LAND BANK OF THE
Petitioner, - versus - FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, Represented by his
Assignee, JOSEFINA LUBRICA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 157903 Present: pUNO, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Amended
Decision[1] dated
February 5, 2003 and Resolution dated April 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70015, entitled “Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner, versus
Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, in his capacity as Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 46,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; Federico C. Suntay, represented by his assignee,
Josefina Lubrica; Department of Agrarian Reform; and Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator Conchita C. Miñas, respondents.”
The facts are:
Federico Suntay (married to Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay), herein
respondent, represented by his assignee, Josefina Lubrica, is the registered
owner of a parcel of land with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares situated in Sta.
Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-31 of the Registry of Deeds of Mamburao, same province.
Sometime
in 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), pursuant to the government’s
land reform program under Presidential Decree No. 27,[2] expropriated
948.1911 hectares of respondent’s property. The portion expropriated consisted mostly of
lowland and non-irrigated riceland.
The Land Bank of the P4,251,141.68 or P4,497.50
per hectare.
Respondent rejected petitioner’s
valuation as being unconscionably low and tantamount to taking his property
without due process. He then filed with
the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), Region IV,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), a petition for the
determination of just compensation against petitioner
and the DAR, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00.
On P157,541,951.30 and directing
petitioner to pay respondent the said amount.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the RARAD in an Order dated
On P4,251,141.67
only.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition mainly on
the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by
Section 11,[5] Rule
XIII of the New Rules of Procedure of DARAB. Hence, the RARAD Decision had attained
finality.
Meanwhile,
on
Going back to Agrarian Case No. R-1241 before the RTC, Executive
Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan issued an Order[6] dated
Thus, on
On
SECTION 60. Appeals. – An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision; otherwise the decision shall become final.
x x
x.
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated
This prompted
petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 70015, now subject of the instant case. Petitioner alleged that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing its notice of appeal; and that decisions or final orders of the RTCs,
acting as Special Agrarian Courts, are not appealable to the Court of Appeals
through a petition for review but through a mere notice of appeal.
On July 19, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[8] (1) granting the petition for certiorari; (2) nullifying the RTC Orders
dated January 18, 2002 and March 08, 2002 dismissing petitioner’s Notice of Appeal;
(3) entering a new judgment giving due course to petitioner’s
notice of appeal; and (4) enjoining permanently the RTC from enforcing its twin
Orders, as well as the RARAD from enforcing the writ of execution issued in
DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00.
Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration maintaining that petitioner
resorted to a wrong mode of appeal; hence, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its notice
of appeal. Respondent cited this
Court’s Decision dated
Finding merit in respondent’s motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the present Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The
injunction issued by this Court enjoining (a) respondent Executive Judge from
enforcing his Orders dated
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution[11] dated
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in applying our ruling in Arlene De
Leon since it has not yet become final and executory, and in affirming the RTC
Order of
Meanwhile, on
The crucial issue
for our resolution is whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank’s petition
for the determination of just compensation.
It is clear that the RTC treated the petition for the determination
of just compensation as an appeal
from the RARAD Decision in DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00. In dismissing the petition for being filed
out of time, the RTC relied on Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure which provides:
Section
11. Land Valuation and Preliminary
Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. – The decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board [Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)] but shall be brought directly to the Regional
Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion
for reconsideration.
The RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank’s petition. It bears stressing that the petition is not an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination of the just compensation for
respondent’s expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. This is clear from Section 57 of R.A. No.
6657 which provides:
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts [the designated
Regional Trial Courts] shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act. The Rules of Court
shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless
modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all
appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.
(Underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, the above provision is not in conflict
with Section 50 of the same R.A. No. 6657 which states:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,[13] we held
that Section 50 must be construed in harmony with Section 57 by considering
cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for
violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted
from the plenitude of power conferred upon the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this
distinction. The DAR is an
administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of
eminent domain (such as taking of land under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal
cases. Thus, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,[14] Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay[15] and Sumulong
v. Guerrero,[16] we held that the valuation of property
in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. Also, in Scoty’s
Department Store, et al. v. Micaller,[17] we struck down a law granting the then
Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations
of the Industrial Peace Act.[18]
The
procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657,
as summarized in Landbank of the
Philippines v. Banal,[19] is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to
be paid for their taking under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition
arrangement.[20] The DAR, relying on the Land Bank’s determination
of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer through a notice
sent to the landowner.[21] If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land
Bank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of
the government.[22] In case the landowner rejects the offer or
fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator[23]
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties
to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land.[24] A party who disagrees with the Decision of
the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a
The
formula in determining the just compensation of the expropriated property, as
laid down in Landbank of the Philippines
v. Banal,[27] is as
follows:
CNI
= Capitalized Net Income
CS
= Comparable Sales
MV
= Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the
three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When
the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall
be:
A.2 When
the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall
be:
A.3 When
both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula
shall be:
x x x the determination of just compensation
involves the examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of
R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax
declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property; and
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, if any.
Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be
established only during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their
respective evidence. In fact, to
underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land,
Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.
In the
instant case, the Land Bank properly instituted its petition for the
determination of just compensation before the RTC in accordance with R.A. No.
6657. The RTC erred in dismissing the
petition. To repeat, Section 57 of R.A.
No. 6657 is explicit in vesting the RTC, acting as a
x x x. It would
subvert this “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to
vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials
and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules [Section
11, Rule XIII of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure] speak of directly appealing
the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it
is clear from Section 57 that the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to
the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would be
void. What adjudicators are
empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable
compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power
to decide this question. (Underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari. The assailed Amended Decision dated
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, Rollo, pp. 28-32.
[2] Decreeing The Emancipation of Tenants from
the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They
Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor.
[3] This bank is a government financial institution organized and existing by virtue of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. It is one of the government agencies or instrumentalities implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) instituted by Republic Act No. 6657, and the designated financial intermediary and custodian of the Agrarian Reform Fund.
[4] Rollo, pp. 174-186.
[5] Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. – The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)] but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
[6] Rollo,
pp. 203-205.
[7]
[8] Annex “G,” Petition, id., pp. 70, 78-79.
[9] G.R. No. 143275,
[10] Annex “A,” Petition, Rollo, pp. 26, 31.
[11] Annex “B,” id., pp. 33-35.
[12] Rollo, p. 592.
[13] 331 Phil. 1070, 1074-1075 (1996).
[14] G.R. No. 164876,
[15] No. L-59603,
[16] No. L-48685,
[17] 99 Phil. 762 (1956).
[18] Cited in Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra,
footnote 13, pp. 1075-1076.
[19] G.R. No. 143276,
[20] Sec. 1, Executive Order No. 405 dated
[21] Sec. 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, as amended.
[22] Sec. 16(c), id.
[23] The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) and the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), depending on the value of the land within their respective territorial jurisdiction (Sec. 2, Rule II, DARAB Rules of Procedure).
[24] Sec. 16(d), of R.A. No. 6657, as amended.
[25] Sec. 56, id.
[26] Sec. 16(f), in relation to Sec. 57, id.
[27] G.R. No. 143276,
[28] Supra,
footnote 13, pp. 1077-1078. See also Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, supra, footnote 14, p. 504; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126332, November 16, 1999, 318 SCRA 144, 154.
[29] Supra,
footnote 19.