SPOUSES
MARIANO S. TANGLAO and CORAZON M. TANGLAO,
Petitioners, -
versus - SPOUSES CORAZON S. PARUNGAO and LORENZO G. PARUNGAO
(deceased), substituted by Respondents. |
G.R. No. 166913
Present:
PUNO, c.j.,
Chairperson,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: October 5, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
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For
our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking
to reverse the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Division) dated January 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 78079.
The
facts of the case are:
In
1992, spouses Lorenzo and Corazon Parungao, respondents, purchased from Spring
Homes Subdivision (Spring Homes) Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 with a total area of
486 square meters (sq. m.) at P1,350.00 per sq. m. or a total price of P656,100.00.
In addition, they also bought Lot Nos.
7, 8, and 9 with a total area of 457 sq. m. at P1,550.00
per sq. m. or a total price of P708,360.00. All these lots are located at Block VI, Phase
II-C, Spring Homes, Barangay Culiat, P536,000.00, leaving a balance of P828,450.00, exclusive
of interest.
Sometime
in November 1992, respondents introduced improvements on the lots consisting of
a concrete perimeter fence with cyclone wires on top, a heavy steel gate, and two
fish breeding buildings, all at a cost of P945,000.00.
They also elevated the ground level of
the lots by filling them with earth and “adobe.”
Under
the terms of the Contracts to Sell signed by respondents and Spring Homes, the balance of P828,450.00 was to be
paid by them within one year from its execution; and that should they apply for
a loan as payment for the balance, they would continue to pay the monthly
installment until their obligation is fully paid.
Respondents
failed to pay the installments. They
also failed to secure a loan because Spring Homes refused to deliver to them
the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering
the lots required in their application for a loan secured by a real estate
mortgage. Apparently, respondents had requested Spring Homes to furnish them
copies of the Contracts to Sell, the TCTs, receipts of real estate taxes paid,
tax declarations, and the survey and vicinity plans of the lots they purchased.
However, Roy Madamba, salesman-representative of Spring Homes, gave respondents
only copies of the Contracts to Sell.
But respondents returned these copies to Spring Homes for correction of the
lot numbers and the names of the vendees.
On
In
a letter dated
Meanwhile,
petitioners took possession of the two lots they bought. They forcibly opened the steel gate as well as the doors of the
buildings and entered the premises.
When
informed of these events, respondents demanded an explanation from Spring
Homes. Bertha Pasic, its treasurer,
apologized and promised she would settle the matter with petitioners. However, the controversy was not settled.
On
Despite
notice, Spring Homes, Pasic, and Messiah did not file their respective answers
to the complaint, nor did they appear during the hearings.
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Dismissing the complaint filed against respondents
Felipa Messiah and Spouses Tanglao for lack of merit;
2.
Ordering respondent Spring Homes to pay complainants:
a)
Php536,000.00 by way of refund of payments with 12%
interest per annum to commence from
b)
Php935,000.00 as actual damages; and
c) Php20,000.00
as attorney’s fees..
3. Ordering respondents Spring Homes Subdivision Co., Inc., and Bertha Pasic, jointly and severally, to pay complainant the sum of Php20,000.00 as moral damages and to pay this Board the sum of Php10,000.00 as administrative fine.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, respondents
filed a petition for review with the HLURB Board of Commissioners, docketed as
HLURB Case No. REM-A-001211-0272.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is granted. The
decision of the office below is set aside and a new decision is rendered as
follows:
1.
Declaring as valid and subsisting the contract to sell
between complainants and respondent Spring Homes;
2.
Directing complainants to immediately update their
account and directing respondent Spring Homes to accept payment and to deliver
title to complainants upon full payment of the purchases price;
3.
Declaring as invalid the deed of absolute sale in favor
of the spouses Tanglao over the subject lots and directing the cancellation of
respondent spouses TCTs Nos. T-268566 and T-268572 of
the Registry of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna and its reversion to respondent
Spring Homes;
4.
Directing respondent Spring Homes to refund to
respondent spouses Tanglao all the amounts paid by the latter in connection
with the sale of the subject lots to the latter with 12% interest reckoned from
the date of the sale;
5.
Directing respondent Spring Homes to pay administrative
fine of P10,000.00 for unsound business practice.
SO ORDERED.
The HLURB Board of
Commissioners found that at the time of the sale of the two lots in question to
petitioners, the contracts between respondents and Spring Homes were still
subsisting. Moreover, the fence and
existing structures erected on the premises should have forewarned petitioners
that there are adverse claimants of the two lots.
Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, but this was denied by the HLURB Board of Commissioners in
a Resolution promulgated on
Petitioners then filed an
appeal with the Office of the President, docketed as O.P. Case No. 02-C-099. But in its Decision dated
Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the said Office in its Order dated
Eventually, petitioners
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered DISMISSED. The Decision dated 12 March 2003 of the Office of the President which affirmed the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners (Third Division) dated 24 August 2001 reversing the 03 October 2000 Decision of Housing and Land Use Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean and the Order dated 18 June 2003 of the Office of the President denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners Sps. Mariano S. Tanglao and Corazon M. Tanglao.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals held
that there was a perfected contract to sell between respondents and Spring
Homes as early as 1992. As this
contract was subsisting at the time of the second sale, respondents have a
superior right over the lots in question.
The only issue for our
resolution is who between the petitioners and respondents have the right of
ownership over the two lots in controversy.
The ownership of
immovable property sold to two different persons at different times is governed
by Article 1544 of the Civil Code,[2]
which provides:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who, in good faith, first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in possession and, in the absence thereof,
to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
In
double sales of immovable property, the governing principle is prius
tempore, prius jure (first in time, stronger in right). Thus, in Payongayong v. Court of Appeals,[3] this
Court held that under Article 1544, preferential rights shall be accorded to:
(1) the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry
of Property, (2) in default thereof to the person who in good faith was first
in possession, and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith. In all of these cases, good faith is
essential, being the basic premise of the preferential rights granted to the
person claiming ownership of the immovable.[4]
In
Occeña v. Esponilla,[5]
this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato
S. Puno, laid down the following rules in the application of Article 1544: (1)
Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s
rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second
sale; and (2) Knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats
his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge taints his
registration with bad faith. Differently put, the act of registration by the
second buyer must be coupled with good faith, meaning, the registrant must have
no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been
aware of facts which should put him upon such inquiry and investigation as
might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.[6]
Applying
the foregoing doctrines, the pivotal question before us is whether petitioners,
the second buyers, are purchasers in good faith.
A
purchaser in good faith or innocent purchaser for value is one who buys
property and pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or
before any notice of some other person’s claim on or interest in it.[7] The burden of proving the status of a
purchaser in good faith lies upon him who asserts that status and it is not
sufficient to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, that is, that
everyone is presumed to have acted in good faith.[8]
In
the instant case, the HLURB Arbiter, the HLURB Commission, the Office of the
President, and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the second sale to
petitioners by Spring Homes, there were already occupants and improvements
on the two lots in question. These facts
should have put petitioners on their guard. Settled is the rule that a buyer of real
property in possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession, for without such inquiry the
buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith and cannot have any right
over the property.[9]
As the petitioners cannot be
considered buyers in good faith, they cannot rely upon the indefeasibility of
their TCTs in view of the doctrine that the defense
of indefeasibility of a torrens title does not extend
to transferees who take the certificate of title in bad faith.[10]
Considering that respondents who, in
good faith, were first in possession of the subject lots, we rule that the
ownership thereof pertains to them.
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Division) dated
SO
ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 20-41. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., and Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
[2] Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, September 10, 2003, 410 SCRA 484.
[3] G.R. No. 144576,
[4] Gabriel v. Spouses Mabanta and
Colobong, G.R. No. 142403,
[5] G.R. No. 156973,
[6] San Lorenzo Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124242, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 99, citing Nuguid v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 213 (1989); Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 446 (1994).
[7] Tanongon v. Samson, G.R.
No. 140889,
[8] Aguirre v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 122249,
[9] Occeña v. Espanilla, supra, footnote 5, pp. 124-125, citing Spouses Castro v. Miat, 397 SCRA 271 (2003).
[10] Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105902, February 9, 2000, 325 SCRA 137, citing Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 232 (1997).