Republic of the
Supreme Court
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G.R. No.
157775 |
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COOPERATIVE,
INC., |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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LEYECO IV
Employees |
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ALU, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent.* |
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October 19, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution[1] dated
September 4, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 72336 which
dismissed outright petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for adopting a
wrong mode of appeal and the CA Resolution[2] dated
February 28, 2003 which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts:
On
On
On
After exhausting the procedures of
the grievance machinery, the parties agreed to submit the issues of the
interpretation and implementation of Section 2, Article VIII of the CBA on the
payment of holiday pay, for arbitration of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Office No. VIII in
While admitting in its Position Paper[7] that the employees were paid all of the days
of the month even if there was no work, respondent alleged that it is not
prevented from making separate demands for the payment of regular holidays
concomitant with the provisions of the CBA, with its supporting documents
consisting of a letter demanding payment of holiday pay, petitioner's reply
thereto and respondent's rejoinder, a computation in the amount of P1,054,393.07
for the unpaid legal holidays, and several pay slips.
Petitioner, on the other hand, in its
Position Paper,[8] insisted
payment of the holiday pay in compliance with the CBA provisions, stating that
payment was presumed since the formula used in determining the daily rate of
pay of the covered employees is Basic Monthly Salary divided by 30 days or
Basic Monthly Salary multiplied by 12 divided by 360 days, thus with said
formula, the employees are already paid their regular and special days, the
days when no work is done, the 51 un-worked Sundays and the 51 un-worked
Saturdays.
On P1,054,393.07. He reasoned that petitioner miserably failed
to show that it complied with the CBA mandate that holiday pay be “reflected
during any payroll period of occurrence” since the payroll slips did not
reflect any payment of the paid holidays.
He found unacceptable not only petitioner's presumption of payment of holiday
pay based on a formula used in determining and computing the daily rate of each
covered employee, but also petitioner's further submission that the rate of its
employees is not less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days
and divided by twelve.
On
Thirty days later, or on July 27,
2002,[13]
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[14] in the
CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction to
the Voluntary Arbitrator: (a) for ignoring that in said company the divisor for
computing the applicable daily rate of rank-and-file employees is 360 days
which already includes payment of 13 un-worked regular holidays under Section
2, Article VIII of the CBA;[15] and (b)
for holding the petitioner liable for the unpaid holidays just because the
payroll slips submitted as evidence did not show any payment for the regular
holidays.[16]
In a Resolution[17] dated
Considering that what is assailed in the present
recourse is a Decision of a Voluntary Arbitrator, the proper remedy is a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence,
the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed on August 15, 2002,
should be rejected, as such a petition cannot be a substitute for a lost
appeal. And in this case, the period for appeal via a petition for review has
already lapsed since the petitioner received a copy of the Resolution denying
its motion for reconsideration on
x x x
x[18]
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[19]
but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution[20] dated
Hence, the present petition anchored
on the following grounds:
(1) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by herein petitioner to assail the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator.[21]
(2) Even if decisions of voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators are appealable to the Honorable Court of Appeals under Rule 43, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is still available if it is grounded on grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by herein petitioner.[22]
(3) The
Honorable Court of Appeals erred in refusing to rule on the legal issue
presented by herein petitioner in the petition for certiorari that it had filed
and in putting emphasis instead on a technicality of procedure. The legal issues needs a clear-cut ruling by
this Honorable Court for the guidance of herein petitioner and private
respondent.[23]
Petitioner contends that Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is the applicable mode of appeal to the CA from judgments
issued by a voluntary arbitrator since Rule 43 only allows appeal from
judgments of particular quasi-judicial agencies and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law and not those judgments and orders issued under the Labor
Code; that the petition before the CA did not raise issues of fact but was
founded on jurisdictional issues and, therefore, reviewable
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65; that
technicalities of law and procedure should not be utilized to subvert the ends
of substantial justice.
In its Comment,[24]
respondent avers that Luzon Development Bank
v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees[25] laid
down the prevailing rule that judgments of the Voluntary Arbitrator are appealable to the CA under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court; that having failed to file the appropriate remedy due to the lapse of
the appeal period, petitioner cannot simply invoke Rule 65 for its own
convenience, as an alternative remedy.
In its Reply,[26]
petitioner submits that the ruling in Luzon Development
Bank does not expressly exclude the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail a decision
of a voluntary arbitrator. It reiterates
that technicalities of law and procedure should not be utilized to subvert the
ends of substantial justice.
It has long been settled in the
landmark case Luzon Development Bank that a voluntary arbitrator, whether
acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial
agency; hence, his decisions and awards are appealable
to the CA. This is so because the awards
of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory
upon the lapse of the period to appeal;[27] and
since their awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions have the
same effect as judgments of a court.
Therefore, the proper remedy from an award of a voluntary arbitrator is
a petition for review to the CA, following Revised Administrative Circular No.
1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for appellate review of all adjudications
of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Section 1, Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
SECTION 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
Section
2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 2. Cases not
covered. - This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the
did not alter the Court's ruling in Luzon
Development Bank. Section 2, Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is nothing more than a reiteration of the
exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA,[29] as
provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[30] as
amended by Republic Act No. 7902:[31]
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees’ Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development Bank but,
nevertheless, held that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued pursuant
to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit, thus:
x x x. The fact that [the voluntary arbitrator’s] functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees’ Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.[32]
This ruling has been repeatedly reiterated in subsequent
cases[33] and
continues to be the controlling
doctrine. Thus, the general rule is that
the proper remedy from decisions of voluntary arbitrators is a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy
for one who complains that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions acted in total disregard
of evidence material to or decisive
of the controversy.[34] As this
Court elucidated in Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission[35]
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[I]n Ong v. People, we ruled that certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings complained of are not supported by the evidence on record. Earlier, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized thus:
[I]t has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court
of justice in certiorari proceedings. The cases in
which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so would be to
destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion
of the court that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or
mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over inferior courts,
we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case “as the
ends of justice may require.” So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or
to do substantial justice. [36]
In addition, while the settled rule is that an independent
action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[37] and certiorari is not a substitute
for the lapsed remedy of appeal,[38] there
are a few significant exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite
the availability of an appeal, namely: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests
of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[39]
In this case, while the petition was filed on
The Voluntary Arbitrator gravely
abused its discretion in giving a strict or literal interpretation of the CBA
provisions that the holiday pay be reflected in the payroll slips. Such literal
interpretation ignores the admission of respondent in its
Position Paper[41] that the
employees were paid all the days of the month even if not worked. In light of such admission, petitioner's submission
of its 360 divisor in the computation of employees’ salaries gains
significance.
In
In
In Producers Bank,[48]
the employer used the divisor 314 in arriving at the daily wage rate of monthly
salaried employees. The divisor 314 was
arrived at by subtracting all Sundays from the total number of calendar days in
a year, since Saturdays are considered paid rest days. The Court held that the use of 314 as a
divisor leads to the inevitable conclusion that the ten legal holidays are
already included therein.
In Odango v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[49] the
Court ruled that the use of a divisor that was less than 365 days cannot make
the employer automatically liable for underpayment of holiday pay. In said case, the employees were required to
work only from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. Thus, the minimum allowable divisor is 287,
which is the result of 365 days, less 52 Sundays and less 26 Saturdays (or 52
half Saturdays). Any divisor below 287
days meant that the employees were deprived of their holiday pay for some or
all of the ten legal holidays. The 304-day
divisor used by the employer was clearly above the minimum of 287 days.
In this case, the employees are required to work only from
Monday to Friday. Thus, the minimum
allowable divisor is 263, which is arrived at by
deducting 51 un-worked Sundays and 51 un-worked Saturdays from 365 days. Considering that petitioner used the 360-day
divisor, which is clearly above the minimum, indubitably, petitioner's
employees are being given their holiday pay.
Thus, the Voluntary Arbitrator should
not have simply brushed aside petitioner's divisor formula. In granting respondent's claim of non-payment
of holiday pay, a “double burden” was imposed upon petitioner because it was
being made to pay twice for its employees' holiday pay when payment thereof had
already been included in the computation of their monthly salaries. Moreover, it is absurd to grant respondent's
claim of non-payment when they in fact admitted that they were being paid all
of the days of the month even if not worked.
By granting respondent's claim, the Voluntary Arbitrator sanctioned unjust enrichment in favor of the respondent
and caused unjust financial burden to the petitioner. Obviously, the Court cannot allow this.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice[50]
and the protection of the working class,[51]
it should not be supposed that every labor dispute would automatically be
decided in favor of labor. Management also has it own rights which, as such,
are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has inclined more often
than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice
is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.[52]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
* The present petition impleaded the Court of Appeals as respondent. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the name of the Court of Appeals is deleted from the title.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (now deceased) and concurred in by Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired) and Amelita G. Tolentino, CA rollo, p. 55.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, p. 18.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] CA rollo, p. 38.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] CA rollo, p. 4. Envelope
showing date of posting by registered mail on
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Supra note 1.
[18]
[19]
[20] Supra note 2.
[21] CA rollo, p. 19.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] G.R. No. 120319,
[26] Rollo, p. 123.
[27] Supra note 22 at 168, citing Volkschel Labor Union v. National Labor Relations
Commission, No. L-39686,
[28] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43, Sec. 1.
[29] Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143397, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 370, 379.
[30] An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
[31] An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, Amending for the Purpose Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as Amended, Known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
[32] Supra note 23, at 170-171.
[33] See Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allied Workers Union-Independent v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165486, May 31, 2006, 490 SCRA 61; Nippon Paint Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159010, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 286; Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[34] Maraguinot,
Jr. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 348 Phil. 580; 284 SCRA 539 (1998): Sajonas
v. National Labor Relations Commission,, G.R. No. 49286,
[35] G.R. No. 147427,
[36] Supra note 35, at 548-549.
[37] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
[38] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 127.
[39] Madriaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142001, July 14, 2005; Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004; Heirs of Lourdes Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 196, 204 (2004); Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. JANCOM Environmental Corp., 425 Phil. 961, 974 (2002); Uy Chua v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 17, 30 (2000).
[40] CA rollo, p. 4.
[41]
[42] G.R. No. 79255,
[43] G.R. No. 114698,
[44] G.R. No. 100701,
[45] G. R. No. 147420,
[46] See Trans-Asia Phils. Employees
Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 118289,
[47] Supra note 43.
[48] Supra note 44.
[49] Supra note 45.
[50] 1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 10.
[51] 1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 18.
[52] Lawin Security Services, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 330
(1997); Sosito v. Aguinaldo
Development Corporation, No. L-48926,