THIRD
DIVISION
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IN THE MATTER OF REVERSION/RECALL OF
RECONSTITUTED OCT NO. 0-116 DECREE NO. 3999 OF
Petitioners, - versus
- REGISTRY OF DEEDS - Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 171304 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO
MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of (1) the 29 April 2005
Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP UDK No. 5314, which dismissed
petitioners’ Petition for Annulment of Judgment and (2) the 5 August 2005
Resolution[2]
of the appellate court which denied petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. The Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals was,
in turn, directed against the 29 October 1993 Decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Branch 67, in Land Case No.
274-P’93, which ordered the reconstitution of the Original Certificates of
Title (OCTs) in the name of the Municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac over the subject
property.
The factual
and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Sometime in
1910, officials of the Municipal Government of Paniqui, headed by Maximo Parazo,
built a school, a public market, and a cemetery on an untitled parcel of land. Thereafter, OCTs No. R0-532 (O-116) and No. 388
were issued on
On 29 October 1993, pursuant to a
Verified Petition for Reconstitution filed by the Municipality of Paniqui,
represented by Mayor Cesar E. Cuchapin, the RTC issued a Decision resolving
that OCTs No. R0-532 (O-116) and No. 388 were indeed lost, and ordering the
cancellation and the reconstitution of the same as Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) No. 259969,
No. 259970, No. 260900, No. 260901, No. 260902, No. 260903, and No. 336772 of
the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac City, registered in the name of the
On
On
Petitioners
based their petition on the claim that their alleged ascendants were the
original pioneers/settlers/occupants of the land in question since 1843 as its
indigenous inhabitants. In 1910,
however, officials of the Municipal Government of Paniqui, headed by Maximo
Parazo, ordered the occupants of the land to vacate their property so that the municipality
could build thereon a school, a public market, and a cemetery. According to petitioners, their ascendants
were not given a chance or opportunity to appear or answer and present their
side at the cadastral proceedings involving the subject properties, from which resulted
the issuance of the OCTs in the name of the
On
1.
The Petition was not verified, contrary to Section 4,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court;
2.
The attached copy of the assailed RTC Decision is a
mere photocopy and not a certified true copy, also contrary to Section 4, Rule
47 of the Rules of Court;
3.
The corresponding Special Powers of Attorney of the
alleged Attorneys-in-Fact were not attached; and
4.
Petitioners failed to indicate the material dates
pertinent to the filing of the Petition, hence, failing to prove that the same
was brought within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud alleged
in the assailed
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of their Petition,
attaching thereto the following:
1.
a copy of page 7 of the Petition containing the
Verification of the same[5];
2.
a photocopy of the assailed
3.
Special Power of Attorney of petitioners Conrado
Rivera and Perseveranda Domingo, appointing and constituting Glorificador D.
Palaganas, Roselynne E. Mendoza, and Danilo M. Marcelo as their Attorneys-in-Fact[7];
and
4.
Special Power of Attorney of petitioners Jose
Velasquez, Demetria de Vera and Luz P. Labutong, appointing and constituting
Paciano P. Paragas and Benedicto P. Manuel as their Attorneys-in-Fact.[8]
The Court
of Appeals, noting that the attached copy of the assailed RTC Decision is still
only a photocopy of a certified xerox copy, held that even if the
technicalities were brushed aside, the Petition would still be dismissed for
lack of substantial merit, for the following reasons:
1.
Petitioners failed to show that they are the real
parties-in-interest authorized to institute the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment. The Petition did not establish
that the petitioners are truly the successors-in-interest of the individuals
indicated in the technical descriptions of OCT No. R0-532 (0-116) and OCT No.
388. Although the surnames appearing in
the technical descriptions are the same as those of some of the petitioners,
there was no allegation of how the alleged original inhabitants and the
petitioners were related nor was any proof thereof presented;
2.
Petitioners failed to allege fraud in connection with
the proceedings in Land Case No. 274-P’93 which culminated in the rendition of
the assailed Decision dated
3.
The claim of petitioners had already been barred by
laches. Although petitioners discovered
their supposed right to the disputed property only recently, their alleged
ascendants should have instituted an action against the Municipal Government of
Paniqui, Tarlac, or against Maximo Parazo for the purportedly unlawful taking
of the property way back in the 1920s.
The petitioners make no allegation as to any action taken by the alleged
ascendants to recover the subject property.
The Motion
for Reconsideration thus having been denied for lack of merit, petitioners
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Section 2,
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the annulment of a
judgment may "be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction."[9]
A perusal
of the records of the case reveals that petitioners did not allege, much less
prove, either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction by the RTC in Land Case
No. 274-P’93. Petitioners’ claim was that
municipal officials ordered their alleged ascendants to vacate the subject property
way back in 1910 to build a school, a public market and a cemetery thereon, and
that the municipality was subsequently issued OCTs after a judicial
confirmation of its title in 1911 and 1915.
Petitioners allege that their ascendants were defrauded when they were
not given a chance or opportunity to appear or answer and present their side at
the cadastral proceedings involving the subject property. It is apparent that what petitioners are
actually challenging are the cadastral proceedings in which the OCTs over the
subject property were issued in the name of the
Even if we
consider that the petition for annulment was, in effect, filed against the 1911
and 1915 judicial decrees confirming the title of the Municipality of Paniqui over
the subject property, as petitioners imply in their Memorandum, their petition must
still be dismissed.
Petitioners
failed to prove either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds for
a petition for annulment of judgment, even with respect to the 1911 and 1915
Decrees.
There is
extrinsic fraud when the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting
fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, or where the defendant never had knowledge of the
suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff.[10] Petitioners presented no proof to
substantiate their allegation that their ascendants were not given a chance or
opportunity to appear or answer and present their side at the cadastral
proceedings involving the subject property.
Likewise,
petitioners presented neither any evidence nor any legal argument in support of
their claim of lack of jurisdiction of the court which took cognizance of the
cadastral proceedings in which the OCTs over the subject property were issued
in the name of the
In order to
cover up for the lack of evidence to prove the grounds for an annulment of
judgment, petitioners relied on an erroneous interpretation of a very old
case. Citing the 1906 case, Nicolas v. Jose,[11]
petitioners claim that extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction are shown by
the mere fact that a municipality had a real property devoted to public use
registered in its name.[12]
In Nicolas, the then Municipality of Cavite
sought to be inscribed as the owner of a certain track of land situated within
said municipality. Finding that the
property in question is a public square, this Court, applying a provision in
the Spanish Civil Code, held that:
The evidence shows, and the court below so
found, that at the time the Kiosko Cafe and the theater were built, they were
built upon a public street or square known as the “Paseo ό Plaza de la
Soledad.”
x x x x
The question remains as to whether the
municipality is entitled to have the land upon which the Kiosko Café stands
registered in its name. Article 344 of the Civil Code is as follows:
“Property for public use in provinces and
in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general
service supported by the said towns or provinces.
“All other property possessed by either is
patrimonial, and shall be governed by the provisions of this code, unless
otherwise prescribed in special laws.”
The land in question, upon which this
Kiosko Café stands, being dedicated to public use, we do not think it is
subject to inscription by the municipality. Article 25 of the regulations for
the execution of the Mortgage Law prohibits the inscription of public streets
in the old registry. Public streets are not bienes
patrimoniales of the municipality so long as they are destined to public
use.[13]
Properties
of local government units under the Spanish Civil Code were limited to
properties for public use and patrimonial property.[14] The same is still true under the 1950 Civil
Code which governs us today. The
principle has remained constant: property for public use can be used by
everybody, even by strangers or aliens, in accordance with its nature; but
nobody can exercise over it the rights of a private owner.[15] As aptly held by this court in The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City
of Zamboanga[16]:
The Civil Code classification is embodied
in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide:
"ART. 423. The property of provinces,
cities and municipalities, is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. "
"ART. 424. Property for public use,
in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities, or municipalities.
"All other property possessed by any
of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws."
Applying the above cited norm, all the
properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the
school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use.
They would not fall under the phrase "public works for public
service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and
indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceeding enumerated
properties in the first paragraph of Art. 424. The playgrounds, however, would
fit into this category.[17]
While this
Court in
In the case
at bar, a school, a public market, and a cemetery were built upon the subject
property. Unlike a public square as that
in Nicolas or a playground as that in
the
As neither
extrinsic fraud nor lack of jurisdiction had been proven by petitioners, we
hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing petitioners’ Petition
for Annulment of Judgment.
We likewise
affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the claim of petitioners had
already been barred by laches. Laches is
defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert
it.[19]
The recent
discovery by petitioners of their supposed right to the disputed property notwithstanding,
petitioners’ alleged ascendants should have instituted an action against the
Municipal Government of Paniqui or against Maximo Parazo for the allegedly
unlawful taking of the property way back in the 1920s. As asserted by petitioners themselves, the
This brings
us to the final reason for the denial of the present petition. The records of the case are bereft of any
proof on the part of petitioners that they are indeed the
successors-in-interest of the supposed former owners of the subject property. Bearing the same surnames as the individuals
indicated in the technical descriptions of the OCTs being reconstituted is
woefully inadequate to prove their relationship. As petitioners failed to establish that they
are the descendants of the supposed former owners of the subject property, the
case at bar cannot be prosecuted in
their name, as they are not the real parties-in-interest as provided in Section
2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
A real
party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. By real interest
is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy; or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.[21] Rule 3, Section 2, of the Rules of Court
provides explicitly that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest.
Petitioners’ failure to prove such real interest constrained the Court
of Appeals to dismiss the petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
The
SO
ORDERED.
|
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring; rollo, pp.
76-77.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 83-88.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Republic of the Phils. v. Heirs of Sancho Magdato, 394 Phil. 423,
428-429 (2000), citing Alarcon v. Court
of Appeals, 380 Phil. 678, 688 (2000); Spouses
Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 163, 171 (2000).
[10] Republic of the Phils. v. Heirs of Sancho Magdato, id.
[11] 6 Phil. 589 (1906).
[12] Petitioners’ Memorandum, page 4; rollo, p. 91.
[13] Nicolas
v. Jose, supra note 11 at 590-593.
[14] CIVIL CODE (1889), Art. 343; CIVIL CODE (1950), Art. 423. Article 343, Spanish Civil Code; Article 423, 1950 Civil Code.
[15] II Arturo M. Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
[16] 131 Phil. 446 (1968).
[17]
[18] In The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, the
The Court identified two norms for the determination of the classification of the properties in question, that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations. Under the Civil Code norm, properties for the free and indiscriminate use of everyone are properties for public use; while all other properties are patrimonial in nature. Under the Municipal Corporations Law norm, to be considered public property, it is enough that a property is held and devoted to a governmental purpose like local administration, public education, and public health.
The Court applied the Municipal Corporations Law norm, holding that the controversy in said case “is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations – State vs. Province – than along that of Civil Law.”
[19] Cormero
v. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 348, 357 (1995).
[20] Biana
v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 132768.
[21] Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 84197 & 84157, 28 July 1989, 175 SCRA 668, 678.