Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
ESTATE OF THE LATE G.R. No. 168661
JESUS S. YUJUICO, represented
by ADMINISTRATORS
BENEDICTO V. YUJUICO and Present:
EDILBERTO V. YUJUICO; and
AUGUSTO Y. CARPIO, QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
Petitioners, CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
- versus - NACHURA,* JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE
and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. October 26, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In
1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation
of her title over a parcel of land with an area of 17,343 square meters covered
by plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Province of
Rizal (now Parañaque City), in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI),
Branch 22. The application was docketed
LRC Case No. N-8239. The application was
opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the Director
of Lands, and by Mercedes Dizon, a private party. Both oppositions were stricken from the
records since the opposition of Dizon was filed after the expiration of the
period given by the court, and the opposition of the Director of Lands was
filed after the entry of the order of general default. After considering the evidence, the trial
court rendered its
____________________________
* As
per
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicant, Fermina Castro, of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of 1515 F. Agoncillo St., Corner J. Escoda St., Ermita, Manila, the true and absolute owner of the land applied for situated in the Municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 17,343 square meters and covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 and orders the registration of said parcel of land in her name with her aforementioned personal circumstances.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the corresponding order for the issuance of the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The
Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision
of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order
for the issuance of a decree of registration became final, and Decree No.
N-150912 was issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC).[2] Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10215
was issued in the name of Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal on May 29, 1974.[3]
The land was then sold to Jesus S.
Yujuico, and OCT No. 10215 was cancelled.
On
Annotations
at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or another,
mortgaged the lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and
Citibank, N.A. Annotations in the title
of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot was mortgaged in favor of Private
Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and
then Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) to secure various loans.
Sometime
in 1977, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 entitled Conveying the Land
Reclaimed in the Foreshore and Offshore of the Manila Bay (The Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road Project) as Property of the Public Estates Authority as well as
Rights and Interests with Assumptions of Obligations in the Reclamation
Contract Covering Areas of the Manila Bay between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (1977) was issued. Land reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore areas of
The
PEA undertook the construction of the
On
On
July 31, 1998, the incumbent PEA General Manager, Carlos P. Doble, informed the
OSG that the new PEA board and management had reviewed the compromise agreement
and had decided to defer its implementation and hold it in abeyance following
the view of the former PEA General Manager, Atty. Arsenio Yulo, Jr., that the
compromise agreement did not reflect a condition of the previous PEA Board,
requiring the approval of the Office of the President. The new PEA management then filed a petition
for relief from the resolution approving the compromise agreement on the ground
of mistake and excusable negligence.
The petition was
dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was filed out of time and
that the allegation of mistake and excusable negligence lacked basis.
The PEA fared no better
in the Court of Appeals (CA), as the petition was dismissed for failure to pay
the required docket fees and for lack of merit.
The matter was raised to
the Supreme Court in Public Estates
Authority v. Yujuico[8] but PEA’s petition was denied,
upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for relief for having
been filed out of time. The allegation
of fraud in the titling of the subject property in the name of Fermina Castro
was not taken up by the Court.
On
More
significantly, respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land
was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina
Castro. Second, the land registration
court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the
decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was
void. And third, the titles of Yujuico
and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void.[9]
On September 13, 2001, Yujuico and
Carpio filed a Motion to Dismiss (With Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens),[10] on
the grounds that: (1) the cause of action was barred by prior judgment; (2) the
claim had been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (3) a condition
precedent for the filing of the complaint was not complied with; and (4) the
complaint was not verified and the certification against forum shopping was not
duly executed by the plaintiff or principal party.
On
In the
On
appeal to the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76212, respondent Republic alleged that the
trial court erred in disregarding that appellant had evidence to prove that the
subject parcel of land used to be foreshore land of the Manila Bay and that the
trial court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 01-0222 on the ground of res judicata.[14]
The
CA observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public
use and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title
upon the registrant.
Further, according to the appellate
court res judicata does not
apply to lands of public domain, nor does possession of the land automatically
divest the land of its public character.
The appellate court explained that
rulings of the Supreme Court have made exceptions in cases where the findings
of the Director of Lands and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) were conflicting as to the true nature of the land in as much
as reversion efforts pertaining foreshore lands are embued with public
interest.
The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Order dated August 7, 2002 of the trial court in Civil Case No. 01-0222 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to said court for further proceedings and a full-blown trial on the merits with utmost dispatch.[15]
Hence,
this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners
now raise the following issues before this Court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS NECESSITATING THE HONORABLE COURT’S EXERCISE OF ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REVERSAL BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE TRIAL COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE INSTANT CASE IS BASED ON ITS ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE
A. IN THE FIRESTONE CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT APPLIED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA NOTWITHSTANDING ALLEGATIONS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OF A LAND REGISTRATION COURT, FORECLOSING ANY FURTHER ATTEMPT BY RESPONDENT THEREIN, AS IN THE INSTANT CASE, TO RESURRECT A LONG-SETTLED JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF REGISTRABILITY OF A PARCEL OF LAND BASED ON THE SHEER ALLEGATION THAT THE SAME IS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
B.
THE
C. RESPONDENT’S REVERSION CASE SEEKS TO RETRY THE VERY SAME FACTUAL ISSUES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN JUDICIALLY DETERMINED OVER THIRTY (30) YEARS AGO.
D.
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BASES APPLIED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION ARE MISPLACED, CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE ALL
PREDICATED ON THE ERRONEOUS PREMISE THAT IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE
II.
RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY JURISDICTIONAL ESTOPPEL AND LACHES FROM QUESTIONING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE
III.
RELIANCE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE ISOLATED PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE PEA CASE IS UNWARRANTED AND MISLEADING
CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTER OF WHETHER RES JUDICATA APPLIES WITH RESPECT TO THE
A. THE INSTANT REVERSION CASE IS NOT THE PROPER RECOURSE.
B. THE
VALIDITY OF THE COURT-APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
IV.
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS MANDATE THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE ON ORDINARY
ESTOPPEL AND LACHES IN THE INSTANT
CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT.
V. RESPONDENT CANNOT BE GIVEN SPECIAL CONSIDERATION AND EXCUSED FOR TRANSGRESSING RULES OF PROCEDURE.[16]
Essentially, the issues boil down to
three: (1) Is a reversion suit proper in
this case? (2) Is the present petition estopped by laches? (3) Did the CA
erroneously apply the principle of res judicata?
An action for reversion seeks to
restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals
or corporations to the mass of public domain.[17] This remedy is provided under Commonwealth
Act (CA) No. 141 (Public Land Act) which became effective on
SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of Sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Section 124 of the Public
Land Act, reversion suits are proper in the following instances, to wit:
1. Alienations
of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions in violation of
Section 118, CA No. 141;
2. Conveyances
made by non-Christians in violation of Section 120, CA No. 141; and
3. Alienations
of lands acquired under CA No. 141 in favor of persons not qualified under
Sections 121, 122, and 123 of CA No. 141.
From the foregoing, an action for
reversion to cancel titles derived from homestead patents or free patents based
on transfers and conveyances in violation of CA No. 141 is filed by the OSG
pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code with the RTC. It is clear therefore that reversion suits
were originally utilized to annul titles or patents administratively issued by
the Director of the Land Management Bureau or the Secretary of the DENR.
While CA No. 141 did not specify
whether judicial confirmation of titles by a land registration court can be
subject of a reversion suit, the government availed of such remedy by filing
actions with the RTC to cancel titles and decrees granted in land registration
applications.
The situation changed on
When the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure became effective on
The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222
for annulment and cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its derivative titles
was filed on
In Collado v. Court of Appeals,[18]
the government, represented by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 9(2)
of BP Blg. 129, filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. Similarly in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,[19]
the Solicitor General correctly filed the annulment of judgment with the said
appellate court.
This was not done in this case. The Republic misfiled the reversion suit with
the Parañaque RTC. It should have been
filed with the CA as required by Rule 47.
Evidently, the Parañaque RTC had no jurisdiction over the instant
reversion case.
Assuming that the Parañaque RTC has jurisdiction over the reversion case,
still the lapse of almost three decades in filing the instant case, the
inexplicable lack of action of the Republic and the injury this would cause
constrain us to rule for petitioners.
While it may be true that estoppel does not operate against the state or
its agents,[20]
deviations have been allowed. In Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, we said:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals.[21] (Emphasis supplied.)
Equitable estoppel may be invoked
against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already alienated
to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to
contest the title for an unreasonable length of time.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent
purchaser for value who relied on the clean certificates of the title was
sought to be cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we
ruled that “[i]t is only fair and
reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the
government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value (emphasis
supplied).”[22] We explained:
Likewise
time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property,
courts cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the
certificate. Such cancellation would
impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every
instance whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of
the law, which is to stabilize land titles.
Verily, all persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore, and the law or the
courts do not oblige them to go behind the certificate in order to investigate
again the true condition of the property.
They are only charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances on the
property that are noted on the certificate.[23]
x x x x
But
in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the titleholder be made to
bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents,
in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to
third persons. First, the real purpose of the
Republic v. Court of Appeals is reinforced by our ruling in Republic
v. Umali,[25] where,
in a reversion case, we held that even if the original grantee of a patent and
title has obtained the same through fraud, reversion will no longer prosper as
the land had become private land and the fraudulent acquisition cannot affect
the titles of innocent purchasers for value.
Considering that innocent purchaser
for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed
before the action for reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by
laches.
While the general rule is that an
action to recover lands of public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be
barred by laches or estoppel. Section 32
of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and
above the interests of the government.
Section 32 provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.—The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances for value. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition, the LRC (now LRA),
on
Likewise protected are the rights of
innocent mortgagees for value, the PISO, Citibank, N.A., PDC, RCBC, PCIB, and DBP. Even if the mortgagor’s title was proved
fraudulent and the title declared null and void, such declaration cannot
nullify the mortgage rights of a mortgagee in good faith.[27]
All told, a reversion suit will no
longer be allowed at this stage.
More on the issue of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled thereto has either abandoned or declined to assert it.[28]
When respondent government filed the
reversion case in 2001, 27 years had already elapsed from the time the late
Jesus Yujuico purchased the land from the original owner Castro. After the
issuance of OCT No. 10215 to Castro, no further action was taken by the
government to question the issuance of the title to Castro until the case of Public Estates Authority, brought up in
the oral argument before this Court on
From the undisputed facts of the
case, it is easily revealed that respondent Republic took its sweet time to
nullify Castro’s title, notwithstanding the easy access to ample remedies which
were readily available after OCT No. 10215 was registered in the name of
Castro. First, it could have appealed to the CA when the Pasig-Rizal CFI
rendered a decision ordering the registration of title in the name of applicant
Castro on
Such a Rip Van Winkle, coupled with
the signing of the settlement with PEA, understandably misled petitioners to
believe that the government no longer had any right or interest in the disputed
lot to the extent that the two lots were even mortgaged to several banks
including a government financing institution.
Any nullification of title at this stage would unsettle and prejudice
the rights and obligations of innocent parties.
All told, we are constrained to conclude that laches had set in.
Even granting arguendo that respondent
Republic is not precluded by laches from challenging the title of petitioners
in the case at bar, still we find that the instant action for reversion is
already barred by res judicata.
Petitioners relying on Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[31] as
a precedent to the case at bar contend that the instant reversion suit is now
barred by res judicata.
We agree with petitioners.
The doctrine on precedents is
expressed in the latin maxim—Stare
decisis et non quieta movere. Follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled.[32] In order however that a case can be
considered as a precedent to another case which is pending consideration, the
facts of the first case should be similar or analogous to the second case.
A perusal of the facts of the
Firestone case and those of the case at bar reveals that the facts in the two
(2) cases are parallel. First, in
Firestone and in this case, the
claimants filed land registration applications with the CFI; both claimants
obtained decrees for registration of lots applied for and were issued OCTs. Second, in Firestone, the Republic filed a reversion case alleging that the
land covered by the OCT was still inalienable forest land at the time of the
application and hence the
Clearly from the above, Firestone is a precedent case. The Public Estates Authority had
become final and thus the validity of OCT No. 10215 issued to Castro could no
longer be questioned.
While we said in Public Estates
Authority that the court does not foreclose the right of the Republic from
pursuing the proper recourse in a separate proceedings as it may deem
warranted, the statement was obiter
dictum since the inquiry on whether or not the disputed land was still
under water at the time of its registration was a non-issue in the said
case.
Even granting for the sake of
argument that Firestone is not squarely
applicable, still we find the reversion suit already barred by res judicata.
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action,
the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or
order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action.[35]
There is no question as to the first,
third and last requisites. The threshold
question pertains to the second requisite, whether or not the then Pasig-Rizal
CFI, Branch 22 had jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. N-8239.
In Civil Case No. 01-0222, the Parañaque
City RTC, Branch 257 held that the CFI had jurisdiction. The CA reversed the decision of the Parañaque
City RTC based on the assertion of respondent Republic that the Pasig-Rizal CFI
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that there was a need to
determine the character of the land in question.
The Parañaque City RTC Order
dismissing the case for res judicata must
be upheld.
The CA, in rejecting the dismissal of
the reversion case by the Parañaque RTC, relied on two cases, namely: Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta[36]
and Republic v. Vda. De Castillo.[37]
In
Since the
“[x x x] the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject matter renders the judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering, further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and hence, can never become executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.”
x x x x
“It follows that ‘if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included’ (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503; Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769).”
[x x x x]
“Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic vs. Animas, et al., supra), and the cancellation maybe pursued through an ordinary action therefore. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. [x x x] Certainly, one of the essential requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the subject matter, is absent in this case.” (Italics supplied).[38]
The
plain import of
Firmly entrenched is the principle that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.[39] Consequently, the proper CFI (now the RTC)
under Section 14 of PD 1529[40]
(Property Registration Decree) has jurisdiction over applications for
registration of title to land.
Section 14 of PD 1592 provides:
SEC.
14. Who
may apply.—The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1)
Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. (Emphasis supplied.)
Conformably,
the Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch XXII has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the land registration case filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest, since jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations of the initiatory pleading¾the application.[41] Settled is the rule that “the authority to
decide a case and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up
jurisdiction. When there is
jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of jurisdiction.”[42]
In our view, it was imprecise to
state in Municipality of Antipolo that the “
Based on our ruling in Antipolo, the threshold question is
whether the land covered by the titles of petitioners is under water and forms
part of
After a scrutiny of the case records
and pleadings of the parties in LRC Case No. N-8239 and in the instant
petition, we rule that the land of Fermina Castro is registrable and not part
of Manila Bay at the time of the filing of the land registration application.
The trial court’s Decision in 1974
easily reveals the basis for its conclusion that the subject matter was a dry
land, thus:
On
The other witness presented by the applicant was Emiliano de Leon, who declared that he was 70 years old, married, farmer and residing at San Jose, Baliwag, Bulacan; that he knew Catalino Castro, the father of the applicant because said Catalino Castro was his neighbor in Tambo, Parañaque, Rizal, he had a house erected on the land of Catalino Castro; that he was born in 1903 and he first came to know of the land in question when in 1918 when he was about 18 years old; that the area of the land owned and possessed by Catalino Castro where he constructed a residential house has an area of more than one and one-half (1 ½) hectares; that the possession of Catalino Castro over the land in question was peaceful, continuous, notorious, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner; that during the time that Catalino Castro was in possession of the land applied for he planted on said parcel of land mango, coconut and banana, etc.; that Catalino Castro continuously possessed and owned said parcel of land up to the year 1952 when he died; that during the time that Catalino Castro was in possession of said land, nobody ever laid claim over the said property; that said land is not within any military or naval reservation; that upon the death of Catalino Castro, the applicant took possession of the land applied for and that up to the present the applicant is in possession of said land; that he resided in the land in question from 1918 up to the time he transferred his place of residence in Baliwag, Bulacan in the year 1958.
On February 11, 1974, the Court, pursuant to the provision of Presidential Decree No. 230 issued by his Excellency, Ferdinand E. Marcos dated July 9, 1973 held in abeyance the rendition of a decision in this case and directed the applicant to submit a white print copy of plan (LRC) Psu-964 to the Director of lands who was directed by the Court to submit his comment and recommendation thereon.
The
property in question is declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
No. 51842 (Exhibit G) and real estate taxes due thereon have been paid up to
the year 1973 (Exhibit H).
In
compliance with the Order of this Court February 11, 1974, the Director of Lands, thru Special Attorney Saturnino A.
Pacubas, submitted a report to this Court dated April 25, 1974, stating among
other things, that upon ocular inspection conducted by Land Inspector Adelino
G. Gorospe and the subsequent joint ocular inspection conducted by Geodetic
Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania, it
was established that the parcel of land covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 no longer
forms part of the Manila Bay but is definitely solid and dry land.
In this connection, it should be noted that Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes, in their report dated March 22, 1974 have also stated that the land applied for cannot be reached by water even in the highest tide and that the said land is occupied by squatter families who have erected makeshift shanties and a basketball court which only prove that the same is dry and solid land away from the shores of Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Land Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe in his letter-report dated November 28, 1973 has also stated that there is a house of pre-war vintage owned by the applicant on the land in question which in effect corroborates the testimony of the applicant and her witness that they have lived on the land in question even prior to the outbreak of the second world war and that the applicant has been in possession of the land in question long time ago.[43]
To counter the evidence of applicant
Castro, and bolster its claim that she has no valid title, respondent Republic
relies on the July 18, 1973 Office Memorandum[44]
of Roman Mataverde, OIC, Surveys Division, to the OIC, Legal Division, of the
Bureau of Lands, stating that “when projected on cadastral maps CM 14º 13’N -
120º 59’ E., Sec. 3-D and CM 14º 30’N - 120º 59’E., Sec. 2-A of Paranaque [sic]
Cadastre (Cad-299), (LRC) Psu-964 falls inside Manila Bay, outside Cad-299.”[45]
The same conclusion was adopted in a
Respondent likewise cites Namria
Hydrographic Map No. 4243 Revised 80-11-2 to support its position that Castro’s
lot is a portion of
The burden of proving these averments
falls to the shoulders of respondent Republic.
The difficulty is locating the witnesses of the government. Roman
Mataverde, then OIC of the Surveys Division retired from the government service
in 1982. He should by this time be in
his 90s. Moreover, Asst. Regional
Director Narciso Villapando and Asst. Director Ernesto C. Mendiola are no
longer connected with the Bureau of Lands since 1986.
Assuming that OIC Roman Mataverde,
Asst. Regional Director Narciso Villapando and Assistant Director Ernesto C.
Mendiola are still available as witnesses, the projections made on the
cadastral maps of the then Bureau of Lands cannot prevail over the results of
the two ocular inspections by several Bureau of Lands officials that the
disputed lot is definitely “dry and solid land” and not part of Manila
Bay. Special Attorney Saturnino A.
Pacubas, Land Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe, Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes
and Administrative Asst. Lazaro A. Berana, all officials of the Bureau of
Lands, were positive that the disputed land is solid and dry land and no longer
forms part of
On the other hand, the Namria
Hydrographic Map No. 4243 does not reveal what portion of
Surveys whose principal purpose is the determination of data relating to bodies of water. A hydrographic survey may consist of the determination of one or several of the following classes of data: depth water; configuration and nature of the bottom; directions and force of currents; heights and times of tides and water stages; and location of fixed objects for survey and navigation purposes.[47]
Juxtaposed with finding of the ocular
inspection by Bureau of Lands Special Attorney Pacubas and others that Castro’s
lot is dry land in 1974, Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 is therefore inferior
evidence and lacking in probative force.
Moreover, the reliability and
veracity of the July 18, 1973 report of Roman Mataverde based on the alleged
projection on cadastral maps and the Villapando report dated November 15, 1973
are put to serious doubt in the face of the opinion dated October 13, 1997 of
the Government Corporate Counsel, the lawyer of the PEA, which upheld the
validity of the titles of petitioners, thus:
We maintain to agree with the findings of the
court that the property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as based on the
two (2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by Lands Administrative
Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Lands Geodetic Engr. Manuel Cervantes, finding
‘… the same no longer forms part of Manila Bay but is definitely solid land
which cannot be reached by water even in the highest of tides’. This Berania-Cervantes report based on
ocular inspections literally overturned the findings and recommendations of
Land Director Narciso V. Villapando dated November 15, 1973, and that of
Director Ernesto C. Mendiola dated December 1, 1977, and the fact that the
Villapando-Mendiola reports were merely based on projections in the cadastral
map or table surveys.
x x x x
A. The Legal prognosis of the case is not
promising in favor of PEA.
4.1 LRC
Case No. N-8239 has already become final and executory and OCT No. 10215 was
already issued in favor of Fermina Castro. Any and all attempts to question its
validity can only be entertained in a quo warranto proceedings (sic), assuming
that there are legal grounds (not factual grounds) to support its nullification.
Subjecting it to a collateral attack is not allowed under the Torrens Title
System. In Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 208 SCRA 215, the
Supreme Court held that the present petition is not the proper remedy in challenging
the validity of certificates of titles since the judicial action required is a
direct and not a collateral attack (refer also to: Toyota Motor Philippine
Corporation vs. CA, 216 SCRA 236).
4.2 OCT
No. 10215 in favor of Fermina Castro was issued pursuant to a cadastral
proceeding, hence is a rem proceedings which is translated as a
constructive notice to the whole world, as held in Adez Realty Incorporated vs.
CA, 212 SCRA 623.
4.3 From
the cursory and intent reading of the decision of Judge Sison in LRC Case No.
N-8239, we cannot find any iota of fraud having been committed by the court and
the parties. In fact, due process was observed when the Office of the Solicitor
General represented ably the Bureau of Lands. In Balangcad vs. Justices of the
Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 169, the Supreme Court held that title to registered
property becomes indefeasible after one-year from date of registration except
where there is actual fraud in which case it may be challenged in a direct
proceeding within that period. This is also the ruling in Bishop vs. CA, 208
SCRA 636, that to sustain an action for annulment of a torrens certificate for
being void ab initio, it must be shown that the registration court had
not acquired jurisdiction over the case and there was actual fraud in securing
the title.
4.4 As
to priority of torrens title, PEA has no defense, assuming that both PEA and
Yujuico titles are valid, as held in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System vs. CA, 215 SCRA 783, where two (2) certificates purport to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails.
4.5 The documents so far submitted by the
parties to the court indicate that the mother title of the Yujuico land when
registered in 1974 was not underwater. This was shown in the two (2) ocular inspections
conducted by the officials of the Land Bureau.
4.6 The
provision of P.D. 239 that no decree of registration may be issued by the court
unless upon approval and recommendation of the Bureau of Lands was
substantially complied with in the Report of Lands Special Attorney Saturnino
Pacubas, submitted to the court.[48]
Even the counsel of respondent
Republic, the OSG, arrived at the conclusion that there is no sufficient legal
basis for said respondent to institute action to annul the titles of petitioners,
thus:
It may be stated at the outset that a
petition for annulment of certificate of title or reconveyance of land may be
based on fraud which attended the issuance of the decree of registration and
the corresponding certificate of title.
Based on the decision in the LRC Case No.
N-8239 involving the petition for registration and confirmation of title filed
by Fermina Castro, there is no showing that fraud attended the issuance of OCT
No. 10215. it appears that the evidence presented by Fermina Castro was
sufficient for the trial court to grant her petition.
The testimony of Fermina Castro, which was
corroborated by Emiliano de Leon, that she and her predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years sufficiently
established her vested right over the property initially covered by OCT No.
10215. The report dated
The aforesaid report must be requested unless
there is a concrete proof that there was an irregularity in the issuance
thereof. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ocular inspection of
the parcel of land, which was made the basis of said report, is presumed to be
in order.
Based
on the available records, there appears to be no sufficient basis for the
Government to institute an action for the annulment of OCT No. 10215 and its
derivative titles. It is opined that a petition for cancellation/annulment of
Decree No. N-150912 and OCT No. 10215 and all its derivative titles will not
prosper unless there is convincing evidence to negate the report of the then
Land Management Bureau through Special Attorney Pacubas. Should the Government
pursue the filing of such an action, the possibility of winning the case is
remote.[49]
More so, respondent Government,
through its counsel, admits that the land applied by Fermina Castro in 1973 was
solid and dry land, negating the nebulous allegation that said land is
underwater. The only conclusion that can
be derived from the admissions of the Solicitor General and Government
Corporate Counsel is that the land subject of the titles of petitioners is
alienable land beyond the reach of the reversion suit of the state.
Notably, the land in question has
been the subject of a compromise agreement upheld by this Court in Public Estates Authority.[50] In that compromise agreement, among other
provisions, it was held that the property covered by TCT Nos. 446386 and S-29361,
the land subject of the instant case, would be exchanged for PEA property. The
fact that PEA signed the May 15, 1998 Compromise Agreement is already a clear
admission that it recognized petitioners as true and legal owners of the land
subject of this controversy.
Moreover, PEA has waived its right to
contest the legality and validity of Castro’s title. Such waiver is clearly within the powers of
PEA since it was created by PD 1084 as a body corporate “which shall have the
attribute of perpetual succession and possessed of the powers of the
corporations, to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of this Charter
[PD 1084].”[51] It has the power “to enter into, make,
perform and carry out contracts of every class and description, including loan
agreements, mortgages and other types of security arrangements, necessary or
incidental to the realization of its purposes with any person, firm or corporation,
private or public, and with any foreign government or entity.”[52] It also has the power to sue and be sued in
its corporate name.[53] Thus, the Compromise Agreement and the Deed
of Exchange of Real Property signed by PEA with the petitioners are legal,
valid and binding on PEA. In the
Compromise Agreement, it is provided that it “settles in full all the
claims/counterclaims of the parties against each other.”[54] The waiver by PEA of its right to question
petitioners’ title is fortified by the manifestation by PEA in the Joint Motion
for Judgment based on Compromise Agreement that
4. The parties herein hereto waive and abandon any and all other claims and counterclaims which they may have against each other arising from this case or related thereto.[55]
Thus, there was a valid waiver of the
right of respondent Republic through PEA to challenge petitioners’ titles.
The recognition of petitioners’ legal
ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal
acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where it stated
that: “Your ownership thereof was acknowledged by PEA when it did not object to
your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which an owner of a piece of land
in CBP-IA automatically becomes a member thereof.”[56] Section 26, Rule 130 provides that “the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.” The admissions of
PEA which is the real party-in-interest in this case on the nature of the
In sum, the Court finds that the
reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Parañaque RTC. Even if we treat said
case as a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to be upheld
because it is already barred by laches.
Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar
facts and circumstances obtaining therein.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76212 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T
A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[8] G.R.
No. 140486,
[15]
[17] O.D. Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds) 352 (2006).
[20]
[25]
G.R. No. 80687,
[26] PD 1529, Sec. 44.
[31] G.R.
No. 127022,
[38] Supra note 35, at 825-826.
[40] “Amending
and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other
Purposes” (1978).
[41] Ganadin
v. Ramos, No. L-23547,
[47] Sec.
01. Surveying, National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA),
<http://www.namria.gov.ph/serv.asp> (visited
[48] Rollo, pp. 93-95.
[49]
[56]