Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 158786 &158789
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
JAVILLONAR, BASILIO LAQUI, ALBERTO LOMBOY,
JUDE JONOBELL LOZADA, JOHNNY LUCIDO, ROMMEL MACALINDONG, NIXON MADRAZO, ROGELIO
MAGISTRADO, JR., PHILIP JOHN MAGNAYE, ALLAN JOHN MALABANAN, ROLANDO MALALUAN,
JR., PAULINO MALEON, MANUEL MANALO, JR., JONAMAR MANAOG, JOVITO MANECLANG,
BAYANI MANGUIL, JR., CARLITO MARASIGAN, ROMMEL MARIANO, BOBIT MENDOZA, ERICSON
MONTERO, MARLAW MONTERO, EDWIN NICANOR, RODERICK NIERVES, LOLITO NUNEZ, FELIMON
ORTIZ, EDWIN PECAYO, ERWIN PENA, JOWALD PENAMANTE, JORGE POLUTAN, EDDIE RAMOS,
ROLANDO REYES, PHILIP ROXAS, DAVID SALLAN, JR., BERNARDO SALVADOR, BALDWIN SAN
PABLO, JEFFREY SANGALANG, BERNABE SAQUILABON, ALEX SIERRA, ROMUALDO SIMBORIO,
EDWIN TABLIZO, PETRONIO TACLAN, JR., RODEL TOLENTINO, ROMMEL TOLENTINO, GRANT
ROBERT TORAL, FEDERICO TORRES, JR., EMANNUEL TULIO, NESTOR UMITEN, JR., APOLLO
VIOLETA, SR., DOMINADOR ZAMORA, JR., ROMMEL ARCETA, ANTONIO BORSIGUE, EMILIO
COMPLETO, RANDY CONSIGNADO, BASILIO DELA CRUZ, ALEXANDER ESTEVA, NIKKO FRANCO,
RODEL GAMIT, ROBERTO GONZALES, PHILIP JALEA, JOEY LLANERA, GERONIMO LOPEZ, RUEL
MANEGO, EDWIN MANZANILLA, KENNETH NATIVIDAD, LARRY ORMILLA, CORNELIO PLATON,
PAUL ARTHUR SALES, ALEJANDRO SAMPANG, LAURO SULIT, ROLANDO TOMAS, JOSE ROMMEL
TRAZONA, MICHAEL TEDDY YANGYON, MAXIMINO CRUZ, VIRGILIO COLANDOG, ROMMEL DIGMA,
JOSELITO HUGO, and RICKY CHAVEZ, Petitioners,
- versus -
G.R. Nos. 158798-99 Promulgated:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, (NLRC-2ND DIVISION),
HON. COMMISSIONERS: VICTORINO CALAYCAY, ANGELITA GACUTAN, and RAUL AQUINO,
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TAKESHI FUKUDA, and DAVID GO, Respondents,
x-----------------------------------------------x
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus -
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS
ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA),
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In the instant petition under Rule 45 subject of G.R. Nos. 158786 and 158789,
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (Union) and its
dismissed officers and members seek to set aside the February 27, 2003 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67100 and 67561, which affirmed
the August 9, 2001 Decision[2]
and September 14, 2001 Resolution[3] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), declaring illegal the strikes
staged by the Union and upholding the dismissal of the 227 Union officers and
members.
On the other hand, in the related
cases docketed as G.R. Nos. 158798-99, Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
(Toyota) prays for the recall of the award of severance compensation to the 227
dismissed employees, which was granted under the June 20, 2003 CA Resolution[4] in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67100 and 67561.
In view of the fact that the parties
are petitioner/s and respondent/s and vice-versa in the four (4) interrelated
cases, they will be referred to as simply the
The Facts
The
On
After
In the meantime, the
In connection with
Despite denial of the
Soon thereafter, on February 27, 2001,
Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain
within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance
of the company’s directive to render overtime work on February 21, 2001, for
their failure to report for work on February 22 and 23, 2001, and for their
participation in the concerted actions which severely disrupted and paralyzed
the plant’s operations.[10] These letters specifically cited Section D, paragraph
6 of the Company’s Code of Conduct, to wit:
Inciting
or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or concerted actions
detrimental to [
1st offense – dismissal.[11]
Meanwhile, a
YANIG sa kanyang
komportableng upuan ang management ng
x x x x
HANDA na tayong
lumabas anumang oras kung patuloy na ipagkakait ng management ang CBA. Oo maari tayong masaktan sa welga. Oo, maari tayong magutom sa piketlayn.
Subalit may pagkakaiba ba ito sa unti-unting pagpatay sa atin sa loob ng 12
taong makabaling likod ng pagtatrabaho? Ilang taon na lang ay magkakabutas na
ang ating mga baga sa mga alipato at usok ng welding. Ilang taon na lang ay marupok na ang ating mga buto sa kabubuhat. Kung
dumating na ang panahong ito at wala pa tayong CBA, paano na? Hahayaan ba nating
ang kumpanya lang ang makinabang sa yamang likha ng higit sa isang dekadang
pagpapagal natin?
HUWAG BIBITIW SA NASIMULANG TAGUMPAY!
PAIGTINGIN ANG PAKIKIBAKA PARA SA ISANG MAKATARUNGANG CBA!
HIGIT PANG PATATAGIN ANG PAGKAKAISA NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA
On the next day, the
On
Consequently, on March 2 and 5, 2001,
Toyota issued two (2) memoranda to the concerned employees to clarify whether
or not they are adopting the March 1, 2001 Union’s explanation as their
own. The employees were also required to
attend an investigative interview,[14]
but they refused to do so.
On
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on hand, and a thorough assessment of your explanation, TMP has concluded that there are overwhelming reasons to terminate your services based on Article 282 of the Labor Code and TMP’s Code of Conduct.
Your repeated absences without permission on
The degree of your offense is aggravated by the following circumstances:
1.
You expressed to management that you will adopt the
union’s letter dated
It is significant that the absences you incurred in order to attend the clarificatory hearing conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations were unnecessary because the union was amply represented in the said hearings by its counsel and certain members who sought and were granted leave for the purpose. Your reason for being absent is, therefore, not acceptable; and
2. Your participation in the organized work boycott by Team Members on February 22 and 23 led to work disruptions that prevented the Company from meeting its production targets, resulting [in] foregone sales of more than eighty (80) vehicles, mostly new-model Revos, valued at more than Fifty Million Pesos (50,000,000.00).
The foregoing is also a violation of TMP’s Code of Conduct (Section D, Paragraph 6) to wit:
“Inciting or participating in riots, disorders, illegal
strikes or concerted actions detrimental to TMP’s interest.”
Based on the above, TMP Management is left with no other recourse but to terminate your employment effective upon your receipt thereof.
[Sgd.]
JOSE MARIA ALIGADA
Deputy Division Manager[16]
In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the
3. On
4. On
5. As a standard operating procedure, I instructed my men to take photographs and video footages of those who participated in the strike. Seen on video footages taken on various dates actively participating in the strike were union officers Emilio C. Completo, Alexander Esteva, Joey Javellonar and Lorenzo Caraqueo.
6. Based on the
pictures, among those identified to have participated in the March 28, 2001
strike were Grant Robert Toral, John Posadas, Alex Sierra, Allan John
Malabanan, Abel Bersos, Ernesto Bonavente, Ariel Garcia, Pablito Adaya,
Feliciano Mercado, Charlie Oliveria, Philip Roxas, June Lamberte, Manjolito
Puno, Baldwin San Pablo, Joseph Naguit, Federico Torres, Larry Gerola, Roderick
Bayani, Allan Oclarino, Reynaldo Cuevas, Jorge Polutan, Arman Ercillo, Jimmy
Hembra, Albert Mariquit, Ramil Gecale, Jimmy Palisoc, Normandy Castalone, Joey
Llanera, Greg Castro, Felicisimo Escrimadora, Rodolfo Bay, Ramon Clemente,
Dante Baclino, Allan Palomares, Arturo Murillo and Robert Gonzales. Attached
hereto as Annexes “1” to “18” are the pictures taken on
7. From
On
Meanwhile,
On
The
In the meantime, the Union filed a
motion for reconsideration of the DOLE Secretary’s April 10, 2001 certification
Order, which, however, was denied by the DOLE Secretary in her May 25, 2001
Resolution. Consequently, a petition for certiorari was filed before the CA, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64998.
In the intervening time, the NLRC, in
compliance with the
Meanwhile, on May 23, 2001, at around
12:00 nn., despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretary’s certification Order,
several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a protest rally in front
of Toyota’s Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in defiance of the
April 10, 2001 Order.
Then, on
On
In the meantime, the NLRC, in
Certified Case No. 000203-01, ordered both parties to submit their respective
position papers on
Thereafter, on
On June 27, 2001, the Union filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
NLRC’s June 19, 2001 Order, praying for the deferment of the submission of
position papers until its petition for certiorari is resolved by the CA.
On
Meanwhile, on July 17, 2001, the CA dismissed the Union’s petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 64998, assailing the DOLE Secretary’s April 10,
2001 Order.
Notwithstanding repeated orders to
file its position paper, the
During the
Subsequently, the NLRC, in its
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered:
(1) Declaring the strikes staged by the
(2)
Declared [sic] that the dismissal of the 227 who
participated in the illegal strike on
(3) However, the Company is ordered to pay the 227 Union members, who participated in the illegal strike severance compensation in an amount equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, as an alternative relief to continued employment.
(4) Declared [sic] that the following Union officers and directors to have forfeited their employment status for having led the illegal strikes on February 21-23, 2001 and May 23 and 28, 2001: Ed Cubelo, Maximino Cruz, Jr., Ricky Chavez, Joselito Hugo, Virgilio Colandog, Rommel Digma, Federico Torres, Emilio Completo, Alexander Esteva, Joey Javellonar, Lorenzo Caraqueo, Roderick Nieres, Antonio Borsigue, Bayani Manguil, Jr., and Mayo Mata.[21]
SO ORDERED.[22]
The NLRC
considered the mass actions staged on
After the DOLE
Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the
The NLRC held that both parties must have maintained the status quo after
the DOLE Secretary issued the assumption/certification Order, and ruled that
the
Accordingly, both
In its February 27, 2003 Decision,[25] the CA ruled that the Union’s petition is defective in form for its failure to append a proper verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, given that, out of the 227 petitioners, only 159 signed the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. Despite the flaw, the CA proceeded to resolve the petitions on the merits and affirmed the assailed NLRC Decision and Resolution with a modification, however, of deleting the award of severance compensation to the dismissed Union members.
In justifying the recall of the severance
compensation, the CA considered the participation in illegal strikes as serious
misconduct. It defined serious misconduct as a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act,
a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgment. It cited Panay
Electric Company, Inc. v. NLRC,[26]
where we revoked the grant of separation benefits to employees who lawfully
participated in an illegal strike based on Art. 264 of the Labor Code, which
states that “any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status.”[27]
However, in its
The Issues
Petitioner
I.
Whether the mere
participation of ordinary employees in an illegal strike is enough reason to
warrant their dismissal.
II.
Whether the Union
officers and members’ act of holding the protest rallies in front of the BLR
office and the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment on February 22
and 23, 2001 should be held as illegal strikes. In relation hereto, whether the
protests committed on May 23 and 28, 2001, should be held as illegal strikes.
Lastly, whether the
III.
Whether the
dismissal of 227 Union officers and members constitutes unfair labor practice.
IV.
Whether the CA
erred in affirming the Decision of the NLRC which excluded the
V.
Whether the CA
erred in dismissing the
I.
Whether the Court
of Appeals erred in issuing its Resolution dated
In sum, two main issues are brought to the fore:
(1) Whether
the mass actions committed by the
(2) Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.
The Court’s Ruling
The
We rule otherwise.
It is entirely the
On a procedural aspect, the
The
Sec. 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 4. Verification.—Except
when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified
which contains a verification based on “information and belief” or upon
“knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation.[30] This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance with the requirement does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal and not a jurisdictional requirement.[31]
In this case, the
problem is not the absence but the adequacy of the
In the case at bench, however, the CA, in the exercise of sound discretion, did not strictly apply the ruling in Loquias and instead proceeded to decide the case on the merits.
The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of
BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the
When is a strike illegal?
Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists
six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz:
(1) [when
it] is contrary to a specific prohibition
of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or
(2) [when
it] violates a specific requirement of law[,
such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3) [when
it] is declared for an unlawful purpose,
such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against
non-union employees; or
(4) [when
it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit
of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example,
prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5) [when
it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[,
such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the
NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
(6) [when
it] is contrary to an existing agreement,
such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.[33]
Petitioner Union contends that the protests or
rallies conducted on February 21 and 23, 2001 are not within the ambit of
strikes as defined in the Labor Code, since they were legitimate exercises of
their right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances. Mainly relying on the doctrine laid down in the case of Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,[34]
it argues that the protest was not directed at
The
While the facts in Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization are similar in some respects to that of the present
case, the
A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute, in turn, includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of the employer and the employee.[35]
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, it was explained that “[t]he fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation and not its appearance, will be deemed controlling.”[36] The term “strike” has been elucidated to encompass not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy, or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.[37]
Applying pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence, we
rule that the protest actions undertaken by the Union officials and members on
We sustain the CA’s affirmance of the NLRC’s finding
that the protest rallies staged on
We have stated in our questioned decision that such
mass actions staged before the Bureau of Labor Relations on
If we are
going to stamp a color of legality on the two (2) [day-] walk out/strike of
respondents without filing a notice of strike, in effect we are giving license
to all the unions in the country to paralyze the operations of their
companies/employers every time they wish to hold a demonstration in front of
any government agency. While we
recognize the right of every person or a group to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such right
is governed by existing laws, rules and regulations.
Although the respondent union admittedly made earnest
representations with the company to hold a mass protest before the BLR,
together with their officers and members, the denial of the request by the
management should have been heeded and ended their insistence to hold the
planned mass demonstration. Verily, the violation of the company rule cannot be
dismissed as mere absences of two days as being suggested by the union [are but]
concerted actions detrimental to Petitioner Toyota’s interest.[38] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is obvious that the
Moreover, the aforementioned February 2001 strikes
are in blatant violation of Sec. D, par. 6 of
With respect to the strikes committed from March 17
to
Petitioner
This contention has no basis.
It is clear that once the DOLE Secretary assumes
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certifies the case for compulsory
arbitration with the NLRC, the parties have to revert to the status quo ante
(the state of things as it was before). The intended normalcy of operations is
apparent from the fallo of the
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby
CERTIFIES the labor dispute at
Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation to the [NLRC] pursuant to Article 263 (g)
of the Labor Code, as amended. This
Certification covers the current labor cases filed in relation with the Toyota
strike, particularly, the Petition for Injunction filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission entitled Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers
Association (TMPCWA), Ed Cubelo, et al., NLRC Injunction Case No.
3401054-01; Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association, et
al., NLRC NCR Case No. 3004-01775-01, and such other labor cases that the
parties may file relating to the strike and its effects while this
Certification is in effect.
As provided under Article 2634(g) of the Labor Code,
all striking workers are directed to return to work at their regular shifts by
April 16, 2001; the Company is in turn directed to accept them back to work
under the same terms and conditions obtaining prior to the work stoppage,
subject to the option of the company to merely reinstate a worker or workers in
the payroll in light of the negative emotions that the strike has generated and
the need to prevent the further deterioration of the relationship between the
company and its workers.
Further, the
parties are hereby ordered to cease and desist from committing any act that
might lead to the worsening of an already deteriorated situation.[42]
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is explicit from this directive that the
This was not heeded by the
While it may be conceded that there was no work
disruption in the two
From the foregoing discussion, we rule that the February 21 to 23, 2001 concerted actions, the March 17 to April 12, 2001 strikes, and the May 23 and 28, 2001 mass actions were illegal strikes.
Union officers are
liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike
Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES
(a) x x x
Any
worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful
lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided,
That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had
been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
Art. 264(a) sanctions the dismissal of a union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike or who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a lawful strike.
It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater than that of the members. They are tasked with the duty to lead and guide the membership in decision making on union activities in accordance with the law, government rules and regulations, and established labor practices. The leaders are expected to recommend actions that are arrived at with circumspection and contemplation, and always keep paramount the best interests of the members and union within the bounds of law. If the implementation of an illegal strike is recommended, then they would mislead and deceive the membership and the supreme penalty of dismissal is appropriate. On the other hand, if the strike is legal at the beginning and the officials commit illegal acts during the duration of the strike, then they cannot evade personal and individual liability for said acts.
The Union officials were in clear breach of Art.
264(a) when they knowingly participated in the illegal strikes held from
As
regards to the Union officers and directors, there is overwhelming
justification to declare their termination from service. Having instigated the Union members to stage
and carry out all illegal strikes from February 21-23, 2001, and May 23 and 28,
2001, the following Union officers are hereby terminated for cause pursuant to
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code: Ed
Cubelo, Maximino Cruz, Jr., Ricky Chavez, Joselito Hugo, Virgilio Colandog,
Rommel Digma, Federico Torres, Emilio Completo, Alexander Esteva, Joey
Javellonar, Lorenzo Caraqueo, Roderick Nieres, Antonio Borsigue, Bayani
Manguil, Jr., and Mayo Mata.[43]
The rule is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the labor tribunal, when affirmed by the appellate court, are generally accorded great respect, even finality.[44]
Likewise, we are not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC in the absence of clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.[45] In the case at bench, the Union failed to convince us that the NLRC findings that the Union officials instigated, led, and knowingly participated in the series of illegal strikes are not reinforced by substantial evidence. Verily, said findings have to be maintained and upheld. We reiterate, as a reminder to labor leaders, the rule that “[u]nion officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law.”[46] Contrarily, if the “officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts.”[47]
Member’s liability depends on participation in illegal acts
Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is liable when he knowingly participates in an illegal act “during a strike.” While the provision is silent on whether the strike is legal or illegal, we find that the same is irrelevant. As long as the members commit illegal acts, in a legal or illegal strike, then they can be terminated.[48] However, when union members merely participate in an illegal strike without committing any illegal act, are they liable?
This was squarely answered in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC,[49] where it was held that an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. This was an affirmation of the rulings in Bacus v. Ople[50] and Progressive Workers Union v. Aguas,[51] where it was held that though the strike is illegal, the ordinary member who merely participates in the strike should not be meted loss of employment on the considerations of compassion and good faith and in view of the security of tenure provisions under the Constitution. In Esso Philippines, Inc. v. Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso (MME), it was explained that a member is not responsible for the union’s illegal strike even if he voted for the holding of a strike which became illegal.[52]
Noted labor law expert, Professor Cesario A. Azucena, Jr., traced the history relating to the liability of a union member in an illegal strike, starting with the “rule of vicarious liability,” thus:
Under [the rule of vicarious liability], mere
membership in a labor union serves as basis of liability for acts of
individuals, or for a labor activity, done on behalf of the union. The union
member is made liable on the theory that all the members are engaged in a
general conspiracy, and the unlawful acts of the particular members are viewed
as necessary incidents of the conspiracy.
It has been said that in the absence of statute providing otherwise, the
rule of vicarious liability applies.
Even the Industrial Peace Act, however, which was in
effect from 1953 to 1974, did not adopt the vicarious liability concept. It expressly provided that:
No officer or member of any association or
organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in
a labor dispute shall be held responsible or liable for the unlawful acts of
individual officers, members, or agents, except upon proof of actual
participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts or of ratifying of such
acts after actual knowledge thereof.
Replacing the Industrial Peace Act, the Labor Code has
not adopted the vicarious liability rule.[53]
Thus, the rule on vicarious liability of a union member was abandoned and it is only when a striking worker “knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike” that he will be penalized with dismissal.
Now, what are considered “illegal acts” under Art. 264(a)?
No precise meaning was given to the phrase “illegal acts.” It may encompass a number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal laws, such as the following:
(1) Violation
of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that “[n]o person engaged in
picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares”;
(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike;[54] and
(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary or NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.
As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other breaches of existing laws.
In the cases at bench, the individual respondents participated in several mass actions, viz:
(1) The rallies held at the DOLE and BLR offices on February 21, 22, and 23, 2001;
(2) The
strikes held on March 17 to
(3) The rallies and picketing on May 23 and 28, 2001 in front of the Toyota Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.
Did they commit illegal acts during the illegal
strikes on
The answer is in the affirmative.
As we have ruled that the strikes by the
Our ruling in Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC lays down the rule on the liability of the union members:
Decisive on the matter is the pertinent provisions of
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code
that: “[x x x] any worker [x x x] who knowingly participates in the commission
of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status. [x x x]” It can be gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of
law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee can not be terminated
for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he
committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in
the commission of illegal act[s] must be identified. But proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the
circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal,
may suffice.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the
court ruled “Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be ‘substantial.’ Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.”[55] (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof on the participation of the striking employee in the commission of illegal acts during the strikes.
After a scrutiny of the records, we find that the
227 employees indeed joined the February 21, 22, and 23, 2001 rallies and refused
to render overtime work or report for work.
These rallies, as we earlier ruled, are in reality illegal strikes, as
the procedural requirements for strikes under Art. 263 were not complied
with. Worse, said strikes were in
violation of the company rule prohibiting acts “in citing or participating in
riots, disorders, alleged strikes or concerted action detrimental to
With respect to the February 21, 22, and 23, 2001 concerted actions, Toyota submitted the list of employees who did not render overtime work on February 21, 2001 and who did not report for work on February 22 and 23, 2001 as shown by Annex “I” of Toyota’s Position Paper in NLRC Certified Case No. 000203-01 entitled In Re: Labor Dispute at Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. The employees who participated in the illegal concerted actions were as follows:
1. Aclan, Eugenio; 2.
Agosto, Joel; 3. Agot, Rodelio; 4. Alarana, Edwin; 5. Alejo, Alex; 6. Alfonso,
Erwin; 7. Apolinario,
Dennis; 8. Apostol, Melvin; 9. Arceta, Romel; 10. Arellano, Ruel; 11. Ariate,
Abraham; 12. Arollado, Daniel; 13. Arriola, Dominador; 14. Atun, Lester; 15. Bala, Rizalino;
16. Baluyut, Rolando; 17. Banzuela, Tirso Jr.; 18. Bayani, Roderick; 19.
Benabise, Sabas Jr.; 20. Berces, Abel; 21. Bering, Benny; 22. Birondo, Alberto;
23. Blanco, Melchor; 24. Bolanos, Dexter; 25. Bolocon, Jerry; 26. Borebor,
Rurel; 27. Borromeo, Jubert; 28. Borsigue, Antonio; 29. Bulan, Elmer; 30.
Busano, Freddie; 31. Bustillo, Ernesto Jr.; 32. Caalim, Alexander; 33. Cabahug,
Nelson; 34. Cabatay, Jessie; 35. Cabezas, Marcelo; 36. Calalang, Richard; 37.
Candelario, Roque Jr.; 38. Capate, Leo Nelson; 39. Carandang, Resty; 40.
Caraqueo, Lorenzo; 41. Caringal, Dennis; 42. Casaba, Gienell; 43. Catapusan,
Christopher; 44. Catral, Rico; 45. Cecilio, Felipe; 46. Cinense, Joey; 47. Cometa,
Julius; 48. Completo, Emilio; 49. Consignado, Randy; 50. Coral, Jay Antonio;
51. Correa, Claudio Jr.; 52. Cuevas,
Reynaldo; 53. Dacalcap, Albert; 54. Dakay, Ryan; 55. Dalanon, Herbert; 56.
Dalisay, Rene; 57. David, Benigno Jr.; 58. De Guzman, Joey; 59. Dela Cruz, Basilio; 60. Dela
Cruz, Ferdinand; 61. Dela Torre, Heremo; 62. De Leon, Leonardo; 63. Delos
Santos, Rogelio; 64. De Ocampo, Joselito; 65. De Silva, Leodegario; 66. Del
Mundo, Alex; 67. Del Rio, Rey; 68. Dela Ysla, Alex; 69. Dia, Frank Manuel; 70.
Dimayuga, Antonio; 71. Dingcong, Jessiah; 72. Dumalag, Jasper; 73. Duyag,
Aldrin; 74. Ercillo, Armando; 75. Espadilla, Delmar; 76. Espejo, Lionel; 77.
Espeloa, Dennis; 78. Esteva, Alexander; 79. Estole, Francisco; 80. Fajardo,
George; 81. Fajilagutan, Jason; 82. Fajura, John; 83. Franco, Melencio; 84. Franco,
Nikko; 85. Fulgar, Dexter; 86. Fulo, Dante; 87. Gado, Eduardo; 88. Galang,
Erwin; 89. Gamit, Rodel; 90. Garces, Robin; 91. Garcia, Ariel; 92. Gaspi,
Ronald; 93. Gavarra, Angelo; 94. Gerola, Genaro Jr.; 95. Gerola, Larry; 96.
Gohilde, Michael; 97. Gojar, Regino; 98. Gojar, Reynaldo; 99. Gonzales,
Roberto; 100. Gutierrez, Bernabe; 101. Hilaga, Edgar; 102. Hilanga, Melchor;
103. Hondrada, Eugene Jay; 104. Imperial, Alejandro; 105. Jaen, Ferdinand; 106.
Jalea, Philip; 107. Javillonar, Joey; 108. Julve, Frederick; 109. Lalisan,
Victorio; 110. Landicho, Danny; 111. Laqui, Basilio; 112. Lavide, Edgar; 113.
Lazaro, Orlando; 114. Legaspi, Noel; 115. Lising, Reynaldo Jr.; 116. Llanera,
Joey; 117. Lomboy, Alberto; 118. Lopez, Geronimo; 119. Lozada, Jude Jonobell;
120. Lucido, Johny; 121. Macalindong, Rommel; 122. Madrazo, Nixon; 123.
Magbalita, Valentin; 124. Magistrado, Rogelio Jr.; 125. Magnaye, Philip John;
126. Malabanan, Allan John; 127. Malabrigo, Angelito; 128. Malaluan, Rolando
Jr.; 129. Malate, Leoncio Jr.; 130. Maleon, Paulino; 131. Manaig, Roger; 132. Manalang,
Joseph Patrick; 133. Manalo, Manuel Jr.; 134. Manaog, Jonamar; 135. Manaog,
Melchor; 136. Mandolado, Melvin; 137. Maneclang, Jovito; 138. Manego, Ruel;
139. Manguil, Bayani Jr.; 140. Manigbas, June; 141. Manjares, Alfred; 142.
Manzanilla, Edwin; 143. Marasigan, Carlito; 144. Marcial, Nilo; 145. Mariano,
Rommel; 146. Mata, Mayo; 147. Mendoza, Bobit; 148. Mendoza, Roberto; 149.
Milan, Joseph; 150. Miranda, Eduardo; 151. Miranda, Luis; 152. Montero,
Ericson; 153. Montero, Marlaw; 154. Montes, Ruel; 155. Morales, Dennis; 156.
Natividad, Kenneth; 157. Nava, Ronaldo; 158. Nevalga, Alexander; 159. Nicanor,
Edwin; 160. Nierves, Roderick; 161. Nunez, Alex; 162. Nunez, Lolito; 163. Obe,
Victor; 164. Oclarino, Alfonso; 165. Ojenal, Leo; 166. Olit, Freddie; 167. Oliver, Rex;
168. Oliveria, Charlie; 169. Operana, Danny; 170. Oriana, Allan; 171. Ormilla,
Larry; 172. Ortiz, Felimon; 173. Paniterce, Alvin; 174. Parallag, Gerald; 175.
Pecayo, Edwin; 176. Pena, Erwin; 177. Penamante, Jowald; 178. Piamonte, Melvin;
179. Piamonte, Rogelio; 180. Platon, Cornelio; 181. Polutan, Jorge; 182. Posada,
John; 183. Puno, Manjolito; 184. Ramos, Eddie; 185. Reyes, Rolando; 186. Roxas, Philip; 187. Sales, Paul Arthur; 188. Sallan,
David Jr.; 189.
Anent the March 28 to April 12, 2001 strikes,
evidence is ample to show commission of illegal acts like acts of coercion or
intimidation and obstructing free ingress to or egress from the company
premises. Mr. Eduardo Nicolas III,
On
1. Grant Robert Toral; 2. John Posadas; 3. Alex
Sierra; 4. Allan John Malabanan; 5. Abel Berces; 6. Ariel Garcia; 7. Charlie
Oliveria; 8. Manjolito Puno; 9. Baldwin San Pablo; 10. Federico Torres; 11.
Larry Gerola; 12. Roderick Bayani; 13. Allan Oclarino; 14. Reynaldo Cuevas; 15.
George Polutan; 16. Arman Ercillo; 17. Joey Llanera; and 18. Roberto
Gonzales
Photographs were submitted by
To further aggravate the situation, a number of
union members committed illegal acts (blocking the ingress to and egress from
the plant) during the strike staged on
1. Basilio Laqui; 2. Sabas Benabise; 3. Federico
Torres; 4. Freddie Olit; and 5. Joel Agosto
Pictures marked as Annexes “21” to “22” of
On the next day,
1. Ariel Garcia; 2. Edgar Hilaga; 3. Charlie Oliveria;
4. Ferdinand Jaen; 5. Wilfredo Tagle; 6. Alejandro Imperial; 7. Manjolito Puno;
8. Delmar Espadilla; 9. Apollo Violeta; and 10. Elvis
Tabirao
Pictures marked as Annexes “25” to “26” and “28” of
On
1. Raymund Santos; 2. Elvis Tabirao; 3. Joseph
Vargas; 4. Bernardo Salvador; 5. Antonio Dimayuga; 6.
Rurel Borebor; and 7. Alberto Lomboy
The participations of the strikers in illegal acts
are manifest in the pictures marked as Annexes “32” and “33” of
On
Lastly, the strikers, though on payroll
reinstatement, staged protest rallies on
a. Strikers
who joined the illegal pickets on May 23, 2001 were (1) Dennis
Apolinario; (2) Abel Berces; (3) Benny Bering; (4) Dexter Bolaños; (5) Freddie
Busano; (6) Ernesto Bustillo, Jr.; (7) Randy Consignado; (8) Herbert Dalanon; (9)
Leodegario De Silva; (10) Alexander Esteva; (11) Jason Fajilagutan; (12) Nikko
Franco; (13) Genaro Gerola, Jr.; (14) Michael Gohilde; (15) Rogelio Magistrado;
(16) Rolando Malaluan, Jr.; (17) Leoncio Malate, Jr.; (18) Edwin Manzanilla; (19)
Nila Marcial; (20) Roderick Nierves; (21) Larry Ormilla; (22) Filemon Ortiz; (23)
Cornelio Platon; (24) Alejandro Sampang; (25) Eric Santiago; (26) Romualdo
Simborio; (27) Lauro Sulit; and (28) Rommel Tagala.
Pictures show the illegal acts (participation in pickets/strikes despite the issuance of a return-to-work order) committed by the aforelisted strikers.[63]
b. Strikers who participated in the May 28, 2001 were (1) Joel Agosto; (2) Alex Alejo; (3) Erwin Alfonso; (4) Dennis Apolinario; (5) Melvin Apostol; (6) Rommel Arceta; (7) Lester Atun; (8) Abel Berces; (9) Benny Bering; (10) Dexter Bolanos; (11) Marcelo Cabezas; (12) Nelson Leo Capate; (13) Lorenzo Caraqueo; (14) Christopher Catapusan; (15) Ricky Chavez; (16) Virgilio Colandog; (17) Claudio Correa; (18) Ed Cubelo; (19) Reynaldo Cuevas; (20) Rene Dalisay; (21) Benigno David, Jr.; (22) Alex Del Mundo; (23) Basilio Dela Cruz; (24) Roel Digma; (25) Aldrin Duyag; (26) Armando Ercillo; (27) Delmar Espadilla; (28) Alexander Esteva; (29) Nikko Franco; (30) Dexter Fulgar; (31) Dante Fulo; (32) Eduardo Gado; (33) Michael Gohilde; (34) Eugene Jay Hondrada II; (35) Joey Javillonar; (36) Basilio Laqui; (37) Alberto Lomboy; (38) Geronimo Lopez; (39) Rommel Macalindog; (40) Nixon Madrazo; (41) Valentin Magbalita; (42) Allan Jon Malabanan; (43) Jonamar Manaog; (44) Bayani Manguil; (45) June Manigbas; (46) Alfred Manjares; (47) Edwin Manzanilla; (48) Mayo Mata; (49) Leo Ojenal; (50) Allan Oriana; (51) Rogelio Piamonte; (52) George Polutan; (53) Eric Santiago; (54) Bernabe Saquilabon; (55) Alex Sierra; (56) Romualdo Simborio; (57) Lauro Sulit; (58) Elvisanto Tabirao; (59) Edwin Tablizo; (60) Emmanuel Tulio; (61) Nestor Umiten; (62) Joseph Vargas; (63) Edwin Vergara; and (64) Michael Teddy Yangyon.
Anent the grant of severance compensation to legally dismissed union members, Toyota assails the turn-around by the CA in granting separation pay in its June 20, 2003 Resolution after initially denying it in its February 27, 2003 Decision. The company asseverates that based on the CA finding that the illegal acts of said union members constitute gross misconduct, not to mention the huge losses it suffered, then the grant of separation pay was not proper.
The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the services of an employee under Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay. The apparent reason behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that lawbreakers should not benefit from their illegal acts. The dismissed employee, however, is entitled to “whatever rights, benefits and privileges [s/he] may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice”[65] or under the Labor Code and other existing laws. This means that the employee, despite the dismissal for a valid cause, retains the right to receive from the employer benefits provided by law, like accrued service incentive leaves. With respect to benefits granted by the CBA provisions and voluntary management policy or practice, the entitlement of the dismissed employees to the benefits depends on the stipulations of the CBA or the company rules and policies.
As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is validly dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. In Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) v. NLRC, the Court elucidated why social justice can validate the grant of separation pay, thus:
The reason is that our Constitution is replete with
positive commands for the promotion of social justice, and particularly the
protection of the rights of the workers.
The enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary concerns of the
present charter. In fact, instead of
confining itself to the general commitment to the cause of labor in Article II
on the Declaration of Principles of State Policies, the new Constitution
contains a separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and
human rights with a separate sub-topic for labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital
role of labor, hand in hand with management, in the advancement of the national
economy and the welfare of the people in general. The categorical mandates in
the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers are more than
sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases even if
the dismissal be for cause.[66]
In the same case, the Court laid down the rule that severance compensation shall be allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct or that which reflects adversely on the employee’s moral character. The Court succinctly discussed the propriety of the grant of separation pay in this wise:
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be
allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character. Where
the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an
offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with
a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed
employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is
called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly
argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee
for his offense. And we do not agree
that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has
nothing to do with the wrong he has committed.
Of course it has. Indeed, if the
employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is
validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in
his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is
again found out. This kind of misplaced
compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage
the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and
concern of the Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to
countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. At best it may mitigate
the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every
humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved
privilege. Social justice cannot be
permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment
to the punishment of the guilty. Those
who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their
motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not
meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it,
like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of
their own character.[67]
Explicit in PLDT are two exceptions when the NLRC or the courts should not grant separation pay based on social justice¾serious misconduct (which is the first ground for dismissal under Art. 282) or acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee. What is unclear is whether the ruling likewise precludes the grant of separation pay when the employee is validly terminated from work on grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code other than serious misconduct.
A recall of recent cases decided bearing on the issue reveals that when the termination is legally justified on any of the grounds under Art. 282, separation pay was not allowed. In Ha Yuan Restaurant v. NLRC,[68] we deleted the award of separation pay to an employee who, while unprovoked, hit her co-worker’s face, causing injuries, which then resulted in a series of fights and scuffles between them. We viewed her act as serious misconduct which did not warrant the award of separation pay. In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,[69] this Court deleted the award of separation pay to a branch supervisor who regularly, without authorization, extended the payment deadlines of the company’s sales agents. Since the cause for the supervisor’s dismissal involved her integrity (which can be considered as breach of trust), she was not worthy of compassion as to deserve separation pay based on her length of service. In Gustilo v. Wyeth Phils., Inc.,[70] this Court found no exceptional circumstance to warrant the grant of financial assistance to an employee who repeatedly violated the company’s disciplinary rules and regulations and whose employment was thus terminated for gross and habitual neglect of his duties. In the doctrinal case of San Miguel v. Lao,[71] this Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA granting retirement benefits or separation pay to an employee who was dismissed for willful breach of trust and confidence by causing the delivery of raw materials, which are needed for its glass production plant, to its competitor. While a review of the case reports does not reveal a case involving a termination by reason of the commission of a crime against the employer or his/her family which dealt with the issue of separation pay, it would be adding insult to injury if the employer would still be compelled to shell out money to the offender after the harm done.
In all of the foregoing situations, the Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee.
In analogous causes for termination like
inefficiency, drug use, and others, the NLRC or the courts may opt to grant
separation pay anchored on social justice in consideration of the length of
service of the employee, the amount involved, whether the act is the first
offense, the performance of the employee and the like, using the guideposts
enunciated in PLDT on the propriety
of the award of separation pay.
In the case at bench, are the 227 striking employees entitled to separation pay?
In the instant case, the CA concluded that the illegal strikes committed by the Union members constituted serious misconduct.[72]
The CA ratiocinated in this manner:
Neither can
social justice justify the award to them of severance compensation or any other
form of financial assistance. x x x
x x x x
Considering
that the dismissal of the employees was due to their participation in the
illegal strikes as well as violation of the Code of Conduct of the company, the
same constitutes serious misconduct. A serious misconduct is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. In fact, in Panay
Electric Company, Inc. v. NLRC, the Supreme Court nullified the grant
of separation benefits to employees who unlawfully participated in an illegal
strike in light of Article 264, Title VIII, Book V of the Labor Code, that, “any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.”
The
constitutional guarantee on social justice is not intended only for the poor
but for the rich as well. It is a policy
of fairness to both labor and management.[73]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In disposing of the
The CA’s grant of separation pay is an erroneous
departure from our ruling in Phil. Long Distance
Telephone Co. v. NLRC that serious misconduct forecloses the award of
separation pay. Secondly, the advertence
to the alleged honest belief on the part of the 227 employees that
A painstaking review of case law renders obtuse the
One last point to consider—it is high time that employer and employee cease to view each other as adversaries and instead recognize that theirs is a symbiotic relationship, wherein they must rely on each other to ensure the success of the business. When they consider only their own self-interests, and when they act only with their own benefit in mind, both parties suffer from short-sightedness, failing to realize that they both have a stake in the business. The employer wants the business to succeed, considering the investment that has been made. The employee in turn, also wants the business to succeed, as continued employment means a living, and the chance to better one’s lot in life. It is clear then that they both have the same goal, even if the benefit that results may be greater for one party than the other. If this becomes a source of conflict, there are various, more amicable means of settling disputes and of balancing interests that do not add fuel to the fire, and instead open avenues for understanding and cooperation between the employer and the employee. Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining tools, it is an antiquated notion that they are truly beneficial, as they only provide short-term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would damage the working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering the business that they both want to succeed. The more progressive and truly effective means of dispute resolution lies in mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which do not increase tension but instead provide relief from them. In the end, an atmosphere of trust and understanding has much more to offer a business relationship than the traditional enmity that has long divided the employer and the employee.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 158786 and 158789 are DENIED while those in G.R. Nos. 158798-99 are GRANTED.
The June 20, 2003 CA Resolution in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67100 and 67561 restoring the grant of severance compensation is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The February 27, 2003 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
67100 and 67561, which affirmed the
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789), pp. 74-94. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Danilo B. Pine.
[2]
[3]
[4] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158798-99), pp. 41-44.
[5] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158786 and 158789), p. 18.
[6]
[7] Supra note 1, at 75.
[8]
[9] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158798-99), pp. 154 & 190.
[10] Supra note 1, at 77.
[11] Supra note 2, at 106.
[12] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158798-99), pp. 308-309;
NLRC Records, Volume II,
[13]
[14] Supra note 2, at 107.
[15]
1. Aclan, Eugenio; 2. Agosto, Joel; 3. Agot, Rodelio; 4. Alarana,
Edwin; 5. Alejo, Alex; 6. Alfonso, Erwin; 7. Apolinario, Dennis; 8. Apostol,
Melvin; 9. Arceta, Romel; 10. Arellano, Ruel; 11. Ariate, Abraham; 12.
Arollado, Daniel; 13. Arriola, Dominador; 14. Atun, Lester; 15. Bala, Rizalino; 16. Baluyut,
Rolando; 17. Banzuela, Tirso Jr.; 18. Bayani, Roderick; 19. Benabise, Sabas
Jr.; 20. Berces, Abel; 21. Bering, Benny; 22. Birondo, Alberto; 23. Blanco,
Melchor; 24. Bolanos, Dexter; 25. Bolocon, Jerry; 26. Borebor, Rurel; 27.
Borromeo, Jubert; 28. Borsigue, Antonio; 29. Bulan, Elmer; 30. Busano, Freddie;
31. Bustillo, Ernesto Jr.; 32. Caalim, Alexander; 33. Cabahug, Nelson; 34.
Cabatay, Jessie; 35. Cabezas, Marcelo; 36. Calalang, Richard; 37.
Candelario, Roque Jr.; 38. Capate, Leo Nelson; 39. Carandang, Resty; 40.
Caraqueo, Lorenzo; 41. Caringal, Dennis; 42. Casaba, Gienell; 43. Catapusan,
Christopher; 44. Catral, Rico; 45. Cecilio, Felipe; 46. Cinense, Joey; 47. Cometa,
Julius; 48. Completo, Emilio; 49. Consignado, Randy; 50. Coral, Jay Antonio;
51. Correa, Claudio Jr.; 52. Cuevas,
Reynaldo; 53. Dacalcap, Albert; 54. Dakay, Ryan; 55. Dalanon, Herbert; 56.
Dalisay, Rene; 57. David, Benigno Jr.; 58. De Guzman, Joey; 59. Dela Cruz, Basilio; 60. Dela
Cruz, Ferdinand; 61. Dela Torre, Heremo; 62. De Leon, Leonardo; 63. Delos
Santos, Rogelio; 64. De Ocampo, Joselito; 65. De Silva, Leodegario; 66. Del
Mundo, Alex; 67. Del Rio, Rey; 68. Dela Ysla, Alex; 69. Dia, Frank Manuel; 70.
Dimayuga, Antonio; 71. Dingcong, Jessiah; 72. Dumalag, Jasper; 73. Duyag,
Aldrin; 74. Ercillo, Armando; 75. Espadilla, Delmar; 76. Espejo, Lionel; 77.
Espeloa, Dennis; 78. Esteva, Alexander; 79. Estole, Francisco; 80. Fajardo,
George; 81. Fajilagutan, Jason; 82. Fajura, John; 83. Franco, Melencio; 84. Franco,
Nikko; 85. Fulgar, Dexter; 86. Fulo, Dante; 87. Gado, Eduardo; 88. Galang,
Erwin; 89. Gamit, Rodel; 90. Garces, Robin; 91. Garcia, Ariel; 92. Gaspi,
Ronald; 93. Gavarra, Angelo; 94. Gerola, Genaro Jr.; 95. Gerola, Larry; 96.
Gohilde, Michael; 97. Gojar, Regino; 98. Gojar, Reynaldo; 99. Gonzales,
Roberto; 100. Gutierrez, Bernabe; 101. Hilaga, Edgar; 102. Hilanga, Melchor;
103. Hondrada, Eugene Jay; 104. Imperial, Alejandro; 105. Jaen, Ferdinand; 106.
Jalea, Philip; 107. Javillonar, Joey; 108. Julve, Frederick; 109. Lalisan,
Victorio; 110. Landicho, Danny; 111. Laqui, Basilio; 112. Lavide, Edgar; 113.
Lazaro, Orlando; 114. Legaspi, Noel; 115. Lising, Reynaldo Jr.; 116. Llanera,
Joey; 117. Lomboy, Alberto; 118. Lopez, Geronimo; 119. Lozada, Jude Jonobell;
120. Lucido, Johny; 121. Macalindong, Rommel; 122. Madrazo, Nixon; 123.
Magbalita, Valentin; 124. Magistrado, Rogelio Jr.; 125. Magnaye, Philip John;
126. Malabanan, Allan John; 127. Malabrigo, Angelito; 128. Malaluan, Rolando
Jr.; 129. Malate, Leoncio Jr.; 130. Maleon, Paulino; 131. Manaig, Roger; 132. Manalang,
Joseph Patrick; 133. Manalo, Manuel Jr.; 134. Manaog, Jonamar; 135. Manaog,
Melchor; 136. Mandolado, Melvin; 137. Maneclang, Jovito; 138. Manego, Ruel;
139. Manguil, Bayani Jr.; 140. Manigbas, June; 141. Manjares, Alfred; 142.
Manzanilla, Edwin; 143. Marasigan, Carlito; 144. Marcial, Nilo; 145. Mariano,
Rommel; 146. Mata, Mayo; 147. Mendoza, Bobit; 148. Mendoza, Roberto; 149.
Milan, Joseph; 150. Miranda, Eduardo; 151. Miranda, Luis; 152. Montero,
Ericson; 153. Montero, Marlaw; 154. Montes, Ruel; 155. Morales, Dennis; 156.
Natividad, Kenneth; 157. Nava, Ronaldo; 158. Nevalga, Alexander; 159. Nicanor,
Edwin; 160. Nierves, Roderick; 161. Nunez, Alex; 162. Nunez, Lolito; 163. Obe,
Victor; 164. Oclarino, Alfonso; 165. Ojenal, Leo; 166. Olit, Freddie; 167. Oliver, Rex;
168. Oliveria, Charlie; 169. Operana, Danny; 170. Oriana, Allan; 171. Ormilla,
Larry; 172. Ortiz, Felimon; 173. Paniterce, Alvin; 174. Parallag, Gerald; 175.
Pecayo, Edwin; 176. Pena, Erwin; 177. Penamante, Jowald; 178. Piamonte, Melvin;
179. Piamonte, Rogelio; 180. Platon, Cornelio; 181. Polutan, Jorge; 182. Posada,
John; 183. Puno, Manjolito; 184. Ramos, Eddie; 185. Reyes, Rolando; 186. Roxas, Philip; 187. Sales, Paul Arthur; 188. Sallan,
David Jr.; 189.
[16] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158798-99), p. 334; NLRC Records Certified Case No. 000203-01, Volume II, Toyota’s Position Paper, Annex “U-1.”
[17]
[18] Supra note 1, at 78.
[19]
[20] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158798-99), pp. 371-374.
[21] The parties’ names in boldface were already included in the list containing the 227 dismissed employees.
[22] Supra note 2, at 122-123.
[23] Supra note 3.
[24] Supra note 2.
[25] Supra note 1.
[26] G.R.
No. 102672,
[27] Supra note 1, at 91-92.
[28] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158786 and 158789), pp. 96-99.
[29] G.R. No. 169091, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 562, 568; citing Villaluz v. Ligon, G.R. No. 143721, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 486, 501.
[30] Chua
v. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA 358, 365; citing
Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634,
July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 463; Bank
of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 450 Phil. 532, 540 (2003); Shipside
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352
SCRA 334, 346.
[31] Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 463; citations omitted.
[32] G.R.
No. 139396,
[34] L-31195,
[35] Labor Code, Art. 212.
DEFINITIONS.
[36]
G.R. No. 124678,
[37] Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 164302-03, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 437, 453-454; citations omitted.
[38] Supra note 3, at 129-130.
[39] The
[40] Supra note 37, at 456; citing Piñero v. NLRC, G.R. No. 149610, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 112.
[41] Stamford Marketing Corp. v. Julian, G.R. No. 145496, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 633, 647; citing Lapanday Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 95494-97, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 95, 104.
[42] Supra note 20, at 373.
[46] Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120505, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 219, 230.
[53] Supra note 33, at 622.
[54] National Brewery and Allied Industries Labor
Union v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., No.
[57] Rollo (G.R Nos. 158798-99), pp. 338-348; NLRC Records, Certified Case No. 000203-01, Volume II, Toyota’s Position Paper, Annexes “1,” “3,” “4,” “5,” “6,” “11,” “14,” “15,” “16,” and “18.”
[61]
[62]
[63] Id. at 500-513; Volume VII, Toyota’s Manifestation, Annexes “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “F,” “G,” “H,” “I,” “J,” “K,” “L,” “M,” and “N.”
[64] Id. at 521-530 & 535-541; Annexes “V,” “W,” “X,” “Y,” and “Z,” and “AA,” “BB,” “CC,” “DD,” “HH,” “II,” “JJ,” “KK,” “LL,” “MM,” “NN,” and “OO.”
[65] Labor Code, Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book VI, Sec. 7.
[66] No.
L-80609,
[67]
[68]
G.R. No. 147719,
[69] G.R.
No. 149013,
[70]
G.R. No. 149629,
[71]
G.R. Nos. 143136-37,
[74] G.R.
Nos. 160058 & 160094,
[75]
G.R. No. 150437,
[76]
G.R. No. 158075,
[77]
G.R. No. 140992,
[78]
G.R. Nos. 153664 and 153665,
[79]
WHEREFORE, the respondents’ appeal is hereby dismissed. The complainant Hotel is however urged, on humanitarian consideration, to pay the respondents a [sic] financial assistance computed at one month pay for every year of service.
[80]
G.R. No. 142824,
[81]
G.R. Nos. 114521 and 123491,
[82]
G.R. No. 116128,
[83]
G.R. No. 105775,