KAREN
and KRISTY FISHING G.R. Nos. 172760-61
INDUSTRY and SPS.
HELIODORO
TUVILLA and AQUILINA TUVILLA,
Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF TINGA,
and
APPEALS,
Fifth Division and VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION,
Third Division,
Respondents Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
This
is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which seeks to nullify two resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 63286 and 63750 for having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion. The
The
following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Petitioners
spouses Heliodoro Tuvilla,
now deceased, and Aquilina Tuvilla
(“spouses Tuvilla”) were the proprietors of Karen
& Kristy Fishing Industry which operated the fishing vessels M/V Karen and
M/V Kristy. On
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[4] on
Both parties again filed separate
petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.[6] In
view of the substantial identity of the parties and the issues, the separate
petitions were ordered consolidated. During the pendency
of the appeal, petitioner Heliodoro Tuvilla passed away.[7]
On
WHEREFORE, the petition of Karen & Kristy and the Tuvillas docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63286, is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. On the other hand, the
petition of the Employees docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63750 is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. Accordingly the assailed
Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[8]
A copy of the said decision was sent
by registered mail to Atty. Eugenio Dela Cruz, petitioners’ counsel of record, but it was
returned as said counsel had moved out of the address of record. Thus, the
Court of Appeals Clerk of Court resent another copy of the decision by
registered mail to spouses Tuvilla. The registry
return receipt showed that the copy was delivered to their address in
On 6 February 2006, petitioner Aquilina Tuvilla filed with the
Court of Appeals a motion captioned “Motion
to Allow Petitioner/Movant a Period Within Which to
Search for Her Counsel; In the Alternative to Look for a New Counsel and Time
to File Necessary Pleading or Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
Received by the Movant/Petitioner last January 27,
2006,”[9]
manifesting that she had difficulty finding their counsel of record as it was
her deceased husband who was handling the case prior to his death.
The following day, she filed a notice of appearance and urgent motion for extension
of time to file motion for reconsideration,[10]
asking for an additional 15 days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration.
On
On
On
Petitioner Tuvilla
elevated the denial of her motions to this Court via a special civil action for
certiorari, raising the following grounds in support of her petition:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH DIVISION
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT REFUSED TO SEE THE LIGHT THAT THE TIME AND PERIOD TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION BY THE PETITIONER HAS NOT YET STARTED TO RUN FOR REASON THAT
THE DECISION WAS NOT YET SERVED OR RECEIVED BY HER COUNSEL OF RECORD AS MANDATED
BY THE RULES AND, IT PREFERRED TO APPLY THE TECHNICALITIES OF THE RULES OF
COURT IN EXCHANGE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO BE
ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL;
2. THE DEATH OF MOVANT’S HUSBAND REQUIRES THE
SUBSTITUTION OF THE HEIRS, AND WITHOUT THE PROPER SUBSTITUTION AS REQUIRED BY
THE RULES, THE HEIRS ARE BASICALLY DENIED OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;
3. THE NEGLIGENCE AND LACK OF INTEREST OF HER PREVIOUS
COUNSEL OF HIS DUTY AS THE COUNSEL OF THE MOVANT CANNOT BIND THE MOVANT, AS SHE
HAS NO WAY UPON WHICH SHE CAN CONTROL THE ACTS OF HER COUNSEL;
4. THE MOVANT RAISED A VALID AND SUBSTANTIALLY NEW
ISSUES IN HER MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THAT THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE PROCEDURAL RULES WILL BE IN KEEPING THE DEMANDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
CONSIDERING THE AMOUNT OF THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TEN AND 46/100 PESOS (P3,235,510.46), PHILIPPINE CURRENCY WOULD
BE A WINDFALL AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MOVANT.[14]
Petitioner Tuvilla
argues that the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration of
the Court of Appeals decision had not commenced because Atty. Dela Cruz, petitioners’ counsel of record at the time of
the promulgation of the decision, did not receive a copy of said decision.
Petitioner Tuvilla adds that neither should the
reglementary period be counted from the date of receipt of the decision by
petitioners in view of the rule that where a party appears by attorney in an
action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices and orders must be given
to the attorney of record.[15]
The records show that the failure of
Atty. Dela Cruz, petitioners’ counsel of record, to
receive a copy of the Court of Appeals decision was caused by his failure to
inform the appellate court of the change of his address of record. Thus, the
Clerk of Court had to resend a copy of the decision, this time to the address
of record of spouses Tuvilla.
If counsel moves to another address
without informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect is
inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be
expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved
or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been
changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides
or holds office.[16]
Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncements that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the
conduct of their case. If it were otherwise, and a lawyer’s mistake or
negligence were admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be
no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or
experienced or learned.[17]
In Macondray
& Co., Inc. v. Provident Insurance Corporation,[18]
petitioner’s previous counsel moved to a new address without informing the
appellate court, eventually causing the appellate court’s decision to become
final and executory. The Court ruled that the counsel’s omission was an inexcusable
neglect binding upon petitioner therein for the following reasons:
In the present case, there is no compelling reason to
overturn well-settled jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in
favor of petitioner, who is not entirely blameless. It should have taken
the initiative of periodically keeping in touch with its counsel, checking with
the court, and inquiring about the status of its case. In so doing, it could
have taken timely steps to neutralize the negligence of its chosen counsel and
to protect its interests. Litigants represented by counsel should not expect
that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their
case.[19]
As pointed out by respondent, after
the death of petitioner Tuvilla’s husband, more than
a year had elapsed before the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision,
but she failed to coordinate with the counsel of record and check the status of
the case in the interim.
Moreover, the general rule is that when
a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must
be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer
than the counsel of record is not notice in law.[20] The
Court of Appeals did not strictly apply this rule and was even liberal when it did
not consider the service on the counsel of record as notice to petitioner. It
even counted the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion of
reconsideration from the later receipt by petitioner Aquilina
Tuvilla of a copy of the decision instead of from the
earlier service on petitioners’ counsel of record. Unfortunately, she
squandered the new period as she failed to file the motion for reconsideration
within the said period.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion for
additional time to file the motion for reconsideration in accordance with the
well-settled principle that no extension for filing said motion may be granted.
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed with fealty
as they are designed primarily to speed up the final disposition of the
case. Such reglementary periods are indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Deviations
from the rules cannot be tolerated. More importantly, their observance cannot
be left to the whims and caprices of the parties. What is worrisome is
that parties who fail to file their pleading within the periods provided for by
the Rules of Court, through their counsel’s inexcusable neglect, resort to
beseeching the Court to bend the rules in the guise of a plea for a liberal
interpretation thereof, thus, sacrificing efficiency and order.[21]
On the merits, petitioners contend that
the motion for reconsideration raised substantially new issues. Suffice it to
say that a petition for certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of
judgment. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. As
already pointed out, the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying a motion for reconsideration which was filed out of time.
In any case, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in setting
aside the decision of the NLRC on the ground that the latter’s ruling to remand
the case to the Labor Arbiter for the recomputation
of the monetary award was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As found by
the appellate court, the NLRC had no basis in ruling that petitioners paid
monthly allowances and commissions to their workers because no proof to this
effect was adduced by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[5]In
its Decision dated
[15]
[16]Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Provident Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 154305, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 644, 653-654.
[17]GCP-Manny
Transport Services, Inc. v.
[19]Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Provident Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 154305, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 644, 654.