THIRD
DIVISION
|
Petitioner, -
versus - JOCELYN RESUENA, EDDIE VILLALON,
SYLVIA SEDAYON and ZONSAYDA EMNACE, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 173076 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated
The following are the factual antecedents of the
instant Petition:
On
Separate
complaints were filed by each of the four respondents against petitioner before
Regional Arbitration Branch VI of the NLRC in
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering [herein petitioner] Mount Carmel College represented by Fr. Modesto
Malandac to pay [herein respondents] Jocelyn Resuena, Zonsayda Emnace, Eddie
Villalon and Sylvia Sedayon, their respective 13th month pay,
separation pay and attorney’s fee in the total sum of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND 67/100 (P334,875.47) to be
deposited with this office within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
The
complaint for moral and exemplary damages is hereby dismissed for lack of legal
basis.
All other
claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.[6]
On
In
the meantime, petitioner appealed to the NLRC Fourth Division in
We rule that complainants were illegally dismissed and
must therefore be ordered reinstated with payment of backwages from the time
they were illegally dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement.
All other
claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification ordering the [herein petitioner] the payment of the backwages of the [herein respondents] from May 15, 1998 up to May 25, 1999, further directing the reinstatement of the [respondents] to their original positions without loss of seniority or in lieu thereof the payment of their separation pay as computed in the appealed decision.[8]
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
The
case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80639 where petitioner assailed the aforementioned
NLRC Decision dated 30 October 2001 and Resolution dated 19 June 2003, arguing
that there is more than enough basis for loss of trust and confidence as ground
for dismissing respondents. It also
reiterated compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The Court of Appeals denied the petition in a
Decision promulgated on
Consequently, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC in ruling that [herein respondents] have been illegally dismissed. Likewise, said [NLRC] correctly held that even if such participation of [respondents] in the protest picket is rather improper under the circumstances or disappointing to the School Administrator who had rightly expected them to take the side of the administration or at least stayed neutral on the demand for ouster of Fr. Malandac and Barairo, dismissal is definitely too harsh where a less punitive action such as reprimand or disciplinary action would have been sufficient. Considering the long years of faithful service of [respondents] in the School without previous record of misconduct, as duly noted by the NLRC in its decision, their termination on the basis of alleged loss of confidence by taking part in an otherwise legitimate and constitutionally-protected right to free speech and peaceful assembly, is certainly illegal and unjustified.
x x x x
Having been illegally dismissed,
[respondents] are entitled to back wages from the time of their termination
until reinstatement, and if reinstatement is no longer possible, the grant of
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service. However,
in this case since the Labor Arbiter did not order reinstatement, the NLRC
correctly excluded the period of the appeal in the computation of back wages
due to [respondents].
Finally, on the prayer for injunctive relief sought by petitioner on the ground that [public respondent] Labor Arbiter exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the writ of execution despite the fact that his decision did not order reinstatement and that he is bereft of authority to implement the decision of the NLRC (Fourth Division).
x x x x
Considering that there is already an entry of judgment on
the Decision dated October 30, 2001, and in view of Our disposition of this
petition, we find no more obstacle for the enforcement of the said judgment
even pending appeal, in accordance with Sections 1 and 2, Rule VIII of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure, as amended, as well as Sections 2, 4 and 6, Rule III of the
NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.[9]
No Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 80639 was filed and it became final and
executory on
At
about the same time as the foregoing developments in CA-G.R. SP No. 80639,
Labor Arbiter Phibun D. Pura issued an Order on
To be sure the Court has not been
consistent in its interpretation of Art. 223. The nagging issue has always been
whether the reinstatement order is self-executory. Citing the divergent views
of the court beginning with Inciong v. NLRC followed by the deviation in
interpretation in Maranaw Hotel Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) v.
NLRC, as reiterated and adopted in Archilles Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC
and Purificacion Ram v. NLRC, the Court in the 1997 Pioneer case has laid down
the doctrine that henceforth an Order or award for reinstatement is
self-executory, meaning that it does not require a writ of execution, much less
a motion for its issuance, as maintained by petitioner. x x x.
Successive
writs of execution pertaining to the backwages and accrued salaries of the
respondents were issued by Labor Arbiter Pura on these dates:
The
first writ of execution, issued on P503,028.05 representing backwages from P508,168.05 with the said bank for deposit to the
Cashier of NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch VI in
By
After
an exchange of pleadings, respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution with the Labor Arbiter considering that the Entry
of Judgment was already issued by the NLRC.
On P503,028.05
deposited with the Cashier of NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch VI.
However,
the foregoing amount was considered to be only a partial payment of the
monetary awards due the respondents and the unpaid balance thereof continued to
grow to P1,307,806.50.
Respondents thus filed a motion for partial writ of execution, which the
Labor Arbiter granted by issuing the third Writ of Execution on P1,736.592.08[14] was garnished by Bailiff/Acting Sheriff Romeo D.
Pasustento, representing respondents’ accrued salaries, backwages, attorney’s
fees and sheriff’s fees computed from the promulgation of the NLRC Decision 30
October 2001.
Respondents
filed on
On
In light of the foregoing, we have
no choice but to adopt the computation of the RAB Fiscal Examiner, hereto
attached and forming part of the record of these cases and conformably thereto,
we grant the Motion to Issue Writ of Execution on backwages for the period
stated in this computation, taking into consideration the grant of
differentials as there are benefits which accrued to the [herein respondents]
and which they should have enjoyed had they been employed and/or reinstated, as
the case may be, and such other amount as may accrue until actually reinstated
or in lieu of reinstatement, to pay [respondents] separation pay to be computed
at one (1) month salary for every year of service in addition to backwages the
formula adopted by the Labor Arbiter in the Decision dated May 25, 1999, page
7, paragraph 1.
Let therefore a Writ of Execution be, as it is hereby issued to enforce judgment in the above entitled cases.[16]
On
P1,131,035.00 representing
respondents’ backwages, separation pay, and attorney’s fees. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash the Alias Writ of Execution on
On
WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit the Motion to Quash the Alias Writ dated
From
the said Order of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner filed with the NLRC an appeal
with an application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the
execution of judgment, docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000377-05. Petitioner assailed the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appeal of respondents is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
From
the foregoing, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Special Civil Action
for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01615, praying for the setting aside and nullification of the Resolutions dated
15 August 2005 and 30 November 2005 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000377-05. Petitioner contended that the NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it denied its appeal and motion for reconsideration
and in not ruling that there was already satisfaction of judgment. The crux of petitioner’s case, as succinctly
worded by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01615:
[P]etitioner
seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions dated
The
Court of Appeals eventually dismissed CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01615, ruling as
follows:
Thus,
petitioner’s avowal that their liability for private respondents’ backwages is
limited from
First, there is no showing, in the
case at bench, that petitioner exercised its option to reinstate private
respondents to their former position or to grant them separation pay.
Accordingly, backwages have to be granted to private respondents until their
reinstatement to their former position is effected or upon petitioner’s payment
of separation pay to private respondents if reinstatement is no longer
feasible; and
Second, the decision dated
x x x x
In light of the foregoing
disquisition, we hereby find public respondent NLRC to have acted accordingly
and without grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned Resolutions
dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the present petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolutions dated
Hence,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following issues:
I.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC
THAT THE AWARD OF BACKWAGES GOES BEYOND THE PERIOD FROM 15 MAY 1998 UP TO 25
MAY 1999 ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT REINSTATEMENT IS SELF-EXECUTORY AND DOES NOT
NEED A WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINIDING THAT THE CONTINUING GRANT AND AWARD OF BACKWAGES UP TO THE PRESENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AS LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
Petitioner prays that this Court
render judgment (a) annulling and setting aside the assailed Decision on 02
June 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01615 and all its orders and issuances;
(b) ordering that backwages be computed and executed corresponding only to the
period from 15 May 1998 to 25 May 1999; (c) ordering that separation pay be
computed based on the computation as originally submitted by the Labor Arbiter,
P344,875.47, which corresponds to the date of respondents’ employment
until 15 May 1998; (d) that no other award except for backwages for the period
15 May 1998 to 25 May 1999 and separation pay amounting to P344,875.47
shall be paid by petitioner; and (e) that the respondents be ordered to refund
and pay the alleged excess in the amounts garnished by virtue of the Writs of
Execution dated 9 June 2003, 10 December 2003, and 30 January 2004.
In sum,
the resolution of this petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether
reinstatement in the instant case is self-executory and does not need a writ of
execution for its enforcement; and (2) whether the continuing award of
backwages is proper.
Petitioner
insists that what is at issue is the manner of execution of the NLRC Decision
dated
In
ruling on the consolidated complaints filed by the four respondents, Labor
Arbiter Drilon found that they were not illegally dismissed but ordered that
they be awarded 13th month pay, separation pay and attorney’s fees
in the amount of P334,875.47.
Upon appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor
Arbiter ruling that the termination of respondents was illegal and ordering the
payment of backwages of respondents from
While
petitioner concedes that the case pertaining to the complaints for illegal
dismissal filed by the respondents before the Labor Arbiter had been resolved
with finality by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 80639, no other remedy
having been taken therefrom, it however assails the correctness and validity of
the execution of the judgment therein. Petitioner
avers that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC that the award of backwages goes beyond the period
Petitioner
vehemently raises the argument that the award of backwages subject to execution
is limited to the period prior to the appeal and does not include the period
during the pendency of the appeal, on the contention that reinstatement during
appeal is warranted only when the Labor Arbiter rules that the dismissed
employee should be reinstated. In support of its foregoing argument, petitioner
invokes Filflex Industrial &
Manufacturing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[30]
where this Court ruled:
In other words, reinstatement during appeal is warranted only when the labor arbiter
(LA) himself rules that the dismissed employee should be reinstated. In the present case, neither the dispositive
portion nor the text of the labor arbiter’s decision ordered the reinstatement
of private respondent. Further, the back wages granted to private
respondent were specifically limited to the period prior to the filing of the
appeal with Respondent NLRC. In
fact, the LA’s decision ordered her separation from service for the parties’
“mutual advantage and most importantly to physical and health welfare of the
complainant.” Hence, it is an error and
an abuse of discretion for the NLRC to hold that the award of limited back
wages, by implication, included an order for private respondent’s
reinstatement.
An order for reinstatement must be specifically declared and cannot be presumed; like back wages, it is a separate and distinct relief given to an illegally dismissed employee. There being no specific order for reinstatement and the order being for complainant’s separation, there can be no basis for the award of salaries/back wages during the pendency of appeal.
Petitioner’s reliance on Filflex is misplaced and inapplicable to
the case at bar. Indeed in Filflex,
this Court ruled that the award of backwages is limited to the period prior to
the filing of the appeal with the NLRC. This
Court had declared in the aforesaid case that reinstatement during appeal is
warranted only when the Labor Arbiter himself rules that the dismissed employee
should be reinstated. But this was precisely because on appeal to the NLRC, it
found that there was no illegal dismissal; thus, neither reinstatement nor
backwages may be awarded. In fact, Filfex
deleted the award of backwages granted during appeal, reiterating that an award
of backwages by the NLRC during the period of appeal is totally inconsistent
with its finding of a valid dismissal. In
the instant petition, the NLRC Decision dated
This
Court sees no cogent reason as to the relevance of a discussion on whether or
not reinstatement is self-executory. However,
since petitioner raised this issue, this Court has opted to discuss it. Verily, Article 223 of the Labor Code is not applicable
in the instant case. The said provision
stipulates that the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
immediately be executory, even pending appeal.
Petitioner
contends that the statutory provision applicable is Article 224 of the Labor
Code, as well as Rule III, Section 2(b) of the NLRC Manual on Execution of
Judgment, because the case was decided on appeal. Furthermore, it is a decision which is of a
final and executory nature. The
provisions invoked by petitioner reads:
Art. 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards. -- (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory x x x.[31]
If the execution be for the reinstatement of any person to any position, office or employment, such writ shall be served by the sheriff upon the losing party or upon any other person required by law to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such decisions, order for reinstatement.[32]
The
records of the case indicate that when Labor Arbiter Drilon issued its
In light of the
foregoing, we have no choice but to adopt the computation of the RAB Fiscal
Examiner, hereto attached and forming part of the record of these cases and
conformably thereto, we grant the Motion to Issue Writ of Execution on backwages
for the period stated in this computation, taking into consideration the grant
of differentials as there are benefits which accrued to the complainants and
which they should have enjoyed had they been employed and/or reinstated, as the
case may be, and such other amount as may accrue until actually reinstated or
in lieu of reinstatement, to pay complainants separation pay to be computed at
one (1) month salary for every year of service in addition to backwages the
formula adopted by the Labor Arbiter in the Decision dated May 25, 1999, page
7, paragraph 1.
Let therefore a Writ of Execution be, as it is hereby issued to enforce judgment in the above entitled cases.[33]
Art.
223 of the Labor Code provides that reinstatement is immediately executory even
pending appeal only when the Labor Arbiter himself ordered the reinstatement. In this case, the original Decision of Labor
Arbiter Drilon did not order reinstatement. Reinstatement in this case was actually
ordered by the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The order of Labor Arbiter Pura on
However,
as we can glean from the succeeding discussion, the above findings will not affect
the award of backwages for the period beyond
Anent
the second issue, petitioner contends that the
Petitioner’s
argument is absurd. Abbott v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[36]
as cited by petitioner, declared that there exists a big difference when what
is sought to be reviewed is the manner of execution of a decision and not the
decision itself. “While it is true that
the decision itself has become final and executory and so can no longer be
challenged, there is no question that it must be enforced in accordance with
its terms and conditions. Any deviation
therefrom can be the subject of a proper appeal.”[37] In
the instant case, however, the manner of execution falls squarely within the
terms of the Decision it seeks to implement.
The
We
rule that complainants were illegally dismissed and must therefore be ordered
reinstated with payment of backwages from the time they were illegally
dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement.
All other claims are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification ordering the respondents the payment of the backwages of the complainants from May 15, 1998 up to May 25, 1999, further directing the reinstatement of the complainants to their original positions without loss of seniority or in lieu thereof the payment of their separation pay as computed in the appealed decision.[38]
When
the afore-quoted NLRC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80639, there seemed to be a contradiction between the body and the fallo
of the appellate court’s Decision dated
However, in this case
since the Labor Arbiter did not order reinstatement, the NLRC correctly
excluded the period of the appeal in the computation of back wages due to
private respondents.[39]
The dispositive portion of the same Decision, however, concludes:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution
are AFFIRMED.[40]
The
general rule is that where there is conflict between the dispositive portion or
the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo
is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering
nothing.[41] Clearly, the award of backwages to respondents
does not merely cover the period from
We rule that [respondents] were illegally dismissed and must therefore be ordered reinstated with payment of backwages from the time they were illegally dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification ordering the [petitioner] payment of the backwages of the [respondents] from May 15, 1998 up to May 25, 1999, further directing the reinstatement of the [respondents] to their original positions without loss of seniority or in lieu thereof the payment of their separation pay as computed in the appealed decision.[43]
The above ruling
of the NLRC in its Decision dated
Backwages
are to be computed from the time of illegal dismissal until reinstatement or upon
petitioner’s payment of separation pay to respondents if reinstatement is no
longer possible. Article 279 of the
Labor Code, as amended, states:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. – x x x
In cases of regular employment the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Thus, an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and
reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and
distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because
of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is
granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.[45]
The
normal consequences of respondents’ illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the
time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an
option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service should be awarded as an alternative.[46] The payment of separation pay is in addition
to payment of backwages.
Concomitantly,
it is evident that respondents’ backwages should not be limited to the period
from
This
Court takes this occasion to reiterate that execution is the final stage of
litigation, the end of the suit. It can
not and should not be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice
and equity.[47] “Litigation must end sometime and somewhere.
An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
be deprived of the fruits of the verdicts. Courts must, therefore, guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them.”[48]
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is dismissed. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato,
Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 35-46.
[2] Penned
by Commissioner Edgardo M. Enerlan with Presiding Commissioner Irenea E. Ceniza
and Commissioner Oscar S. Uy, concurring; rollo,
pp. 59-65.
[3] Penned
by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Mario L.
Guariña III and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring. Rollo, pp. 82-95.
[4] Rollo, pp. 48-56.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] NOW
THEREFORE, you are hereby directed to proceed to the premises of the
[petitioner] MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE and/or MODESTO MALANDAC, O CARM situated at
Escalante, Negros Occidental together with the [respondents] and collect from
said [petitioner] the total amount of FIVE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND TWENTY EIGHT
PESOS AND 05/100 (P503,028.05) representing [respondents’] back wages
(sic) from May 15, 1998 up to May 19, 2003 x x x. (RAB Case No. 06-06-10293-98
Writ of Execution; rollo, pp. 73-74.)
[11] NOW
THEREFORE, you are hereby directed to proceed to the premises of the
[petitioner] MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE and/or MODESTO MALANDAC, O CARM situated at
Escalante, Negros Occidental together with the [respondents] and collect from
said [petitioner] the total amount of FIVE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND TWENTY-EIGHT
PESOS AND 05/100 (P503,028.05) representing [respondents’] back wages
(sic) from May 15, 1998 up to May 19, 2003 x x x. (RAB Case No. 06-06-10393-00
et. al. Writ of Execution; rollo, pp.
75-77.)
[12] NOW
THEREFORE, you are hereby directed to proceed to the premises of the
[petitioner] MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE and/or MODESTO MALANDAC, O CARM situated at
Escalante, Negros Occidental together with the [respondents] and collect from
said [petitioner] the total amount of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTEEN
THOUSAND and FOUR HUNDRED PESOS AND 6/100 (P1,316,400.66) representing
[respondents’] back wages (sic) from May 15, 1998 up to May 19, 2003, accrued
salaries May 26, 1999 to October 29, 2001 and May 20, 2003 to December 31, 2003
x x x. (RAB Case No. 06-06-10393-00 et. al. Writ of Execution; rollo, pp. 78-80.)
[13] Based
on the computations provided by the RAB VI Cashier, the total of the monetary
judgment is P1,316,400.66. The additional sum of P289,875.41 was
garnished and released to respondents. Before the transmittal of the original
case records before the Court of Appeals, P516,497.20 was released to
private respondents.
[14] Collected
on different dates.
[15] Rollo, pp. 96-119.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Penned
by Commissioner Aurelio D. Menzon with Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles
and Commissioner Oscar S. Uy, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 35-46.
[21] CA rollo, p. 46.
[22] Rollo, pp. 41-42.
[23]
[24] Article
223 of the Labor Code, as cited by petitioner.
[25] Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 345 Phil. 1057 (1997).
[26]
[27] Art.
223. Appeal x x x
x
x x x
In any event, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond
by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
[28] Art.
224. Execution
of decisions, orders or awards.- (a) The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or
med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any
interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years
from the date it becomes final and executory x x x.
[29] Sec.
2. x x x
(1)
If the execution be for the payment of a sum of money by the losing party, the
writ shall be served by the sheriff upon the losing party or upon any other
person required by law to obey the same before proceeding to satisfy the
judgment out of the personal property of such party and if no sufficient
personal property can be found, then out of his real property;
(2) If the execution be for the reinstatement of any
person to any position, office or employment, such writ shall be served by the
sheriff upon the losing party or upon any other person required by law to obey
the same and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys
such decisions, order for reinstatement.
[30] 349
Phil. 913, 921-922 (1998).
[31] Labor
Code.
[32] NLRC
Manual on the Execution of Judgment, Rule III, Section 2(b).
[33] Rollo, pp. 116-117.
[34] Rule
III, NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment.
[35] NLRC
Decision dated
[36] 229
Phil. 229, 233 (1986).
[37]
[38] Rollo, p. 65.
[39]
[40]
[41] Poliand Industrial Limited v. National Development Company, G.R. No.
143866, 22 August 2005, 467 SCRA 500, 550; Mendoza,
Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc., G.R. No. 158684, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 664,
676-677.
[42] Article
279, Labor Code; Pheschem Industrial
Corporation v. Moldez, G.R. No. 161158,
[43] Rollo, p. 65
[44] Judy Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 352 Phil. 593, 604 (1998).
[45] Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc.
v. Ortega, Jr., G.R. No. 160871,
[46] Pheschem Industrial Corporation v. Moldez,
supra note 42.
[47] Torres v. National Labor Relations Commission,
386 Phil. 513, 520 (2000).
[48] Dizon v. Court of Appeals, 444 Phil.
161, 168 (2003).