SECOND DIVISION
|
SPOUSES ISMAEL DISQUITADO AND
VILMA DISQUITADO, Petitioners, - versus - JESUS
CORNELIA, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 170853 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR. JJ.
Promulgated: October 19, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a decision dated August 12, 1994
in Civil Case No. 9852,[1] “Alba Bonillla et
al. v. Rito Cornelia, Rufina
Cornelia, Candida Cornelia et al.,” for Reconveyance, Nullification of
Documents, Cancellation of Certificates of Titles and Damages, Branch 39 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dumaguete City dismissed the complaint against the therein
defendants Rito Cornelia et al. which questioned their
acquisition of portions of Lot Nos. 2626 and 2628 located at Boloc-Boloc, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. In
dismissing the complaint, the trial court held, inter alia,
that the acquisition in 1939 by Rito Cornelia’s
father Andres Cornelia, who died on February 20, 1940,[2] of
portions of the two lots “remains valid and legal even as to the latter’s heirs.”[3] The decision became final and executory after the Court of Appeals affirmed[4] it
by Decision of
In October 2003, Rito
Cornelia and some of his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 9852 filed before the
trial court a Motion for Approval of Project of Partition wherein Andres
Cornelia, father of Rito Cornelia who in turn was the
father of herein respondent Jesus Cornelia, was apportioned 24/180 shares or
1,774 square meters (sq. ms.) of Lot No. 2626, and 24/60 or 672 sq. ms. of Lot No.
2628. The trial court, by Order of
In March 2003, respondent, with the
approval of his siblings, fenced the 1,774 sq. ms. of Lot No. 2626 and 672 sq.
ms. of Lot No. 2628 adjudicated to his grandfather Andres Cornelia, drawing petitioner
spouses Ismael and Vilma Disquitado to file on August 14, 2003 a complaint for
forcible entry and damages against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Sibulan, Negros
Oriental.[5] The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
482. In their Complaint, petitioners claimed
that they had since 1989 been in possession of the two lots as tenants of all
the co-owners thereof until the forcible entry by respondent.
Respondent countered that he,
together with his siblings, had the right to fence the questioned areas, the
same having been adjudicated to their grandfather Andres Cornelia from whom
they derived ownership thereof.
To the Position Paper which they submitted
before the MTC[6] in
support of their complaint for forcible entry against respondent, petitioners
attached an October 11, 2003 Affidavit of Magdalena Aranas-Decano
(Magdalena)[7] reading:
x x x x
1. That I am one of the legitimate surviving heirs of the late Alberto Aranas, a registered co-owner of Lot Nos. 2626 and 2628, located at Boloc-boloc, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, under Original Certificate of Title No. 15698;
2. That sometime in 1989, all the heirs of all the original registered owners of both lots agreed with spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado that the latter shall work on our co-owned lots aforesaid as tenants thereof;
3. That since 1989 up to the present, the subject lots have been tilled and tenanted by spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado and by virtue of which the latter have introduced various agricultural improvements thereon;
4. That the tenancy rights of spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado are still subsisting up to the present;
5. That sometime in March, 2003 we were informed by spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado that separate portions of Lot 2626 and Lot 2628, both of Sibulan, Negros Oriental were forcefully entered into by Mr. Jesus Cornelia;
6. That for almost fifteen years, the tenancy rights of spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado have never been questioned or terminated by any of the co-owners of the aforesaid lots;
x x x x[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The affiant is the same Magdalena who
was one of the plaintiffs in the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 9852 for
reconveyance . . . against the therein defendant-co-owners of the two lots
including Rito Cornelia-father of respondent, which
case was dismissed by the RTC.
By Decision of
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds preponderance of evidence for the [plaintiff-]Spouses Wilma R. Disquitado and Ismael Disquitado and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Jesus Cornelia and/or any person or persons acting in his behalf to vacate and demolish the fence, which he has constructed [on] the lots [sic] in question;
2. Ordering defendant Jesus Cornelia to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
3. Ordering defendant Jesus Cornelia to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal, Branch 40 of the RTC of Negros Oriental, by Decision dated
Petitioners thus filed the present Petition[13]
before this Court, faulting the Court of Appeals for “commit[ing] apparent error in the appreciation, interpretation,
and application of the laws on jurisdiction, forcible entry, and agrarian
disputes.”
By petitioners’ claim, they had since
1989 been tenants of all the co-owners of the two lots, in support of which
they, as earlier stated, submitted the Affidavit of Magdalena. Magdalena, however, was, it bears repeating, one
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 9852 who assailed the acquisition of
portions of the lots by the therein defendants Rito
Cornelia et al., which case was, as stated early on, dismissed by Branch
39 of the Dumaguete RTC. Thus,
in so far as the portions of the lots acquired in 1939 by and adjudicated to
Andres Cornelia-grandfather of respondent,
Upon the other hand, in his Position
Paper and Offer of Documentary Evidence filed before the MTC,[15]
respondent manifested that upon motion filed in Civil Case No. 9852, Branch 39
of the Dumaguete RTC, by Order of May 8, 2001,
directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution and/or Possession over the questioned
portions of the lots in favor of the therein defendant-co-owners Rito Cornelia et al. and “simultaneously command[ed] the
[therein] plaintiffs-appellants [including Magdalena], members of their
family relatives, trespassers, squatters, agents and other privies of the
plaintiffs-appellants to vacate immediately . . . the . . . premises”; and that the Project of Partition, to which
was attached a Sketch Plan indicating the location of the portions of the two
lots adjudicated to Andres Cornelia, was prepared by Geodetic Engineer Jorge S.
Suasin Sr. (Engr. Suasin) and was approved by the RTC by Order of February
11, 2002.
And respondent submitted the
September 23, 2003 Affidavit of Engr. Suasin[16]
declaring that, inter alia, he conducted an actual survey
of the questioned portions of the lots in March 2003 after informing all
co-owners and occupants of the lots including herein petitioner Ismael “Nonoy” Disquitado; and that
he pointed to the heirs of Andres Cornelia the location and monuments of the areas
of the lots adjudicated to him (Lots 2626-C and 2628-A), which areas respondent
later caused to be fenced.
Petitioners’ claim then that they
were instituted in 1989 as tenants of and by all the owners of the lots
including the questioned portions thereof is bereft of merit. There is thus no tenancy relationship to
speak of over which the DAR has original jurisdiction.
As petitioners’ occupation of the
questioned portions of the lots did not bear the imprimatur of respondent and
his siblings-co-owners thereof, it may be deemed to have been merely by tolerance,
to say the least. Petitioners must then be
among those referred to by Branch 39 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 9852 as trespassers,
squatters, agents, or privies of Magdalena et al. who were ordered to vacate
the premises. Engr.
Suasin’s statement in his Affidavit that he advised petitioner
Ismael Disquitado of the circumstances
which culminated in the fencing of the questioned portions of the lots has not even
been impugned.
In fine, petitioners’ complaint for
forcible entry against respondent does not lie.
WHEREFORE, in
light of the foregoing disquisition, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE and another is
rendered dismissing Civil Case
No. 482 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
The case filed by petitioners is simply one for forcible entry within
the jurisdiction of first level courts.
The Project of Partition mentioned
above does not mention the name of Alberto Aranas,
the alleged landlord of petitioners, as owners.
Be that as it may, if petitioners had occupied that portion fenced by
respondent which portion appears to have been part of the 1,744 sq. m.
adjudicated to respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest Andres Cornelia then petitioners were either illegally
occupying it or with tolerance. In
either case, they should respect the rights of the owners thereof. In this light, this Court finds the complaint
of petitioners bereft of merit.
On
In his Answer with Counterclaim,[19]
the respondent admitted that the fencing was done with his knowledge, but
claimed that his sisters, not he, caused it.
He further claimed that he and his siblings are well within their rights
to enter and fence in the lots as the
heirs of a certain Andres Cornelia, a deceased registered co-owner of Lots No.
2626 and 2628 under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9785 and T-9786,
respectively.[20] The respondent also argued that the issue of
ownership and possession of the lots have already been decided by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 39 in
Civil Case No. 9852 on
In his Position Paper and Offer of
Documentary Evidence,[22]
the respondent further argued:
It
could not be claimed also that plaintiffs are tenants of the defendant’s
family. They have admitted that they
have not been giving any share of the produce, which element of sharing is an
essential element of tenancy. And should
they be claiming tenancy, they should ventilate such a claim in the proper
forum, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. But it is unfortunate that in such a
circumstance, the controversy becomes an agrarian dispute and a case of
Forcible Entry under Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall not
apply.[23]
In Ramos v. Stateland
Investment Corporation,[24]
this Court held that when a tenancy is merely averred as a special and
affirmative defense to a complaint for unlawful detainer,
the MTC does not automatically lose its jurisdiction over the said action.[25]
Similarly, in the case at bar, the mere claim by the petitioners that they are
tenants of the lots in question place the case under the original jurisdiction
of the DARAB. As this Court held in Suarez
v. Saul:[26]
In order for a dispute to fall under the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the controversy must relate to “tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers[‘] associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.” There must be a tenancy relationship between the party litigants for the DARAB to validly take cognizance of a controversy.[27]
The conditions enumerated in the
above-quoted portion of Suarez v. Saul do not attend the case at
bar.
The respondent’s allegations and
evidence of ownership do not defeat the petitioners’ cause. It is settled that
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence, or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivinvidicatoria.[28]
The respondent argued before the MTC
that he and his family did not fence the lots through the use of force,
intimidation, threat, stealth, or strategy, but by virtue of a
judicially-approved partition that allotted Lot No. 2626-C and 2628-A to their
predecessor-in-interest.[29] This contention holds no water. Construing the phrase “by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth”, this Court held:
xxx The words “by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth” include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcibl[e] entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.[30]
That the respondent and his family acted
by virtue of a final and executory decision, a Writ
of Execution and/or Writ of Possession, and by a judicially-approved Project of
Partition[31] is of
no moment. Article 536 of the Civil Code
provides,
In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
In the case at bar, the respondent
and his family should have exercised their right to ownership by executing the
writ of execution and/or writ of possession allegedly issued by Branch 39 of
the RTC of Negros Oriental, if such writ/s, indeed,
been issued. As the MTC noted, no
evidence of the said writ of execution and/or writ of possession had been
attached to the respondent’s pleadings.[32] The MTC further observed:
xxx Besides, once a writ of execution is issued, Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “the writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full.” Without such return, there can be no basis for stating that defendant has been placed in possession of the lots subject of the project of partition, which are the lots subject of this case. Even then, the plaintiffs were not parties to the said case in RTC Branch 39. As such, they cannot be ejected or their improvements on the land cannot be demolished pursuant to such writ if any has been issued without giving them an opportunity to be heard. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.[33]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO VELASCO Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 15-29.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Ibid.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Penned by Court of Appeals then-Executive
Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with the concurrences
of Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos
and Enrico A. Lanzanas. CA rollo,
pp. 110-118.
[13] Rollo, pp. 9-27.
[14] MTC Order of
[15]
[16]
[17] RTC records, pp. 1-6.
[18] RTC records, pp. 61-62, 71.
[19] RTC records, pp. 41.
[20] RTC records, pp. 13-14, 38.
[21] RTC
records, p. 39. Vide RTC records pp. 15-30, 57-58..
[22] RTC records, pp. 49-55.
[23] RTC records, p. 52.
[24] G.R.
No. 161973,
[25]
[26] G.R. No.
166664,
[27]
[28] German
Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76216 and
76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 494, 499.
[29] Vide
RTC records, p. 51.
[30] David
v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992,
[31] RTC
records, p. 51. Vide RTC records,
pp. 15-35, 56-60.
[32] RTC records, p. 77.
[33] Ibid. Citations omitted.