
use. Indeed, on
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the dismissal of the [petitioner] is herein declared to be
illegal. [Private respondent] is
directed to pay the complainant backwages and separation pay in the total amount
of One Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty One Pesos and Fifty
Three Centavos (P184, 861.53).[14]
Both parties questioned the Labor Arbiter’s Decision before
the NLRC. Petitioner assailed the
portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision denying his prayer for reinstatement,
and arguing that the doctrine of strained relations is applied only to
confidential employees and his position as a driver was not covered by such
prohibition.[15] On the other hand, private respondent controverted the Labor Arbiter’s finding that petitioner
was illegally dismissed from employment, and insisted that petitioner was never
dismissed from his job but failed to report to work after he was asked to
explain regarding his suspected drug use.[16]
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the decision under review is, hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another entered, DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
[Petitioner] is however,
ordered REINSTATED to his former position without loss of seniority rights, but
WITHOUT BACKWAGES.[18]
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was
likewise denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and affirmed the NLRC Decision giving more credence to private
respondent’s stance that petitioner was not dismissed from employment, as it is
more in accord with the evidence on record and the attendant circumstances of
the instant case.[20] Similarly ill-fated was petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
issued on
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[22]
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, filed by petitioner assailing the foregoing Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. PETITIONER’S
DISMISSAL WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCES ON RECORD, WHICH WERE
MISAPPRECIATED BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC, AND HAD THESE BEEN CONSIDERED THE
INEVITABLE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THE AFFIRMATION OF THE LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION
FINDING ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
II.
WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SUBVERTED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS NO JUST CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL AS PETITIONER IS NOT A DRUG USER AND
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.
III.
WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SUBVERTED PETITIONER’S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW.[23]
Before we delve into the merits of this case, it is best to
stress that the issues raised by petitioner in this instant petition are
factual in nature which is not within the office of a Petition for Review.[24] The raison d’etre
for this rule is that, this Court is not a trier
of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties for the factual findings of the labor
officials who have acquired expertise in their own fields are accorded not only
respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court.[25]
However, when the findings of the Labor Arbiter contradict
those of the NLRC, departure from the general rule is warranted, and this Court
must of necessity make an infinitesimal scrunity and
examine the records all over again including the evidence presented by the
opposing parties to determine which findings should be preferred as more
conformable with evidentiary facts.[26]
The primordial issue in the petition at bar is whether the
petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.
The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally
dismissed from employment warranting the payment of his backwages. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals found
otherwise.
In reversing the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision, the NLRC underscored the settled evidentiary rule that before the
burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove the validity of the employee’s
dismissal, the employee must first sufficiently establish that he was indeed
dismissed from employment. The
petitioner, in the present case, failed to establish the fact of his dismissal. The NLRC did not give credence to
petitioner’s allegation that he was banned by the private respondent from
entering the workplace, opining that had it been true that petitioner was no
longer allowed to enter the training site when he reported for work thereat on
2 December 2000, it is quite a wonder he was able to do so the very next day,
on 3 December 2000, to claim his salary.[27]
The Court of Appeals validated the above conclusion reached
by the NLRC and further rationated that petitioner’s
positive allegations that he was dismissed from service was negated by
substantial evidence to the contrary.
Petitioner’s averments of what transpired inside private respondent’s
main office on 29 November 2000, when he was allegedly already dismissed from
service, and his claim that he was effectively banned from private respondent’s
premises are belied by the fact that he was able to claim his salary for the
period of 16-30 November 2000 at private respondent’s training site.
Petitioner, therefore, is now before this Court assailing the
Decisions handed down by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, and insisting that
he was illegally dismissed from his employment. Petitioner argues that his receipt of his
earned salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000, and his 13th
month pay, is neither inconsistent with nor a negation of his allegation of
illegal dismissal. Petitioner maintains
that he received his salary and benefit only from the guardhouse, for he was
already banned from the work premises.
We are not persuaded.
Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a
case before judicial and quasi-administrative bodies, it is necessary that
allegations must be supported by substantial evidence.[28] Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[29]
In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record
so as to meet the quantum of evidence required, i.e., substantial evidence.
Petitioner’s claim of illegal dismissal is supported by no other than
his own bare, uncorroborated and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are
also incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory.
Petitioner himself narrated that when his presence was
requested on
Moreover, the petitioner alleged that he was not allowed to
enter the training site by the guard on duty who told him that he was already
banned from the premises. Subsequently,
however, petitioner admitted in his Supplemental Affidavit that he was able to
return to the said site on
Finally, petitioner’s stance that he was dismissed by
private respondent was further weakened with the presentation of private
respondent’s payroll bearing petitioner’s name proving that petitioner remained
as private respondent’s employee up to December 2000. Again, petitioner’s assertion that the
payroll was merely fabricated for the purpose of supporting private
respondent’s case before the NLRC cannot be given credence. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the
course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section
43 of the Rules of Court. It is
therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to adduce clear and convincing evidence
in support of his claim of fabrication and to overcome such presumption of
regularity.[30] Unfortunately, petitioner again failed in
such endeavor.
On these scores, there is a dearth of evidence to establish
the fact of petitioner’s dismissal. We
have scrupulously examined the records and we found no evidence presented by
petitioner, other than his own contentions that he was indeed dismissed by
private respondent.
While this Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases
of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause in the case at bar, however,
the facts and the evidence did not establish a prima facie case that the
petitioner was dismissed from employment.[31] Before the private respondent must bear the
burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, petitioner must first establish
by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then
there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.
In Machica v. Roosevelt
Services Center, Inc.,[32]
we had underscored that the burden of proving the allegations rest upon the
party alleging, to wit:
The rule is that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners
were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from
their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this
fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer
bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here
because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners.[33]
In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain,[34]
this Court took the occasion to emphasize:
It is a basic rule in
evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who
makes the allegations – ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat. If
he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness
of that of his opponent.[35]
It is
true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in light
of this Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in striking down any
attempt of the management to exploit or oppress the working class. However, it does not mean that we are bound
to uphold the working class in every labor dispute brought before this Court
for our resolution.
The law
in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the
law tilts the scales of justice in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the
inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to
balance the scales of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal
positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor
over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the
result is an injustice to the employer. Justitia
nemini neganda est -- justice is to be denied to none.[36]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) with Associate
Justices Josefina Guevarra-Salonga and Fernanda Lampas-Peralta , concurring. Rollo, pp. 38-50.
[2] Rollo, pp. 52-53.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
Limketkai
Sons Milling, Inc. v. Llamera, G.R. No. 152514,
[25]
Dusit
Hotel Nikko v. National Union of Workers in Hotel,
Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN), Dusit
Hotel Nikko Chapter, G.R. No. 160391, 9 August 2005, 466 SCRA 374, 387-388; The
Philippine American Life and General
Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R. No. 156963, 11
November 2004, 442 SCRA 274, 283.
[26]
[27] Rollo, pp. 118-119.
[28] Philippine Air Line v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159556, 26 May
2005, 459 SCRA 236, 251.
[29] Government
Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 511, 531 (1998).
[30]
[31] Schering
Employees Labor Union (SELU) v. Schering Plough Corporation, G.R. No.
142506, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 689, 695.
[32] G.R.
No. 168664,
[33]
[34] G.R. No. 146202,
[35]
[36] JPL Marketing Promotions v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 151966, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA 136, 149-150.