THIRD
DIVISION
A & C MINIMART CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus
- PATRICIA S. VILLAREAL, TRICIA ANN VILLAREAL
and CLAIRE HOPE VILLAREAL, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 172268 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: October 10, 2007 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]
dated
The subject
property is a one-storey commercial building constructed on a parcel of land
located at
However,
ownership of the subject property is under dispute. Respondents and spouses
Joaquin and Teresita Bonifacio
(spouses Bonifacio) claim ownership over the subject
property.
The
respondents claim ownership based on a sale of property on execution pending
appeal in a separate case. Civil Case
No. 16194 is an independent action for damages filed by respondents against spouses
Eliseo and Erna Sevilla (spouses Sevilla),
original owners of the disputed property, arising from the murder of Jose Villareal, the husband of respondent Patricia Villareal and father of respondents Tricia Ann and Claire
Hope Villareal.
In its Decision dated P10,882,040.00.[5]
Thereafter, the Makati
RTC, Branch 132, issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Deputy Sheriff Eulalio
Juanson levied on two parcels of land registered
under the name of the Sevillas covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 41338 and No. 41339, issued by the Register of
Deeds of Parañaque City, and a one-storey commercial
building built thereon. On
On the other hand, the spouses Bonifacio claim to have purchased the property from the spouses
Sevilla. Twice
they challenged the Villareals’ ownership of the
property. The first was on 12 September
1990, when they filed Civil Case No. 90-2551 against respondent Patricia Villareal before Branch 58, later unloaded to Branch 63, of
the Makati RTC, for declaration of nullity of levy on
real property, damages and injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order against the sheriff of the Makati
RTC, Branch 132. They allegedly bought
the property from the spouses Sevilla on 17 June
1986, but were unable to transfer the titles to their names when they
discovered that notice of levy on execution was already annotated in the TCTs.[7] On 8 November 1994, the Makati
RTC, Branch 63, declared that the Deed of Sale in favor of the Bonifacios was null and void and thus dismissed the complaint
filed by the spouses Bonifacio for lack of merit. The spouses Bonifacio
filed an appeal, docketed as C.A. G.R. CV No. 48478, which was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals. The dismissal of the
said case became final and executory on
Despite the final and executory decision dismissing the claim of the Bonifacios, the latter, for the second time filed on 25
January 1999, Civil Case No. 99-037 against respondent Patricia Villareal for Declaration of Ownership, Annulment and
Cancellation of Attachment, Notice of Levy, and Execution Sale with Damages at
Branch 257 of the Parañaque RTC, which was dismissed
in an Order dated 8 November 1999.[9] They filed an appeal of the dismissal with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60176, which was likewise
dismissed in a Decision, dated
Meanwhile, upon learning that the spouses
Bonifacio’s claim of ownership over the subject
property had been seriously challenged and denied in the Decision dated 8
November 1994 of the Makati RTC, Branch 63, in Civil
Case No. 90-2551, petitioner stopped paying its rentals on the subject property
on 2 March 1999, in violation of the renewed Lease Contract dated 22 January
1998.[12]
On
Respondents appealed before Branch 194
of the Parañaque RTC, the dismissal ordered by the Parañaque MTC, Branch 78, in Civil Cases No. 11200, 11201,
and 11262. The cases were docketed as
Civil Cases No. 02-0538 to 40. The Parañaque RTC, Branch 194, affirmed the decision of the Parañaque MTC, Branch 78, as to its lack of jurisdiction,
and then treated the complaint as if it were originally filed with the RTC, in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.[14] Thereafter, in its Decision dated
WHEREFORE foregoing considered, judgment is hereby ordered:
1.
Directing and ordering defendant Spouses Bonifacios (sic) to deposit the amount of P315,000.00 paid by A & C Minimart to Account No. 1831-0166-91, with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati City.
2. Ordering defendant A & C Minimart to deposit with Account No. 1831-0166-91, Land Bank of the Philippines, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati City, the monthly rentals due from the premises form (sic) the last rental payment consigned with the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City.
3. Ordering defendant A & C Minimart to furnish the Villareals copies of the Lease Contract it entered into with the Bonifacios.
4. And for convenience, ordering the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City to transfer and deposit the rental payments made by A & C Minimart together with the accrued interest to Account No. 1831-0166-91 with Land Bank of the Philippines, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati City.
No pronouncement as to costs, attorney’s fees and damages.[15]
On P100,000.00
and the costs of suit; and to vacate the subject property, to wit:
1.
[O]rdering defendant A & C
Minimart to deposit with account no. 1831-0166-91 of
the Land Bank of the Philippines, J.P. Rizal Branch[,]
Makati City, the monthly rentals due from March 2,
1999, in accordance with the Lease Contract until it delivers possession thereof
to the Villareals plus 12% interest per annum from
the date of receipt of the demand letter in 25 June 1999 until full
satisfaction less the rental payment consigned to the Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City.
2. [F]or
convenience, ordering the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City to transfer and deposit the rental payments
made by A & C Minimart together with the accrued
interest to Account No. 1831-0166-91 with the Land Bank of the Philippines, J.
P. Rizal Branch, Makati
City.
3.
[D]irecting and ordering
defendant A & C Minimart to pay the Plaintiff
Attorney’s fees in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00)
and the cost of suit.
4.
[O]rdering defendant A &
C Minimart Corp. to vacate the portion of the
building located at
On 27
October 2003, upon motion of the respondents, the Parañaque
RTC, Branch 194, issued a Writ of
Execution requiring petitioner to deposit in Land Bank Account No. 1831-0166-91
the amount of P3,186,154.68, plus 12% yearly interest, computed from the
date of petitioner’s receipt of the demand letter on 25 June 1999.[17]
On
g) To pay the LESSOR three (3%) percent interest per month on the total amount of rental and other charges not paid on time under this contract with said amount accruing automatically upon default without necessity of any demand.[18]
Respondents
anchored their claim on the Amended Decision dated 1 October 2003, and the Writ
of Execution dated 27 October 2003, in Civil Cases No. 02-0538 to 40, which both
used the phrase “in accordance with the Lease Contract,” when referring to the
monthly rentals due and were to be deposited in the bank by the petitioner.
In an Order
dated
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, before the
Court of Appeals, which ruled in favor of the respondents. In the assailed Decision, the appellate court
found that petitioner consigned the rental payments after they fell due and,
thus, it ruled that the 3% interest stipulated in the Contract of Lease dated
WHEREFORE, there being merit in the petition, it is GRANTED. The assailed Order is MODIFIED in that respondent A and C Minimart is additionally DIRECTED to pay a monthly interest of 3% on the total amount of rental and other charges not paid on time pursuant to the contract of lease. This case is REMANDED to the court of origin for proper computation and execution.
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision, which the Court
of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated
Hence, the
present Petition, where petitioner raises the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING VILLAREALS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
CONSIDERING THAT APPEAL IS THE PROPER
AND ADEQUATE REMEDY TO QUESTION THE DECISION OF THE RTC (BRANCH 194) OF
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE CLAIM OF THE VILLAREALS’ THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS (RENTALS AND INTERESTS) OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE ENTERED INTO BETEWEN “A & C MINIMART CORP.” AND TERESITA BONIFACIO.
III
THE HONRABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION) FILED BY THE VILLAREALS CONSIDERING THAT THE LATTER HAVE NO RIGHTS AND INTEREST OVER THE CONTRACT OF LEASE BETWEEN THE SPOUSES BONIFACIOS (sic) AND THE “A & C MINIMART CORP.”
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING C.A.-G.R. SP NO. 81875 CONSIDERING THAT THE
VILLAREALS’ CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY IS STILL THE SUBJECT OF A
PENDING CASE WHICH PRO TANTO RENDERED
THE EJECTMENT SUIT FILED BY THE VILLAREALS AGAINST THE PETITIONER OBVIOUSLY PREMATURE.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT OVERRULLING THE RTC OF PARANAQUE (BR. 194) WHICH REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE MTC OF PARANAQUE CITY DISMISSING THE CONSOLIDATED EJECTMENT CASES (02-0538; 02-0539; 02-540) FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION CONSIDERING THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE INVOLVED IS OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PREMISES WHICH ISSUE REQUIRES FULL-BLOWN TRIAL IN A DIRECT ACTION BEFORE A COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION FOR FULL DETERMINATION.[21]
The petition is partly meritorious.
Petitioner avers that the respondents
should have filed with the Court of Appeals an ordinary appeal instead of a
special civil action for certiorari,
when it questioned the computation made by the Parañaque
RTC, Branch 194, of the rentals due the owner of the subject property.
Such contention runs counter to
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1.
Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal
may be taken from:
x x x x
(f) an
order of execution;
x x x x
In all the
above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
It
is explicit from the afore-quoted provision that no appeal may be taken from an
order of execution; instead, such order may be challenged by the aggrieved
party via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Respondents filed the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 81875, to question the Writ of Execution dated 27 October
2003, issued by the Parañaque RTC, Branch 194, which
computed the rentals to be paid by the petitioner to whoever is declared the
owner of the subject property, without including the 3% penalty interest
stipulated in the Lease Contract dated 22 January 2002. Contrary to the position taken by the
petitioner, respondents’ recourse to an appeal would have been unavailing under
Section 1, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court.
The filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was the proper
remedy questioning an order of execution.
Petitioner
argues that respondents are not entitled to the 3% penalty stipulated under the
Lease Contract dated
It
is a well-known rule that a contractual obligation or liability, or an action ex-contractu,
must be founded upon a contract, oral or written, either express or
implied. If there is no contract, there
is no corresponding liability and no cause of action may arise therefrom.[22] This is provided for in Article 1311 of the
Civil Code:
Article
1311. Contracts take effect only between
the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law.
The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from
the decedent.
The
Lease Contract dated
Contracts
produce an effect as between the parties who execute them. A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot
be enforced by one who is not party to it.
Although the respondents were adjudged to be entitled to rentals
accruing from
Art. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
In
the present case, the spouses Bonifacio, who were
named as the lessors in the Lease Contracts, dated
Since
the spouses Bonifacio are not the owners of the
subject property, they cannot unjustly benefit from it by collecting rent which
should accrue to the rightful owners of the same. Hence, the Makati RTC,
Branch 132, had set up a bank account where the rent due on the subject
property should be deposited and kept in trust for the real owners thereto.
The
last two issues raised by the petitioner on whether the Parañaque
RTC, Branch 194, should have dismissed the case for being premature or for any
other ground cannot be raised in this petition.
Such issues should be, and were, in fact, raised by petitioner in CA-
G.R. No. 86157, which was an appeal of the Amended Decision dated
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81875, promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with
Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and
Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring. Rollo, pp. 38-48.
[2] Penned
by Judge Leoncia Real-Dimagiba.
Rollo, pp. 90-93.
[3] Rollo, pp. 256-259 and 309.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Section
8. Appeals from orders dismissing case
without trial; lack of jurisdiction.—If an appeal is taken from an order of
the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance
and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover,
shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with
it.
In case of reversal, the case shall be
remanded for further proceedings.
If
the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the
case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in
accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of
amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
[15] Rollo, p. 61.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Salonga v. Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88
Phil. 125, 129 (1951); and E.Macias & Co. v.
Warner, Barnes & Co., 43 Phil. 155, 162 (1922).