FIRST DIVISION
RAMMEL MONARES ANILAO G.R. No. 149681
alias JOJO,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
-
versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA,
JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent.
X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 19995 promulgated on
In its decision, the CA affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat dated
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was charged with the crime
of Frustrated Murder in an Information which reads:
That in the evening of January 15, 1994, at Purok Pagkaisa, Barangay Saliao, Municipality of Esperanza, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a bladed instrument, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one RONALD APUD with the use of the aforementioned weapon, thereby inflicting stab wound upon the latter, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produce[d] the crime of murder as a consequence thereof but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the victim which prevented his death.
CONTRARY
TO LAW, particularly Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code of the
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
At the
trial, the prosecution presented private complainant Ronald Apud, who narrated
the following:[3]
On
January 15, 1994, at around 8:45 p.m., private complainant Ronald Apud, a
resident of Banaba, Ampatuan, Maguindanao, was riding on his bicycle on the way
to the house of his brother at Purok Masagan, Saliao, Esperanza, Sultan
Kudarat, when he met along the way petitioner Rammel Anilao alias “Jojo” with a
companion. He allegedly heard petitioner
tell his companion, “Ara si Nonoy
Apud, birahan ta” (Here comes Nonoy Apud, we will hit him). The companion, however, replied that it was
not Nonoy Apud.
Private
complainant then proceeded about twenty meters farther but decided to return to
the dance hall and look for his brother, Efren Apud alias “Nonoy,” to warn him
of what he heard from the two men. On
his way back, he had to pass by petitioner and his companion again. However, private complainant did not find his
brother so he decided to go home to the house of his other brother, Antonio
Apud, where he would sleep that night.
Private
complainant biked until he reached the junction, near the Notre Dame
Cooperative store, where petitioner allegedly grabbed the steering wheel of his
bicycle and pulled it toward the right side.
Petitioner then stabbed private complainant on the upper right side of
his waist towards the back causing him to fall on the ground. Thereafter, petitioner fled.
After
a while, Efren Apud alias “Nonoy” arrived and brought private complainant to
the house of his uncle, Julian Apud.
They then brought private complainant to the clinic of Dr. Jesus
Galapate where he stayed for about five hours until he was referred to another
clinic due to lack of facilities and for further treatment. Private complainant
was brought to the clinic of Dr. Quijano where he was operated on by Dr. Estanislao
Duque.
Nine days after the incident or on
Q And while you were in the house of your
uncle in company with your brother Antonio, what happened there?
A When we were there, sir, a tricycle
passed by and a certain passenger was there and I asked my brother who was
that and he told me that it is Jojo
Anilao, sir, and I told him he was the one who stabbed me.
Q This brother whom you asked is Antonio
Apud?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q Why did you ask your brother about the
identity of the passenger of the tricycle? Does that mean that you did not recognize the
person who allegedly stabbed you?
A I don’t know his name, Your Honor, but only I could recognize his face because he actually passed the house of my uncle because I always stayed there in the house of my uncle.[4]
The other prosecution witnesses were Psyche
Faith Apud, Arnie Lanado and Dr. Jesus Galapate.
Dr. Galapate
testified that he treated private complainant for a stab wound on his right
lumbar area, posterior aspect, and that the wound sustained was serious and
could have caused the death of private complainant. He identified the medical certificate he
issued in favor of private complainant.
Petitioner
had a different version of the incident.
He alleged that it was private complainant who suddenly bumped him with
his bicycle, hitting him on the left leg.
He then held the steering wheel of the bicycle, but private complainant was
able to lift the bicycle and thrust it on him, allegedly hitting him on his
chest. This prompted him to step backward and box private complainant, causing
the latter to move backward. While they
were allegedly pulling the bicycle against each other, a certain Joe approached
private complainant, boxed him and finally stabbed him on his right back
portion and then fled.
The trial
court did not give credence to the defense of petitioner. It held that since
the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery
were not duly proven, petitioner was not guilty of frustrated
murder but of the lower offense of frustrated homicide. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises above-considered,
the Court finds the accused, Rammel Monares Anilao alias Jojo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide.
Accordingly,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the
accused, Rammel Monares Anilao alias Jojo, to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment, ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of
prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the private offended victim, Ronald Apud
alias Bingbing:
(a)
the total amount of P24,541.50 as actual
damages, by way of actual expenses incurred by the latter for his hospitalization
arising from the stab wounds inflicted on him by the accused;
(b)
the amount of P6,000.00 as moral damages;
(c)
the amount of P4,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to
pay the costs of suit.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.[5]
On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in a Decision promulgated on
Hence,
this petition.
The assigned errors are:
1. The
Honorable Court of Appeals failed to apply the Equipoise Doctrine which arises
from the presumption of innocence and the required quantum of evidence which is
that of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The
Honorable Court of Appeals never considered the brief submitted by the private
counsel of petitioner which is tantamount to violation of the right of due
process.
3. The
Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts of substance which if
considered may result in petitioner’s acquittal.[6]
Petitioner
argues that the CA failed to apply the equipoise rule that where the evidence
in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused, citing People v. Lagmay.[7]
Petitioner
contends that the location of the wound and the position of petitioner in
relation to the victim, and the presence of another assailant belie the claim
of the prosecution that petitioner stabbed the victim. Besides, one of the witnesses of the
prosecution categorically testified that petitioner only boxed the victim. In
addition, petitioner never fled the scene of the crime, which fact supports his
innocence. The victim himself vacillated
by saying that his only reason for pointing at petitioner was that “he is the
one who blocked me.”[8]
The material
facts stated above were raised in the Appellant’s Brief of petitioner, but
evidently they were not considered. Such
inadvertence on the part of the CA amounts to denial of due process.
Petitioner
contends that since the evidence presented does not create moral certainty as
to his guilt, he should be acquitted.
Petitioner’s arguments are without merit.
Petitioner
admits his presence at the scene of the crime, but denies having committed the
crime of Frustrated Homicide and points to someone named Joe as the one who
stabbed private complainant.
Mere
denial by an accused, particularly when not properly corroborated or
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[9] Denial partakes of the nature of negative and
self-serving evidence and is seldom given weight in law.[10] Positive and forthright declarations of
witnesses are often held to be worthier of credence than the self-serving
denial of an accused.[11]
The
Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the location
of the wound of private complainant does not negate the fact that petitioner
was the offender. Aside from private complainant, eyewitnesses Psyche Faith Apud
and Arnie Lanado testified that petitioner was the culprit, and the relative
positions of private complainant and petitioner did not render it impossible
for petitioner to have stabbed the victim.[12]
Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter
prevails over a denial.[13]
As
stated by the OSG, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner in challenging the narration of private
complainant are minor points which cannot overcome the straightforward
testimonies of private complainant, Psyche
Faith Apud and Arnie Lanado who did not have any ulterior motive in testifying
that petitioner was the perpetrator of the offense.
The
trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses is accorded great
respect and finality in the absence of any indication that it overlooked
certain facts or circumstances of weight and influence, which if reconsidered,
would alter the result of the case.[14]
The
Court has reviewed the records of the case and found no cogent reason to alter
the conclusions of the trial court and the CA.
Contrary
to petitioner’s contention, the CA considered the Appellant’s Brief filed by
petitioner’s private counsel in addition to the one filed by the Public
Attorney’s Office. The CA denied
respondent’s motion to expunge the Appellant’s Brief filed by petitioner’s
private counsel as evidenced by the Resolution promulgated on
The
trial court, therefore, correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.[16] A felony is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.[17]
Frustrated Homicide carries with it the
penalty of prision mayor.[18] Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty is an indeterminate
prison term ranging from six months and one day to six years of prision
correccional, as minimum, and eight years and one day to ten years of prision
mayor, as maximum. The maximum term
of the indeterminate penalty is imposed in the medium period since there is no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offense.
The Court
upholds the award of moral damages by the trial court in accordance with par.
1, Art. 2219 of the Civil Code which provides that moral damages may be
recovered where a criminal offense resulted in physical injuries, as in the
present case.
However,
the Court finds that the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P4,000 has no basis.
Art. 2230 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n criminal offenses, exemplary
damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.” In this case, the trial court held that that
no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance was established in the commission of
the crime; hence, the award of exemplary damages by the trial court should be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CR No. 19995 promulgated on P24,541.50), and moral damages in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000).
No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] CA Rollo, p. 5.
[3] Rollo, pp. 17-19.
[4] RTC
Judgment, CA Rollo, pp. 13-14. Emphasis
supplied.
[5]
[6] Rollo, p. 7.
[7] G.R. No. 125310,
[8] TSN,
[9] People v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 125311,
[10] Ibid.
[11]
[12] RTC Judgment, CA Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[13] People
v. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 &
94312,
[14] People
v. Realin, G.R. No. 126051,
[15] CA Rollo, p. 169.
[16] Art. 249. Homicide.— Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
[17] Art. 6, Revised Penal Code.
[18] Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.