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RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, Petitioner, |
G.R. Nos. 164166 &
164173-80
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- versus - HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, |
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA,
and VELASCO,
JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil
action for certiorari seeks the annulment of the Resolution[1]
dated
Public respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) filed with the Sandiganbayan nine informations charging petitioner Rodolfo S. de Jesus and one Edelwina DG Parungao with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[3] These informations, except for the appointees’ names,[4] dates of appointment and salaries, similarly read as follows:
x x x
x
That
on December 12, 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused RODOLFO S. DE JESUS a high ranking public officer
with Salary Grade 28, and EDELWINA DG PARUNGAO, a low ranking public
officer with Salary Grade 26, being the Deputy Administrator and the Manager,
HRMD, respectively, of the [Local] Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City, conspiring and confederating together and
helping each other, while in the performance of their official functions,
committing the offense in relation to their office, and taking advantage of
their official positions, with legal obligation to disclose the truth, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify, or cause to be
falsified the appointment of one JESUSITO R. TOREN, a confidential staff of the
Trustees of the said LWUA, which is a public document, by making it appear that
the said appointment paper was prepared, approved and issued on October 15,
2001 and that the said appointee assumed office on the same date, thereby
allowing the said appointee to withdraw or receive the salaries and allowances
for the period from October 15, 2001 to December 31, 2001, when in truth and in
fact the accused had known fully well that said appointee was officially
appointed only on December 12, 2001, as shown by another set of appointment paper
of said JESUSITO R. TOREN, endorsed and subsequently approved by the Civil
Service Commission, thus making untruthful statement in a narration of facts.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[5]
The
arraignment was originally set for
The prosecution in its comment
contended that the informations were sufficient in form and substance
considering that they constituted the various elements of the crime of
falsification.[8] In its rejoinder, it also claimed that the appointing
power and the function to prepare the documents were inherent in their
position.[9]
The Sandiganbayan in its Resolution
dated
Hence this petition where petitioner
contends:
I.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
II.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING IT IS
INHERENT IN BOTH POSITIONS OF ACCUSED-PETITIONER DE JESUS AS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, AND CO-ACCUSED PARUNGAO AS HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT MANAGER TO APPROVE APPOINTMENTS OF LWUA EMPLOYEES,
PARTICULARLY THE CONFIDENTIAL STAFF OF THE LWUA BOARD OF TRUSTEES.
III.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AMENDING BY
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. 198, AS AMENDED, AND EXEC. ORDER
NO. 286, S. 1995, RELATIVE TO APPOINTING AUTHORITIES.
IV.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE FACTS CHARGED IN THE NINE (9) INFORMATIONS CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE.
V.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER DE JESUS [WAS] DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF
BACK SALARIES, ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS OF THE BOARD’S CONFIDENTIAL STAFF.[10]
Simply, the issue in this case is whether the resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s motion to quash were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged since the informations did not
show that his position as Deputy Administrator and Parungao’s position as Manager
of HRMD had a connection with the offense.
According to him, the material facts proving the close intimacy of the
offense charged and his official functions must be set forth in the informations
and not mere conclusions of law.[11] More so, the informations were based on the
Ombudsman’s erroneous belief that the power to appoint was inherent in the
positions of petitioner and Parungao when in fact he could only sign
appointment papers already approved by the appointing authority, in this case,
the LWUA Trustees and Administrator.
Further, petitioner avers that the
informations failed to disclose material facts with regard to the other set of
appointment papers sent to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Lastly, petitioner claims that the
allegations do not constitute an offense such that he does not have any legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated in the alleged
fraudulent appointment papers and that the narration of facts therein is not
false. He also asserts that he is not
directly responsible for the payment of the back salaries, allowances and other
benefits received by the appointees.
For its part, public respondent
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that the
present petition is premature, considering that the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation.
It
also avers that the very nature of the positions of petitioner and Parungao
mandates them to disclose the truth when the nine confidential employees of the
LWUA Board were officially appointed and when they actually assumed office.
Further,
it maintains that petitioner can, under a delegated authority, sign the
appointments previously approved by the Administrator or the Board of Trustees;
he can advise the Administrator and the Board of Trustees on the legality of
the appointments; and he was bound to prepare, approve and issue only correct
appointments. Upon investigation, it was
established that he had prepared, approved and issued the appointment papers
with dates of appointment different from those when the appointees actually
assumed office.[12] It further claims that petitioner’s admission
that there are two sets of appointment papers more than sustains the
prosecutorial indictments against him and Parungao.
Moreover,
it maintains that the Ombudsman determined the existence of probable cause
after it had evaluated the documents submitted by the parties. It could not have gone beyond its function of
determining probable cause and filing the informations. The alleged failure of the Ombudsman in its
investigation would not affect the validity of the informations since the
absence of preliminary investigation neither affects the court’s jurisdiction
over the case, nor impairs the validity of the informations.[13]
Lastly, it contends that
the allegations in the informations constitute an
offense since petitioner and Parungao, in view of their positions, are required
to disclose the truth of the facts they had narrated in the fraudulent
documents, and such narration of facts in the appointment papers was
false. For issuing the appointment
papers, petitioner and Parungao are also directly responsible for the payment
of back salaries, allowances and other benefits of the appointees.
At the outset, we stress the settled
rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a
preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the
following instances:
(1) To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
(2) When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3) When there is a prejudicial question which
is sub-judice;
(4) When the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority;
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution;
(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by lust for vengeance;
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied;
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the
Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.[14]
Thus, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is not
precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is an abuse of
discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may exceptionally be
invoked pursuant to Section 1,[15]
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Accordingly, where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of
probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, we have held that while there is no appeal, the
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[16]
Considering the circumstances of this
case, we find for petitioner.
It appears that petitioner, under
Office Order No. 205.01 dated
In a letter[18]
dated
The LWUA received a letter[20]
from the DBM on
Consequently, petitioner
and Parungao prepared, approved and signed the appointment papers, that is, CSC
Form No. 33, bearing retroactive dates of appointment. Thereafter, Jamora issued a memorandum[25]
dated
However, another set of CSC Form No.
33 relating to the nine aforementioned appointees was prepared with
The Ombudsman allegedly found a prima
facie case of falsification of public documents under Article 171, par. 4
of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner because he prepared and signed the
appointments of the nine confidential staff with dates earlier than the actual
date of appointment which was
We disagree with the findings of the
Ombudsman. The elements of the offense
are:
1. That the offender makes in a document statements in a
narration of facts;
2. That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated by him;
3. That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false; and
4. That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.[27]
Criminal intent must be shown in
felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification. In this case, there is no reasonable ground
to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present.[28] The Ombudsman assails the first set of documents
with dates of appointment earlier than
We note that the
Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation.[35]
By allowing the reinvestigation, the
Sandiganbayan thus deferred to the authority of the Ombudsman to further
re-assess or re-examine the facts. In
short, the Sandiganbayan was willing to accept and adopt the final resolution
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman on the issue of
whether or not the offense charged was in fact committed by petitioner. But, the Sandiganbayan was not bound by such
quasi-judicial findings. In fact, under
the principles governing criminal procedure, the Sandiganbayan, or any trial court
for that matter, is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of
the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
prosecutor. Hence, the logical thing for
us to do would be to remand this case to the Sandiganbayan. Nevertheless, where the innocence of an
accused is manifest from the evidence, as here, we find neither reason nor
logic to merely remand the case.[36]
The effort to eradicate
graft and corruption and remove scalawags in government is commendable. But we
cannot overemphasize the admonition to agencies tasked with the preliminary
investigation and prosecution of crimes that the very purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and
burdensome prosecution. They are
duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely necessary, open and public accusation of
crime not only to spare the innocent the trouble, expense and torment of a
public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary expense on the part of the State
for useless and expensive trials. Thus,
when at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or the
existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any
person the trauma of going through a trial.[37]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated
SO
ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 48-56. Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Raoul V. Victorino and Roland B. Jurado concurring.
[2]
[3] ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.—The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
x x x x
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x
[4] The other eight appointees are Ma. Susana
G. Facto, Ma. Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor, Michael M. Raval, Albino G.
Valenciano, Jr., Marc Anthony S. Verzosa, Ma.
[5] Rollo, pp. 146-163.
[6] Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, pp. 62 & 65.
[7] Rollo, pp. 164-176.
[8] Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, p. 100.
[9] Rollo, p. 179.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
129904,
[15] Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[16] Cabahug
v. People, G.R. No. 132816,
[17] Rollo, p. 68.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing on the face of the appointment, shall be ineffective. The appointing authority shall be liable for the salaries of the appointee whose appointment became ineffective….
[27] L. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Book Two 223 (14th ed., 1998).
[28] Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas), G.R. No. 149148,
[29] Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 96-104.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Civil Service Commission Omnibus Rules, Rule V, Sec. 11.
[34] Supra note 16, at 133.
[35] Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. II, pp. 119-121.
[36] Venus v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130319,
[37] Supra note 34.